{
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  "name": "FRANK DiFOGGIO, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE COUNTY EMPLOYEES ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF COOK COUNTY, Ex-Officio for the Forest Preserve District Employees Annuity and Benefit Fund, et al., Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "DiFoggio v. Retirement Board of the County Employees Annuity & Benefit Fund of Cook County",
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    "parties": [
      "FRANK DiFOGGIO, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE COUNTY EMPLOYEES ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF COOK COUNTY, Ex-Officio for the Forest Preserve District Employees Annuity and Benefit Fund, et al., Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal requires us to determine the extent that duty disability benefits received under the Illinois Pension Code are offset (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. IO8V2, par. 9 \u2014 159(c)) against benefits received under the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.8). Based on the plain language of the Pension Code, we hold that duty disability benefits under the Code are offset against any amount paid or recoverable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nBACKGROUND\nThe record contains the following undisputed facts. Plaintiff, Frank DiFoggio, worked as a plumber at Cook County Hospital in Chicago. On August 13, 1984, plaintiff injured his right arm and shoulder; the injury arose out of and was sustained in the course of his employment. He required surgery and therapy. As a result, plaintiff did not work or receive wages from August 14, 1984, to October 26,1987, a total of 166.29 weeks.\nPlaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim with the Illinois Industrial Commission. During the disability period, he received temporary total disability benefits from the county in the amount of $434.67 per week, which equalled 662/s% of his salary. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.8(b).) Temporary total disability is a condition that exists from the time an injury incapacitates an employee from work until the employee is as recovered or restored as the character of the injury will permit. Brinkmann v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (and cases cited therein).\nIn addition to the temporary total disability benefits, plaintiff received permanent partial disability benefits in a lump sum settlement between plaintiff and the county. Based on a 65% loss of use of his right arm, plaintiff received $48,848.92. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.8(d)(2).) A worker has a permanent partial disability when the injury received leaves the worker permanently partially incapacitated from pursuing his or her usual and customary employment, and is reasonably certain to permanently prevent the worker from earning as much as the worker would have earned absent the injury. Guest Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1927), 324 Ill. 268, 275.\nAfter the workers\u2019 compensation settlement, plaintiff applied to the Retirement Board of the County Employees Annuity and Benefit Fund of Cook County for duty disability benefits under the Pension Code. The statute provides that benefits for a disability resulting from the performance of an act of duty shall be 75% of the worker\u2019s salary at the date of the injury, payable during any disability period in which the worker does not receive any wages. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. lOShk, par. 9 \u2014 156.) Plaintiff claimed Pension Code duty disability benefits for the same period of 166.29 weeks for which he received workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nThe Retirement Board concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to duty disability benefits. The Board ruled that the Pension Code requires duty disability benefits to be offset against any workers\u2019 compensation benefits received. The Board found that plaintiff\u2019s total workers\u2019 compensation benefits \u2014 both the temporary total and the permanent partial benefits \u2014 exceeded the 75% obligation under the Pension Code. Therefore, the Board denied plaintiff\u2019s claim for duty disability benefits.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County seeking administrative review of the Retirement Board's denial. The trial court confirmed the Board's decision.\nThe appellate court reversed the trial court and the Board. The appellate court held that duty disability benefits under the Pension Code should not be offset against permanent partial disability benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. (236 Ill. App. 3d 361, 367.) We allowed the Retirement Board\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse the appellate court.\nDISCUSSION\nWe note at the outset our standard of review. The Pension Code provides that judicial review of the Retirement Board\u2019s decisions be in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101 et seq.). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 108x/2, par. 9\u2014 236.) The Administrative Review Law provides that our review extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 110.) The rule that an administrative agency\u2019s findings of fact should not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence does not apply where the question involved is one of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute. (City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 499, 516.) Rather, in such a case, the Board\u2019s finding is not binding on the court. City of Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 507.\nThe Retirement Board based its denial of plaintiff\u2019s duty disability benefits on Pension Code section 9\u2014 159(c), which states in pertinent part:\n\u201c(c) If an employee who shall be disabled, or his widow or children receive any compensation or payment from the county for specific loss, disability or death under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act or Workers\u2019 Occupational Disease Act, the disability benefit or any annuity for him or his widow or children payable as the result of such specific loss, disability or death shall be reduced by any amount so received or recoverable. If the amount received as such compensation or payment exceeds such disability benefit or other annuity payable as the result of such specific loss, disability or death, no payment of disability benefit or other annuity shall be made until the accumulated amounts thereof equals the amount of such compensation or payment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. IO8V2, par. 9-159(c).\nThe Retirement Board argues, inter alia, that the language of section 9 \u2014 159(c) is unambiguous. According to the Board, the provision requires that plaintiff\u2019s duty disability benefits be offset against all of plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation payments. Since plaintiff\u2019s total workers\u2019 compensation payments exceeded the Pension Code\u2019s 75% obligation, the Board maintains that plaintiff is not entitled to any duty disability benefits.\nPlaintiff argues that Pension Code section 9 \u2014 159(c) is ambiguous and, therefore, resorts to statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent. After comparing Pension Code section 9 \u2014 159(c) to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, plaintiff contends that Pension Code duty disability benefits are to be offset against only workers\u2019 compensation temporary total disability benefits.\nThe appellate court accepted plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of the Pension Code and agreed with his result. (236 Ill. App. 3d at 365-67.) The court found that the language of section 9 \u2014 159(c) was ambiguous. The court reasoned:\n\u201cIt is unclear what the statute means by the terms \u2018specific loss,\u2019 \u2018disability,\u2019 or \u2018death.\u2019 The statute does not provide that a duty disability benefit payable as a result of an injury shall be reduced by any payment from the county for that injury. If that were the case, the statute\u2019s language would be clearer. Instead, we are placed in the position of hypothesizing what the statute\u2019s language actually means.\u201d 236 Ill. App. 3d at 365-66.\nThus, according to plaintiff, he is entitled to Pension Code duty disability benefits in the amount of 8V3% of his wages in addition to his workers\u2019 compensation permanent partial disability benefits. This represents the Pension Code\u2019s obligation to pay 75% of his wages for a disability, offset against the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\u2019s obligation to pay 662/s% of his wages, which plaintiff received in workers\u2019 compensation temporary total disability benefits.\nWe cannot accept plaintiff\u2019s argument. The following principles are quite settled:\n\u201c \u2018It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations.] This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. [Citations.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.\u2019 (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.)\u201d Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 189, 194.\nAccord Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 181, 192-93.\nApplying these principles to the present case, we conclude that Pension Code section 9 \u2014 159(c) is unambiguous. It does not distinguish between temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Rather, Pension Code section 9 \u2014 159(c) simply provides that any disability benefits paid or recoverable trader the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act shall serve to offset Pension Code duty disability benefits.\nThe appellate court looked to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to determine which workers\u2019 compensation benefits constituted disability benefits as described in the Pension Code. However, a court should not attempt to read a statute other than in the manner in which it was written. In applying plain and unambiguous language, it is not necessary for a court to search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature. (Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 211, 215-16.) As the Board notes, the appellate court had to look no further than the plain language of the Pension Code itself to make its determination.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Karen Covy, Patricia M. Shymanski and Sophia Lopez, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "George J. Cullen, of Cullen, Haskins, Nicholson & Menchetti P.C., of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 74563.\nFRANK DiFOGGIO, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE COUNTY EMPLOYEES ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF COOK COUNTY, Ex-Officio for the Forest Preserve District Employees Annuity and Benefit Fund, et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed September 23, 1993.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Karen Covy, Patricia M. Shymanski and Sophia Lopez, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellants.\nGeorge J. Cullen, of Cullen, Haskins, Nicholson & Menchetti P.C., of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0377-01",
  "first_page_order": 387,
  "last_page_order": 393
}
