{ "id": 780294, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. MICHAEL J. WALLER, State's Attorney of Lake County, Appellant, v. 1990 FORD BRONCO (Vincent Puccio, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Waller v. 1990 Ford Bronco", "decision_date": "1994-03-24", "docket_number": "No. 75810", "first_page": "460", "last_page": "465", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 460" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2851659 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121957 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0382-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 437, "char_count": 7735, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.622382420211624e-07, "percentile": 0.6874472218264462 }, "sha256": "a4d43ff066783e6f64666f359ee10c280298dc8caaf35dc52ca2706395278f81", "simhash": "1:a5a765f3516a0fb2", "word_count": 1286 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:17.496069+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. MICHAEL J. WALLER, State\u2019s Attorney of Lake County, Appellant, v. 1990 FORD BRONCO (Vincent Puccio, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State filed a complaint in the circuit court of Lake County pursuant to section 1.25 of the Wildlife Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 61, par. 1.25) to obtain, by forfeiture, a 1990 Ford Bronco automobile, a shotgun, and a handgun with scope, all of which are owned by Vincent Puccio. On Puccio\u2019s motion, the circuit court dismissed the action on the grounds that section 1.25 of the Code is unconstitutional and therefore invalid. The State now brings this direct appeal pursuant to Rule 302(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1)). For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of dismissal, but do not reach the question of the statute\u2019s validity.\n- The dispute which gave rise to this appeal occurred on October 31, 1992, when officers of the Department of Conservation and the Lake Forest police department arrested Vincent Puccio for violation of section 24\u2014 1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4)). That statute provides that a person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly\n\"Carries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4).)\nThe weapons in question consisted of a Winchester 12-gauge shotgun and a Thompson handgun, with scope, which were allegedly carried by Puccio in his 1990 Ford Bronco.\nFollowing Puccio\u2019s arrest, the conservation officers and the Lake Forest police seized the weapons and the Bronco and placed them in the Conservation Department\u2019s custody. Approximately six weeks later, the Department caused a complaint to be filed in the circuit court of Lake County in order to have the guns and the Bronco forfeited to the State. The State claimed that it was entitled to forfeiture of the Bronco, as well as the guns, because the vehicle was used to transport the guns \"and was also used to facilitate commission of the [weapons] offense.\u201d Although no violations of the Wildlife Code were claimed, both the seizure and the forfeiture action were premised exclusively on section 1.25 of that statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 61, par. 1.25).\nPuccio moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint on the grounds that the proceedings had not been initiated as promptly as the statute requires. Although this motion was denied, the court granted Puccio temporary use of the Bronco during the pendency of this action. Shortly thereafter, Puccio moved for suppression, in this action, of any evidence that was ultimately suppressed in his prosecution on the criminal charge. In addition, he asked the court to declare section 1.25 of the Wildlife Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 61, par. 1.25) unconstitutional.\nFollowing a hearing, the circuit court found Puccio\u2019s constitutional challenge to be meritorious. Specifically, it held that section 1.25 is unconstitutionally vague because it \"requires the trier of fact to employ discretion but fails to give effective standards by which such trier of fact could determine when it should forfeit a vehicle after a determination that the vehicle was used illegally.\u201d Accordingly, the court entered judgment dismissing the forfeiture proceeding. The State\u2019s post-trial motion was denied, and this appeal followed.\nBecause of the circuit court\u2019s declaration that section 1.25 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 61, par. 1.25) is unconstitutional and therefore invalid, there is no dispute that its judgment dismissing the forfeiture action is properly before us for direct review. (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1).) We note, however, that while the issue of the statute\u2019s invalidity may have triggered our jurisdiction, it is the propriety of the judgment itself that is before us on appeal, not the circuit court\u2019s reasoning. (See Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387.) A reviewing court \"is not bound to accept the reasons given by the trial court for its judgment [citation], and the judgment may be sustained upon any ground warranted, regardless of whether it was relied on by the trial court and regardless of whether the reason given by the trial court was correct.\u201d Material Service Corp., 98 Ill. 2d at 387.\nAlthough the circuit court founded its decision on constitutional principles, this court has long held that constitutional questions will not be considered if the cause can be determined on other grounds. (Exchange National Bank v. Lawndale National Bank (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 316, 321.) This basic principle of review is applicable here, for the State\u2019s forfeiture action is fatally defective for reasons wholly unrelated to the constitutionality of the statute on which it is based.\nAs we have noted, the State brings this action under section 1.25 of the Wildlife Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 61, par. 1.25). By its terms, that statute authorizes the seizure and forfeiture of\n\"Every hunting or trapping device, vehicle or conveyance, when used or operated illegally, or attempted to be used or operated illegally by any person in taking, transporting, holding, or conveying any wild bird or wild mammal, contrary to the provisions of this Act, including administrative rules ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 61, par. 1.25.)\nThe problem here is that the State has never contended that the guns or the Bronco were used or operated illegally by Puccio in taking, transporting, holding or conveying any wild bird or wild mammal contrary to the provisions of the Act. Indeed, there is no indication from the record that any wild birds or wild mammals were involved in this case at all. Although defense counsel suggested at oral argument that Puccio did have two geese in his possession at the time of his arrest, there is nothing inherently wrong with that, and absolutely no charge has been made that Puccio\u2019s possession of the geese was in any way illegal under the Wildlife Code. The only \"illegality\u201d alleged is unlawful use of weapons in violation of section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4)). As noted earlier, this criminal violation was the explicit and exclusive basis for the seizure and forfeiture proceedings before us today.\nNothing in section 1.25 of the Wildlife Code authorizes the seizure or forfeiture of property for violation of section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) or any other provision of the Criminal Code. In addition, nothing in the Criminal Code authorizes the seizure or forfeiture of property by means of the procedures set forth in the Wildlife Code. (See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 6.) Accordingly, section 1.25 of the Wildlife Code can have no possible application to the facts present here. Because section 1.25 is inapplicable, there is no need to consider the additional question of whether it is unconstitutional. Valid or not, the statute would not permit the relief sought by the State here. The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing the forfeiture action is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Norbert J. Goetten, William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "Marc W. Martin, of Genson, Steinback, Gillespie & Martin, of Chicago, and Robert J. Fox, of Ori, Fox, Lunardi & Zeit, of Waukegan, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 75810.\nTHE PEOPLE ex rel. MICHAEL J. WALLER, State\u2019s Attorney of Lake County, Appellant, v. 1990 FORD BRONCO (Vincent Puccio, Appellee).\nOpinion filed March 24, 1994.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Norbert J. Goetten, William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nMarc W. Martin, of Genson, Steinback, Gillespie & Martin, of Chicago, and Robert J. Fox, of Ori, Fox, Lunardi & Zeit, of Waukegan, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0460-01", "first_page_order": 472, "last_page_order": 477 }