{ "id": 483564, "name": "CHESTER BREWER, Appellant, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, a/k/a Amtrak, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Brewer v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "decision_date": "1995-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 76723", "first_page": "100", "last_page": "107", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 100" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 1083", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385193 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087-88" }, { "page": "1087-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/1083-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909764 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592343 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615606 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5474879 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2773702 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/86/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2647210 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604323 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3195877 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0005-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 500, "char_count": 9395, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.4739316579256903e-07, "percentile": 0.8813871001745661 }, "sha256": "49c2e965229d44af8d08d1dfb99b8ba9fdb4d3c053efb8acd8e03329fe20a157", "simhash": "1:6e69524e690c07c1", "word_count": 1482 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:49.005215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHESTER BREWER, Appellant, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, a/k/a Amtrak, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Chester Brewer, brought a personal injury action in the circuit court of Cook County against defendant, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, also known as Amtrak. The trial court entered an order enforcing a settlement of the suit. The appellate court affirmed. (256 Ill. App. 3d 1083.) We allowed plaintiff\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. (145 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).) We now reverse the judgments below and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.\nBACKGROUND\nThe appellate court detailed the facts of this case. We repeat only those facts that are necessary to dispose of this appeal.\nPlaintiff sought damages for injuries suffered in the course of his employment with defendant. Plaintiff fell while inspecting track, injuring his head and lower back.\nThe trial court held a pretrial settlement conference. Present were the trial judge, the attorneys for plaintiff and defendant, and defendant\u2019s claims agent. Although plaintiff and his wife were in the courthouse, they were not present in the trial judge\u2019s chambers during the negotiations.\nThe attorneys reached a settlement. Defense counsel agreed to pay plaintiff $250,000 plus an additional $50,000 if plaintiff would undergo back surgery within six months of the entry of a dismissal order. The parties disagree on plaintiff\u2019s duties under the settlement. According to defense counsel and defendant\u2019s claims agent, plaintiff\u2019s attorney agreed that plaintiff would quit his job with defendant. However, according to plaintiff\u2019s attorney, he never agreed to that condition. It is undisputed that plaintiff\u2019s attorney left the trial judge\u2019s chambers to confer with plaintiff.\nAfter the attorneys reached a settlement, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. The order incorporated only defendant\u2019s agreement to pay plaintiff. The order did not incorporate an agreement that plaintiff would quit his job.\nWithin nine days of the dismissal order, defendant moved to enforce its version of the settlement agreement. Soon thereafter, plaintiff timely moved to vacate the dismissal order. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1203.) At the hearing on the motions, plaintiff\u2019s attorney first contended that the issue of plaintiff\u2019s resignation was never discussed at the settlement conference. However, the trial judge remembered and found that the issue was discussed and was the basis of defendant\u2019s payment to plaintiff.\nPlaintiff\u2019s attorney also contended that plaintiff never authorized him to compromise plaintiff\u2019s job. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney, plaintiff, and plaintiff\u2019s wife each submitted an affidavit testifying, inter alia, that plaintiff never agreed to quit his job; plaintiff never authorized his attorney to make such an agreement; and no one ever told plaintiff that his resignation was a settlement term.\nRejecting this contention, the trial judge assumed that plaintiffs attorney conferred with plaintiff on the resignation issue. The trial judge personally spoke to plaintiff prior to dismissing the lawsuit. However, the judge did not remember specifically mentioning the resignation issue. The trial judge rejected plaintiff\u2019s affidavit evidence by relying solely on the general presumption that the attorney speaks for the client; the trial judge did not make any findings of fact or rely on any evidence.\nThe trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate the dismissal order and granted defendant\u2019s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court ordered plaintiff to quit his job, finding that it was a condition of the settlement agreement.\nIn affirming the trial court, the appellate court assumed that plaintiff\u2019s attorney conferred with plaintiff on the resignation issue. 256 Ill. App. 3d at 1087-88.\nDISCUSSION\nJurisdiction\nWe initially note plaintiff\u2019s contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. Plaintiff notes that he moved to vacate the dismissal order under section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section allows a party, within 30 days after entry of judgment, to \u201cfile a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1203.) Plaintiff further notes that \u201cthe 'other relief referred to in section 68.3 [the predecessor to section 2 \u2014 1203] must be similar in nature to the other forms of relief enumerated in that section.\u201d Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131, 136.\nPlaintiff argues that the enforcement of a settlement agreement is not similar to a rehearing or a retrial, or a modification or vacation of a judgment. Thus, plaintiff concludes, the trial court, after denying his section 2 \u2014 1203 motion to vacate the dismissal order, lacked jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.\nWe cannot accept plaintiff\u2019s contention. A trial court retains jurisdiction over a cause for 30 days after entry of a final order or judgment. (Beck v. Stepp (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 232, 238.) Plaintiff\u2019s timely section 2 \u2014 1203 motion properly brought before the trial court the issue of the settlement agreement\u2019s validity. A trial court has the power to enforce a settlement agreement entered into by the parties while the suit is pending before the court. (See McAllister v. Hayes (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 426, 427; Sheffield Poly-Glaz, Inc. v. Humboldt Glass Co. (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 865, 868.) We hold that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.\nAttorney\u2019s Authority to Settle\nTurning to the merits, the controlling legal principles are quite settled. The authority of an attorney to represent a client in litigation is separate from and does not involve the authority to compromise or settle the lawsuit. An attorney who represents a client in litigation has no authority to compromise, consent to a judgment against the client, or give up or waive any right of the client. Rather, the attorney must receive the client\u2019s express authorization to do so. Danziger v. Pittsfield Shoe Co. (1903), 204 Ill. 145, 149-50; McClintock v. Heiberg (1897), 168 Ill. 384, 391-92; see Colvin v. Hobart Brothers (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 166, 176-77 (Harrison, J., dissenting).\nWhere a settlement is made out of court and is not made a part of the judgment, the client will not be bound by the agreement without proof of express authority. This authority will not be presumed and the burden of proof rests on the party alleging authority to show that fact. (Danziger, 204 Ill. at 149.) Further, in such a case, opposing counsel is put on notice to ascertain the attorney\u2019s authority. If opposing counsel fails to make inquiry or to demand proof of the attorney\u2019s authority, opposing counsel deals with the attorney at his or her peril. McClintock, 168 Ill. at 392.\nHowever, \"[w]hile an attorney\u2019s authority to settle must be expressly conferred, the existence of the attorney of record\u2019s authority to settle in open court is presumed unless rebutted by affirmative evidence that authority is lacking.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Szymkowski v. Szymkowski (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 630, 633 (and cases cited therein); see Brooks v. Kearns (1877), 86 Ill. 547, 551.\nIn the present case, the trial court erroneously relied on the presumption that plaintiff's attorney spoke for plaintiff on the issue of plaintiff\u2019s resignation. The record contains affirmative evidence, in the form of affidavits, that plaintiff did not expressly authorize his attorney to agree that plaintiff would quit his job. Thus, the trial court could no longer presume that plaintiff\u2019s attorney spoke for plaintiff on this point.\nIn affirming the trial court, the appellate court did not address these principles or this necessary conclusion. Rather, the appellate court erroneously assumed that such express authorization existed. Having made this assumption, the appellate court discussed the legal principles that pertain to an attorney binding the client to a settlement agreement. (256 Ill. App. 3d at 1087-88.) However, as courts have explained, an attorney\u2019s general authority to represent the client in litigation does not extend so far as to permit the attorney to waive the rights of the client. See Kazale v. Kar-Lee Flowers (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 224, 227; Knisley v. City of Jacksonville (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 116, 120; County of Cook v. Patka (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 5, 11.\nIn sum, the record contains affirmative uncontradicted evidence that plaintiff did not expressly authorize his attorney to agree that plaintiff would quit his job. The record does not contain any facts that show that plaintiff authorized his attorney to compromise this point. Accordingly, we must reverse the judgments of the trial and appellate courts.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court of Cook County are reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nJudgments reversed; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James N. Vail and Sands & Associates, all of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (Hugh C. Griffin, M. Elizabeth Bennett, Sandra K. Macauley and Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 76723.\nCHESTER BREWER, Appellant, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, a/k/a Amtrak, Appellee.\nOpinion filed March 30, 1995.\nJames N. Vail and Sands & Associates, all of Chicago, for appellant.\nLord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (Hugh C. Griffin, M. Elizabeth Bennett, Sandra K. Macauley and Leslie J. Rosen, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0100-01", "first_page_order": 112, "last_page_order": 119 }