{ "id": 864518, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. REMON CASA WILLIAMS, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1998-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 80242", "first_page": "171", "last_page": "193", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 171" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223628 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218090 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "page": "485-86" }, { "page": "1628" }, { "page": "132-37" }, { "page": "483-86" }, { "page": "1626-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201896 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313-18", "parenthetical": "improper under Bruton to revise codefendant's statements to say that \"friends\" or \"two other named individuals\" were involved in the crime" }, { "page": "313-14" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201461 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331-35", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "332-33" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2775093 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623-25", "parenthetical": "error to substitute defendant's name with \"Blank\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2634905 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333-35", "parenthetical": "error to substitute defendant's name with a letter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "848 F.2d 1134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1783499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "revising codefendant's admission to state \"they\" were involved still clearly referred to defendants" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/848/1134-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 U.S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212712 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "1709" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "1709" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "1709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295771 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "309-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801339 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563775 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0012-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1399, "char_count": 39768, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.51366031597171e-08, "percentile": 0.48688803864626856 }, "sha256": "1f4b1908fad4ed345a117d6f3ed5a844c2e6b20ee3552ccf5796dbcceb4bd873", "simhash": "1:fad8711ec74705d1", "word_count": 6610 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:59:33.883421+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. REMON CASA WILLIAMS, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NICKELS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants Remon Williams, Michael Coleman, and Sherrell Towns were all indicted in the circuit court of Madison County on five counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 1994)), arising from the November 17, 1993, shooting deaths of five individuals. Williams and Coleman were tried jointly and a jury found both guilty on all counts. Williams waived his right to be sentenced by the jury and the trial judge determined he was eligible for the death penalty based on the aggravating factor that he was convicted of murdering two or more individuals. See 720 ILCS 5/9\u2014 1(b)(3) (West 1994). After considering factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial judge determined that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, Williams was sentenced to death. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(h) (West 1994).\nCodefendant Coleman was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1994). Codefendant Towns was tried separately and was found guilty on five counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 1994)). Towns was sentenced to death, and his convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by this court in People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453 (1996). The instant appeal involves only Remon Williams\u2019 convictions and sentence. Williams\u2019 sentence has been stayed pending this appeal. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a).\nBACKGROUND\nEvidence presented at trial revealed the following. On November 17, 1993, Kim Fulton and her three children lived with Jeff Mosby in a trailer located at 204 Hare Street in Eagle Park. Kim left home that night about 8:30 p.m. to run some errands. At that time, Mosby was at home barbecuing and watching the three children. Sometime later in the evening, Mosby and the children were watching television when three men entered the trailer. Christopher Fulton, Kim\u2019s eight-year-old son, identified one of the men as \u201cLittle Mike,\u201d whom Christopher knew previously from the neighborhood and whom Christopher believed lived in the trailer next door. The men made Christopher lie on the floor with his face down. Little Mike and one of the other men then went into the back room of the trailer and Christopher heard Little Mike ask Mosby where their mail was. The men returned to the front room of the trailer and Little Mike yelled at Mosby and then shot him in the chest.\nKim returned home at about 10:30 p.m. with a friend, Demetria Mclntire. Upon arriving at her trailer, Kim noticed a green minivan parked in the driveway of the neighboring trailer. Kim then saw three persons jump into the green minivan, and it pulled away in a hurry. When Kim and Mclntire entered the trailer, they saw Mosby lying on the floor. Kim\u2019s children said \u201cthey killed Jeff.\u201d Kim asked Christopher what happened and in response Christopher kept repeating \u201cthe boy next door.\u201d Mclntire called 911 and Kim went outside and yelled for David Thompson who was next door. The door to Thompson\u2019s trailer was cracked open but no one responded to Kim\u2019s calls.\nAt trial, Christopher identified Coleman as being \u201cLittle Mike,\u201d the man who shot Mosby. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that during the police investigation into the murders Christopher was shown a photographic array of five men, which included Williams\u2019 picture. Christopher selected three men out of the array who he believed resembled the three men who entered his trailer that night. However, Christopher did not identify Williams as one of the intruders. Kim was unable to identify any of the three persons she saw get into the green minivan. Mclntire did not see either the people or a minivan outside the neighbor\u2019s trailer; however, she was not wearing her glasses at the time and she does not see well at night without them.\nState Police Officer Michael Terrell received a call at 10:28 p.m. the night of the murders. He responded to 204 Hare Street in Eagle Park. Terrell arrived at the same time as an ambulance, and the ambulance personnel attempted to resuscitate Mosby. After speaking with Kim regarding what had occurred, Terrell went next door to 206 Hare Street. Terrell found the front door of the trailer partially open. Terrell entered the trailer and immediately saw three men lying on the floor. The men had their hands bound with duct tape and tape had also been placed over their mouths. Terrell observed that all three men had massive head wounds and were lying in pools of blood. When Terrell noticed one of the men move, he returned next door to bring paramedics to the scene. Terrell returned to the trailer with paramedics, who attempted to resuscitate the man without success. At that time, Terrell discovered the body of another man to the right of the door.\nThe four men discovered in the trailer at 206 Hare Street were Marion Jennings, Bedford Jennings, Cedric Gardner, and David Thompson. Bedford Jennings, Gardner, and Thompson all had their hands and ankles bound with duct tape. It was stipulated at trial that all four men had died of gunshot wounds. Gardner, Thompson, and Bedford Jennings all died of a single gunshot would to the head. Marion Jennings suffered separate gunshot wounds to the chest and head, with the head wound being the fatal wound. In addition, it was stipulated that Mosby died of a single gunshot to the forearm which passed into his chest causing the fatal wound.\nThere were no other witnesses to any of the shootings, but several prosecution witnesses gave testimony regarding events they observed on November 17 which may have been connected to the crimes. At about 9:45 p.m., Yuenna Sander was speaking with her brother, Bedford Jennings, on the telephone when she heard a gunshot. Bedford\u2019s phone was then hung up. Sander immediately called Bedford back but his answering machine answered the call. Sander did nothing more that night because she believed that Bedford and his roommates were just playing with guns, as they often did. Sander also testified that she had been present at the trailer at 206 Hare Street several times and was aware that drugs were being sold at the residence.\nCandice Branch, a sixth-grade student who lived on Hare Street, was returning home from a school program some time between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. While walking past Thompson\u2019s trailer, Branch saw three boys outside in the yard. A van was also parked outside the trailer. Branch heard one of the three boys say \u201clet\u2019s go do this\u201d or \u201clet\u2019s smoke them.\u201d Branch ran home after hearing this. Although Branch could not identify anyone in the courtroom, she did pick Towns from a photo array as resembling one of the boys she saw that night.\nDarren Wise, an Eagle Park resident, was walking to a tavern sometime between 9 and 10 p.m. As he was walking, a turquoise-green Chrysler van traveled past him in the direction of Hare Street. Wise was unable to see anyone inside the van. Wise returned home briefly to retrieve something he had forgotten. After leaving his home again, Wise heard a gunshot, but he continued on to the tavern. Approximately 15 minutes later, Wise saw several ambulances drive by the tavern. On cross-examination by defense counsel, Wise admitted that at the time of the murders he was addicted to crack cocaine and had used drugs the day he saw the van.\nJohnnie Mosley, codefendant Towns\u2019 cousin, testified that Towns and Williams visited him some time in the evening on November 17 in a minivan. During a conversation between the three men, Towns asked Mosley if he wanted to go with him to \u201ctake care of some business.\u201d Mosley testified that he declined Towns\u2019 invitation because he was on parole and did not \u201cwant to get involved in that anymore.\u201d On cross-examination, Mosley admitted that he was not sure what time or even what day it was that Towns and Williams visited him and that he was probably \u201chigh\u201d at the time.\nChontelle Clark testified that she was driving around between 9 and 10 p.m. when she saw Williams, Towns, Coleman, and another boy in a dark-colored car at a stop light. Clark testified that she did not recognize the fourth person in the car. On cross-examination, Clark denied ever dating Towns. Also, defense counsel impeached Clark with the contents of a police report which stated that Clark had told police that Towns, Michael Coleman, and Eric Coleman were the only occupants of the car that evening.\nDefendant Williams also offered the testimony of Theodore Beatty, a sheriff\u2019s deputy who interviewed Clark shortly after the murders. Beatty testified that Clark had stated to him that she was Towns\u2019 girlfriend. Clark had also stated that it was between 11 p.m. and 12 a.m. that she saw Towns, Michael Coleman, and Eric Coleman in a dark-colored car. Clark never mentioned seeing Williams with the others in the car that night.\nYulanda Allen testified that she was Towns\u2019 girlfriend. Between 10 and 10:30 p.m. Allen stopped by Towns\u2019 home. Allen noticed that both Towns\u2019 green minivan and grey Grand Am were parked outside. Allen entered the house and found Williams, Coleman, and Towns inside. Allen made plans to meet Towns later that evening and then she departed. Later, as Allen was dropping a friend off at home, Towns pulled up alone in a dark-colored automobile which was a Cadillac or a Park Avenue.\nSeveral witnesses testified regarding the physical evidence found at the scene. At Thompson\u2019s trailer at 206 Hare Street, crime scene technicians found four spent shell casings stamped \u201cWinchester nine millimeter.\u201d Two spent projectiles were discovered in the trailer and two spent projectiles were recovered underneath the trailer. In addition, a projectile fragment was recovered from Gardner\u2019s body. A bullet hole was also discovered in the door of the trailer, but the projectile which caused the hole was never recovered. At Mosby\u2019s trailer at 204 Hare Street, one spent 9-millimeter shell casing was discovered lying on the floor. A forensic scientist tested the projectiles and the shell casings and determined that all the shots were fired from the same gun, most likely a 9-millimeter handgun manufactured by Glock.\nMore than 100 fingerprints suitable for comparison were recovered from the crime scene. Of these, fingerprints matching Towns\u2019 fingerprints were discovered on the duct tape used to bind some of the victims. In addition, Towns\u2019 fingerprints were found on some papers in Mosby\u2019s trailer. Neither Williams\u2019 nor Coleman\u2019s fingerprints matched any fingerprints left at the scene. Although shoeprints were recovered at the scene, none of the prints matched the shoes that were seized from Williams.\nAn employee of Croft Motors testified that his company rented a green minivan to Elmer Jennings on November 6, 1993. Elmer Jennings testified that he rented a green minivan from Croft Motors for Roosevelt Towns, Sherrell Towns\u2019 uncle. Elmer saw Sherrell driving the minivan on one occasion. In addition, he saw Sherrell washing the minivan one or two days after the murders.\nTony Whitehead testified twice for the prosecution. The first time he testified, Whitehead was asked about a statement he had heard Williams make during a birthday party in a St. Louis hotel. \"Whitehead was unresponsive and stated that he needed \u201csome air or something.\u201d After an examination outside the presence of the jury, the court declared \"Whitehead a hostile witness. The State then impeached Whitehead with a prior statement he had made to police in which he indicated he had heard Williams admit taking part in the murders.\nOn cross-examination, Whitehead admitted that at the time he made the statement he was in jail for violating probation. The day after giving the statement to police, Whitehead was released from jail. Whitehead stated that his statement consisted of things he heard about the crime on the street, not from anything he had heard Williams say. Whitehead admitted that at the birthday party he was drunk and everyone eventually got thrown out of the hotel because the party got too loud.\nThe next day of trial, Whitehead testified again. Whitehead stated that he contacted the prosecutor the previous night and informed him that he had not testified truthfully the first day because there were a couple of Gangster Disciples in the court room. Whitehead testified that he, Williams, and Coleman all belonged to the Gangster Disciples. Whitehead testified that he did overhear Williams talking at the birthday party. Whitehead heard Williams say that \u201che didn\u2019t know that Sherrell [Towns] didn\u2019t know how to do a murder.\u201d In addition, Williams stated that after Towns shot \u201cthose people,\u201d Williams picked up a shell casing. Whitehead also heard Williams claim to shoot three people.\nDefendant Williams offered the testimony of Larry Delk. Delk testified that he attended the birthday party with Williams. The room where the birthday party was held was very crowded and noisy and a person had to shout in order to talk to someone. Delk did not recall seeing Whitehead at the party, and if he was there, Delk knew that Williams did not speak with Whitehead. Delk did not hear Williams ever talk about the murders. Delk also testified that the day of the murders he was with Williams riding around in Towns\u2019 Grand Am getting drunk and high. Williams dropped Delk off at home around dark.\nNeither Williams nor Coleman testified. Williams presented evidence of an alibi. Williams\u2019 girlfriend and her family members testified that Williams came to their house between 4 and 6 p.m. the day of the murders. Williams was high and drunk and went into a bedroom and slept. At some point in the evening, Towns showed up at their house and exchanged his green minivan for the Grand Am that Williams had been driving. Williams did not leave with Towns and Williams remained at their home all night.\nISSUES\nOn appeal, Williams\u2019 principal contention of error arises from the circuit court\u2019s refusal to sever his trial from that of codefendant Coleman. Prior to trial, the circuit court granted the State\u2019s motion to consolidate Williams\u2019 case with Coleman\u2019s case. See 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 7 (West 1994). Thereafter, Williams filed a written motion to be tried separately from Coleman. See 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 8 (West 1994). Defense counsel argued, inter alia, that Williams would be prejudiced by the introduction of admissions by a nontestifying codefendant which implicated Williams. The circuit court denied the motion. Williams renewed his motion for severance several times prior to trial; however, the circuit court denied each request.\nOn the eve of trial, Williams waived his right to be sentenced by the jury and then made an oral motion for severance. Defense counsel argued that death-qualifying potential jurors for Coleman\u2019s sentencing would prejudice Williams. The court granted Williams\u2019 motion for severance. At that point, the State withdrew its request for the death penalty for Coleman. The court then reversed its ruling on defendant\u2019s severance motion.\nDefense counsel also filed a motion in limine seeking to bar, inter alia, the introduction of out-of-court statements by any codefendant which \u201crefers to or gives rise to any inference that inculpates [Williams] as such would violate the Bruton rule.\u201d Williams\u2019 counsel cited specific examples of statements made by codefendant Coleman that would imply the complicity of Williams and argued that use of such statements would violate Williams\u2019 right to confront witnesses. The circuit court denied Williams\u2019 motion. Immediately before trial began, the circuit court clarified its ruling on the motion in limine. The court stated that it would allow the introduction of Coleman\u2019s out-of-court statements, but admonished the State that the \u201cstatements [were] to be cleansed of all references to the non-declaring defendant.\u201d\nWilliams argues that the trial court erred in denying these motions and, therefore, he was denied a fair trial because the testimony of several witnesses improperly connected him to Coleman\u2019s admissions. See People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400 (1988). Williams further contends that the admission of Coleman\u2019s statements at the joint trial with Williams violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. See U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968).\nWilliams first protests the testimony of Alfred Lump-kins regarding a conversation Lumpkins had with Coleman in January 1994 while both men were incarcerated at the Madison County jail. During examination of Lumpkins by the State, there was the following colloquy:\n\u201cQ. Would you tell us what [Coleman] said regarding his charge?\nA. That him and two other guys was \u2014 went to a trailer in Eagle Park and in a green mini-van to buy drugs and once they got inside [Coleman] went inside to set up a deal on a drug deal. Once he got inside he took Cecil Gardner \u2014 control of Cecil Gardner and waved the other guys to come on in and ordered the other guys to search the trailers and tie these guys up so they could search the trailer and at that time he got them all tied up.\nQ. Did he say what they used to tie the people up?\nA. Duct tape.\n* * *\nQ. And what happened next?\nA. They searched the trailer and then he ordered them to shoot them.\n* * *\nQ. Did he tell you whether there would be any fingerprints or not?\nA. Yes, he told me Towns left a fingerprint behind. That\u2019s because they had on gloves and Towns didn\u2019t. That\u2019s how\u2014\nMR. HILDEBRAND [Coleman\u2019s counsel]: I am going to object to the narrative, your Honor, move to strike.\nMS. ROBBINS [Williams\u2019 counsel]: I am going to object to the references, your Honor, which we previously discussed in various Motions in Limine.\nTHE COURT: Thank you, ma\u2019am. Overruled.\nQ. Did Mr. Coleman tell you that he had worn gloves?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Did he tell you anything about his clothing?\nA. Yes, sir. He said he got rid of the clothing because they had blood and could have been identified through their clothing.\nQ. Did he say how he got rid of the clothing?\nA. They burned them.\nQ. Did he say when they got rid of the clothing?\nA. Right after they left Eagle Park and went to East St. Louis.\nQ. Did he tell you anything about the trailer next door?\nA. Yes. The reason he was \u2014 shot the guy outside because he could identify Coleman for coming out and the guy that was with him.\u201d\nWilliams also disputes the admission at his joint trial of the testimony of Robert Lockett. During direct examination, Robert testified that he and his brother, Michael, were with Coleman one day in June 1993. The three men were sitting in Coleman\u2019s car outside a liquor store planning a home invasion. Bedford \u201cSonny\u201d Jennings and David Thompson, two of the murder victims, pulled up beside Coleman\u2019s car and Coleman stated that they could rob Thompson. Coleman then exited the vehicle and spoke with Thompson. Coleman quickly returned and informed the Locketts that the robbery would have to wait because Thompson did not have any dope at the time. Robert testified that he and his brother never participated in any robbery of Thompson because Michael was arrested and incarcerated soon thereafter.\nRobert further testified that he, his brother Michael, and Coleman were all incarcerated in the Madison County jail at a later time. One day in December 1993 or January 1994, while all three men were waiting in a lounge to see their attorney, Robert entered into a conversation with Coleman about the murders. Robert testified:\n\u201cA. I asked him, why did they kill them. And he stated to me that one of the individuals jumped up and got shot in the chest so therefore they knew they were going to have to do them all. And by that time, by him not being able to wear a mask because he had to get the door open he had to take care of the clucker in which I mention which is Jeff Mosby and at that time I asked him so I referred to \u2014 said so if you seen me with some money\u2014\n* * *\nQ. Did you convey that information to anyone?\nA. You mean\u2014\nQ. Did you talk to anyone and tell them that you had been told about the murder?\nA. I spoke with Sherrell but\u2014\nQ. Any law enforcement?\nA. Yes, I contacted your office.\u201d\nOn cross-examination by Coleman\u2019s counsel, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cQ. You are telling this court that Mike Coleman sat down with you and told you all about this case here?\nA. I am telling you and the Court that Mr. Coleman discussed this case with me due to the fact that we know circumstances and individuals and\u2014\nQ. You know what?\nA. We know individuals such as Mr. Towns. As I said before I was in the same cell block and the initial conversation started.\u201d\nFinally, Williams complains of the testimony of Michael Lockett. During examination by the State, Michael testified consistently with the testimony of his brother about the June 1993 meeting in Coleman\u2019s car, when Coleman identified David Thompson as a possible target for a robbery. Then, regarding the conversation between the three men in the Madison County jail, this dialogue followed:\n\u201cQ. And what was said at that time by Mr. Coleman?\nA. Little Mike just said that \u2014 he said that he went\u2014 that he went into the trailer and that the gun actually [sic] went off or whatever. It was an accident and they knew they had to kill the rest.\nQ. When he said it was an accident what did he say about that?\nA. He said the gun \u2014 he heard the gun go pop, gun went off.\nQ. Then he said they had to kill the rest?\nA. Because they knew the boy was going to die.\u201d\nSubsequently, during redirect examination by the State, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cQ. Did [defense counsel] ask you about any other acquaintances that you had or did she just ask you if you were going to testify about the police report?\nA. What did she ask me, she asked me if I knew him. I don\u2019t know, I suppose that\u2019s Remon.\u201d\nThe court sustained defense counsel\u2019s immediate objection and instructed the jury to disregard Michael\u2019s reference to Williams.\nDuring Robert Lockett\u2019s testimony, a sidebar conference was held at which defense counsel objected that Lumpkins\u2019 testimony regarding Coleman\u2019s admissions had not been cleansed of all references to Williams. The court overruled the objection. Counsel for both defendants then objected to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that the testimony of Lumpkins and Lockett was to be considered only against codefendant Coleman. The court agreed to so instruct the jury regarding Lump-kins\u2019 testimony when the sidebar ended. In addition, the court stated that it would instruct the jury regarding the testimony of the Lockett brothers after each witness testified. When the proceedings resumed, the prosecutor asked the judge if he had any instructions for the jury. In response, the court stated that it was going to wait until the witness was finished testifying. However, the court did not provide the jury with the appropriate limiting instructions regarding any of the three witnesses\u2019 testimony until the next day of the trial.\nDISCUSSION\nIn Bruton, the Supreme Court ruled that the admission at joint trial of a statement by a nontestifying codefendant which expressly implicates defendant in the crime violates the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 485-86, 88 S. Ct. at 1628. The Bruton Court reasoned that instructing the jury to disregard the statement in determining defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence was an inadequate substitution for the defendant\u2019s right to cross-examine the codefendant regarding the powerfully incriminating yet doubtfully credible extrajudicial statement. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132-37, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 483-86, 88 S. Ct. at 1626-28.\nThis court subsequently addressed a similar issue in People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400 (1988). In Duncan, the trial court admitted testimony at joint trial of an extrajudicial statement made by the nontestifying codefendant which named one of the victims and \u201cBill\u201d as two of the people who stood in the way of the codefendant\u2019s control of the local drug trade. The trial court admitted a second statement which acknowledged the existence of a drug courier from Kansas City. Other testimony revealed that the defendant, William Duncan, had participated in delivering drugs from Kansas City. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 408.\nOn appeal, this court granted Duncan a new trial, determining that the trial court erred in failing to sever Duncan\u2019s trial from that of the codefendant. This court stated that \u201cwe have allowed admission of such statements at joint trials only reluctantly, only with proper limiting instructions, and only if the statements are cleansed of all references to a nondeclaring defendant.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 414. This court observed that the proper cleansing was not performed when the jury heard, among other things, a reference to a Kansas City drug courier \u201cthat in light of other testimony it might reasonably construe to mean defendant.\u201d Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 414.\nIn the instant case, Alfred Lumpkins testified that Coleman said he and \u201ctwo other guys\u201d traveled to a trailer in Eagle Park in a green minivan. Once Coleman was inside the trailer, he ordered the other guys to restrain the occupants with duct tape. After searching the trailer, Coleman ordered \u201cthem\u201d to shoot the victims. Coleman also said that Towns left fingerprints at the scene because, unlike Coleman and the remaining guy, Towns had not worn gloves. Coleman said that, because of the blood, \u201cthey\u201d burned their clothing right after returning to East St. Louis. Both of the Lockett brothers testified that Coleman said that \u201cthey\u201d believed that, after the first victim was shot, they needed to kill all the victims.\nOther testimony offered against Williams showed that he was with Towns the evening of the murders in a green minivan while Towns solicited Johnnie Mosley to help \u201ctake care of some business.\u201d Another witness saw three men, one of whom looked like Towns, standing by a van outside David Thompson\u2019s trailer between 9:30 and 10 p.m. that same evening. One of the men said something like \u201clet\u2019s go do this,\u201d or \u201clet\u2019s smoke them.\u201d Christopher Fulton stated that Coleman and two other black men entered his trailer that evening and Coleman shot Mosby. Towns\u2019 fingerprints were discovered on papers inside Mosby\u2019s trailer. Kim Fulton returned home shortly after 10 p.m. that evening. Before entering her trailer to discover Mosby\u2019s body, Fulton saw three black men jump into a green minivan parked next door at Thompson\u2019s trailer and leave in a hurry. Williams was seen at Towns\u2019 home, along with Towns and Coleman, between 10 and 10:30 p.m. the night of the murders. Towns\u2019 green minivan was parked outside. At the crime scene, evidence technicians found Towns\u2019 fingerprints on the duct tape used to bind the victims. However, neither Williams\u2019 nor Coleman\u2019s fingerprints were found at the scene.\nWe disagree with the State\u2019s assertion that Coleman\u2019s statements did not prejudice Williams merely because there was no direct reference to him by either his name or nickname. As this court observed in Duncan:\n\u201c[F]or its use at a joint trial to be weighed against a defendant\u2019s right to confrontation, a codefendant\u2019s \u2018confession or admission\u2019 need not expressly state that a defendant was involved in an offense; it is sufficient that it clearly imply the defendant\u2019s guilt when considered in light of other evidence against the defendant.\u201d Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 410.\nThis court has repeatedly rejected the contention that substitution of another word for the defendant\u2019s name cures the Bruton error when the substituted term still plainly identifies defendant. See People v. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d 293, 313-18 (1988) (improper under Bruton to revise codefendant\u2019s statements to say that \u201cfriends\u201d or \u201ctwo other named individuals\u201d were involved in the crime); People v. Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d 321, 331-35 (1988) (same); People v. Johnson, 13 Ill. 2d 619, 623-25 (1958) (error to substitute defendant\u2019s name with \u201cBlank\u201d); People v. Hodson, 406 Ill. 328, 333-35 (1950) (error to substitute defendant\u2019s name with a letter); see also United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1142 n.8 (11th Cir. 1988) (revising codefendant\u2019s admission to state \u201cthey\u201d were involved still clearly referred to defendants).\nWhen considering Coleman\u2019s statements in light of the other evidence offered against Williams, it is clear that they implied Williams\u2019 guilt. Although Coleman\u2019s admissions are not directly inculpatory of Williams in that they did not explicitly name Remon Williams as his accomplice, the nature of these statements in the context of the joint trial and the testimony linking Williams with Coleman and Towns rendered it impossible for the jury to conclude that the other person to whom Coleman referred was anyone other than the man seated next to him in the courtroom.\nThe State nevertheless urges this court to follow the holding of Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987), and find that the limiting instruction provided to the jury was an adequate protection of Williams\u2019 rights. The State supports its contention by arguing that, unlike Duncan, the prosecutor did not encourage the jury to use Coleman\u2019s admissions against Williams. Under these circumstances, the State contends that the limiting instructions given to the jury were adequate to protect Williams\u2019 rights.\nWe first observe that this case does not fall under the purview of the Richardson holding. In Richardson, the Supreme Court addressed a scenario where the non-testifying codefendant\u2019s written confession was redacted to eliminate all references to defendant\u2019s existence. The codefendant\u2019s confession did not become incriminating of defendant until defendant\u2019s own testimony placed herself in the codefendant\u2019s company during the crime. Under these circumstances, the Court declined to extend the Bruton reasoning, holding that \u201cthe Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s confession with a proper limiting instruction when *** the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant\u2019s name, but any reference to his or her existence.\u201d Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 188, 107 S. Ct. at 1709. The Richardson Court expressly refused to consider the admissibility of a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s statement in which, as here, the defendant\u2019s name has been replaced with a neutral pronoun. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211 n.5, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 188 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 1709 n.5.\nUnlike Richardson, which dealt with a written confession carefully redacted to eliminate even an anonymous reference to the defendant, the instant case involves the oral testimony of third parties regarding a codefendant\u2019s out-of-court admissions which inculpated two other defendants. This court has criticized attempts to cleanse such oral testimony to procure admissibility at a joint trial (see, e.g., Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 408; Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d at 330), and the Supreme Court has recognized the dangers that can occur when such a witness mistakenly or intentionally refers to the defendant while testifying, as Michael Lockett did in this case (see Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 484 n.10, 88 S. Ct. at 1626 n.10).\nFor Coleman\u2019s statements to be otherwise admissible under Richardson, a proper limiting instruction would still be required. See Richardson v. March, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176, 188, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (1987); Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 411. Here, the limiting instructions were not proper. Despite a timely request, the limiting instructions were not given contemporaneously with any of the disputed witnesses\u2019 testimony; the jury was not instructed regarding the disputed witnesses until the day after they all finished testifying. See Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 411; see also Bennett, 848 F.2d at 1142 n.8 (jury should be instructed at time the confession is admitted to consider it only against declaring defendant).\nFurthermore, and contrary to the State\u2019s assertion, the prosecution did encourage the jurors to consider Coleman\u2019s admissions against Williams. Such actions erased any possibility that the jury would be able to follow the mandate of the limiting instructions. See Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 411; Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at 313-14; Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d at 332-33. During closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor specifically addressed the connections between Williams\u2019 and Coleman\u2019s statements:\n\u201cNow we\u2019re talking about how much time would it take to bind the people up. I don\u2019t know. I don\u2019t know how fast you act in a crime like this. But if there are two people doing it, it goes faster. Are there two people? Look at the evidence. On two of the victims Sherrell Towns\u2019 fingerprints appear on the tape, not the third. Was Alfred Lumpkins right? Was somebody wearing gloves that was helping? I don\u2019t know. That\u2019s for you to decide.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nLumpkins testified that Coleman stated that he and one of the perpetrators wore gloves. Moreover, Lumpkins testified that Coleman ordered the \u201cother guys\u201d to bind the victims with the duct tape. Therefore, the prosecutor\u2019s statement was intended to refer directly to Williams.\nIn another instance, the prosecutor commented on Coleman\u2019s attempts to recruit accomplices to rob these specific victims:\n\u201cTravon Watt was on the street in November. He testified that he sees Michael Coleman, Ramone [sic] Williams and Sherrell Towns together. What\u2019s the significance of that? The significance of that is that we have Michael Coleman who has looked for someone to commit the crime with him. He\u2019s been unsuccessful because the victims didn\u2019t have the money at that time and didn\u2019t have the right things, so he\u2019s still looking.\nAt that time he finds someone to commit the crime. He finds two more. He finds Ramone [sic] Williams and Sherrell Towns. Now, they aren\u2019t committing it then, but they\u2019re out. They\u2019re associating.\u201d\nThe only testimony regarding Coleman\u2019s predisposed intent to rob the specific victims came from the Lockett brothers, which was admissible only against Coleman. However, the prosecution utilized that testimony here to transfer that intent to Williams.\nFinally, commenting on the deals offered by the State in exchange for the testimony of the Lockett brothers, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cYou\u2019ve heard from the Lockett\u2019s, [sic] and I\u2019ve talked with you about them. It\u2019s not easy to offer something to someone to come in to testify. As a prosecutor, we sit in a tough chair. You\u2019ve got to be fair. You\u2019ve got to make decisions that affect people\u2019s lives. And you have to make a call once in a while. If the call is letting two people go for five murders or taking someone who\u2019s been in trouble before that has no convictions and is a first offense and pleading for six years to the penitentiary, then that\u2019s the call we have to make.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe prosecutor\u2019s comment implied to the jury that the Locketts had testified against both Coleman and Williams.\nThe Supreme Court has recognized that it is error for a prosecutor to attempt to negate the court\u2019s limiting instruction by encouraging the jury to use a codefendant\u2019s statements in evaluating a defendant\u2019s case. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 188, 107 S. Ct. at 1709. The prosecution\u2019s attempts during closing arguments to connect Williams to Coleman\u2019s statements was a \u201cconstitutionally unacceptable attempt *** to circumvent the strictures of Bruton and the confrontation clause.\u201d Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d at 333. Moreover, the admission of Coleman\u2019s statements \u201cat a joint trial, absent a total deletion of all references to defendant, violated established Illinois case law that is independent of Bruton-Richardson constitutional doctrine.\u201d Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 415.\nWe cannot agree with the State\u2019s assertion that the error of admitting Coleman\u2019s statements at Williams\u2019 joint trial was harmless. The evidence against Williams was not overwhelming. Towns was linked to the murders by direct physical evidence. Coleman was identified by the only eyewitness to any of the shootings and admitted his involvement in the murders on two separate occasions. However, the bulk of the evidence against Williams was circumstantial; Williams was linked to the crime by being seen in the company of Towns and Coleman at times surrounding the murders. The only direct evidence of Williams\u2019 involvement was an out-of-court statement testified to by Whitehead, a witness who changed his testimony on the stand. Therefore, determining the outcome of the trial in the absence of the improper testimony is impossible and reversal and remand for a new trial is the necessary and proper remedy. See Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d at 335.\nIn order to address the issue of subjecting Williams to double jeopardy, we address Williams\u2019 contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. See People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 134 (1997); People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309 (1979). Williams argues that no physical evidence connected him to the murders, the sole eyewitness to any of the shootings failed to identify him, and the only direct evidence that he participated in the crimes was the highly questionable testimony of Tony Whitehead. Williams argues further that his alibi evidence and the testimony of his own witnesses greatly contradict the State\u2019s evidence.\nWe find that the competent evidence presented against Williams was such that the jury could have concluded that he was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof of physical evidence connecting a defendant to a crime has never been required to establish guilt. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at 319. In addition, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction where it satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged. People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 43 (1997). The determinations of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are responsibilities that must be left to the trier of fact. See People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1991); Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d at 336. Finally, the jury was not obligated to accept alibi evidence given by Williams\u2019 girlfriend and her family over the State\u2019s evidence. See People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 46 (1989); Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at 320.\nIn conclusion, we observe that we are not making a finding as to Williams\u2019 guilt or innocence which would be binding on retrial, but rather, we consider the evidence in order to protect Williams\u2019 constitutional right against double jeopardy. See Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 309-10. We find that under the evidence presented here, retrial of Williams would not constitute double jeopardy.\nBecause of our reversal of Williams\u2019 convictions on the Bruton-Duncan errors, we need not address the other issues raised in this appeal.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth herein, the defendant\u2019s convictions are reversed and his sentence vacated. This cause is remanded to the circuit court of Madison County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NICKELS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Martin J. Ryan, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Arleen C. Anderson and Steven R. Splitt, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 80242.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. REMON CASA WILLIAMS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed March 19, 1998.\nRehearing denied June 1, 1998.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Martin J. Ryan, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Arleen C. Anderson and Steven R. Splitt, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0171-01", "first_page_order": 183, "last_page_order": 205 }