{ "id": 780269, "name": "PAUL LANNOM et al., v. ROBERT KOSCO, Appellant (The County of Williamson, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Lannom v. Kosco", "decision_date": "1994-04-21", "docket_number": "No. 75983", "first_page": "535", "last_page": "543", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 535" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 Ill. B.J. 122", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2926895 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5412648 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5403861 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805433 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192653 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122414 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516573 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470281 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045513 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5813471 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5328152 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291449 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" }, { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2928660 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597125 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0155-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 569, "char_count": 12724, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.704359528696504e-07, "percentile": 0.9287869678888615 }, "sha256": "04c53fbb288b7ef60ecac6c29dc59280cd24219b060683e73b5fc594a08a551f", "simhash": "1:934a1d8c65c517d5", "word_count": 2004 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:17.496069+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAUL LANNOM et al., v. ROBERT KOSCO, Appellant (The County of Williamson, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, Paul and Nadine Lannom, brought an action in the circuit court of Williamson County against the defendant, Robert Kosco. The plaintiffs\u2019 complaint sought to recover damages for personal injury to Paul and loss of consortium to Nadine. Defendant Kosco, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the County of Williamson, Paul\u2019s employer at the time of the accident, seeking contribution. On the day of trial, the county moved to dismiss the third-party complaint against it, stipulating that it would waive its workers\u2019 compensation lien. As support for its motion, the county relied upon this court\u2019s decision in Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp. (1991), 146 Ill. 2d 155. The trial court granted the county\u2019s motion to dismiss, rejecting Kosco\u2019s argument that Kotecki applies prospectively only. The appellate court affirmed. (247 Ill. App. 3d 629.) We granted Kosco\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nThe primary issue raised in this interlocutory appeal is whether the rule adopted in Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp. (1991), 146 Ill. 2d 155, applies retroactively to cases that were pending when this court announced that decision. We conclude that the decision applies retroactively.\nFacts\nOn February 16,1989, the plaintiffs filed a complaint that alleged that the defendant, Kosco, negligently drove his automobile and struck Paul Lannom, as he was working alongside a highway. On March 8, 1989, Kosco filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Paul\u2019s employer, the County of Williamson. The third-party complaint alleged that the county engaged in willful and wanton misconduct when it parked its truck on the wrong side of the road without hazard lights or warning devices. On April 18,1991, this court announced its decision in Kotecki, which held that an employer\u2019s liability in contribution is limited to the amount of its workers\u2019 compensation liability. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d 155.\nThe County of Williamson then filed three motions: a motion to strike the ad damnum clause of Kosco\u2019s third-party complaint; a motion to limit its liability to the amount of its workers\u2019 compensation lien; and, finally, a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, pursuant to its agreement to waive its workers\u2019 compensation lien. Kosco objected to the motions, arguing that the decision in Kotecki should apply prospectively only. The plaintiffs also objected for the same reason. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the county\u2019s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint upon waiver of the county\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien. The court found that nothing in this court\u2019s decision suggested that Kotecki would apply prospectively only. The appellate court affirmed. (247 Ill. App. 3d 629.) This court granted the third-party defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal to consider whether the decision in Kotecki should apply prospectively only (134 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nGenerally, this court\u2019s decisions apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the decision was announced. (Deichmueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 413, 416.) This court has inherent power to declare, however, that a decision will apply prospectively only. (Deichmueller, 151 Ill. 2d at 416.) In the past, when the court intended for a decision to apply prospectively, it expressly stated so in the opinion. See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26-27; Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 348, 359; Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 196; Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 28; Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 104; Torres v. Walsh (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 338, 353.\nThe Kotecki decision does not expressly state that its holding will apply prospectively only. Moreover, the court denied the appellee\u2019s petition for rehearing which specifically asked the court to modify the opinion to make it prospective only. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d 155; cf. Elg v. Whittington (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 344, 357; Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17 (where the court modified opinions upon denial of the petitions for rehearing to make the holdings apply prospectively only).\nThe appellants nevertheless argue that the Kotecki decision should not be applied retroactively. As support for this claim, the appellants argue that the decision satisfies the test for prospective application that this court adopted in Elg v. Whittington (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 344, 357. We conclude that it is not necessary to consider the Elg test. That test was created for the purpose of explaining or justifying the court\u2019s decision to deviate from the general rule of retroactive application. (See, e.g., Elg, 119 Ill. 2d at 357.) We need not apply that Elg test to cases such as Kotecki, where the court decided to follow the general rule and apply its decision retroactively, as well as prospectively. As the Kotecki court determined, the rule that an employer\u2019s contribution liability is limited to its workers\u2019 compensation liability applies retroactively to all cases that were pending at the time this court announced the Kotecki decision, including the present action.\nThe defendant raises several additional arguments in support of his claim that the trial court improperly dismissed his third-party complaint against the county. We briefly address each of these arguments.\nKosco first claims that the county waived its Kotecki defense of limited contribution liability by purchasing liability insurance for unlimited contribution protection. We agree with the appellate court\u2019s conclusion, however, that Kosco waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. The parties did not argue and the trial court did not consider what effect the county\u2019s alleged purchase of liability insurance would have upon application of the Kotecki rule. Accordingly, we find that Kosco waived the issue for purposes of this appeal.\nKosco next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the third-party complaint against the county because Kotecki does not apply where the third-party complaint alleges willful and wanton misconduct, rather than simple negligence. Kosco argues that Kotecki limits an employer\u2019s contribution liability to its workers\u2019 compensation liability only in cases where the employer\u2019s conduct is negligent. He argues that the Kotecki rule does not apply to employers who are guilty of willful and wanton misconduct.\nWe disagree. Nothing in the text of the Kotecki opinion suggests that the decision is limited to cases where the direct defendant alleges that the employer\u2019s conduct was negligent, rather than willful and wanton. Moreover, the policies underlying the rule adopted in Kotecki support application of that rule to employers who are guilty of willful and wanton misconduct, as well as those guilty of simple negligence. As stated, the Kotecki rule was designed to allow third parties to obtain some contribution from employers, while preserving the employer\u2019s right to rely upon the protections of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Thus, the Kotecki rule, limiting an employer\u2019s contribution liability, logically applies in all those circumstances where the employer has a right to rely upon the protections of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nUnder the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, employers must pay their employees compensation for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. (820 ILCS 305/2 (West 1992).) This court has stated that the term \"accidental\u201d is not a technical legal term. (International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 84.) An injury is \"accidental\u201d within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act when it occurs unexpectedly and without affirmative act or design by the employee. (International Harvester, 56 Ill. 2d 84.) The plaintiffs injuries here were \"accidental\u201d within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, even if those injuries were the result of the county\u2019s willful and wanton misconduct. See Mier v. Staley (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 373.\nAccordingly, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act applies to the plaintiff\u2019s injuries and the compensation the plaintiff received under that statute is the exclusive measure of the county\u2019s liability to the plaintiff. Because the county has a right to invoke the protections of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, it also has a right to invoke the protections of the Kotecki rule, which limits the county\u2019s contribution liability to its liability under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Accordingly, we reject Kosco\u2019s claim that Kotecki does not apply to claims for contribution alleging willful and wanton misconduct by the employer.\nKosco finally argues that the trial court should not have dismissed the third-party complaint against the county simply because the county waived its right to recover any of its past or future workers\u2019 compensation payments from the plaintiff. He argues that if the employer is not a party, witnesses employed by the employer will not be available for deposition or trial, except by subpoena or independent action for discovery, as provided by Supreme Court Rule 214, with attendant delay and additional expense. He also argues that production of documents and inspection of the employer\u2019s premises will likewise be available only by subpoena or independent action for discovery.\nIt is true that dismissal of a third-party defendant may result in delay and additional cost to the direct defendant. However, such dismissal will also save direct defendants and trial courts time and expense. The plaintiff and direct defendant need not respond to motions filed by the third-party defendant, and trial courts will not spend time on third-party defendants\u2019 motions and trial testimony.\nIn any event, the fact that a direct defendant may suffer additional expense and delay, standing alone, is not an adequate reason to require a third-party employer to remain a party to an action, after the employer has waived its workers\u2019 compensation lien. Such obstacles occur any time a third-party defendant is dismissed from a lawsuit. As the county points out, if added expense were enough to keep parties in a case, dismissal would never be allowed.\nKosco also argues that dismissal will obstruct the purpose of section 2 \u2014 1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1117 et seq. (West 1992)). That section provides that a defendant is only severally liable, and not jointly liable, for damages other than the plaintiffs medical expenses if its level of fault \"is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff.\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1117 (West 1992).) Relying upon this statute, Kosco contends that dismissal of the third-party complaint against the county will preclude the jury from apportioning any fault to the county due to its absence from the litigation. Thus, Kosco argues that he will be denied his right to obtain an apportionment of fault of 25% or less and the resulting opportunity to be only severally liable for some of the plaintiffs damages.\nWe note, however, that this dilemma arises whenever a defendant or third party settles with the plaintiff or is. dismissed from an action for any reason. Section 2 \u2014 1117 was not intended to prohibit the dismissal of a defendant or third party from an action, where such dismissal is otherwise warranted. Moreover, the defendant\u2019s rights under section 2 \u2014 1117 are not abolished simply because a defendant or third party settles or is dismissed from an action. The jury may still assess the remaining defendants\u2019 relative culpability, and if the degree of fault attributable to one or more defendants is less than 25%, those defendants\u2019 liability is several only. See Alvarez v. Fred Hintze Construction (1993), 247 Ill. App. 3d 811; Walsh & Doherty, Section 2 \u2014 1117: Several Liability\u2019s Effect on Settlement and Contribution, 79 Ill. B.J. 122, 125 (1991).\nThus, the trial court properly dismissed Kosco\u2019s third-party action for contribution against the county when the county stipulated that it would waive its workers\u2019 compensation lien. We affirm the appellate court\u2019s decision upholding the dismissal of the third-party complaint.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC" } ], "attorneys": [ "Christy Solverson, of Brandon, Schmidt & Palmer, of Carbondale, for appellant.", "Dennis E. Rose and Georgiann Oliver, of Donovan, Rose, Nester & Szewczyk, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 75983.\nPAUL LANNOM et al., v. ROBERT KOSCO, Appellant (The County of Williamson, Appellee).\nOpinion filed April 21, 1994.\nChristy Solverson, of Brandon, Schmidt & Palmer, of Carbondale, for appellant.\nDennis E. Rose and Georgiann Oliver, of Donovan, Rose, Nester & Szewczyk, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0535-01", "first_page_order": 547, "last_page_order": 555 }