{ "id": 801363, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VICTOR GARCIA, Appellant; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ROGER WALLACE, Appellant; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. AARON O'NEAL, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Garcia", "decision_date": "1997-10-23", "docket_number": "Nos. 81246, 81248, 81274 cons.", "first_page": "55", "last_page": "79", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 55" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "475 U.S. 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6198771 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 794", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605800 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "872", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "2204", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "799" }, { "page": "872-73" }, { "page": "2204-05" }, { "page": "799" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "2205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 711", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772134 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "670" }, { "page": "2081" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2663295 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "\"a void decree has no legal effect\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5284029 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1012", "parenthetical": "following Segara" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383817 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" }, { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780266 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597224 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557241 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5797201 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112-13" }, { "page": "112-13" }, { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "because order imposing concurrent terms was void, appellate court not prohibited from increasing defendant's sentence on review" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150161 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "615, 617" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307259 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222762 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "115-17", "parenthetical": "Nickels, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1056, "char_count": 44666, "ocr_confidence": 0.846, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.501837068503537e-07, "percentile": 0.9229474382483303 }, "sha256": "ad84ee72d2ec09eba45836f03e019fe88e3fd19c8e50bf669a69a464fc84ee2f", "simhash": "1:abbaff866931a252", "word_count": 7246 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:18:16.218667+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VICTOR GARCIA, Appellant. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ROGER WALLACE, Appellant. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. AARON O\u2019NEAL, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nVictor Garcia, Roger Wallace, and Aaron O\u2019Neal, defendants in these consolidated cases, were convicted of numerous crimes in the circuit court of Cook County for the gang rape of an 18-year-old female victim. In sentencing defendants, the trial judge failed to enter consecutive sentences on several convictions as required under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1992)). The relevant portion of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) provides:\n\"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 \u2014 13 or 12 \u2014 14 [aggravated criminal sexual assault] of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1992).\nThe appellate court found that the trial judge\u2019s imposition of several concurrent sentences in violation of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) rendered those sentences void. 281 Ill. App. 3d 602, 613. The court vacated all of defendants\u2019 sentences and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. 281 Ill. App. 3d at 615, 617.\nDefendants, Victor Garcia (cause No. 81246), Roger Wallace (cause No. 81248), and Aaron O\u2019Neal (cause No. 81274), each filed a petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a); 134 Ill. 2d R. 612(b). We allowed defendants\u2019 petitions and consolidated them for purposes of this appeal.\nBACKGROUND\nThe victim (S.B.) had been dating Victor Garcia for about one week. On the afternoon of June 2, 1992, S.B. and her friend Jessica met Garcia, Roger Wallace, Aaron O\u2019Neal, and Richard Walters (a codefendant not a party to this appeal) at a park. Without S.B.\u2019s knowledge, the four males had decided to initiate S.B. as a \"Deucette\u201d \u2014 a member of the female branch of the Insane Deuces street gang. A Deucette\u2019s initiation consists of engaging in sex with a number of male gang members.\nAfter meeting at the park, S.B. agreed to go with Garcia, Wallace, O\u2019Neal, and Walters to Walters\u2019 apartment in order to drink some alcoholic beverages. Jessica could not attend and left to pick up her sister. Once at the apartment, the group played a drinking game in which S.B. consumed approximately five to eight shots of alcohol in a short amount of time.\nFollowing the drinking game, Garcia led S.B. to the bedroom of the apartment and asked S.B. to engage in consensual sex. S.B. refused. Despite S.B.\u2019s refusal, Garcia removed S.B.\u2019s clothing and penetrated S.B.\u2019s vagina with his penis. When S.B. screamed for Garcia to stop, Garcia hit her several times and told her to shut up. Garcia then left the bedroom.\nO\u2019Neal and Walters entered the bedroom. O\u2019Neal penetrated S.B.\u2019s vagina with his penis. When S.B. screamed, O\u2019Neal hit her. Walters penetrated S.B.\u2019s mouth with his penis. Then, following O\u2019Neal\u2019s instruction that Walters have intercourse with S.B., Walters either penetrated or touched S.B.\u2019s vagina with his penis. Throughout this episode, S.B. was crying and screaming for them to stop. When O\u2019Neal and Walters exited the bedroom, Walters was carrying a handgun.\nNext, Wallace entered the bedroom. Wallace either penetrated or touched S.B.\u2019s vagina with his penis. S.B. continued to cry and scream. In order to quiet S.B., Wallace hit her. Wallace then exited the bedroom.\nLater, S.B. and the mattress from the bedroom were brought into the living room of the apartment. Pursuant to an instruction from O\u2019Neal, Wallace penetrated or touched S.B.\u2019s vagina with his penis. In order to quiet S.B.\u2019s screams, Garcia held a gun to her head and threatened to kill her if she did not shut up. Wallace then penetrated S.B.\u2019s mouth with his penis.\nGarcia, O\u2019Neal, and Wallace discussed whether S.B. should be killed. Following this discussion, but prior to any attempt on S.B.\u2019s life, Walters left the apartment. Garcia and Wallace then choked S.B. with a plastic belt. S.B. became unconscious and urinated. However, the belt broke during the strangulation and S.B. survived.\nThe next morning, Garcia, O\u2019Neal, and Wallace instructed S.B. not to tell her parents or the police what had happened. Defendants fabricated a story so that S.B. could explain her injuries without implicating defendants. Defendants quizzed S.B. regarding the story. Garcia and Wallace walked S.B. to a bus stop so that she could get home. Before the bus arrived, Garcia and Wallace left. After arriving at home, S.B. told her friend Jessica, her mother, the police, and emergency room medical personnel what had happened and not the story fabricated by defendants.\nLater, Garcia, Wallace, O\u2019Neal, and Walters were arrested and charged by indictment. Garcia, Wallace, and O\u2019Neal were tried simultaneously in severed trials. Garcia and O\u2019Neal were tried before separate juries. Wallace was tried in a bench trial. Richard Walters agreed to be a witness for the State in exchange for his plea of guilty and a 10-year prison sentence. Richard Walters is not a party to this appeal.\nCause No. 81246\nVictor Garcia was 16 years old at the time of the crimes. Garcia was charged as an adult in a 56-count indictment. Prior to trial, the State nol-prossed 47 counts of the indictment. The State initially proceeded against Garcia on three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on Garcia\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (counts 1, 9, 17). The counts were premised on three distinct aggravating factors: using a dangerous weapon; causing the victim bodily harm; and threatening the victim\u2019s life. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1992).\nThe State also proceeded against Garcia on three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault under a theory of accountability based on Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (counts 3, 11, 21). These counts were premised on the same three aggravating factors. In addition, the State proceeded against Garcia on one count of conspiracy (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2 (West 1992)) to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41); one count of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(1) (West 1992)) based on Garcia\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 45); and one count of aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 3.1 (West 1992)) (count 56).\nThe jury found Garcia guilty of two acts of sexual penetration: his own penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina and, under a theory of accountability, Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina. The jury also found Garcia guilty of the conspiracy, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated unlawful restraint charges.\nAt sentencing, the trial judge merged Garcia\u2019s convictions for the lesser included offenses of criminal sexual assault (count 45) and aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56) into Garcia\u2019s other convictions. No sentences were entered on these counts.\nThe judge sentenced Garcia to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on count 1. The judge then sentenced Garcia to four, 30-year terms of imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on counts 2, 9, 11, and 21 to be served concurrent with each other and concurrent with count 1. The judge sentenced Garcia on count 2 despite the fact that count 2 had been nol-prossed prior to trial. The judge failed to enter a sentence on count 3, a count submitted to the jury. Apparently, the judge transposed these two counts when imposing Garcia\u2019s sentences.\nIn addition, the judge sentenced Garcia to a 15-year concurrent term of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41). Finally, the judge sentenced Garcia to a 20-year term of imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 17) that was to run consecutively to counts 1, 2, 9, 11, 21, and 41. Taken together, the concurrent 30-year terms and the consecutive 20-year term totaled 50 years of imprisonment.\nGarcia appealed his convictions and sentences. The appellate court stated that Garcia waived review of his sentences through his failure to challenge them in the trial court with a written motion pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) (West Supp. 1993)). Nevertheless, the court addressed Garcia\u2019s sentences because the sentences were related to the propriety of Garcia\u2019s convictions and because of our holding in People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995). In Arna, we found that an order imposing concurrent terms of imprisonment is void when consecutive terms of imprisonment are required by section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a). Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 112-13.\nThe appellate court vacated Garcia\u2019s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41). The court stated that no person may be convicted of both the inchoate and the principal offense. See 720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 5 (West 1992). The appellate court also vacated Garcia\u2019s sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on count 2 because the jury did not return a verdict of guilty on count 2.\nIn addition, the appellate court found that Garcia was improperly convicted on multiple counts arising from two single acts. See People v. Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 482, 493 (1991). Counts 1, 9, and 17 concern the act of Garcia penetrating S.B.\u2019s vagina. Counts 11 and 21 concern the act of Wallace penetrating S.B.\u2019s vagina. However, the court did not remand to the trial court for a determination as to which two of the five convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault Garcia was to be sentenced on. See People v. Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70, 78 (1988). Instead, the court affirmed the convictions on counts 1 and 11 and vacated Garcia\u2019s convictions on counts 9, 17, and 21.\nThe appellate court found that because the sentences entered on counts 1 and 11 were concurrent, the sentences violated section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) and were therefore void under Ama. The court vacated these sentences and remanded to the trial court so that two consecutive sentences could be entered on counts 1 and 11 in conformity with section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a).\nThe appellate court did not address Garcia\u2019s convictions for the lesser included offenses of criminal sexual assault (count 45) and aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56). The trial judge had merged these counts into Garcia\u2019s other convictions.\nCause No. 81248\nRoger Wallace was 22 years old at the time of the crimes. Wallace was charged by a 56-count indictment. Prior to trial, the State nol-prossed three counts of the indictment (counts 42, 43, 44). The State proceeded on 40 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (counts 1 through 40). These counts were based on Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina and mouth as well as his accountability for the similar sexual assaults committed by Garcia, Walters, and O\u2019Neal. These counts were premised on five aggravating factors: using a dangerous weapon; causing the victim bodily harm; threatening the victim\u2019s life; endangering the victim\u2019s life; and committing the sexual assault during the course of another felony (armed robbery). 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4) (West 1992).\nIn addition, the State proceeded against Wallace on one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41); eight counts of criminal sexual assault based on Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina and mouth as well as his accountability for the similar sexual assaults committed by Garcia, Walters, and O\u2019Neal (counts 45 through 52); two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(a) (West 1992)) (counts 53, 54); one count of compelling organizational membership (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 6.1 (West 1992)) (count 55); and one count of aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56).\nFollowing a bench trial, Wallace was found guilty of 40 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (counts 1 through 40); one count of conspiracy (count 41); eight counts of criminal sexual assault (counts 45 through 52); two counts of aggravated battery (counts 53, 54); and one count of aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56). In addition, the trial judge found Wallace guilty of one count of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A \u2014 2 (West 1992)) predicated on aggravated battery despite the fact that the State had nol-prossed this count prior to trial (count 44). Wallace w\u00e1s found not guilty of compelling organizational membership (count 55). Wallace was also found not guilty of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2 (West 1992)) even though the State had nol-prossed the armed robbery count prior to trial (count 43).\nAt sentencing, the trial judge merged Wallace\u2019s convictions for the lesser included offenses of criminal sexual assault (counts 45 through 52) and aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56) into Wallace\u2019s other convictions. No sentences were entered on these counts.\nThe judge sentenced Wallace to concurrent 30-year terms of imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on counts 1 through 34. The judge then sentenced Wallace to six, 10-year terms of imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on counts 35 through 40 to be served concurrently with each other. These six concurrent terms were to be served consecutively to the 30-year terms based on counts 1 through 34.\nNext, the judge sentenced Wallace to a 15-year term of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41) to be served concurrently with the 30-year terms entered on counts 1 through 34. The judge also sentenced Wallace to a concurrent 30-year term of imprisonment for armed violence even though the armed violence count had been nol-prossed prior to trial (count 44). Finally, the judge sentenced Wallace to a five-year term of imprisonment for aggravated battery (counts 53, 54) to be served concurrently with counts 1 through 34. Taken together, the concurrent 30-year terms and the consecutive 10-year terms totaled 40 years of imprisonment.\nWallace appealed his convictions and sentences. The appellate court stated that Wallace waived review of his sentences through his failure to challenge them in the trial court with a written motion pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c). Nevertheless, the court addressed Wallace\u2019s sentences because the sentences were related to the propriety of Wallace\u2019s convictions and because of our holding in Ama.\nThe appellate court vacated Wallace\u2019s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41). See 720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 5 (West 1992). The court also vacated Wallace\u2019s conviction and sentence for armed violence (count 44) because the State nol-prossed this count prior to trial.\nIn addition, the appellate court found that no evidence was presented at trial demonstrating that either Garcia\u2019s or O\u2019Neal\u2019s penis penetrated S.B.\u2019s mouth. Accordingly, Wallace\u2019s convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on a theory of accountability for Garcia\u2019s and O\u2019Neal\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s mouth were not supported by the evidence. The court vacated these convictions and their corresponding sentences (counts 5, 8, 13, 16, 25, 26, 31, 32, 37, 40).\nNext, the appellate court found that the charge of armed robbery against Wallace had been nol-prossed prior to trial (count 43). Notwithstanding the nolle prosequi, the trial judge found Wallace not guilty of armed robbery. However, the trial judge did find Wallace guilty of eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault premised on the aggravating factor that the sexual assault was committed during an armed robbery. The appellate court vacated Wallace\u2019s convictions and sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault premised on armed robbery (counts 33 through 40).\nThe appellate court also found that Wallace was improperly convicted on 24 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault when he was only responsible for six acts of penetration: vaginal penetrations by Wallace, Garcia, O\u2019Neal, and Walters; and oral penetrations by Wallace and Walters. The redundant convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule. The court noted that Wallace and the State concurred that convictions on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 should remain while the other 18 counts (counts 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17 through 24, and 27 through 30) were to be vacated.\nThe appellate court found that the trial judge\u2019s failure to enter six consecutive sentences on Wallace\u2019s six convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault violated section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a). Thus, Wallace\u2019s concurrent terms of 30 years\u2019 imprisonment based on counts 1 through 34 were void under Arna. The court vacated these sentences and remanded for the imposition of six consecutive sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault in conformity with section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a).\nThe appellate court did not address Wallace\u2019s convictions for the lesser included oifenses of criminal sexual assault (counts 45 through 52) and aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56). The trial judge had merged these counts into Wallace\u2019s other convictions. In addition, the court did not address Wallace\u2019s convictions or sentence for aggravated battery (counts 53, 54).\nCause No. 81274\nAaron O\u2019Neal was 27 years old at the time of the crimes. O\u2019Neal was charged by a 57-count indictment. Prior to trial, the State nol-prossed 43 counts of the indictment. The State proceeded against O\u2019Neal on one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on his penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina and causing her bodily harm (count 12). The State also proceeded on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on O\u2019Neal\u2019s accountability for the penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina and mouth by Garcia, Walters, and Wallace (counts 3, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20). These counts were premised on three aggravating factors: using a dangerous weapon; causing the victim bodily harm; and threatening the victim\u2019s life.\nThe State also proceeded against O\u2019Neal on one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41) and four counts of criminal sexual assault: O\u2019Neal\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 48); O\u2019Neal\u2019s accountability for the penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina by Garcia (count 45); and O\u2019Neal\u2019s accountability for the penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina and mouth by Walters (counts 46, 50). Finally, the State proceeded on one count of aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56).\nThe jury found O\u2019Neal guilty of five acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault: his own penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina; and under a theory of accountability, Garcia\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina; Walters\u2019 penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina and mouth; and Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina. The jury also found O\u2019Neal guilty of the conspiracy, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated unlawful restraint charges.\nAt sentencing, the trial judge merged O\u2019Neal\u2019s convictions for the lesser included offenses of criminal sexual assault (counts 45, 46, 48, 50) and aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56) into O\u2019Neal\u2019s other convictions. No sentences were entered on these counts.\nThe judge sentenced O\u2019Neal to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on count 3. The judge then sentenced O\u2019Neal to six, 30-year terms of imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on counts 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, and 21 to be served concurrent with each other and with count 3.\nThe judge also sentenced O\u2019Neal to a 15-year concurrent term of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41). Finally, the judge sentenced O\u2019Neal to a 30-year term of imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 12) that was to be served consecutively to counts 3, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 21, and 41. Taken together, the concurrent 30-year terms and the consecutive 30-year term totaled 60 years of imprisonment.\nO\u2019Neal appealed his convictions and sentences. The appellate court stated that O\u2019Neal waived review of his sentences through his failure to challenge them in the trial court with a written motion pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c). Nevertheless, the court addressed O\u2019Neal\u2019s sentences because the sentences were related to the propriety of O\u2019Neal\u2019s convictions and because of our holding in Arna.\nThe appellate court vacated O\u2019Neal\u2019s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault (count 41). See 720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 5 (West 1992). Unlike Garcia and Wallace, however, several of O\u2019Neal\u2019s convictions did not run afoul of the one-act, one-crime rule. O\u2019Neal was convicted on only one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault for his penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 12), for Walters\u2019 penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 10), and for Walters\u2019 penetration of S.B.\u2019s mouth (count 14). These convictions properly reflect one conviction per criminal act.\nHowever, O\u2019Neal was convicted twice for Garcia\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (counts 9, 17) and three times for Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (counts 3, 11, 21). Instead of remanding for a determination as to which two of these five counts O\u2019Neal was to be sentenced on (see Segara, 126 Ill. 2d at 78), the appellate court itself determined that counts 3 and 9 should be affirmed while the convictions on counts 11, 17, and 21 should be vacated.\nThe appellate court found that the sentences entered on counts 3, 9, 10,12, and 14 were not consecutive. Thus, these sentences did not conform with section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) and were void under Arna. The court vacated these sentences and remanded to the trial court for the imposition of five consecutive sentences in conformity with section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a).\nThe appellate court did not address O\u2019Neal\u2019s convictions for the lesser included offenses of criminal sexual assault (counts 45, 46, 48, 50) and aggravated unlawful restraint (count 56). The trial judge had merged these counts into O\u2019Neal\u2019s other convictions.\nDISCUSSION\nPrior to our discussion of the sentencing issues raised in this appeal, we address several of defendants\u2019 convictions and sentences that are not contested on the merits by the parties. A preliminary resolution of these concerns will serve to clarify a somewhat complicated assortment of indictment counts, convictions, and sentences.\nAs a general matter, the State has renewed here its argument made in the appellate court that defendants have waived review of any sentencing errors that occurred in the trial court by failing to file section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 1(c) motions challenging their sentences. The appellate court agreed with the State and found that defendants had waived review of any sentencing issues. Despite this finding of waiver, the court still considered defendants\u2019 sentencing claims because those claims were related to the propriety of each defendant\u2019s convictions. See 281 Ill. App. 3d at 613. Because the State has not contested the judgment of the appellate court, we will not review the State\u2019s waiver claim here.\nThe appellate court did not address defendants\u2019 convictions for the lesser included offenses of criminal sexual assault and aggravated unlawful restraint (Garcia, counts 45, 56; Wallace, counts 45 through 52, and 56; O\u2019Neal, counts 45, 46, 48, 50, 56). The trial judge had merged these counts into defendants\u2019 other convictions and did not enter sentences on these counts. The parties do not raise any issues regarding these convictions. These convictions are not before us and we do not consider them.\nThe appellate court also did not address Wallace\u2019s convictions and sentence for aggravated battery (counts 53, 54). The trial judge had sentenced Wallace to a five-year concurrent term of imprisonment for these convictions. The parties do not raise any issues regarding the aggravated battery counts. Wallace\u2019s aggravated battery convictions are not before us and we do not consider them.\nA person may not be convicted of both the inchoate and the principal offense. See 720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 5 (West 1992); People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 519 (1992). In the trial court, each defendant was found guilty and sentenced for the inchoate offense of conspiracy to commit aggravated criminal sexual assault as well as the principal offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The appellate court vacated the convictions and sentences on the conspiracy counts. The parties do not address the merits of this issue. We affirm the appellate court\u2019s finding that the convictions and sentences for conspiracy imposed on Garcia (count 41), Wallace (count 41), and O\u2019Neal (count 41) should be vacated.\nThe trial judge sentenced Garcia on one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on his accountability for Walters\u2019 penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 2). However, the State nol-prossed this count prior to trial. The appellate court vacated the sentence on count 2. The parties do not address the merits of this issue; We affirm the appellate court\u2019s finding that Garcia\u2019s sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on count 2 should be vacated.\nThe trial judge found Wallace guilty of one count of armed violence predicated on aggravated battery even though the State had nol-prossed this count prior to trial. The appellate court vacated Wallace\u2019s conviction and sentence for armed violence. The parties do not address the merits of this issue. We affirm the appellate court\u2019s finding that Wallace\u2019s conviction and sentence for armed violence should be vacated (count 44).\nAdditionally, no evidence was presented at trial demonstrating that Garcia\u2019s or O\u2019Neal\u2019s penis penetrated S.B.\u2019s mouth. The appellate court found that Wallace\u2019s convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on a theory of accountability for Garcia\u2019s and O\u2019Neal\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s mouth were not supported by the evidence. The appellate court vacated these convictions and their corresponding sentences. The parties do not address the merits of this issue. We affirm the appellate court\u2019s finding that Wallace\u2019s convictions and sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the penetration of S.B.\u2019s mouth by Garcia and O\u2019Neal should be vacated (counts 5, 8, 13, 16, 25, 26, 31, 32, 37, 40).\nThe charge of armed robbery against Wallace was nol-prossed prior to trial (count 43). Notwithstanding this fact, the trial judge found Wallace not guilty of armed robbery. However, the judge found Wallace guilty of eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault premised on the aggravating factor that the sexual assault was committed during an armed robbery. The appellate court vacated Wallace\u2019s convictions and sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault premised on armed robbery. See Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 491. The parties do not address the merits of this issue. We affirm the appellate court\u2019s finding that Wallace\u2019s convictions and corresponding sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault premised on armed robbery should be vacated (counts 33 through 40).\nFurthermore, the parties do not take issue with the proposition that multiple convictions cannot be carved from the same physical act. See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). However, Garcia and O\u2019Neal argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the one-act, one-crime rule. They argue that the appellate court improperly determined which of several convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault should be vacated and which convictions should have sentences entered on them. The State argues that the appellate court correctly determined which convictions should be vacated and which should have sentences entered on them.\nWhen multiple convictions of greater and lesser offenses are obtained for offenses arising from a single act, a sentence should be imposed on the most serious offense and the convictions on the less serious offenses should be vacated. See People v. Cardona, 158 Ill. 2d 403, 411 (1994). However, when multiple convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault are obtained from a single act of penetration, there is no way to determine the most serious conviction because none of the convictions involve either a more or less culpable mental state. See People v. Calva, 256 Ill. App. 3d 865, 870 (1993). In such cases, reviewing courts have remanded to the trial court for a determination as to which \"counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault are retained.\u201d Segara, 126 Ill. 2d at 78; see also Calva, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 870\n(following Segara); People v. Bell, 217 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1012 (1991) (following Segara).\nWe therefore reverse the appellate court\u2019s determinations regarding which of Garcia\u2019s and O\u2019Neal\u2019s convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault should have sentences entered on them and which should be vacated. On remand, the judge is to determine which of Garcia\u2019s convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault are to have sentences entered on them for his penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 1, 9, or 17) and for his accountability for Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 11 or 21). The judge is also to determine which of O\u2019Neal\u2019s convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault are to have sentences entered on them for his accountability for Garcia\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 9 or 17) and his accountability for Wallace\u2019s penetration of S.B.\u2019s vagina (count 3, 11, or 21). The sentences imposed on Garcia\u2019s and O\u2019Neal\u2019s redundant convictions should be vacated.\nWe note that neither Wallace nor the State takes issue with the application of the one-act, one-crime rule in Wallace\u2019s case. In the appellate court, the court noted that Wallace and the State concurred that convictions on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 should remain while the other 18 counts (counts 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17 through 24, and 27 through 30) were to be vacated. Given Wallace\u2019s and the State\u2019s concurrence, and the fact that neither party addresses this point on the merits, we affirm the appellate court\u2019s finding as to Wallace.\nGarcia\u2019s two convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault, Wallace\u2019s six convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault, and O\u2019Neal\u2019s five convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault trigger the consecutive sentencing provision of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a). See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1992). Defendants do not dispute that section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) requires this result. Accordingly, on remand, once the trial judge has determined which of defendants\u2019 convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault shall have sentences entered on them, the judge is directed to enter consecutive sentences on these convictions in conformity with section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a).\nThe remaining issues arise from the imposition of consecutive sentences on remand. In remanding, the appellate court \"allow[ed] the circuit court, in its discretion, either to increase the total sentence [imposed on a defendant] or to impose a total sentence equal to the total of the vacated sentences.\u201d 281 Ill. App. 3d at 615. Defendants argue that the appellate court\u2019s remand instructions violate: (1) Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)) which describes the powers of a reviewing court; (2) section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections which governs a defendant\u2019s motion to reduce a sentence; (3) the statute on resentencing (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20144 (West 1992)); and (4) defendants\u2019 federal due process rights.\nIn this appeal, however, we need not reach these issues. Because the concurrent sentences imposed on various counts were imposed in some instances in violation of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) requiring consecutive sentences, those sentences are void. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 112-13. The sentences to be imposed on those counts on remand, therefore, will not be greater than, less than, or equal to defendants\u2019 original sentences. See People v. Roth, Inc., 412 Ill. 446, 450 (1952) (\"a void decree has no legal effect\u201d); Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113 (because order imposing concurrent terms was void, appellate court not prohibited from increasing defendant\u2019s sentence on review). Thus, defendants\u2019 resentencing arguments based on Rule 615(b), section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections, and the statute on resentencing are inapplicable because they are premised on the erroneous assumption that there is a valid sentence to increase.\nDefendants also argue that an increased sentence on remand would violate their federal due process rights. Defendants rely on the prophylactic rule announced in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969), designed to protect a defendant on retrial from the potential vindictiveness of a resentencing judge. Pearce held that if an increased sentence is imposed following a retrial, reasons for the increased sentence must appear on the record and be based on objective information regarding the defendant\u2019s conduct subsequent to the imposition of the original sentence. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 670, 89 S. Ct. at 2081.\nHowever, the Supreme Court has explained that \"[wjhile the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule of sweeping dimension, our subsequent cases have made clear that its presumption of vindictiveness 'do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.\u2019 \u201d Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865, 872, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 2204 (1989) (second alteration in original), quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138, 89 L. Ed. 2d 104, 110, 106 S. Ct. 976, 978 (1986). Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that \"vindictiveness of a sentencing judge is the evil the Court sought to prevent rather than simply enlarged sentences after a new trial.\u201d McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 110, 106 S. Ct. at 978.\nDefendants argue that the imposition of an increased sentence on remand would violate Pearce\u2019s prophylactic rule. We do not agree. The Supreme Court has stated that Pearce\u2019s prophylactic rule has been limited in its application to circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that an increase in sentence is the product of actual judicial vindictiveness. See Smith, 490 U.S. at 799, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 872-73, 109 S. Ct. at 2204-05. \"Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness.\u201d Smith, 490 U.S. at 799, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 873, 109 S. Ct. at 2205.\nWe believe that the correction of a void sentence under Arna fails to present circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that a sentence imposed on remand will be the product of judicial vindictiveness against a defendant. As a general rule, defendants will not be raising Arna errors. Instead, the State and reviewing courts will be the parties pointing to a trial judge\u2019s error. Thus, it is not a defendant who runs the risk of inciting the potential for judicial vindictiveness.\nOf course, as the Supreme Court has noted, \"Where the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness ***.\u201d McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 111, 106 S. Ct. at 979.\nCONCLUSION\nBased on the foregoing, the appellate court judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The circuit court judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. These causes (Nos. 81246, 81248, 81274) are remanded to the circuit court. The circuit court is directed to determine which of defendants\u2019 convictions should have sentences entered on them in conformity with this opinion. Those convictions upon which no sentences are entered should be vacated. The circuit court is directed to sentence defendants consistent with this opinion and section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1992)).\nNos. 81246, 81248, and 81274\u2014 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; causes remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE NICKELS,\ndissenting:\nThis appeal raises the question of whether the circuit court may impose consecutive sentences on remand where the circuit court initially imposed concurrent sentences on certain offenses. The majority holds that the initial sentences were \"void\u201d and therefore the circuit court may impose consecutive sentences. This holding allows the circuit court to lengthen the aggregate sentence for each defendant. Because this holding, in effect, penalizes defendants for appealing their sentences, I dissent.\nIn reaching its conclusion, the majority relies heavily on People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995). In Amo, the defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 and 45 years in prison, as opposed to consecutive terms. This court held that the circuit court erred in sentencing and that consecutive sentences were required. Although the State was not entitled to appeal the sentencing issue, this court found that the issue was reviewable. In justifying this action, the Arna majority reasoned that \"[a] sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void\u201d and is therefore reviewable at any time. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113.\nI dissented in Arna and I still believe Arna was wrongly decided. See Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 115-17 (Nickels, J., dissenting). Supreme Court Rule 604(a) is specific in providing when the State may appeal in criminal cases. It does not allow the State to appeal sentencing issues. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a). In the majority\u2019s discussion, the majority notes that \"the State and reviewing courts will be the parties pointing to a trial judge\u2019s error.\u201d 179 Ill. 2d at 75. Because the State may not appeal sentencing issues, it is also prohibited on a defendant\u2019s appeal from \"pointing to\u201d sentencing errors made in the circuit court. In addition, Rule 615(b) sets forth the powers of a reviewing court. It does not give a reviewing court the power to increase a sentence on appeal. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b). In the instant case, the majority essentially authorizes an increase in defendants\u2019 aggregate sentences.\nIn addition to requiring consecutive sentences on remand, the majority finds that, because the original sentences imposed on the various counts were void, the sentences imposed on remand \"will not be greater than, less, or equal to defendants\u2019 original sentences.\u201d 179 Ill. 2d at 73. The majority apparently holds that the circuit court may impose a longer sentence for each individual offense. This is simply incorrect. Section 5 \u2014 5\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:\n\"Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied unless the more severe sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20144 (West 1992).\nThis statute places a limitation on resentencing. The statute applies to the instant case because defendants\u2019 sentences have been \"set aside\u201d on appeal. Pursuant to the statute, a more severe sentence can be imposed for each individual offense only if it is based on conduct that occurs after sentencing.\nIn their briefs, defendants argue against the imposition of more severe sentences on remand. They rely extensively on People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (1995), and People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367 (1995), two recent cases from this court. Although these cases were discussed in the appellate court and raised in the briefs to this court, the majority ignores them.\nIn Kilpatrick, the circuit court imposed consecutive sentences of six and nine years for two offenses. On reconsideration, the circuit court determined that consecutive sentences were not appropriate under the sentencing statute and vacated the consecutive sentences. It then imposed longer terms of 15 years for each offense, to be served concurrently. In Kilpatrick, this court held that this action resulted in an impermissible increase in sentencing because section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) (West 1992)) prohibited the circuit court from increasing a sentence after it was imposed. Thus, on reconsideration, the circuit court could not impose a more severe sentence for each individual offense. This court employed the same reasoning in Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367.\nIn Kilpatrick and Jones, this court found that section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) limited the circuit court\u2019s discretion in resentencing after the defendants filed motions to reconsider in the circuit court. Similarly, in the instant case, section 5 \u2014 5\u20144 limits the circuit court\u2019s discretion in resentencing where a reviewing court has set aside the original sentences on appeal. It is inconsistent to hold that a sentence cannot be increased after a motion to reconsider the sentence but may be increased on resentencing following an appeal. Given these similar statutory prohibitions and given the reasoning of Kilpatrick and Jones, the circuit court cannot impose a more severe sentence on each individual offense.\nThe majority fails to address the foregoing statutes and case law. According to the majority, because the original sentences were \"void,\u201d there are no limitations on the circuit court on remand. The majority holds that the circuit court is free to impose any sentence for each individual offense, even if it is greater than the original sentence.\nI believe that there is a fundamental inconsistency between Arna, which the majority relies on in the instant case, and Kilpatrick and Jones. Under the majority\u2019s reasoning, the defendants\u2019 original sentences in Kilpatrick and Jones would have been just as void as those involved here because there was no statutory authorization for the original sentences. Under this reasoning, any time a trial judge does not correctly follow a sentencing statute and makes an erroneous decision, the sentence is void. In effect, this reasoning eliminates many of the statutory protections and rules that safeguard defendants on resentencing. Such a result raises grave due process concerns.\nIn my view, the best solution is to recognize that Arna was wrongly decided and to overrule it. In the instant case, the circuit court may have applied the sentencing statute incorrectly, but this error does not make its determination \"void.\u201d Sentences were imposed for each defendant. They appealed their convictions and sentences and were partially successful in their appeals. On remand, however, they may suffer the consequences of longer sentences as a result of pursuing their right to appeal.\nGiven such consequences, defendants in future cases will face a difficult choice. They may choose to appeal in the belief that they have meritorious legal arguments requiring reversal. It may be wiser, however, to forgo an appeal because defendants will subject themselves to the risk of increased punishment by appealing. Certainly, such a scenario will have a chilling effect on every defendant\u2019s right to appeal and clearly flies in the face of Rule 615(b) and section 5 \u2014 5\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Defendants should not be required to make such a choice. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.\nJUSTICES HARRISON and McMORROW join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE NICKELS," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Barbara C. Kamm, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant Garcia.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Kenneth L. Jones, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant Wallace.", "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James H. Reddy and Pamela Leeming, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant O\u2019Neal.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry and Joan F. Frazier, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 81246, 81248, 81274 cons.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VICTOR GARCIA, Appellant. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ROGER WALLACE, Appellant. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. AARON O\u2019NEAL, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 23, 1997.\nRehearing denied December 1, 1997.\nNICKELS, J., joined by HARRISON and McMORROW, JJ., dissenting.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Barbara C. Kamm, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant Garcia.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Kenneth L. Jones, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant Wallace.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James H. Reddy and Pamela Leeming, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant O\u2019Neal.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry and Joan F. Frazier, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0055-01", "first_page_order": 67, "last_page_order": 91 }