{ "id": 317127, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GREGORY MADEJ, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. 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Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7835950 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/883/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783176 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307265 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166-67" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592134 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57338 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150-51" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "758 F.2d 523", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 311922 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/758/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557518 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543128 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588867 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909170 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "467-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 S. Ct. 608", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 L. Ed. 2d 586", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 S. Ct. 268", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 L. Ed. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6436229, 6436368, 6436471, 6436536, 6436639 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0935-01", "/us/474/0935-02", "/us/474/0935-03", "/us/474/0935-04", "/us/474/0935-05" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139219 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215-16" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "214" }, { "page": "214" }, { "page": "216-17" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0201-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2428, "char_count": 82364, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.7228672523560485e-07, "percentile": 0.8939318469918517 }, "sha256": "dd7354049d41198aa84935d2b47d3f847eaec74f203d3e51035f10e4f8ea451e", "simhash": "1:abb7d5a67224d4ed", "word_count": 13189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:44:12.485046+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel-lee, v. GREGORY MADEJ, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Gregory Madej, was convicted of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1)), felony murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(3)), rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 1), deviate sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 3), and armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 18\u2014 2). The circuit court sentenced defendant to death on the murder and felony murder convictions. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985). The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari. Madej v. Illinois, 474 U.S. 935, 88 L. Ed. 2d 274, 106 S. Ct. 268 (1985), reh\u2019g denied, 474 U.S. 1038, 88 L. Ed. 2d 586, 106 S. Ct. 608 (1985).\nDefendant thereafter filed a pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 1 et seq.). His attorney filed an amended petition several years later. The circuit court dismissed the amended petition without an evidentiary hearing, and this appeal followed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651. We now affirm the order of the circuit court.\nBACKGROUND\nBarbara Doyle\u2019s naked body was found in an alley on the north side of Chicago in the early morning hours of August 23, 1981. She had been stabbed and slashed approximately 34 times. A post-mortem examination revealed the presence of numerous abrasions over various parts of her body. Semen was found in her vagina and rectum.\nAt approximately 5 a.m. on the day in question, two Chicago police officers observed defendant drive through a posted stop sign on Wilson Avenue in Chicago. The officers signalled for defendant to pull over. Instead of stopping, defendant accelerated and proceeded to lead the officers on a high-speed chase. Several other police cars joined in the chase as defendant sped through red lights in excess of 80 miles per hour. Defendant eventually drove into an alley, where he tried unsuccessfully to escape on foot. When the officers arrested defendant, his hands, head, shirt, pants and undershorts were covered with blood. The automobile, which was later determined to be Barbara\u2019s, was likewise stained with blood, mostly in the area of the passenger\u2019s seat. Upon searching the vehicle, police officers recovered a large knife as well as Barbara\u2019s jeans and blouse, both of which were saturated with blood.\nAt the police station, defendant explained to the officers that he had been drinking at the Garage Inn tavern until 2:20 a.m., at which time he was thrown out for disorderly conduct. He then met a friend named \"Ho-jamoto,\u201d who was driving Barbara\u2019s car. When defendant got into the vehicle to go \"cruising,\u201d he noticed that Hojamoto was wearing a bloody shirt. Hojamoto told defendant that he had been in a gang fight. Defendant then switched seats with Hojamoto, who jumped from the vehicle during the high-speed chase with the police.\nPolice subsequently charged defendant with the murder of Barbara Doyle and other felonies. Prior to trial, defendant waived his right to have a jury determine his guilt or innocence.\nAt trial, Barbara\u2019s estranged husband, David Doyle, testified that he and Barbara were drinking at the Garage Inn tavern until 2:15 a.m. The two left the bar and fell asleep in Barbara\u2019s car. When he woke up, David noticed that defendant was in the driver\u2019s seat, and it appeared to him that Barbara and defendant knew each other. Defendant drove to the Golden Flame restaurant, where he and Barbara went inside. David, meanwhile, walked home alone.\nA waitress from the Golden Flame restaurant testified that she served coffee to Barbara and defendant around 3:15 a.m. Another witness testified that he saw defendant \"tinkering\u201d with Barbara\u2019s car in an alley approximately 25 minutes later.\nJames Bunker, who knew defendant socially, also testified on behalf of the State. Bunker told the court that he was at a party with defendant on the night before Barbara\u2019s murder. According to Bunker, defendant had taken a \"Buck-type knife\u201d from another person at the party. In court, Bunker identified the knife which police recovered from Barbara\u2019s car as the knife defendant had taken the night before. Bunker further testified that \"Hojamoto\u201d was a fictitious name commonly used by defendant and friends as a form of greeting. In fact, defendant had in the past referred to Bunker as \"Hojamoto,\u201d and vice versa. When asked why the group used the name, Bunker responded, \"[It was] just like a greeting, you know ***. How are you doing? Moto.\u201d\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. In contrast to his original statement to the police, at trial defendant claimed that he had killed Barbara only after she drew a knife on him during a drug deal that had gone awry. Defendant explained to the court that he had been drinking alcohol and ingesting drugs throughout the day. When he arrived at the Garage Inn tavern, he noticed Barbara, whom he had previously known, sitting at the bar with her husband. Barbara and her husband later left the tavern. Defendant, meanwhile, continued to drink until he was thrown out for disorderly behavior. He then approached Barbara\u2019s vehicle, and she asked him if he would like to smoke some marijuana. The two of them proceeded to get \"high,\u201d and they later drove to the Golden Flame restaurant. Upon leaving the restaurant, they smoked more marijuana and stopped three times to purchase liquor. According to defendant, he had by that time consumed at least two cases of beer, drank some whiskey, smoked one ounce of marijuana, ingested 10 quaaludes, and injected Talwin.\nDefendant further testified that he and Barbara stopped twice to engage in consensual sexual relations. Afterwards, Barbara asked defendant if he would sell her some marijuana. He agreed, and placed seven one-ounce bags of marijuana on the vehicle\u2019s console. After paying for one of the bags, Barbara attempted to steal two more. A struggle ensued, and she eventually brandished a knife and began attacking him. At some point in the struggle, defendant gained control of the knife and began stabbing Barbara, realizing what he was doing only after he saw that she was bleeding from her chest. He then removed Barbara\u2019s body from the car and sounded the car\u2019s horn (apparently in an attempt to summon help). He drove to a friend\u2019s house, but left when no one answered the door. Defendant next recalled being chased by the police, but could not remember anything else other than being taken into custody.\nAt the close of the evidence, the circuit court found defendant guilty of all charges. On the following day, the court ruled that defendant was eligible for the death penalty (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b)(6)(c) (West 1994) (commission of first degree murder in the course of another felony)) and that the evidence in mitigation did not outweigh the aggravating factors. Accordingly, the court imposed a sentence of death. This court affirmed that decision on direct appeal. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985).\nANALYSIS\nThe matter is now before this court on dismissal of defendant\u2019s amended petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1992)). A post-conviction action is a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1995). The scope of the proceeding is limited to constitutional matters which have not been, nor could have been, previously adjudicated. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 370 (1996). Any issues which could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are waived (People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989)) and any issues which have already been decided by a reviewing court are barred by the doctrine of res judicata (People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987)). In addition, a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations set forth in the petition, as supported by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, show that a constitutional right has been violated. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 259 (1989). In making that determination, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and affidavits are to be taken as true. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d at 259. Upon review of a dismissal of a petition without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 370-71 (1996).\nIneffective Assistance of Counsel During Sentencing\nA. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence\nDefendant first argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the aggravation /mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing due to his attorney\u2019s failure to investigate potential mitigating evidence prior to trial. According to defendant, counsel decided to forgo such an investigation under the mistaken belief that there would be sufficient time to prepare a mitigation defense if defendant were found guilty. Once the court reached its verdict, however, the State requested an immediate hearing on the death penalty in order to accommodate out-of-state members of the victim\u2019s family. Although the court denied the State\u2019s request for a hearing instanter, the court nevertheless scheduled the hearing for the following day. Defendant claims that such a short continuance, coupled with his attorney\u2019s lack of pretrial preparation, prejudiced his ability to put on an adequate mitigation defense. In support of this contention, defendant points out that his entire defense consisted of a brief statement to the court. In the statement, defendant merely noted that he had the opportunity to use drugs and alcohol while in jail, but had declined to do so. He further stated that if he were ever released from prison he would never use drugs or alcohol again. He also acknowledged that he had been using drugs since his teenage years, and that drugs \"had the greatest part to do with the case.\u201d When counsel asked him whether there were \"any events occurring in [his] life or ... in [his] home situation that may have been a contributing factor in [his] being heavily involved in drugs,\u201d and hence a contributing factor in Barbara\u2019s murder, defendant explained, \"Well, it was hard to cope with my parents [because they] always did have something against the drugs.\u201d Defendant then expressed remorse for his crimes. No other evidence was offered in mitigation.\nDefendant now argues that had his trial counsel undertaken a proper investigation prior to trial, he would have discovered \"a wealth of available mitigating evidence\u201d which could have been presented to the trial court. That evidence, appended to defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief, can be summarized as follows.\nDefendant was born in Poland and came to the United States while still an infant. His parents, Helena and Kazamier Madej, were strict disciplinarians who physically punished their children\u2019s acts of disobedience. Helena Madej acknowledges that her husband would often beat defendant, and that her husband was a violent person with a drinking problem. Jill Miller, a forensic social worker who submitted a report on defendant\u2019s behalf, believes that \"Kazamier Madej\u2019s chronic abuse of alcohol during [defendant\u2019s] childhood, and into his adult years, had a significant impact on the development of [his] personality, and on his behavior.\u201d She further maintains that defendant exhibits \"many of the characteristics of adult children of alcoholics, including: low self-esteem; difficulty trusting others; difficulty establishing or maintaining intimate relationships; denial and repression of feelings; poor problem solving skills; impulsiveness; and increased incidence of alcohol or drug abuse.\u201d According to Miller, defendant continues to show \"some of the characteristics of an adult chid [sic] of an alcoholic.\u201d\nThe evidence further shows that defendant began using drugs and alcohol during his early teenage years. He soon dropped out of high school and entered the military. Despite his continued use of drugs and alcohol while in the army, defendant eventually earned his GED certificate and was later honorably discharged. Upon returning to Chicago, defendant attended Triton College for two semesters before withdrawing due to his first arrest in November 1977. Defendant later obtained employment at an' automobile service station. That employment ended, however, following his second arrest in July 1978. Defendant spent the next seven months travelling around the country, eventually finding part-time work in California \"doing odd jobs.\u201d He returned to Chicago in February 1979 and was soon arrested again. He remained in jail until October 1980. After his release, defendant worked for a short time at Methode Electronics. He was laid off in April 1981 due to a \"phase down\u201d of Methode\u2019s Chicago plant. He worked briefly for three more employers before his final arrest for the instant offense.\nThe petition further alleges that defendant suffers from both psychological and neurological impairments. Dr. James O\u2019Donnell, an assistant professor of pharmacology, believes that defendant is a drug addict and an alcoholic whose \"atrophy of brain tissue [has led] to an impairment in his neuropsychological function; in other words, his ability to think and reason.\u201d Dr. Linda Wet-zel, the director of Neuropsychological Assessment at the West Side V.A. Hospital, also believes that defendant suffers from \"mild to moderate\u201d atrophy of the brain tissue. In her affidavit, she explains that defendant shows signs of attention deficit and impaired verbal learning ability, and that he has experienced headaches and depression during his incarceration. Dr. Dan L. Zim-broflf, a board certified psychiatrist and neurologist, opines that defendant has been in need of psychiatric treatment since he was 14 years old. He further postulates that defendant was \"physically and verbally abused by his sadistic and alcoholic father who show[ed] no signs at all of being a competent and empathic parent in any way.\u201d\nFinally, defendant claims that he has had an excellent incarceration record. For example, he notes that he had been both compliant and responsible during his confinement at Cook County jail while awaiting trial for the instant offense. During that time, he developed \"some insight\u201d into his behavior and recognized the negative effects of drugs and alcohol. In addition, he has, since his conviction for Barbara\u2019s murder, adjusted well to his incarceration at Menard State Penitentiary.\nAccording to defendant, his attorney\u2019s failure to investigate his background and present the foregoing evidence \"amounted in every respect to no representation at all.\u201d Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 534 (11th Cir. 1985). He describes his attorney\u2019s effort in this regard as a \"mere sham,\u201d adding that counsel simply \"[gave] up and abandoned] any attempt to present mitigating evidence.\u201d He concludes that his counsel was incompetent, and that as a result he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8.\nIn response, the State points out that this court previously rejected defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel\u2019s failure to present sufficient mitigating evidence. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985). On direct appeal, this court held that defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing hearing would have been different. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d at 215-16. The State insists, therefore, that the defendant is now barred from relitigating that issue under the doctrine of res judicata. People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987). We disagree.\nAs defendant points out, most of the evidence submitted in support of the amended petition for post-conviction relief did not appear in the original trial record and was not available to appellate counsel on direct appeal. For example, the affidavits of Drs. O\u2019Donnell, Wetzel and Zimbroff, all of which offer expert opinions on defendant\u2019s psychological and neurological impairments, were presented for the first time in defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief. Thus, when the court held on direct appeal that defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different, it did so solely on the basis of the record as it then existed. The record now contains substantial mitigation evidence which, defendant claims, should have been presented at the original trial, but was not. Under these circumstances, we have repeatedly held that procedural fairness dictates that the rules of res judicata be relaxed, and that the merits of defendant\u2019s claim be considered. See People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 150-51 (1996); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 528 (1991); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166-67 (1995); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148,166 (1994). Consequently, we decline to utilize the doctrine of res judicata to bar defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.\nRes judicata notwithstanding, the State alternatively argues that defendant knowingly waived his right to present additional mitigating evidence when he told his counsel and the trial court that he did not want any other witnesses to testify on his behalf. The record here discloses that after defendant testified, the court asked defense counsel whether any other witnesses would be called to the stand. Counsel replied, \"No, your Honor. I have been instructed by my client that he wishes to have no one else called in his defense ***.\u201d The court then asked defendant whether he wished to present any other witnesses or testimony \"in any form.\u201d Defendant replied, \"No, sir.\u201d\nRelying on People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411 (1987), the State maintains that defendant should not be allowed to complain of his counsel\u2019s failure to present additional mitigating evidence because defendant himself was the reason for the lack of the evidence in the first place. In Emerson, the defendant claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not present any evidence in mitigation. The court rejected that argument, in part, on the ground that Emerson had specifically instructed his attorney not to do so. Noting that \"counsel\u2019s conduct at the sentencing hearing was consistent with the defendant\u2019s stated wishes,\u201d this court held that Emerson could no longer complain of his counsel\u2019s failure to present evidence at the sentencing hearing. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d at 440.\nWe note, however, that during the pendency of this appeal, the federal courts granted Emerson\u2019s request for habeas corpus relief on the basis that his counsel\u2019s performance at sentencing was constitutionally deficient. United States ex rel. Emerson v. Gramley, 883 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff\u2019d, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996). Contrary to the position taken by this court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that \"Emerson\u2019s waiver of his procedural rights at the sentencing hearing [could not] be considered a knowing waiver to which he should be held.\u201d Emerson, 91 F.3d at 906. The court reached this conclusion by noting that Emerson\u2019s counsel had not undertaken any investigation into the possible existence of mitigating evidence. Without such an investigation, the court stressed, defense counsel could not adequately advise Emerson on whether he should present evidence in mitigation. Emerson, 91 F.3d at 906. The Seventh Circuit further emphasized that neither counsel nor the trial court warned Emerson of \"the fell consequences of failing to establish some mitigating circumstances without which (because the evidence of aggravating circumstances was overwhelming) a sentence of death was certain unless the jury disobeyed the judge\u2019s instructions.\u201d Emerson, 91 F.3d at 906. As a result, the decision to forgo the presentation of mitigating evidence could not be considered a \"knowing\u201d waiver; therefore, Emerson was entitled to a new sentencing hearing.\nIn light of the recent developments in Emerson, defendant submits that he, too, could not have knowingly waived his right to present additional mitigating evidence. Defendant points out that his attorney, like Emerson\u2019s, did not conduct an investigation into possible sources of mitigation. He further states that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel would be meaningless if courts were to condone an attorney\u2019s failure to investigate and prepare for a capital sentencing hearing. We agree.\nThe record in the instant case reveals that although defendant understood the concept of mitigation, he was never advised of the considerable quantity of mitigating evidence available for presentation to the court, including the opinions of several expert witnesses who now believe that defendant suffers from various psychological and neurological impairments. The reason defendant was not informed of this evidence was because his attorney never conducted an investigation into possible sources of mitigation. Without such an investigation, defense counsel was not in a position to provide defendant with a realistic assessment of all available options. Thus, when defendant indicated to the trial court that he did not wish to present any other testimony at the sentencing hearing, he did so without a full appreciation of the nature and extent of the mitigating evidence that could be presented on his behalf. See Emerson, 91 F.3d 898. Indeed, that it is questionable whether defendant fully understood the potential consequences of his decision to forgo the presentation of additional mitigating evidence can be readily seen from the paucity of evidence that he did present. Defendant\u2019s entire mitigation defense consisted of his own statement to the court as well as a few answers to questions posed by counsel, all of which now comprise approximately eight pages of transcript. Such meager testimony at a capital sentencing hearing can hardly be deemed the equivalent of a fully presented mitigation defense, one that is complete with the testimony of relatives, colleagues and psychological experts. In fact, defendant\u2019s brief, self-serving and at times rambling account of his drug usage, which in this case is tantamount to the presentation of no evidence at all, clearly demonstrates that defendant failed to appreciate the gravity of his decision to limit his mitigation defense. This failure is critical, for as this court stated in People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 194 (1992), \"[m]itigating evidence is extremely important under the Illinois capital sentencing scheme.\u201d Accordingly, we reject the State\u2019s argument that defendant \"knowingly\u201d waived the right to present additional evidence at the sentencing hearing under the circumstances of this case.\nHaving found waiver inapplicable, we now turn to the merits of defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The standard for determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his or her right to effective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing hearing is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, absent the errors, the judge \" \u2019would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.\u2019 \u201d People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 144 (1996), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Applying this standard to the case at bar, we initially determine whether counsel\u2019s decision to forgo an investigation into defendant\u2019s background, including the possibility that defendant may have suffered from psychological and neurological impairments, was supported by reasonable professional judgment.\nIn People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 149 (1995), we held that an attorney \"has only a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision which makes particular investigations unnecessary, and the reasonableness of a decision to investigate is assessed applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel\u2019s judgment.\u201d People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 149 (1995), citing People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 158 (1989). We recognized in that case that an attorney\u2019s decision not to pursue an endless investigation into defendant\u2019s background could, under some circumstances, be deemed tactical. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d at 149. For instance, where the facts and circumstances do not reveal a sound basis for further inquiry into a particular area, an attorney\u2019s decision to limit the scope of the investigation will not be deemed ineffective representation. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d at 150, citing People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d 356, 371 (1995). On the other hand, \" 'case law rejects the notion that a \"strategic\u201d decision can be reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.\u2019 \u201d Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1514 (11th Cir. 1995), quoting Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991). In other words, the decision not to investigate must be the product of an informed judgment. See generally Orange, 168 Ill. 2d at 149.\nOur review of the record in the instant case reveals that counsel\u2019s decision to forgo an investigation was neither the product of an informed judgment nor a strategic decision reached after weighing all available options. Rather, as counsel explained in his affidavit, the sole reason he had not made an investigation prior to trial was because he \"expected to get sufficient time to investigate, prepare and present mitigation\u201d in the event defendant would be found guilty. He then had less than 24 hours to prepare his mitigation evidence after the court found defendant guilty of all charges. Courts from other jurisdictions have, under similar circumstances, proclaimed that \"[i]t should be beyond cavil that an attorney who fails altogether to make any preparations for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial deprives his client of reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any objective standard of reasonableness.\u201d Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 763 (11th Cir. 1989). We agree with the Blake court and hold that counsel\u2019s failure in this case to conduct an investigation into potential sources of mitigation fell below the minimum level of competent representation. We emphasize, however, that our decision on this issue is limited solely to the unique facts of this case. We further caution that if a \" 'decision not to mount an all-out investigation ... [is] supported by reasonable professional judgment,\u2019 it is not ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d Stewart v. Gram-ley, 74 F.3d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1996), quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638, 657, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126 (1987).\nWe next determine whether defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of his attorney\u2019s failure to conduct an adequate investigation, and hence his failure to present a full mitigation defense. We note that defendant\u2019s amended post-conviction petition was ruled upon by the same judge who presided over the trial in this matter. He was also the same judge who sentenced defendant to death. After thoroughly reviewing all of the mitigation material submitted in support of the amended petition, the trial judge denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. The judge ruled that \"there [were] no justifiable grounds upon which relief can be granted defendant.\u201d Having undertaken our own review of the record, we do not believe that the trial judge abused his discretion in this regard.\nAt the time of sentencing, defendant stood convicted of the brutal rape and murder of Barbara Doyle. Medical evidence presented at trial revealed the presence of semen in Barbara\u2019s vagina and rectum. The report of the post-mortem examination further indicated that defendant had stabbed and slashed Barbara 34 times over various parts of her body. Most of the more serious wounds were located on her head, face and chest. The medical examiner also found several abrasions at the bridge of her nose and on her chin. In addition to the rape, sodomy and repeated stabbing of the victim, the State also introduced defendant\u2019s criminal record into evidence. Defendant had been convicted of robbery, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and two separate incidents of criminal trespass to a vehicle. Based on the foregoing evidence, the circuit court determined that the only appropriate sentence was death. As the court noted at the original sentencing hearing, \"[t]he repeated acts of savagery perpetrated on the middle-aged woman requires a sentence to meet the severity of the crime against her. Any less, or term of years in the penitentiary!,] would encourage other criminals to repeat this kind of behavior on innocent victims in our society.\u201d\nIn contrast to the State\u2019s evidence, defendant, in his amended post-conviction petition, submitted expert testimony relating to his chronic use of drugs and alcohol. Defendant further sought to show the negative effects that such abuse had on his psychological and neurological health. However, this court, like others, has recognized that a history of substance abuse is a double-edged sword at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the penalty hearing. For example, in People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 159 (1996), we stated that \"[s]imply because the defendant views his drug abuse history as mitigating does not require the sentencer to do so.\u201d In Shatner, as in the instant case, defendant claimed that the sentencing judge should have found that defendant\u2019s history of drug abuse was a factor relating to his criminal behavior. We rejected that argument on the following grounds:\n\"Underlying this premise is that since drugs are partly to blame for his actions, the defendant is somehow less culpable and should not suffer the ultimate penalty for his criminal behavior. Simply stated, the sentencing judge was under no legal obligation to subscribe to this suggestion. To the contrary, the sentencing judge was free to conclude, under the circumstances, that defendant\u2019s drug history simply had no mitigating value but was, in fact, aggravating.\u201d Shatner, 174 111. 2d at 160.\nConsistent with our opinion in Shatner, we do not believe that the trial judge in this case was required to view the purported negative effects of defendant\u2019s chronic abuse of drugs and alcohol as a mitigating factor.\nFurthermore, with respect to the impairment of defendant\u2019s neurological functions, this court has repeatedly held that \"information about a defendant\u2019s mental or psychological impairments is not inherently mitigating.\u201d People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997), citing People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491-92 (1996). As we explained in Tenner, \"[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.\u201d Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d at 382 (citing People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1995), People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467-68 (1995), and People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 272-73 (1991)). Even if we were to consider defendant\u2019s alleged psychological and neurological impairments as mitigating factors, \"[mjitigation evidence of a defendant\u2019s cognitive abilities and mental health does not preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by aggravating evidence.\u201d People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 286 (1997), citing People v. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 460 (1994) .\nSimilarly, the remainder of the evidence offered by defendant carries little, if any, weight in terms of mitigation. For example, defendant\u2019s employment history was erratic at best. We note that defendant never held a job for very long, often being fired as a result of his arrests for various crimes. As to defendant\u2019s somewhat troubled childhood, the trial court in this case was free to conclude \"that it simply had no mitigating value but may have been, in fact, actually aggravating.\u201d People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 337 (1992). Moreover, \"evidence that a defendant has been physically or sexually abused *** does not invalidate a death sentence when outweighed by aggravating evidence.\u201d People.v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d at 286, citing People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414 (1995) . Finally, although defendant\u2019s good behavior during incarceration may be viewed as a mitigating circurhstance, we do not consider that evidence sufficiently offsetting in light of the aggravating circumstances in this case.\nIn view of the foregoing, we hold that defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of his sentencing hearing would have been different if his attorney had investigated and prepared more adequately for the aggravation /mitigation phase of the trial. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that defendant\u2019s attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing.\nB. Failure to Inform Defendant of Nonunanimity Rule\nDefendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him, prior to waiving a jury for sentencing, that the jury\u2019s decision to impose the death penalty had to be unanimous. This contention is similar to an argument defendant raised on direct appeal. There, defendant claimed that the trial court erred by accepting his waiver of the jury without first informing him of the \"nonunanimity\u201d rule, as it is sometimes referred to. We rejected that argument in toto, noting that this court had already \"declined *** to adopt a requirement that trial courts must inform a defendant of the jury unanimity requirement before accepting jury waivers at capital sentencing hearings.\u201d People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220 (1985), citing People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984).\nNow, in a slightly different argument, defendant maintains that his attorney, as opposed to the trial court, should have informed him of the nonunanimity rule. Defendant claims that his attorney\u2019s failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As the State correctly points out, however, this court rejected a similar contention in People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1 (1989). In that case, this court stated in pertinent part:\n\"[W]e do not consider that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the defendant of the nonunanimity rule, assuming that allegation to be true. The defendant knew of his right to have a jury during the sentencing phase of the proceedings, and the record reveals that he waived the right knowingly and voluntarily. The defendant does not allege that he would not have waived his right to a jury had he known of the nonunanimity rule.\u201d Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d at 21.\nDefendant attempts to circumvent the holding in Ruiz by focusing solely on the last sentence quoted above. Defendant here claims that, unlike the defendant in Ruiz, he would not have waived his right to be sentenced by a jury had his attorney informed him of the nonunanimity rule.\nIn our view, defendant places too much emphasis on the isolated comment in Ruiz concerning defendant\u2019s failure to allege that he would have waived a jury at the sentencing hearing. The court\u2019s holding in Ruiz, that counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform his client that a jury had to reach a unanimous decision, was based primarily on this court\u2019s rejection of \"a requirement that a defendant be expressly advised of the nonunanimity rule *** as a condition of a valid jury waiver at a capital sentencing hearing.\u201d Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d at 20-21 (citing People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271 (1987), and People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985)). The holding in Ruiz was not limited solely to defendants who failed to allege that they would have opted for a jury. Thus, the fact that defendant here claims he would have requested a jury had he known of the nonunanimity rule does not compel a different result from that of Ruiz. Therefore, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him that a sentencing jury had to reach a unanimous decision. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d at 21.\nC. Error in Stipulating to Death Eligibility\nDefendant further claims that his counsel rendered ineffective representation at the sentencing hearing when counsel stipulated that defendant knew, at the time he killed Barbara, that his conduct created a strong probability of death. The record reflects that during the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel specifically told the court that \"[i]t is our position that [defendant] did not murder the individual intentionally as the act created \u2014 that he did create a strong probability of death, that was his testimony at trial.\u201d Defendant points out that, in order for him to be death eligible, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted either \"intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.\u201d See 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(6)(b). Defendant now argues that his counsel erred by conceding that defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death when in fact defendant had proceeded at trial under the theory of diminished mental capacity.\nInitially, we reject this argument as being waived due to defendant\u2019s failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. See People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989). Defendant, however, argues in his brief that his appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting this argument when the matter-previously came before this court. Thus, we will address the merits of the claim in the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 474 (1995).\nBecause claims of ineffective appellate counsel are reviewed under the Strickland standard (see People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 523 (1995)), we need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness if defendant cannot show prejudice resulting from the actions of his counsel. People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 231 (1997) (noting that counsel\u2019s concession of death eligibility is subject to the analysis employed in Strickland rather than United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984)). After reviewing the record in the instant case, we do not believe that defendant has made the requisite showing of prejudice to him caused by ineffective assistance of counsel. Significantly, the trial judge in this case did not base his findings of death eligibility on the basis of counsel\u2019s statement, but rather on the evidence presented at trial. The trial judge noted: \"I believe that those factors [rendering defendant death eligible] have been clearly established in overwhelming nature by the State\u2019s evidence ***.\u201d From these comments, it is clear that defendant\u2019s contention that his eligibility hearing might have been different had his attorney not conceded his state of mind is doubtful at best. Because counsel\u2019s purported concession to the court had little, if any, impact on the judgment in this case, defendant has not shown that he suffered any prejudice. \"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Consequently, we do not find that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.\nIneffective Assistance of Counsel at Trial\nA. Failure to Advise Defendant of Right Not to Testify\nWe are next asked to consider whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney told him that he had to testify during the guilt and innocence stage of the proceedings. According to defendant, counsel never explained to him that he had a right not to testify. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). Nor did counsel explain to him the implications of his decision to testify in his case in chief. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992). Instead, counsel merely told him that he \"must testify *** but gave no reasons.\u201d As a result, \"not only was he denied his constitutional rights, but his testimony provided the prosecution with the only eyewitness in an otherwise circumstantial case.\u201d\nIn response, the State offers three arguments to counter defendant\u2019s allegation that he had no input into counsel\u2019s decision to put him on the stand. First, the State argues that defendant testified voluntarily. In support of this argument, the State points out that defendant never told the trial judge that he did not want to testify, nor did he ever complain of coercion or threats. In addition, the State directs our attention to closing arguments, where defense counsel specifically told the court, \u201cWe heard [defendant] testify, and he did so voluntarily and on his own accord ***.\u201d The State concludes that \"[although defense counsel may have told defendant that he 'must\u2019 testify, this simply meant that it was in defendant\u2019s best interests to testify, given the evidence at hand.\u201d\nAlthough facially appealing, we do not believe that we can, at this juncture in the litigation, decide this issue in the manner suggested by the State. As noted at the outset, the matter is before this court on dismissal of defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Given this procedural posture of the case, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and affidavits are to be taken as true. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 259 (1989). Accordingly, we must accept as true defendant\u2019s averment that he played no part in counsel\u2019s decision to have him take the stand.\nThe State next responds that counsel\u2019s decision to have defendant testify can be viewed merely as trial strategy. According to the State, counsel knew that the evidence against defendant was overwhelming and that the only potentially successful defense was either (i) a claim of lack of intent due to the ingestion of drugs and alcohol or (ii) a claim of self-defense. In either case, defendant\u2019s testimony would be necessary since he was the only eyewitness to the crime. The State further asserts that defendant\u2019s attorney could later utilize that same testimony at sentencing in order to show that defendant lacked the requisite mental state for death eligibility. In the State\u2019s view, because the decision to have defendant testify constituted a matter of trial strategy, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective. We disagree with this argument for the following reasons.\nA defendant\u2019s right to testify at trial is a fundamental constitutional right, as is his or her right to choose not to testify. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). It is now generally recognized that the decision whether to testify ultimately rests with the defendant. People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 227 (1994); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 177 (1994). Therefore, it \"is not one of those matters which is considered a strategic or tactical decision best left to trial counsel.\u201d People v. Seaberg, 262 Ill. App. 3d 79, 83 (1994), citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 993, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983); People v. Wilson, 146 Ill. App. 3d 567, 580 (1986), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 121 Ill. 2d 585 (1988); People v. Campbell, 129 Ill. App. 3d 819, 821 (1984). See also People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54 (1992); People v. Anderson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 947, 956 (1994); People v. Daniels, 230 Ill. App. 3d 527, 535 (1992); People v. von Perbandt, 221 Ill. App. 3d 951, 954-55 (1991); People v. Dredge, 148 Ill. App. 3d 911, 913 (1986). Consequently, even though counsel\u2019s decision requiring defendant to testify in this case may be explained in terms of trial strategy, it cannot be justified on those grounds. Only the defendant may waive his right to testify. Seaberg, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 83; see also Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54.\nFinally, the State argues that even if we were to hold that counsel could not unilaterally require defendant to testify under the guise of trial strategy, defendant has still failed to satisfy the prejudice component of the Strickland analysis. We agree. We do not believe that the absence of defendant\u2019s testimony would create a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial. The voluminous and largely uncontro-verted evidence revealed that defendant was driving the victim\u2019s car over 80 miles an hour as he led police officers on a high-speed chase. When the police finally apprehended defendant, he was covered with blood. The murder weapon, which was later identified by a State\u2019s witness as the knife defendant had previously taken from a party, was found in the victim\u2019s car. The victim\u2019s bloody blouse and pants were also found in the car. Defendant\u2019s own explanation to the police as to how he came to be in the victim\u2019s car proved to be a sham. James Bunker, testifying that \"Hojamoto\u201d was a fictitious character, completely undermined defendant\u2019s fabricated explanation to the police, as did the testimony of several other witnesses who placed defendant with the victim prior to her death. The State aptly points out that \"[ejvery bit of this evidence, save for the impeachment evidence during defendant\u2019s cross-examination, would have been introduced, regardless of whether defendant testified, and, in fact, was introduced during the People\u2019s case-in-chief.\u201d Collectively, this evidence leads to the one, inescapable conclusion that defendant was the person who committed these crimes.\nIn view of the compelling nature of the foregoing evidence, defendant cannot demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from his attorney\u2019s alleged coercion to testify. As a result, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).\nB. Failure to Corroborate Diminished Capacity Defense\nDefendant next maintains that even if this court were to disagree with him concerning counsel\u2019s decision to have him testify, the record nevertheless demonstrates that his attorney provided ineffective representation throughout the remainder of the trial. For example, defendant contends that once \"the decision was made to have [him] testify it was imperative that his testimony be corroborated and that independent lay and expert testimony supporting a defense of diminished capacity be presented.\u201d In support of this argument, defendant suggests that his attorney should have questioned a second waitress from the Golden Flame restaurant, Jane Sparks, concerning a statement she made to the police. In the statement, Sparks indicated that defendant and the victim \u201dappear[ed] to be high on something.\u201d Defendant further argues that his attorney erred by not having his brother and three acquaintances take the stand on defendant\u2019s behalf. According to defendant, these witnesses could have testified as to defendant\u2019s history of drug and alcohol abuse. Defendant also submits that his attorney should have called Dr. O\u2019Donnell as an expert witness. Defendant believes that testimony from Dr. O\u2019Donnell would have confirmed that Barbara had ingested either heroin, morphine or codeine shortly before her death. Finally, defendant points out that a police inventory sheet disclosed that a \"bag containing crushed green plant\u201d had been confiscated at the scene of the crime, but was later misplaced by the police. Defendant believes that his attorney should have offered the inventory sheet into evidence to corroborate his story that drugs did indeed play a part in Barbara\u2019s murder. According to defendant, his attorney\u2019s failure to present the foregoing corroborative evidence resulted in the denial of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. We find this argument unpersuasive.\nIt is well established that decisions concerning which witnesses to call at trial and what evidence to present on defendant\u2019s behalf ultimately rest with trial counsel. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 53-55 (1992). Such decisions have long been viewed as matters of trial strategy (People v. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 543-44 (1980)), which are generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995); see also People v. Gosier, 165 Ill. 2d 16, 22 (1995) (noting that strategic choices are virtually unchallengeable); People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994) (same)). This general rule is predicated upon our recognition that the right to effective assistance of counsel refers to \"competent, not perfect representation. \u201d People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 492 (1984). Hence, \" '[m]istakes in trial strategy or tactics or in judgment do not of themselves render the representation incompetent.\u2019 \u201d People v. Hillenbrand, 121 Ill. 2d 537, 548 (1988). The only exception to this rule is when counsel\u2019s chosen trial strategy is so unsound that \"counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing.\u201d Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 394, citing People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449, 464 (1985), citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 666, 104 S. a. 2039, 2045 (1984). In our view, the above principles have particular resonance when applied to the case at bar.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s position, our review of the record reveals that counsel\u2019s trial strategy cannot be viewed as so unsound as to lead us to believe that he did not fulfill his obligation to provide a meaningful adversarial testing of the State\u2019s case. In fact, defendant\u2019s attorney presented ample evidence in support of his theory that defendant suffered from a diminished mental capacity. James Bunker testified that he and defendant began drinking beer at approximately 9 o\u2019clock on the morning in question. He and defendant then went to a party at a local forest preserve, where they continued to drink alcohol until early afternoon. The two men eventually drove to a friend\u2019s house later in the afternoon to have a few more beers. When asked by defense counsel whether defendant was intoxicated, Bunker replied, \"Yes, more or less. He had a few.\u201d Defense counsel later utilized Bunker\u2019s testimony during closing arguments when he reminded the court that defendant had \"starting drinking \u2014 starting doing drugs as early as about 9:00 o\u2019clock that Saturday morning.\u201d\nThe record also contains the testimony of Jacque Garceau, the bartender at the Garage Inn tavern, and George Moraitis, one of its patrons. Although both of these witnesses testified on behalf of the State, defense counsel did, during cross-examination, elicit evidence which was highly relevant to defendant\u2019s diminished capacity defense. Garceau, for example, acknowledged that at one point in the evening defendant had fallen asleep on his bar stool while drinking. Moraitis, meanwhile, agreed with defense counsel that defendant appeared to be high \"on some kind of drug or whatever.\u201d In fact, Moraitis described defendant as a \"maniac\u201d:\n\"Well, the defendant was \u2014 he was walking around, was very hypersensitive, spaced out or something, and he was going by the telephone and was trying to call somebody up and he put the telephone back up there, up on the dial, on the hook and he was infuriated or something. He started shaking the telephone off the wall. He was very hypersensitive, he was very \u2014 like a maniac. It is unbelievable.\u201d\nThus, the record amply demonstrates that counsel, in furtherance of his theory of diminished capacity, elicited testimony from witnesses who directly observed defendant\u2019s drinking and behavior during the immediate hours preceding Barbara\u2019s murder.\nIn contrast to this evidence, defendant now insists that his attorney should have questioned another waitress from the Golden Flame restaurant concerning her statement to police, i.e., that defendant and Barbara \"appeared\u201d to be \"high.\u201d However, even if this witness had been called to the stand, and further assuming that she testified consistent with her prior out-of-court statement, her testimony would have been merely cumulative of the in-court testimony offered by Bunker, Garceau and Moraitis. Moreover, the statement itself is equivocal on its face because it, at most, indicates that defendant and the victim \"appeared\u201d to be high. Consequently, counsel\u2019s decision not to question the waitress about her prior statement to the police can hardly be viewed as a grave error in trial strategy.\nSimilarly, having defendant\u2019s brother and his three friends take the stand would not, in our view, have made a significant impact on the diminished-capacity defense. Their testimony, the substance of which has been presented to this court pursuant to an offer of proof, pertains only to defendant\u2019s use of drugs and alcohol on other occasions. Notably, none of these witnesses were with defendant during the critical hours leading up to Barbara\u2019s murder. As a result, they could not have testified as to defendant\u2019s drug and alcohol consumption at that time. As noted above, Bunker, Garceau and Mo-raitis all observed defendant on the day in question. Their testimony, therefore, was far more probative on the issue of whether defendant\u2019s mental capacity was diminished at the time he killed Barbara than was the testimony of defendant\u2019s brother and his friends.\nAs to defendant\u2019s assertion that his attorney erred by not presenting any expert witnesses, we seriously doubt whether Dr. O\u2019Donnell\u2019s proffered testimony would have had an impact on the outcome of this case. First, any testimony regarding Barbara\u2019s consumption of drugs and alcohol would have had little, if any, relevance in determining whether defendant himself suffered from a diminished mental capacity. Second, even if Dr. O\u2019Donnell had been called as a witness, his testimony would have been limited to the findings presented in the toxicologist\u2019s report. Although that report itself has not been made a part of the record for this appeal, it was admitted into evidence by way of stipulation. The record reflects that the report included a specific finding of 14.6 micrograms per millimeter of morphine in Barbara\u2019s bile. Consequently, defense counsel had no reason to call Dr. O\u2019Donnell. Indeed, the toxicology report itself already corroborated defendant\u2019s claim regarding Barbara\u2019s consumption of drugs and alcohol. Finally, we consider any alleged error on counsel\u2019s part for failing to introduce the police inventory sheet referring to a \"bag containing crushed green plant\u201d barred by the doctrine of res judicata, that issue having been previously litigated on direct appeal. See Madej, 106 Ill. 2d at 214.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present additional evidence supporting his claim of diminished mental capacity.\nC. Failure to Obtain Timely Ruling on Motion to Suppress\nIn a completely different vein, defendant faults his lawyer for failing to obtain a ruling on a motion to suppress his custodial statements prior to having him take the stand at trial. In order to fully evaluate this claim, we must set forth some additional background facts. Shortly before trial, defendant\u2019s attorney filed a combined motion to suppress and motion to quash arrest. In the motion, defendant sought to exclude certain tangible evidence recovered by the police. That motion, however, was never ruled on prior to the commencement of the trial. During the trial, defendant took the stand on his own behalf and testified as to the events leading up to his arrest. Specifically, defendant stated that he had killed Barbara only after she attempted to steal his drugs. This in-court testimony differed significantly from defendant\u2019s original statement to the police, in which defendant tried to shift responsibility for the crimes to his friend \"Hojamoto.\u201d Defendant further testified that certain police officers had beaten him during questioning. At that point, the circuit court converted the trial into a hearing on the combined motion to suppress and motion to quash arrest. After hearing further testimony, the court denied the motion and resumed the trial.\nDefendant now asserts that his trial counsel should have obtained a ruling on the motion to suppress prior to advising defendant to testify in his case in chief. By failing to do so, defendant argues, the State was later able to impeach defendant\u2019s trial testimony with his prior inconsistent statements to the police. Defendant suggests that there are only two possible explanations as to why counsel failed in this regard: (i) counsel did not know the substance of defendant\u2019s in-custody statements, or (ii) counsel did not consider their impeachment value very important. Defendant submits that, regardless of which of the two explanations this court accepts, his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, defendant contends that, when counsel finally did argue the motion to suppress, he did so ineffectively because he failed to seek suppression of defendant\u2019s \"Hojamoto\u201d statement on the ground that defendant was mistreated while in police custody. Specifically, defendant argues that his attorney erred by not presenting pathological evidence to corroborate his claim that police officers struck him in the head with a flashlight during his interrogation.\nInitially, we note that defendant never sought the suppression of any statements he made while in custody, nor did he raise such a challenge on direct appeal. Therefore, the issue is waived. See Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d at 9. Even so, because defendant also challenges the effectiveness of his appellate counsel for. not preserving the issue, we will proceed to the merits of his claim. See People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 474 (1995).\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contention, we agree with the State that counsel\u2019s decision not to seek a ruling on the motion to suppress prior to calling defendant to the stand does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant cannot satisfy Strickland\u2019s prejudice requirement. As previously noted, defendant\u2019s motion to suppress did not seek the suppression of inculpatory statements made by defendant, but instead sought only to suppress certain tangible evidence. Because defendant\u2019s in-custody statements were not the subject of the motion, a ruling in favor of the defendant would not have made a difference with respect to the State\u2019s ability to impeach him with his prior inconsistent statements. Furthermore, even if counsel had sought to suppress defendant\u2019s statements in the motion, the motion itself was patently without merit. During the hearing on the motion, defendant claimed that police physically abused him while he was in custody. Specifically, defendant accused Detective James Grant of hitting him on the head with a flashlight. On cross-examination, however, defendant admitted that he had received a head wound at a party approximately one week prior to killing Barbara. In addition, defendant\u2019s accusations of police mistreatment were also discredited by the testimony of the interrogating officers. For example, Detective Grant, who testified at the suppression hearing, was specifically asked whether \"on August 23, 1981, when you were in the interview room with the Defendant, either with Detective Dolan or by yourself, did you physically abuse the Defendant in any way?\u201d Detective Grant answered, \"No, Sir.\u201d The State further asked Detective Grant whether he had struck defendant in any manner, either with or without a flashlight, on any part of his body, including his head. Detective Grant again replied, \"No, Sir.\u201d\nBased on this evidence, the court concluded that defendant presented no \"believable\u201d or \"credible\u201d evidence in support of his motion to suppress. Consequently, the court denied the motion on its merits, a decision which we believe was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Under these circumstances, defendant could not have suffered any prejudice as a result of his attorney\u2019s failure to obtain an early ruling on the motion to suppress. That motion, which did not even seek to suppress defendant\u2019s statements, was destined to be denied.\nIn a related argument, defendant maintains that his trial attorney should have cited a \"significant line of authority [which] holds that in determining whether a statement was voluntarily made it is improper for a trial court to disregard a defendant\u2019s uncontroverted testimony.\u201d See People v. Rhoads, 73 Ill. App. 3d 288, 309 (1979); People v. Peck, 18 Ill. App. 3d 112,116 (1974); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513, 83 S. Ct. 1336 (1963). Defendant points out that (i) he testified during the suppression hearing that police denied his requests for food, medical attention, a visit and a telephone call, and (ii) the State never rebutted this testimony. Defendant submits that his attorney\u2019s failure to cite the aforementioned legal authority in connection with his uncontroverted testimony resulted in the denial of effective assistance of counsel. We find this argument unpersuasive for two reasons.\nFirst, even if we were to agree with defendant that the trial court in this case could not disregard his testimony, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the alleged denial of defendant\u2019s request for food and medical attention had anything to do with defendant\u2019s decision to speak with the police. In fact, defendant\u2019s \"Hojamoto\u201d statement appears to be a deliberate attempt on the part of the defendant to steer the police in the direction of another suspect. Second, even if the \"Hojamoto\u201d statement had been suppressed, it would not have changed the outcome in this case in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial. Hence, defendant cannot show prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).\nD. Failure to Introduce 911 Tape Recording\nDefendant next contends that his trial counsel erred by not presenting as a defense the possibility that another person may have been involved in the crimes. In support of this contention, defendant relies upon a 911 tape recording which contains the conversation between the police officers who pursued defendant and the police dispatcher who coordinated the pursuit. That recording purportedly referred to \"two male white suspects in the car.\u201d Defendant believes that the \"[introduction of the 911 tapes would have raised a reasonable doubt about whether [he] was guilty of all or some of [his] crimes.\u201d\nDue to defendant\u2019s failure to raise this argument either on direct appeal or in his amended petition for post-conviction relief, this argument is waived. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (1993), citing People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264 (1992). We further find no reason to excuse defendant\u2019s waiver under the exception for plain error. See generally People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1980).\nE. Cumulative Error\nFinally, defendant argues that his trial attorney committed a plethora of errors due to his inexperience in trying criminal matters. According to defendant, these errors include \"attempts to learn the basic facts of the case from the State\u2019s witnesses, ineffective cross-examination, ignorance of the adverse witness rule, ignorance on how to impeach a witness with a prior conviction, and attempts to elicit testimony, sometimes successful, that were harmful to the defense.\u201d Defendant submits that commission of the errors, cumulatively, resulted in a denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel throughout the trial proceedings. We disagree.\nAfter undertaking a thorough review of each of these errors, both individually and collectively, we conclude that defendant\u2019s contention regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. In fact, we find nothing in the record to support defendant\u2019s claim that the alleged errors in this case were the product of an inexperienced trial counsel. We are mindful of the fact that \"[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel\u2019s performance must be highly deferential\u201d and that \" '[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel\u2019s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel\u2019s perspective at the time.\u2019 \u201d Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 393, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Having eliminated the distortion of hindsight in this case, we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness on the basis of the foregoing trial errors.\nIneffective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal\nIn addition to challenging the preceding errors, all of which concern counsel\u2019s performance at trial, defendant also challenges numerous errors allegedly committed by his appellate counsel. We shall, however, limit our present discussion to only those errors which are adequately supported by citation to the record and applicable legal precedent.\nA. State\u2019s Failure to Preserve Exculpatory I Mitigating Evidence\nDefendant maintains that his appellate counsel should have argued, on direct appeal, that defendant was denied due process of law as a result of the State\u2019s failure to preserve two pieces of evidence: (i) a prescription pill bottle bearing Barbara\u2019s name, and (ii) a bag containing \"crushed green plant.\u201d Defendant\u2019s arguments concerning the bag of green plant were previously rejected by this court on direct appeal and, therefore, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Madej, 106 Ill. 2d at 214. With respect to the pill bottle, the record shows that although several of the investigating officers had noticed a small plastic bottle on the front seat of Barbara\u2019s car, they never included the bottle in the police inventory. Defendant claims that had the police properly inventoried the bottle, his counsel could have offered the bottle into evidence and substantiated his claim that he and Barbara were intoxicated at the time of the murder. We disagree.\nFirst, the record already contained substantial evidence of Barbara\u2019s intoxication at the time of her death, not the least of which was the toxicologist\u2019s report showing significant amounts of morphine in Barbara\u2019s bile. Introduction of the pill bottle, therefore, would have only provided an explanation as to the source of Barbara\u2019s intoxication, a fact which was already accepted by the trial court. Second, introduction of the pill bottle would not have substantiated defendant\u2019s claim of his own diminished capacity. Despite the fact that defendant himself took the stand, he never testified that he had ingested any of the drugs purportedly contained in the bottle. Thus, even if the State had preserved the pill bottle, its introduction into evidence would not have changed the outcome in this case.\nB. Trial Court\u2019s Consideration of Matters Dehors the Record\nThe next argument for our consideration centers around certain comments made by the trial judge during the hearing on the motion to suppress. The record in this case reveals that, after reviewing photographs of defendant\u2019s head, the trial judge remarked that defendant\u2019s wound did not appear consistent with his claim of being struck by a flashlight. Specifically, the trial judge stated that \"a flashlight would normally leave a bruise, not a scratch.\u201d The court also referred to the fact that defendant\u2019s wound was \"heavily laden with scab formation showing an old wound,\u201d thereby giving credence to the State\u2019s theory that defendant\u2019s wound was inflicted prior to his incarceration. Defendant believes that the trial court, in making those comments, impermissibly relied on matters \"outside the record.\u201d See People v. White, 183 Ill. App. 3d 838, 841 (1989) (holding that the \"ability to examine a cut and determine the instrument that made it is beyond the province of common knowledge\u201d). Defendant further concludes that his appellate counsel erred in not raising this argument on appeal. Again, we disagree.\nThe sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel does not mandate that appellate counsel \" 'raise every conceivable argument which might be made, and counsel\u2019s assessment of what to raise and argue will not be questioned unless it can be said that his judgment in this regard was patently erroneous.\u2019 \u201d Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d at 523, quoting People v. Collins, 153 Ill. 2d 130, 140 (1992). In this case, appellate counsel\u2019s decision not to raise an argument with respect to the trial judge\u2019s speculation about defendant\u2019s wound was not patently erroneous. As we have pointed out elsewhere in this opinion, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing strongly supported the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Throughout this post-conviction proceeding, defendant has repeatedly focused solely on his own self-serving testimony of what transpired during the police interrogation. Defendant, however, overlooks the fact that his credibility was severely assailed by the State during cross-examination. For example, after claiming that he had received a head wound at the hands of the police, defendant acknowledged being hit in the head with a bottle a few days earlier. In addition, defendant originally told the court that the wound caused by the bottle was so inconsequential that he never sought any medical attention. Under the pressure of cross-examination, however, defendant changed his story, admitting that he had in fact gone to a local hospital. Needless to say, \"[ijnconsistencies in defendant\u2019s testimony reflect adversely upon his credibility.\u201d People v. West, 137 Ill. 2d 558, 583 (1990).\nIt is, of course, \"the function of the trial judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses at a suppression hearing and to resolve any conflicts in their testimony.\u201d People v. Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d 409, 422 (1995). We simply will not usurp the trial judge\u2019s role in this case and ignore his express finding that defendant presented no \"believable\u201d or \"credible\u201d evidence in support of his motion to suppress. Because we do not believe that the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been different had the trial judge not speculated upon the age or origin of defendant\u2019s head wound, we reject defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective appellate representation.\nIn two related arguments, defendant accuses the trial court of engaging in improper speculation when it (i) \"determined that the blemishes on the decedent\u2019s body shown in the autopsy photographs were caused by decedent being run over by a tire\u201d and (ii) \"determined in the absence of expert testimony that [defendant] could not have consumed the amount of alcohol and drugs he testified to having consumed on the date of the incident and to have engaged in a high speed chase with the police, jumped over a fence, and hid under a car.\u201d This latter argument was rejected on direct appeal (Madej, 106 Ill. 2d at 216-17); further argument, therefore, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata (People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987)). As for the autopsy photographs, we agree with the State that the trial court never stated that it believed that defendant had run over Barbara\u2019s body. Rather, the trial court merely asked counsel if he could explain why there were \"gray and black and blue markings\u201d on the victim\u2019s legs. We find no error in the trial court\u2019s asking this question.\nC. Misstatement of the Evidence\nDefendant next challenges a statement made by the prosecutor regarding a tear in the victim\u2019s pants. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated the victim\u2019s jeans were \"torn.\u201d Defendant claims that the pants were cut, not \"torn.\u201d We note, however, that \"prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument and improper remarks will not merit reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice to the accused.\u201d People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 30 (1996). We fail to see how the prosecutor\u2019s characterization of the victim\u2019s pants constitutes reversible error in this case.\nD. Errors During Sentencing\nDefendant further argues that the State had an obligation to inform the trial court of the fact that the State had offered defendant an 80-year prison term in exchange for a guilty plea. Defendant suggests that such an offer constitutes mitigating evidence. Defendant has cited no legal authority for this proposition; therefore, the argument is waived. 155 Ill. 2d R. 341; People v. Felella, 131 Ill. 2d 525, 540 (1989).\nDefendant also contends that the defendant\u2019s lack of any significant criminal history is a mitigating factor which precludes the imposition of the death penalty as a matter of law. We previously rejected this argument on direct appeal (Madej, 106 Ill. 2d at 221); therefore, the argument is barred (People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1987)).\nMiscellaneous Arguments\nA. Reduction in Sentence\nBased upon the mitigating evidence presented in the amended petition for post-conviction relief, defendant requests this court to reduce his sentence to a term of years. We decline to do so. The determination of the propriety of a death sentence in any particular case \" 'requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.\u2019 \u201d People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 201 (1992), quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976). Accordingly, although we will conduct a thorough evaluation of the record when reviewing a sentence of death, we will not lightly overturn the trier of fact\u2019s findings where those findings are amply supported by the record. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 201; People v. Odie, 128 Ill. 2d 111, 130-32 (1988). See also People v. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d 484, 506 (1985) (holding that supreme court\u2019s limited authority upon review does not permit reversal where \"there is no indication that the [sentencer] imposed the penalty on other than a reasoned basis\u201d). In our view, the record in the case at bar demonstrates that the trial court properly afforded defendant an individualized assessment of all relevant circumstances, and further did not act out of caprice or compassion in imposing the sentence of death. As noted elsewhere in the opinion, the evidence in aggravation was ample despite the mitigation now submitted by defendant. In sum, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. See People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 533 (1986) (holding death penalty appropriate even where mitigating evidence consisted of a troubled youth, an alcoholic mother, an abusive and drug-addicted father, heavy drinking and an extreme mental or emotional disturbance).\nB. Failure to Grant Motion Seeking Substitution of Judge\nDefendant next maintains that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for substitution of judge or, alternatively, in not transferring the motion to another judge for ruling. Defendant claims that the trial judge, who at one point admonished defense counsel not to use the already delayed post-conviction proceedings as a further \"delay tactic to stop the imposition of what the Illinois Supreme Court has said was a fair trial, a fair verdict, a fair death sentence after a fair death hearing,\u201d had prejudged the merits of defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief. We disagree. It is well settled that \"[tjhere is no absolute right to a substitution of judge at a post-conviction proceeding.\u201d People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324, 331 (1993), citing People v. House, 202 Ill. App. 3d 893, 910 (1990), citing People v. Wilson, 37 Ill. 2d 617 (1967). \"Rather, the same judge who presided over the defendant\u2019s trial should hear his post-conviction petition, unless it is shown that the defendant would be substantially prejudiced.\u201d Hall, 157 Ill. 2d at 331 (citing People v. Mamolella, 42 Ill. 2d 69, 73 (1969), People v. Neal, 123 Ill. App. 3d 148, 152 (1984), and People v. Day, 152 Ill. App. 3d 416, 421 (1987)).\nThe record here discloses that defendant filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief on April 9, 1986. The matter, which was originally assigned to another judge, was continued for various reasons over the course of the next five years. During that time, post-conviction counsel repeatedly represented to the court that an amended petition would be filed. Eventually, the matter was reassigned to the current judge. Although counsel again reassured the court that an amended petition would be forthcoming, nearly two more years passed before the amendment was actually filed. Consequently, when the trial judge warned counsel not to further prolong the proceedings, the trial judge was not prejudging the merits of defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief, as defendant suggests. Rather, the trial judge was merely expressing his understandable frustration with the progress of the case. Furthermore, we have carefully reviewed the transcript in this respect, and can find no evidence of any bias on the part of the circuit court in this matter. Under these circumstances, we simply do not believe that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for substitution of judge.\nC. Failure to Grant Request for Discovery\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for discovery during the pendency of the post-conviction proceedings. We note, however, that defendant fails to specify, in his brief, the nature of the alleged error. Consequently, we are unable to review this claim.\nD. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute\nAs a final matter, defendant raises seven separate challenges to the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. We have repeatedly rejected the same contentions in past decisions, and defendant provides no new grounds which would warrant a different result in this case. Defendant\u2019s first argument, that various aspects of the death penalty statute invite an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the sentence, was recently rejected in People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 323 (1997). This court has also held that the statute is not invalid due to the fact that it fails to provide adequate pretrial notice of the State\u2019s intention to seek the death penalty. People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 161-62 (1984). Nor is our death penalty statute unconstitutional for imposing a burden on defendant to establish that some other penalty should be imposed (People v. Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 76 (1990)), or for not requiring the sentencer to issue a written memorial of its findings (People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 499 (1984)). We further reject defendant\u2019s contention that the statute improperly gives unequal consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors (see People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d at 322), and that it improperly fails to limit the nonstatutory aggravating factors which the sentencer may consider (People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 285 (1985)). Finally, we have never considered our death penalty statute unconstitutional for excluding any sympathies that may exist as mitigating evidence. People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 543 (1989).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Tuesday, November 11,1997, as the date on which the sentence is to be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119 \u2014 5 (West 1994). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where defendant is confined.\nAffirmed.\nIn his amended petition for post-conviction relief, defendant states, \"Defense counsel requested leave to file a motion to suppress statements.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This, however, is not an accurate representation of the record. The motion reads in pertinent part: \"NOW COMES the Defendant and respectfully moves this Honorable Court to suppress as evidence herein, certain property seized in violation of Article II, Sections 6 and 10 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois ***.\u201d\nDetective Dolan corroborated Detective Grant\u2019s testimony. He also testified that he neither struck nor physically abused defendant in any way.\nAttached to defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief is an affidavit from a pathologist who contradicts the trial court\u2019s conclusion regarding defendant\u2019s head wound.\nIn contrast to defendant\u2019s testimony, which can be viewed as untrustworthy, both Officer Grant and Officer Dolan unequivocally denied abusing defendant in any way.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Christina M. Tchen, James F. Martin, Pauline H. Yoo, Amarjeet S. Bhachu and Tiffanie N. Cason, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 77167.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel-lee, v. GREGORY MADEJ, Appellant.\nOpinion filed June 19, 1997.\nRehearing denied September 29, 1997.\nChristina M. Tchen, James F. Martin, Pauline H. Yoo, Amarjeet S. Bhachu and Tiffanie N. Cason, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Judy L. DeAngelis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0116-01", "first_page_order": 220, "last_page_order": 270 }