{ "id": 295827, "name": "RONALD \"RINK\" LUCAS, Appellant, v. L. THOMAS LAKIN et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Lucas v. Lakin", "decision_date": "1997-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 80719", "first_page": "166", "last_page": "176", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 166" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57340 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "legislation which limits the people's right to nominate candidates implicates the fundamental right to vote" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 862", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5432919 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0862-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5544901 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222739 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780275 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 1110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887223 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1112-13" }, { "page": "1113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/1110-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156919 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0163-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 701, "char_count": 17990, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.221662472445548e-06, "percentile": 0.9880881086117376 }, "sha256": "b66427449b5670ec19e525177b716777425a4de03f6aba567dcc29592f99185b", "simhash": "1:0d9a94993e22ee40", "word_count": 2910 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:09:22.300312+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RONALD \"RINK\" LUCAS, Appellant, v. L. THOMAS LAKIN et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe question presented in this appeal is whether an individual sheet of a nominating petition which is filed pursuant to section 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 10 (West 1994)) is rendered invalid if the address set forth within the circulator\u2019s affidavit at the bottom of the petition sheet does not match the address where the circulator of the sheet is registered to vote. The fifth district of the appellate court answered this question affirmatively. 278 Ill. App. 3d 163. We granted leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court.\nBackground\nOn December 11, 1995, Ronald P. \"Rink\u201d Lucas (Lucas) filed a nominating petition seeking to have his name placed on the ballot for the March 19, 1996, Democratic primary for the office of Madison County. recorder. The nominating petition consisted of 20 individual sheets containing a total of 330 signatures. Two hundred fifty-five valid signatures were required to secure a position on the primary election ballot.\nOn December 22, 1995, L. Thomas Lakin (Lakin) filed an objector\u2019s petition (see 10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 8 (West 1994)) in which he contested the validity of numerous signatures on Lucas\u2019 nominating petition and asserted that there was an insufficient number of valid signatures remaining on the petition to warrant placing Lucas\u2019 name on the primary election ballot. In the portion of the objector\u2019s petition relevant here, Lakin alleged that the circulator of the first sheet of Lucas\u2019 nominating petition, Aaron Wanagat (Wanagat), was not registered to vote at the address listed in the circulator\u2019s affidavit on that sheet. Thus, according to Lakin, Wanagat was not a valid circulator and the sheet, which contained 20 signatures, had to be stricken in its entirety.\nOn January 9, 1996, the Madison County officers electoral board (the Board) held a hearing pursuant to section 10 \u2014 9 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 9 (West 1994)) to consider Lakin\u2019s objections. In a written decision issued on January 11, 1996, the Board found, inter alia, that Wanagat was a registered voter of Madison County. However, the Board also found that Wanagat was registered to vote at an address other than the one listed in the circulator\u2019s affidavit on the petition sheet. The Board ruled that Wanagat was therefore not a valid circulator and that the first sheet of Lucas\u2019 nominating petition was void. As a result of this ruling, and others made by the Board, Lucas\u2019 nominating petition had only 244 valid signatures \u2014 11 short of the 255 required. Accordingly, the Board ordered that Lucas\u2019 name not appear on the ballot for the primary election.\nLucas sought judicial review of the Board\u2019s decision in the circuit court of Madison County. See 10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 10.1 (West 1994). Following a hearing held on February 2, 1996, the circuit court entered judgment reversing the Board\u2019s decision regarding the validity of the first petition sheet. The circuit court based its judgment on two appellate court decisions, Bass v. Hamblet, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1110 (1st Dist. 1994), and Whelan v. County Officers\u2019 Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d 555 (2d Dist. 1994). Both of these decisions held that the relevant provisions of the Election Code do not require that the address in the circulator\u2019s affidavit match the address where the circulator is registered to vote. Because the circuit court\u2019s ruling restored 20 signatures to Lucas\u2019 petition, the court ordered that Lucas\u2019 name be placed on the primary election ballot.\nLakin appealed from the circuit court\u2019s judgment and, after expedited review, the appellate court reversed the circuit court and affirmed the original decision of the Board. The appellate court expressly declined to follow Whelan and Bass, concluding that those opinions were too restrictive in their reading of the pertinent sections of the Election Code. The appellate court\u2019s mandate was issued along with its opinion on March 14, 1996. On Lucas\u2019 motion, this court stayed the appellate court\u2019s mandate pending consideration of Lucas\u2019 petitian for leave to appeal. On March 19, 1996, the primary election took place. Lucas appeared on the ballot and lost the election.\nAnalysis\nWe observe, at the outset, that while the primary election which is at the heart of this appeal has already been held, this cause is not moot. One exception to the mootness doctrine permits a court to resolve an otherwise moot issue if that issue concerns a substantial public interest. This public interest exception may be applied if (1) the question presented is of a public nature, (2) an authoritative resolution of the question is desirable for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the question is likely to recur. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395 (1994). The instant appeal raises a question of election law which, inherently, is a matter of public concern. In addition, as noted above, the issue before us has created a split of authority in our appellate court. Resolution of the question presented in this appeal is therefore necessary, as the issue will likely arise again in future elections. Accordingly, we reach the merits in this cause.\nThe facts in this case are not in dispute. At some time prior to circulating the first sheet of Lucas\u2019 nominating petition, Wanagat moved from the Madison County address where he was registered to vote to another address located within Madison County. When he moved, Wanagat inadvertently failed to transfer his voter registration to his new address. Subsequently, when asked to provide his address in the circulator\u2019s affidavit at the bottom of the petition sheet he was circulating, Wanagat simply listed, without any intent to deceive or mislead, his new Madison County address. The sole issue which the parties contest is whether, under these facts, the relevant provisions of the Election Code require that the petition sheet which Wanagat circulated be declared invalid.\nWhen construing the meaning of a disputed statute, this court\u2019s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 40 (1994). Legislative intent is best determined by examining the statutory language, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 435 (1995). Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, our review is de nova. Vuletich v. United States Steel Corp., 117 Ill. 2d 417, 421 (1987).\nSection 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code sets out the requirements for nominating petitions filed on behalf of political parties in primary elections. The section states that the circulator\u2019s affidavit must appear in the following form:\n\"At the bottom of each sheet of such petition shall be added a statement signed by a registered voter of the political division, who has been a registered voter at all times he or she circulated the petition, for which the candidate is seeking a nomination, stating the street address or rural route number of the voter, as the case may be, as well as the voter\u2019s city, village or town; and certifying that the signatures on that sheet of the petition were signed in his presence; [and indicating the dates the sheet was circulated]; and certifying that the signatures on the sheet are genuine, and certifying that to the best of his knowledge and belief the persons so signing were at the time of signing the petitions qualified voters of the political party for which a nomination is sought. Such statement shall be sworn to before some officer authorized to administer oaths in this State.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 10 (West 1994).\nLakin does not contest the Board\u2019s finding that Wanagat was registered to vote in Madison County at the time he circulated the petition, nor does he argue that Wanagat\u2019s failure to update his registration address, by itself, invalidated his status as a registered voter as a matter of law. It is also undisputed that sectian 7 \u2014 10 does not expressly require the address in the circulator\u2019s affidavit to match the address where the circulator is registered to vote. Lakin does not allege any other irregularities with respect to Wanagat\u2019s affidavit. Therefore, we conclude that Wanagat\u2019s affidavit was in compliance with the criteria set out in section 7 \u2014 10.\nLakin contends, however, that in addition to being governed by section 7 \u2014 10, Wanagat was also subject to the requirements of a definition section of the Election Code, section 3 \u2014 1.2 (10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1.2 (West 1994)). Under the terms of this section, Lakin argues, Wanagat was not a valid circulator of Lucas\u2019 nominating petition. Section 3 \u2014 1.2 of the Election Code provides:\n\"\u00a7 3 \u2014 1.2. For the purpose of determining eligibility to sign a nominating petition or a petition proposing a public question the terms 'voter\u2019, 'registered voter\u2019, 'qualified voter\u2019, 'legal voter\u2019, 'elector\u2019, 'qualified elector\u2019, 'primary elector\u2019 and 'qualified primary elector\u2019 as used in this Code or in another Statute shall mean a person who is registered to vote at the address shown opposite his signature on the petition or was registered to vote at such address when he signed the petition.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1.2 (West 1994).\nLakin maintains that the phrase \"[f]or the purpose of determining eligibility to sign a nominating petition\u201d does not refer solely to those individuals whose signatures count toward the nominating petition\u2019s numerical signature requirement, but instead refers to all the individuals who physically sign the petition, including the circulator. From this, Lakin reasons that because the address in Wariagat\u2019s affidavit was different from his voter registration address, he was not a \"registered voter\u201d within the meaning of section 3 \u2014 1.2. Lakin notes that section 7 \u2014 10 requires circulators to be registered voters. Therefore, according to Lakin, Wanagat was not a valid circulator and the Board was correct in striking the petition sheet from Lucas\u2019 nominating petition. We disagree.\nTo \"sign\u201d a nominating petition, in the plain and ordinary sense of the word, means to add one\u2019s signature to the nominating petition for the purpose of supporting the candidate whose name appears on the petition. See Whelan, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 559; Bass, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1112-13. We believe the legislature had this commonly accepted meaning of the word \"sign\u201d in mind when it enacted section 3 \u2014 1.2. To hold otherwise would strain the language of that section beyond its normal meaning. Section 3 \u2014 1.2 speaks of eligibility to sign a nominating petition, not of eligibility to circulate one. By its own terms, section 3 \u2014 1.2 does not govern the actions of petition circulators.\nOur conclusion that the phrase \"eligibility to sign a nominating petition\u201d refers only to those individuals who sign the petition as a means of endorsing the listed candidate is supported by the remaining language of section 3 \u2014 1.2 and by the language of section 7 \u2014 10. Section 3 \u2014 1.2 defines \"registered voter\u201d as \"a person who is registered to vote at the address shown opposite his signature on the petition.\u201d This definitional language parallels the portion of section 7 \u2014 10 describing the requirements which must be met by the individuals signing the nominating petition:\n\"Such petition shall be signed by qualified primary electors residing in the political division for which the nominating is sought in their own proper persons only and opposite the signature of each signer, his residence address shall be written or printed. The residence address required to be written or printed opposite each qualified primary elector\u2019s name shall include the street address or rural route number of the signer, as the case may be, as well as the signer\u2019s city, village or town.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 10 (West 1994).\nThe portion of section 7 \u2014 10 which describes the requirements which petition circulators must meet states that the circulators must provide their \"street address or rural route number\u201d and their \"city, village or town,\u201d but makes no reference to the circulator\u2019s address appearing opposite his or her signature. Indeed, as the sample form provided in section 7 \u2014 10 shows, the circulator\u2019s signature appears at the bottom of the petition sheet, underneath the address and other information contained within the circulator\u2019s affidavit. See 10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 10 (West 1994); see also T. Jaconetty & S. Ruffolo, Ballot Access, in Election Law \u00a7 1S.72 (Ill. Inst. for Cont. Legal Educ. Supp. 1995) (containing a complete sample nominating petition). Clearly, if the legislature had intended section 3 \u2014 1.2 to apply to petition circulators, it would not have created a definition of \"registered voter\u201d which follows, narrowly and exclusively, the portion of the statutory language and sample form which applies only to the individuals who sign the nominating petition as a means of endorsing the listed candidate.\nLakin also maintains, as did the appellate court below, that his proposed construction of section 3 \u2014 1.2 is necessary to effectuate the legislative intent behind that provision. Lakin notes that section 3 \u2014 1.2 codified a 1983 appellate court decision, Greene v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 862 (1983). In Greene, the appellate court determined that section 10 \u2014 4 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 10 \u2014 4) required a person who signs a nominating petition to be registered to vote at the address set forth on the nominating petition. The court noted that it would be difficult to verify that an individual is registered to vote, and is therefore qualified to sign the nominating petition, if that individual was registered to vote at an address other than the one shown on the petition. The court concluded that its holding was therefore necessary to facilitate the verification procedure and to preserve the integrity of the election process. Greene, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 869.\nAnalogizing to Greene, Lakin maintains that it is difficult to verify that a circulator has met the statutory requirement of being registered to vote when the circulator\u2019s voter registration address and the address given in the circulator\u2019s affidavit are not identical. Lakin asserts that, as in Greene, this difficulty provides a compelling justification for requiring that the address listed in the circulator\u2019s affidavit and the circulator\u2019s voter registration address match one another. Lakin concludes, therefore, that the legislature must have intended for section 3 \u2014 1.2 to apply to circulators.\nContrary to Lakin\u2019s assertions, we do not believe that the need to facilitate the process of verifying th\u00e9 voter registration of petition circulators is necessarily as compelling as the need to facilitate the verification process for those who sign the nominating petition. First, unlike the individuals who sign the nominating petition to endorse the listed candidate, the circulator must make a sworn statement that he or she is a registered voter. Thus, the circulator is subject to an additional constraint which, by itself, helps ensure that the circulator is registered to vote. In addition, in any nominating petition, there are far fewer circulators than there are individuals signing that petition. Therefore, as a practical matter, verifying the registration of circulators is less burdensome than verifying the registration of the individuals who sign the nominating petition. These factors, in conjunction with the plain language of the statute, provide the basis for concluding that the legislature intended to limit the reach of section 3 \u2014 1.2 to individuals who sign a nominating petition in support of the listed candidate.\nAs the instant appeal demonstrates, Lakin\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 1.2 imposes a potentially harsh result upon the individuals who sign the nominating petition. Under Lakin\u2019s proposed construction, a registered circulator\u2019s inadvertent failure to update his or her voter registration address may cancel the otherwise valid signatures of the voters who sign the petition sheet, thereby nullifying those voters\u2019 right to endorse the candidate of their choice. See Bass, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1113. We are mindful of the need to tread cautiously when construing statutory language which restricts the people\u2019s right to endorse and nominate the candidate of their choice. See, e.g., Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 307 (1996) (legislation which limits the people\u2019s right to nominate candidates implicates the fundamental right to vote). Accordingly, in the absence of a clear legislative statement to the contrary, we hold that the Election Code does not require that the address in the circulator\u2019s affidavit on a nominating petition filed pursuant to section 7 \u2014 10 be identical to the address where the circulator is registered to vote.\nFor the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nThe electoral board which first considered this case determined that the nominating petition at issue is governed by section 10 \u2014 4 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 4 (West 1994)). The circuit court and appellate court proceeded under the same assumption. Before this court, the parties have acknowledged that the nominating petition is, in fact, governed by section 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 10 (West 1994)). However, the relevant language of section 10 \u2014 4 is essentially identical to the language found in section 7 \u2014 10. Thus, the lower courts\u2019 analysis remains largely unaffected by this error.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Carl R. Draper, of Feldman & Wasser, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Gail G. Renshaw and Roy C. Dripps, of the Lakin Law Firm, of Wood River, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 80719.\nRONALD \"RINK\" LUCAS, Appellant, v. L. THOMAS LAKIN et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed January 30, 1997.\nCarl R. Draper, of Feldman & Wasser, of Springfield, for appellant.\nGail G. Renshaw and Roy C. Dripps, of the Lakin Law Firm, of Wood River, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0166-01", "first_page_order": 178, "last_page_order": 188 }