{ "id": 4738127, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICKEY P. JOHNS, Appellee; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. TONY WALL, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johns", "decision_date": "1992-12-04", "docket_number": "Nos. 72263, 72264 cons.", "first_page": "436", "last_page": "449", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 436" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5352446 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 996", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614822 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1000" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141517 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106824 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494560 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074828 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134711 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069839 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493797 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254662 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130415 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591622 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278489 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "403" }, { "page": "403-06", "parenthetical": "Freeman, J., concurring, joined by Miller, C.J." }, { "page": "402-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2566040 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0711-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 880, "char_count": 22300, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.02439708592388e-07, "percentile": 0.7458095047240206 }, "sha256": "ba469f11a6e9499a795d440b850ea69a8558e32add706bd64585125427e4361c", "simhash": "1:bd28b09b7facbcfc", "word_count": 3629 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:53:24.153197+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICKEY P. JOHNS, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. TONY WALL, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, Rickey R Johns and Tony Wall, were charged by separate complaints with possession of certificates of title without complete assignment in violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 4 \u2014 104(aX2)). Prior to trial, defendants filed separate motions to declare section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1), the penalty provision of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), unconstitutional (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 4-104(aX2), (b)(1)). The trial court held that the penalty provision was violative of the due process and proportionate penalties clauses of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7\u00a72, 11), and dismissed the charges against defendants.\nFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\nDefendant Wall possessed certificates of title to a 1985 Chevrolet and a 1985 Oldsmobile. The certificates were issued by the Secretary of State of Michigan to persons other than defendant. On both certificates, the signed names of the persons designated on the face of the certificates as owners appear in the space provided for the signature of the \u201cSeller.\u201d The certificate for the Oldsmobile also bears the name and address of a \u201c1st Secured Party.\u201d Neither defendant Wall\u2019s name, address nor signature appears in the space provided on the certificates for information concerning the purchaser. Defendant Wall was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of salvage certificates of title without complete assignment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 4\u2014 104(aX2).\nDefendant Johns possessed a certificate of title to a 1978 Buick. The certif\u00edcate was issued by the Secretary of State of Illinois to a person other than defendant. The signed name of the person designated on the face of the certificate as \u201cOWNER(S)\u201d appears in the space provided for the signature of the \u201cSeller.\u201d Defendant\u2019s name does not appear in the space provided for \u201cSignature^) of Buyer(s).\u201d Defendant Johns was charged with one count of possession of a certificate of title without complete assignment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 4 \u2014 104(a)(2).\nPrior to trial, defendants filed separate motions to declare section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1), the penalty provision for a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), unconstitutional. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 4-104(a)(2), (b)(1).) Following the hearing on defendants\u2019 motions, the trial court stated that sections 4 \u2014 104(a)(1) and (a)(2) \u201ccould actually apply to people who have done nothing wrong. They haven\u2019t stolen the vehicle, they just didn\u2019t complete the paperwork.\u201d Further, the court considered the penalty for a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) in relation to penalties imposed for other offenses. The court stated that theft of a car valued at $300 was only a Class A misdemeanor, while a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) is a Class 4 felony. The court held the \u201cstatute\u201d unconstitutionally violative of the due process and proportional penalties clauses of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7\u00a72,11) and dismissed the complaints.\nThe State timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s order. In its motion, the State asserted that the appellate court\u2019s decision in People v. Tolliver (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 711, rev\u2019d (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 397, required reversal of the trial court\u2019s order. In reliance on the Tolliver opinion, the court reversed its order and held the penalty provision to be constitutional.\nHowever, after re-reading the appellate court opinion in Tolliver, 205 Ill. App. 3d 711, which held section 4\u2014 104(a)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad, the trial court, on its own motion, \u201creconsidered [the State\u2019s] motion to reconsider.\u201d The court again declared the provision to be constitutionally infirm and dismissed the complaints. Neither party objected to the court's sua sponte reconsideration.\nThe State brought this direct appeal as a matter of right pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603). We granted th\u00e9 State\u2019s motion to consolidate the two cases. We now reverse.\nDISCUSSION\nSection 4 \u2014 104 provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cOffenses relating to possession of titles and registration. (a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:\n2. A person to possess any manufacturers certificate of origin, salvage certificate, junking certificate, certificate of title, display certificate without complete assignment;\n(b) Sentence:\n1. A person convicted of a 'violation of subsection 1 or 2 of paragraph (a) of this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), (b)(1).)\nThe failure of a possessor of a certificate of title to fill in any portion of the document constitutes an incomplete assignment. (People v. Tolliver (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 397, 402.) Conviction of a Class 4 felony is punishable by a prison sentence of at least one year, but not more than three years (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014 1(a)(7)), and a fine not to exceed $10,000 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-9-l(a)(l)).\nThis court has once before considered the constitutionality of section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1). Recently, in People v. Gean (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 281, this court considered whether section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1) was unconstitutional because it authorizes felony penalties for a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), which does not expressly state a required mental state. In deciding the issue, the court necessarily determined whether a violation of section 4\u2014 104(a)(2) is an absolute liability offense. Concluding that a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) does not create absolute liability, the court determined that \u201cknowledge is the appropriate mental element.\u201d (Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 288.) Accordingly, the court held that because section 4\u2014 104(b)(1) does not prescribe felony penalties for an absolute liability offense, it is not unconstitutional.\nSubsequently, in Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d 397, a majority of this court \u201cmodif[ied] the \u2018knowledge\u2019 required in Gean to include that the accused individual possessed the incomplete title with a criminal knowledge, or in other words, knowledge plus criminal purpose.\u201d Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 403. But see Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 403-06 (Freeman, J., concurring, joined by Miller, C.J.).\nANALYSIS\nAt the outset, we note that no appellees\u2019 briefs have been filed in this case. However, we shall consider the merits of the appeal as it pertains to appellees under the guidelines set out in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128.\nInitially the State asserts that it is difficult to determine which portion of the statute the trial court held unconstitutional. Review of the record reveals that defendants\u2019 motion sought only to have the penalty provision, section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1), declared unconstitutional. The court\u2019s written order, however, states that \u201cdefendant\u2019s motion to declare ch. 951/2, Sec. 4 \u2014 -104(a)(2) unconstitutional is granted.\u201d During the proceeding on the State\u2019s motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated, \u201cI simply held the penalty section unconstitutional.\u201d\nA determination of the constitutionality of the penalty provision of the- statute, section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1), necessarily required the trial court to consider the substantive provision, section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), to which the penalty provision pertains. However, given the relief requested in defendants\u2019 motions and the trial court\u2019s oral statement concerning its finding thereon, we perceive that the court\u2019s written order intended to find only the penalty provision, section 4 \u2014 104(b)(2), unconstitutional. In our review, we must likewise consider section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2); however, we confine our holding to the constitutionality of section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1), the penalty provision.\nBefore proceeding, we acknowledge those established principles which guide us in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes. Statutes are presumed constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of upholding their validity. (People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 499.) Thus, the party challenging a statute has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation. People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 182, 188. ,\n\u201c[I]t is an elementary rule of construction that all sections of an act relating to the same subject matter should be considered together unless to do so would be plainly contrary to the legislative intent.\u201d (2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction \u00a747.06, at 151 (5th ed. 1992).) Article I of the Code pertains to offenses relating to titles and registration and is part of the general statutory scheme entitled \u201cANTI-THEFT LAWS.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 4 \u2014 100 et seq.) Section 3\u2014 100 et seq. of the Code pertains, generally, to certificates of title. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 100 et seq.) Consistent with the rule of construction, we review section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1) together with the general statutory provisions concerning certificates of title.\nWe begin our analysis with recitation of some of the statutory provisions regarding certificates of title. In Illinois, every owner of a vehicle which is in this State and for which no certificate of title has been issued must apply to the Secretary of State (Secretary) for a certificate of title. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3\u2014 101(a).) Pursuant to our Code, the transferee of a vehicle \u201cshall, promptly and within 5 business days after delivery to him of the vehicle and the assigned title, execute the application for a new certificate of title in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the Secretary of State prescribes, and cause the certificate and application to be mailed or delivered to the Secretary of State.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 112(b).) Upon satisfaction of compliance with the statutory requirements, the Secretary issues a certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 3 \u2014 116(a).) The Secretary maintains a record of all certificates of title issued by him under a distinct title number assigned to the vehicle. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 106(b).\nHaving considered these provisions, it is apparent to us that the requirement of complete assignment of title contemplates compliance with those statutory provisions which mandate application for and attainment of certificates of title. (See generally Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 100 et seq.) Otherwise completion of the assignment would be a mere perfunctory act.\nGenerally, statutes which relate to certificates of title to motor vehicles, such as ours, serve to protect owners of motor vehicles, lienholders, and innocent purchasers for value. The statutes provide for the tracing, accuracy and security of titles to motor vehicles, thereby protecting the public against fraud and imposition in transaetions involving titles of motor vehicles, and discourage larceny and the unlawful disposition of such vehicles. (See 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles \u00a742(1) (1969).) Additionally, such statutes provide a mechanism for auditing and collecting State taxes. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 3 \u2014 104(f), 3 \u2014 106(a).) It has been stated that the purpose of the anti-theft laws in section 4 \u2014 100 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 4 \u2014 100 et seq.) \u201c 'is to protect automobile owners against theft and to protect the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen automobiles.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Morris (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 157, 162, quoting People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 506, 510.\nIn our view, the statutory provisions regarding certificates of title and registration, generally (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95^2, par. 3 \u2014 100 et seq.), and the anti-theft provisions, specifically (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 4 \u2014 100 et seq.), share a broad commonality of purpose. Together the provisions seek to prevent theft-related activity, to insure the accuracy and security of title, and to prevent fraudulent conduct involving vehicles. It is that broad purpose which we consider in reviewing the constitutionality of section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1).\nA. Due Process\nWe first address defendants\u2019 contention that the penalty provision is a violation of due process. Under the State\u2019s police power, the legislature has broad discretion in establishing criminal penalties. (Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 161.) That power, however, is subject to the limitation that a person\u2019s liberty may not be deprived without due process of law. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a72; People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 410, 417.) \u201c[T]he question of whether a legislative exercise of the police power meets the constitutional requirement of due process involves identifying the public interest that the statute is intended to protect, examining whether the statute \u2018bears a reasonable relationship\u2019 to that interest, and determining whether the method used to protect or further that interest is \u2018reasonable.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Wick (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 62, 66.) The test, thus, focuses on the purposes and objectives of the enactment in question. See Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 161, quoting City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115.\nAt the hearing on the motions, defendants argued that charges for a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) are \u201cselective.\u201d Defendants asserted that used car dealers hold incomplete titles when they become possessed of a vehicle. Yet, defendants argued, dealers are not subject to penalty for violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2).\nDefendants\u2019 argument is flawed. Car dealers are engaged in the business of the purchase and sale of motor vehicles. The statutory requirements concerning the transfer of vehicles and the issuance of certificates of title for car dealers (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 113) necessarily differ from the requirements for non-dealers (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 3\u2014 112(b), (e)). Generally, if a dealer buys a vehicle, procures a certificate of title from the owner and holds it for resale, the dealer need not send the certificate to the Secretary. However, upon transferring the vehicle to another person, the dealer must then execute an assignment and mail the certificate to the Secretary with the transferee\u2019s application for a new certificate. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 113.\nDefendants argued, additionally, that because they owned the vehicles at issue, their conduct did not contribute to theft-related activities. For purposes of this discussion, we equate defendants\u2019 assertions of \u201cownership\u201d with a valid right to possess title.\nWe noted in Tolliver several scenarios where a title might not be completed and yet no criminal offense was intended, hence, the \u201ccriminal knowledge\u201d requirement. (See Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 402-03.) Thus, any argument that section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) punishes nonculpable conduct is effectively foreclosed by Tolliver.\nClearly where a possessor of a certificate of title to a motor vehicle has no valid right to the vehicle, it is easy to conceive of how knowing possession without complete assignment contributes to theft-related, \u201cchop-shop\u201d or organized criminal activity. However, because we perceive that section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) purports not only to prevent theft related activity, but also to prevent fraudulent conduct involving vehicles, we reject defendant\u2019s argument as a basis upon which to hold the provision unconstitutional. Although a true owner\u2019s possession without complete assignment may not contribute to theft-related activity, it may, nonetheless, contribute to other prohibited conduct. For example, where the true owner\u2019s conduct has as its purpose to evade tracing chain of title in a vehicle for some illegal purpose, or to engage in fraudulent or otherwise illegal disposition of a vehicle, such conduct constitutes the evil which the statutory scheme relating to certificates of title in general and section 4\u2014 104(a)(2), specifically, seeks to prevent.\nIt is not our function, however, to conceptualize the various scenarios in which a defendant\u2019s failure to complete assignment might contribute to theft-related or any other illegal activity. We presume that the legislature was guided by an awareness of the evils to be prevented in enacting the challenged provision.\nAfter careful consideration, we believe that the requirement of complete assignment, which contemplates the application and attainment of a certificate of title, bears a rational relationship to protecting the public against fraud, theft and traffic in stolen motor vehicles. Thus, we find that section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1) does not violate due process.\nAs an aside, and though we express no opinion as to defendants\u2019 rights in the titles at issue here, we note that other than defendants\u2019 assertions, the record is devoid of any evidence of \u201cownership.\u201d Defendants\u2019 assertion of \u201cownership,\u201d without more, presumes that the conveyers of title to the certificated vehicles had good title to convey. Absent complete assignment, application and issuance of new certificates of title on the subject vehicles, however, \u201cownership\u201d is subject to question. Significantly, \u201c[ejxcept as provided in [the section of the Code concerning car dealers] and as between the parties, a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions [regarding applications for the issuance of a new certificate of title] have been complied with ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 112(e).\nB. Proportionate Penalties\nDefendants\u2019 second challenge to the constitutionality of section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1) is that it violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711.) The proportionate penalties clause of our constitution requires that the legislature, in defining crimes and their penalties, consider the constitutional goals of restoring an offender to useful citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711.) A sentencing scheme violates the proportionate penalties clause where conduct creating a less serious threat to the public health and safety than other conduct is punished more harshly. See People v. Wagner (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 308, 313; see also People v. Wisslead (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 190,196.\nIn the trial court, defendants supported their proportionate penalties argument with comparison of the penalty for a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) to prescribed penalties for offenses, perceived by defendants, of a less serious nature. In that regard, defendants asserted that the vehicles involved in this case were valued at $300. Yet, defendants argued, theft of a vehicle valued at $300 would be merely a Class A misdemeanor. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(b)(1).) Similarly, defendants asserted that a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(4), which prohibits, inter alia, a person from displaying on a vehicle a certificate of title not authorized for use on such vehicle, is as serious an offense as a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2). Yet, a violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(4) results in a lesser penalty than does violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2). Further, defendants argued that a violation of section 4 \u2014 105.1, which makes it illegal for a person to knowingly, with the intent to defraud, surrender a certificate of title, or other title document, in exchange for a certificate of title which results in, inter alia, the deletion of the words \u201cS.V.\u201d or \u201cREBUILT\u201d or the alteration or deletion of any other information required to be contained on such a certificate of title or other title document is only a Class A misdemeanor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 4 \u2014 105.1(a)(1), (c).\nUnlike defendants, we do not necessarily equate the seriousness of a crime with the value of the property involved. Moreover, we believe that the conduct involved in the theft of a $300 vehicle is quite distinct from the conduct prohibited by section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2). The legislature could reasonably have determined that an isolated incident of theft of a $300 automobile is less serious than the systematic and continuous conduct involved in chop-shop activity, or evading the tracking and security of titles. We believe this reasoning has equal validity in the case of a first violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(4) or section 4 \u2014 105.1. Notably, a second or subsequent violation of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(4), or a second violation of section 4\u2014 105.1 within a five-year period is a Class 4 felony. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, pars. 4 \u2014 104(b)(3), 4 \u2014 105.1(c).\nWithout question, \u201c[t]he legislature may perceive a need to enact a more stringent penalty provision in order to halt an increase in the commission of a particular crime.\u201d (People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 320.) Because we are unable to conclude that the penalty prescribed by section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1) for knowing possession of certificate of title without complete assignment \u201cis so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community or is cruel or degrading,\u201d we do not find it violative of the proportionate penalties clause. People v. Bryant (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1000; see also People v. Gonzales (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, we do not find that section 4 \u2014 104(b)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95Vz, par. 4 \u2014 104(b)(1)) violates either the due process or proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendants have failed to meet their burden. Thus, the decision of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Gary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Norbert J. Goetten, William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "No appearance for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 72263, 72264 cons.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICKEY P. JOHNS, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. TONY WALL, Appellee.\nOpinion filed December 4, 1992.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Gary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Norbert J. Goetten, William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nNo appearance for appellees." }, "file_name": "0436-01", "first_page_order": 446, "last_page_order": 459 }