{ "id": 780281, "name": "ENVIRITE CORPORATION, Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Envirite Corp. v. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency", "decision_date": "1994-02-17", "docket_number": "No.75060", "first_page": "210", "last_page": "217", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 210" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111336 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482762 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256412 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443195 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742628 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5329823 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2520677 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/371/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12128412 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254628 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256350 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507, 516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5146653 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009" }, { "page": "1009" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/1004-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994664 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0541-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 596, "char_count": 11874, "ocr_confidence": 0.815, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.458185213218362e-07, "percentile": 0.9601111879495677 }, "sha256": "964a7096c03b76b67290b60389b3d086f7ebd7550e5a424c05a073862e9715ef", "simhash": "1:4ba16e6842957578", "word_count": 1905 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:17.496069+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ENVIRITE CORPORATION, Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe question presented for review is whether the producer of hazardous waste in this case, who sent the waste to a treatment and disposal facility, was required to obtain authorization from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency for disposal of the waste in Illinois, separate and apart from the treater\u2019s authorization. We hold that the Illinois Environmental Protection Act did not require the producer to obtain such authorization.\nBACKGROUND\nEnvirite Corporation operates a hazardous waste treatment facility in Cook County, Illinois. Peoria Disposal Company operates a hazardous waste treatment facility in Peoria County, Illinois. Each facility is capable of treating certain hazardous wastes, including those designated \"F006\u201d and \"F019\u201d by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).\nEnvirite\u2019s treatment process neutralizes the F006 and F019 wastes so as to render them officially nonhazardous, or \"delisted,\u201d according to EPA standards. The nonhazardous waste is then deposited in a nonhazardous waste landfill.\nPeoria Disposal\u2019s treatment process combines the F006 and F019 wastes with other wastes, and then subjects this mixture to a chemical stabilization process. The resulting residue has a substantially inhibited ability to leach, but, at the time of the proceedings below, remained officially \"listed\u201d as a hazardous waste product. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) authorizes Peoria Disposal to dispose of this end-waste in Peoria Disposal\u2019s hazardous waste landfill. This authorization is required for \"generators\u201d of hazardous waste pursuant to section 39(h) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/39(h) (West 1992)).\nProduction Plated Plastics (PPP) is a Michigan company that produces F006 hazardous waste. In 1981, Envirite and Peoria Disposal submitted bids to PPP for the treatment and disposal of PPP\u2019s waste. PPP awarded the contract to Peoria Disposal. Peoria Disposal accepted and treated PPP\u2019s waste, and disposed of the stabilized end-waste in its hazardous waste landfill. PPP has not obtained the section 39(h) authorization from the Agency.\nEnvirite filed a complaint with the Illinois Pollution Control Board (Board) against Peoria Disposal and the Agency. (415 ILCS 5/31(b) (West 1992).) Citing PPP\u2019s lack of section 39(h) authorization, Envirite claimed that Peoria Disposal violated the Act by accepting, treating, and disposing of PPP\u2019s waste. (415 ILCS 5/21(e), 39(h) (West 1992).) Envirite also alleged that the Agency violated the Act by failing to end Peoria Disposal\u2019s practice despite Envirite\u2019s requests to the Agency to take action. 415 ILCS 5/30, 31(a) (West 1992).\nThe Board, on the Agency\u2019s motion, dismissed the Agency from the proceeding. The Board concluded that the Agency is not subject to an enforcement action brought under section 31(b) of the Act. (See Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 541, 556-57.) The Board also granted Peoria Disposal\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The Board concluded that PPP was not a \"generator\u201d and that Peoria Disposal was, within the meaning of section 39(h) of the Act.\nEnvirite petitioned the appellate court for review of the Board\u2019s decision. (415 ILCS 5/41(a) (West 1992).) The appellate court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the Board\u2019s dismissal of the Agency from the action. The court reversed the Board\u2019s determination that Peoria Disposal did not violate section 39(h) of the Act. (239 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1009.) The court remanded the cause for reinstatement of the action against Peoria Disposal.\nThe Agency and Peoria Disposal jointly petitioned for leave to appeal. (134 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).) We allowed the petition and now reverse the appellate court\u2019s determination that Peoria Disposal violated section 39(h) of the Act.\nDISCUSSION\nWe note at the outset our standard of review. The Act provides that judicial review of the Board\u2019s decisions be in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1992)). (415 ILCS 5/41(a) (West 1992).) The Administrative Review Law provides that our review extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record. (735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 110 (West 1992).) The rule that an administrative agency\u2019s findings of fact should not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence does not apply where the question involved is one of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute. Rather, in such a case, the Board\u2019s finding is not binding on the court. City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 499, 507, 516.\nAt issue in this case is, Who is the \"generator\u201d of Peoria Disposal\u2019s end-waste for purposes of section 39(h) of the Act? The appellate court held that an original producer of hazardous waste such as PPP is a \"generator\u201d within the meaning of section 39(h), in addition to a waste treater such as Peoria Disposal. Therefore, PPP must obtain separate section 39(h) authorization to dispose of its waste in Illinois. Since PPP lacked such authorization, Peoria Disposal violated the Act by treating and disposing of PPP\u2019s waste. 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1009.\nThe legislature amended section 39(h) of the Act subsequent to the appellate court\u2019s decision and while the cause was pending in this court. It is settled that where the legislature changes the law pending an appeal and where no vested rights are involved, the case must be disposed of by the reviewing court under the law as it then exists, not as it was when the decision was made by the lower court. (Bates v. Board of Education, Allendale Community Consolidated School District No. 17 (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 260, 268-69; Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Comm\u2019n (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 374, 378.) There is no vested right in the continuance of a law. The legislature has an ongoing right to amend a statute. (People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer (1939), 371 Ill. 367, 373.) Accordingly, we must review the Board\u2019s order in light of section 39(h) as amended. See Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 306, 310; Hughes, 2 Ill. 2d at 378-79.\nSection 3.12 of the Act defines \"[g]enerator\u201d as \"any person whose act or process produces waste.\u201d (415 ILCS 5/3.12 (West 1992).) Section 39(h) of the Act, as amended, provides in pertinent part:\n\"(h) A hazardous waste stream may not be deposited in a permitted hazardous waste site unless specific authorization is obtained from the Agency by the generator and disposal site owner and operator for the deposit of that specific hazardous waste stream. The Agency may grant specific authorization for disposal of hazardous waste streams only after the generator has reasonably demonstrated that, considering technological feasibility and economic reasonableness, the hazardous waste cannot be reasonably recycled for reuse, nor incinerated or chemically, physically or biologically treated so as to neutralize the hazardous waste and render it nonhazardous. *** For purposes of this subsection (h), the term 'generator\u2019 has the meaning given in Section 3.12 of this Act, unless: (1) the hazardous waste is treated, incinerated, or partially recycled for reuse prior to disposal, in which case the last person who treats, incinerates, or partially recycles the hazardous waste prior to disposal is the generator ***.\u201d Pub. Act 88 \u2014 320, eff. August 12,1993 (amending 415ILCS 5/39(h) (West 1992)).\nThe controlling principles are quite settled:\n\" 'It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations.] This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. [Citations.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.\u2019 (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.)\u201d Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 189, 194.\nAccord County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151.\nThe amendment to section 39(h) of the Act added the last quoted sentence (\"For purposes of this subsection ***\u201d). The amendment expressly provides that only the last hazardous waste treater, in this case Peoria Disposal, is the \"generator\u201d for purposes of section 39(h). The amendment to section 39(h) of the Act requires reversal of the appellate court.\nFurther, the appellate court\u2019s determination that PPP was a \"generator\u201d within the meaning of section 39(h) of the Act is not supported by the unamended version of that provision. The court began its analysis as follows:\n\"Because statutory interpretation requires us to ascertain the true intent of the legislature, we find guidance in legislative debates pertaining to the proposed legislation.\u201d 239 Ill. App. 3d at 1007.\nWe repeat that a court should first look to the statutory language as the best indication of legislative intent without resorting to other aids for construction. (County of Du Page, 109 Ill. 2d at 151.) Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court need not consider its legislative history. Village of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Board (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 463, 469-70; County of Du Page, 109 Ill. 2d at 152; City of East Peoria v. Pollution Control Board (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 673, 679.\nThe plain language of the unamended section 39(h) expressly requires that only the generator of \"that specific hazardous waste stream\u201d that is deposited in a landfill must obtain Agency authorization prior to disposal. It is undisputed that Peoria Disposal combined PPP\u2019s F006 waste with other wastes and then subjected this mixture to a chemical stabilization process, which resulted in a new residue. Based on these undisputed facts, we agree with the Board that Peoria Disposal and not PPP was the generator of this specific hazardous waste stream, which Peoria Disposal deposited in its landfill.\nThe appellate court agreed with Envirite that this reasoning erroneously focuses on the term \" 'specific hazardous waste stream.\u2019 \u201d (239 Ill. App. 3d at 1007, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 1111/2, par. 1039(h).) However, a court should not attempt to read a statute other than in the manner in which it was written. In applying plain and unambiguous language, it is not necessary for a court to search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature. (Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 211, 215-16.) The appellate court had to look no further than the plain language of the Act itself.\nFor the foregoing reasons, that part of the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the decision of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, is reversed, and the decision of the Board is confirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed;\nBoard decision confirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Alison E. O\u2019Hara, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Environmental Protection Agency.", "Robin R. Lunn and Michael O\u2019Neil, of Chicago, and Brian J. Meginnes and Robert M. Riffle, of Peoria, all of Keck, Mahin & Cate, for appellant Peoria Disposal Co.", "Mohan, Alewelt, Prillaman & Adami, of Springfield (Stephen F. Hedinger, of co\u00fansel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No.75060.\nENVIRITE CORPORATION, Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed February 17, 1994.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Alison E. O\u2019Hara, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Environmental Protection Agency.\nRobin R. Lunn and Michael O\u2019Neil, of Chicago, and Brian J. Meginnes and Robert M. Riffle, of Peoria, all of Keck, Mahin & Cate, for appellant Peoria Disposal Co.\nMohan, Alewelt, Prillaman & Adami, of Springfield (Stephen F. Hedinger, of co\u00fansel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0210-01", "first_page_order": 222, "last_page_order": 229 }