{ "id": 864525, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. STEVEN MANNING, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Manning", "decision_date": "1998-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 81393", "first_page": "193", "last_page": "220", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 193" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822871 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122654 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" }, { "page": "250" }, { "page": "2397" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "250" }, { "page": "2397" }, { "page": "296-97" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "2397" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "2398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2483690 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3282880 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" }, { "page": "312-13" }, { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3588199 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1034" }, { "page": "1034-35", "parenthetical": "both cases discussing Connelly" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 157", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6213196 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256584 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 F.3d 639", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1839006 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/28/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260348 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238549 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "959 F.2d 1377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10523742 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1384-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/959/1377-01" ] }, { "cite": "877 F.2d 1341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10540949 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/877/1341-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5164857 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512173 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251719 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 870", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650698 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "956 F.2d 1388", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10520249 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1395" }, { "page": "1395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/956/1388-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596379 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291911 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2702991 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/5/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070395 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2878788 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 809", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906781 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3097135 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57334 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545016 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3390207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "485-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2460444 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "984-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201150 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 912", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581035 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931" }, { "page": "931" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2703755 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2609273 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" }, { "page": "580-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097208 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538892 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1570, "char_count": 42012, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.92591511796896e-07, "percentile": 0.902826574058951 }, "sha256": "b963ba570660c18d51f823a5f0cd70b94cbe3ae8b249163f2312f5ff832ee6d1", "simhash": "1:daaef1747c289f5d", "word_count": 6789 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:59:33.883421+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. STEVEN MANNING, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Steven Manning, was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a), 18 \u2014 2(a). Defendant chose to have the trial judge determine his sentence. At a separate sentencing hearing, the trial judge'found defendant to be eligible for the death penalty and further determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude the imposition of that sentence.\nAccordingly, the trial judge sentenced defendant to death on the murder conviction and to a concurrent 30-year prison term on the armed robbery conviction. The death sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). We reverse defendant\u2019s convictions and remand for a new trial.\nBACKGROUND\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial was essentially as follows. On June 3, 1990, the body of the victim, Jimmy Pellegrino, was found floating in the Des Plaines River near the Lawrence Avenue Bridge in or near Chicago. The body\u2019s wrists and ankles were bound together with duct tape, the head was in a plastic bag and covered with a towel, and the entire body was wrapped in canvas.\nAn autopsy revealed that the victim died of a single gunshot wound to the back of the head. The bullet entered the middle of the back of the head and travelled left and slightly downward. There were no chemicals in the body that would accelerate decomposition. The victim had been dead for at least several days, and the body showed signs of prolonged submersion.\nThe victim\u2019s wife, Joyce Pellegrino, testified as follows. The victim worked as a truck driver for a trucking company. During this time, the victim was in business with defendant. Joyce believed that this business involved a large amount of money. In the last month before his death, the victim had told her that defendant had \u201cripped him off for a lot of money,\u201d and that he was going to get his money back from defendant.\nOn the morning of May 14, 1990, the victim told his wife that he had errands to do, and that he was going to meet with defendant. The victim also told her \u201cthat if he turns up dead,\u201d that she should contact a particular agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and say that defendant killed him.\nRonald Tyrakowski, a longtime friend of the victim, testified as follows. Tyrakowski admitted that he was convicted of possession with intent to deliver cocaine and was serving a 10-year federal prison sentence. Further, that sentence was part of a plea bargain in which Tyrakowski agreed to cooperate with the federal government in any of its ongoing investigations.\nIn late 1989 and early 1990, Tyrakowski sold drugs. The victim operated a trucking business and sold drugs with Tyrakowski. The victim dealt in kilo amounts, which at that time cost between $20,000 and $25,000. Tyrakowski would lend the victim the money, and the victim would buy and resell the cocaine. The victim would then repay Tyrakowski with a bonus from the revenues received. The victim\u2019s main supplier was defendant, whom Tyrakowski had never met.\nIn the spring of 1990, Tyrakowski had given $25,000 to the victim, who in turn gave the money to defendant to buy cocaine. However, defendant never delivered the drugs on that deal. The victim covered Tyrakowski\u2019s loss from his own assets.\nIn early May 1990, Tyrakowski and the victim agreed on another drug transaction with defendant. They would buy two kilos of cocaine from defendant for $52,000. Defendant would also include a third kilo for free, to replace the kilo that he previously failed to deliver.\nOn the morning of May 14, 1990, Tyrakowski and the victim met at around 4700 S. Kedzie Avenue. There, Tyrakowski gave $31,000 to the victim, who already had $14,000 of his own money. Later that morning, a friend of Tyrakowski, Alan Casey, supplied the remaining $7,000 in south suburban Worth.\nAt about noon, Tyrakowski gave the money to the victim, who was waiting in his car. The victim put all of the money in a gym bag, in which Tyrakowski saw the money, clothes and towels, and a silver .357 revolver. Tyrakowski did not know the victim to have ever brought a gun to a drug deal. The victim said that he was going to meet defendant, and that the victim would telephone Tyrakowski in about an hour. Tyrakowski never saw the victim again. The victim did not call, and Tyrakowski could not reach the victim on his mobile phone. The next day, Tyrakowski called Joyce Pellegrino.\nOn May 18, Joyce Pellegrino reported her husband\u2019s disappearance to the Will County sheriffs police. She told police that this was the first time the victim had been missing or had avoided home for an extended time. She told Chicago Police Detective Louis Rabbit that she suspected that the business the victim had with defendant might have involved drugs. She knew that the victim had borrowed $25,000 for a drug deal. She also contacted the FBI as the victim had instructed.\nOn June 24, 1990, the victim\u2019s automobile was found on a city street. Police did not find any money in the unlocked car, nor did they discover fingerprints, fibers, or blood.\nThomas Dye, a police informant, testified as follows. Dye had a significant criminal history dating from 1978. Dye admitted that throughout his adult life he has had at least 10 felony convictions. At the time of trial, he and his girlfriend were in the Federal Witness Protection Program, and had been relocated outside of Chicago.\nIn June 1990, Dye was in Cook County jail serving a 14-year sentence for residential burglary. He was also awaiting trial on three felony cases of theft and robbery; he was subsequently convicted of these charges and received a concurrent five-year sentence. During this time, Dye assisted the Illinois State Police in their investigation of jailguards who were bringing drugs into the jail. Dye was moved into another division of the jail with different guards.\nOn August 17, defendant was incarcerated based on an unrelated charge and was placed in Dye\u2019s division of the jail. A friendship developed immediately upon their meeting. They talked about \u201canything two guys could talk about under those circumstances,\u201d but \u201c[p]rimarily crime; crimes that we had done, crimes that we were aware of.\u201d Soon thereafter they discussed the pending case for which each was jailed, and how each could help the other evade conviction. Defendant asked Dye if he could provide an alibi for defendant in a case pending in another jurisdiction. As payment, defendant would kill, or arrange to have killed, the main witness in the case against Dye.\nDuring these conversations defendant twice told Dye that he had murdered the victim. In the first conversation, defendant stated that he and another had established the victim in the trucking business and that the victim had actually worked for them. The victim had caused problems for the business, so defendant killed him.\nDuring the next several days, defendant admitted to Dye that the problem between him and the victim did not involve the trucking business, but actually involved drugs. Defendant stated that he had cheated the victim on a drug transaction by not supplying him with cocaine. Defendant decided to cheat the victim a second time. The victim \u201cwhined\u201d to defendant about his failure to deliver the cocaine again, and threatened to turn defendant in to the police. Defendant told Dye that \u201cnobody tells on him,\u201d so he killed the victim.\nDefendant told Dye that he shot the victim once in the back of the head with a .25-caliber semiautomatic pistol from a few feet away. He explained that he used a small caliber gun because a large caliber bullet could travel through a body so the target might survive the shot. However, a small caliber bullet, particularly one aimed at the back of the head, would bounce around inside the brain, ensuring death. Defendant also admitted that he wrapped the victim\u2019s body and dumped it in a river, explaining that such a disposal causes incriminating evidence to be more difficult to trace. Defendant also claimed that he put chemicals on the victim\u2019s body to accelerate decomposition. Dye believed that defendant was not on drugs during these confessions, and defendant never told Dye that he was taking medication.\nOn August 22, 1990, Dye met with FBI Agent Gary Miller. Dye agreed to wear a body wire and record his conversations with defendant. On Friday August 24, Agents Miller and Robert Buchan wired Dye, who wore it during the weekend of August 24 through 26. The recording apparatus was taped high up on his inner thigh and the microphones were taped to his navel area. Once the recorder was turned on, it could not be stopped. Each tape ran for two hours.\nThe recording contained many conversations regarding defendant\u2019s and Dye\u2019s plan of mutual assistance in their pending cases. Dye testified that during this weekend defendant made an incriminating statement regarding the Pellegrino murder. Defendant pinned Dye\u2019s left arm behind his back, pushed him towards the ground, and, gesturing with his hand as a gun, pointed at the back of Dye\u2019s head, and said, \u201cit was the same thing\u201d with the victim. However, this conversation, or even any reference to the victim, was not recorded. Rather, the tape contains a two-second inaudible gap. Dye explained that the microphones were pressed against his body when he bent over.\nOn September 24, Dye again agreed to wear a wire. Dye asked defendant a question regarding killing the victim. Defendant became angry and said \u201cF \u2014 k, yeah, I killed him.\u201d Again, however, this conversation was not recorded due to a recorder malfunction.\nOn October 4, Detective Rabbit executed a search warrant for defendant\u2019s storage locker in his apartment building. The building\u2019s maintenance engineer, while repairing plumbing, saw bullets in defendant\u2019s locker, knew that defendant was in jail, and reported what he saw to the police. Detective Rabbit found, inter alia, seven live .25-caliber bullets. Those bullets were subsequently tested with the bullet recovered from the victim. The tests revealed no association beyond the fact that they were all .25 caliber. Further, the bullet recovered from the victim and the bullets found in defendant\u2019s locker had significantly different metal composition. The bullet from the victim was never compared to a particular gun.\nIn December 1990, Dye testified before a federal grand jury regarding the Pellegrino murder. In May or June 1991, the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney and Dye\u2019s attorney formally agreed that if Dye cooperated with the State\u2019s Attorney, told the truth, and testified when asked, Dye\u2019s sentence would be reduced from 14 to 6 years. Dye\u2019s sentence was accordingly reduced in May or June 1992, and he was paroled in July 1992 and placed in the Federal Witness Protection Program.\nIn late 1991, Tyrakowski was arrested for his federal drug offense. As previously discussed, he was with the victim on the day that he disappeared. However, Tyrakowski did not then go to the authorities because he had an outstanding indictment against him and he did not want to be arrested. In December 1991, Tyrakowski testified before the grand jury regarding this case.\nOn February 20, 1992, defendant was indicted on three counts of murder, i.e., intentional, knowing, and felony murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) through (a)(3)), and a fourth count of armed robbery (111. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2(a)). Defendant was also indicted on a fifth count of concealment of homicidal death (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 3.1(a)), on which the State entered a nolle prosequi prior to trial.\nThe defense case, as presented in the opening statement of defendant\u2019s trial counsel, was essentially that the State failed to prove defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense also asserted that the true murderer was Gary Engle, who had ties to both defendant and the victim. The defense presented several witnesses in support of its theory. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned two general verdicts of guilty, one each for first degree murder and armed robbery.\nDefendant waived a sentencing jury prior to trial and again after his conviction. The trial judge found the presence of a statutory aggravating factor: the murder was committed in the course of a felony, i.e., armed robbery. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b). Thus, the trial judge concluded that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. At the close of the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The trial judge accordingly sentenced defendant to death on the first degree murder conviction. The trial judge also sentenced defendant to a concurrent 30-year prison term on the armed robbery conviction.\nDefendant appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.\nDISCUSSION\nDefendant contends (1) the trial court should have suppressed his incriminating statements to Dye; (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence the recordings of himself and Dye, other-crimes evidence, and hearsay testimony from the victim\u2019s wife. Defendant also contends (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel elicited hearsay testimony from the victim\u2019s wife, elicited testimony that defendant was involved in another murder, failed to object to hearsay testimony from Tyrakowski, and failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the death penalty hearing. Defendant contends (5) his sentencing jury waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Also, (6) defendant raises two constitutional challenges to the Illinois death penalty statute.\nI. Suppression of Incriminating Statements\nDefendant denies that he ever made incriminating statements to Dye regarding the Pellegrino murder. However, defendant alternatively contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress them. See People v. Norfleet, 29 Ill. 2d 287 (1963). Defendant raises two issues: (1) the statements were obtained without giving him the Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)), and (2) the statements were coerced in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.\nMiranda\nDefendant argues that Dye was required to give him the Miranda warnings prior to speaking with him. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court \u201cheld that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements given by a suspect during \u2018custodial interrogation\u2019 without a prior warning.\u201d Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 250, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (1990).\nThe Perkins Court explained that the Miranda warnings were meant to preserve the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination during incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere. Courts view that atmosphere as generating inherently compelling pressures that work to undermine the individual\u2019s will to resist and to compel the person to speak where the person would not otherwise do so freely. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 250, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.\nHowever, Miranda is not implicated in conversations between suspects and undercover agents. The essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion are not present when a prisoner speaks freely to an undercover agent. Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull the suspect into a false sense of security \u2014 that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak\u2014 are not within Miranda\u2019s concerns. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-97, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 251, 110 S. Ct. at 2397.\nDefendant attempts to distinguish this case from Perkins. Defendant argues that, unlike Perkins, defendant knew that Dye was an informant, \u201cwho, as a result, had control over [defendant\u2019s] fate.\u201d Defendant \u201cbelieved that he had to talk to Dye for his own survival, to remain in a relatively safe tier in the jail, to benefit from Dye\u2019s promised help, and to try to be on sufficiently good terms with Dye so that Dye wouldn\u2019t inform on him.\u201d Defendant argues that being placed with a known informant, who was assigned to gather incriminating information, where the informant and his handlers knew that the informant would likely elicit incriminating responses from defendant, \u201cwas the functional equivalent of interrogation.\u201d\nWe note the State\u2019s claim that defendant waived this issue for review. The State contends that defendant\u2019s motion to suppress did not include the foregoing allegations. However, our review of the record persuades us that defendant adequately preserved this issue for review.\nDefendant\u2019s own testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress belies his argument. True, defendant testified that he knew that Dye was an informant, and for that reason feared what Dye could cause to be done to him in jail. However, defendant also testified that he had been a police officer and was a convict, and that he had cooperated with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and informed for the FBI. Defendant characterized himself as \u201cpretty seasoned to what goes on in law enforcement,\u201d and \u201cpretty well aware of jailhouse informants and how they operate.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he could have confronted Dye and told Dye to stay away from him, or he could have \u201cplayed along and jerked [Dye] around.\u201d Defendant chose the latter approach. The incriminating statements to Dye were \u201cnothing but empty jailhouse bravado,\u201d or \u201cpuffing.\u201d Although defendant could have remained silent around Dye at any time, defendant instead chose to speak to Dye. Defendant thus voluntarily accepted the risk that Dye would reveal the statement; defendant spoke at his own peril. See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 298, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 252, 110 S. Ct. at 2398; People v. Johnson, 197 Ill. App. 3d 762, 765-66 (1990).\nVoluntariness \u2014 Due Process Clause\nDefendant also argues that his incriminating statements to Dye were involuntary in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pursuant to the due process test, known as the \u201cvoluntariness requirement,\u201d \u201c \u2018certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.\u2019 \u201d People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 314 (1992), quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405, 410, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985); People v. Mays, 176 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1034 (1988).\nIn Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986), the United States Supreme Court discussed the constitutional voluntariness of a statement made under circumstances not requiring Miranda warnings. The Court held that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a statement is not \u201cvoluntary\u201d within the meaning of the due process clause. While mental condition is relevant to an individual\u2019s susceptibility to police coercion, the mere examination of the declarant\u2019s state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry. A voluntariness analysis under the due process clause must focus on the crucial element of police overreaching. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d at 312-13; Mays, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35 (both cases discussing Connelly).\nThus, in the present case, the constitutional voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements depends on the absence of police overreaching. Our inquiry is, therefore, confined to an analysis of Dye\u2019s conduct and whether that conduct was causally related to defendant\u2019s confession. We must decide whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Dye obtained defendant\u2019s statements in a manner that comports with due process. See Easley, 148 Ill. 2d at 312.\nThe State has the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a defendant\u2019s confession by a preponderance of the evidence. Also, the trial court\u2019s findings on the question of the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 292-93 (1990).\nThe trial judge found as follows. Dye did not physically or mentally coerce defendant. Dye did not make any material misrepresentation to defendant, except that Dye was an informant, which defendant already knew. Also, defendant was extremely intelligent, well-oriented, and experienced based on his former roles of police officer and informant. Our review of the record does not reveal any evidence that Dye ever threatened defendant or promised him a benefit to obtain his incriminating statements. Also, the conversations between Dye and defendant were not lengthy, and defendant was always free to walk away from Dye, or at least stop talking to him.\nFor an incriminating statement to be involuntary under the due process clause, the threats, promises, misinformation and the like must emanate from the police. True, defendant testified that he feared what Dye could cause to be done to him in jail. However, the only reason to suppress a confession on federal constitutional grounds is coercion by a public officer. In this context, \u201c[t]he Constitution has not yet been interpreted to protect people against themselves.\u201d Johnson v. Trigg, 28 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1994). We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nII. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nDefendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Where a criminal conviction is challenged based on insufficient evidence, a reviewing court, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must determine whether any rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 191 (1989).\nDefendant views the State\u2019s case as depending on the testimony of Dye, whom defendant characterizes as a \u201cjailhouse informant\u201d and an \u201cexperienced liar.\u201d Defendant argues that Dye\u2019s \u201cuncorroborated testimony should never be the basis for any conviction. Jailhouse informants are motivated by the desire to help themselves and are notoriously dishonest and unreliable witnesses.\u201d According to defendant, without Dye\u2019s testimony, the remainder of the State\u2019s case is testimony that the victim was going to meet defendant on the day the victim disappeared, and that the bullets found in defendant\u2019s storage locker were the same caliber of the fatal bullet, but had a different metal composition. Defendant argues that this evidence, taken as a whole, fails to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIt is not the function of a reviewing court to retry a defendant when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, it is the function of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1990). Specifically, it is quite established that the credibility of a government informant, as with any other witness, is a question for the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377,1384-85 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir. 1989); People v. Irby, 237 Ill. App. 3d 38, 58-59 (1992).\nThe jury was aware of the factors that would allow it to adequately judge the credibility of Dye. Thus, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See People v. Carter, 168 Ill. App. 3d 237, 243-44 (1988). Regarding defendant\u2019s insinuation that someone else murdered the victim, we note that speculation that another person might have committed the offense does not necessarily raise a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 206 (1990).\nWe have reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution. We note that the evidence against defendant was not ample or overwhelming. However, we cannot say that the evidence was so improbable or unsatisfactory that no rational fact finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder and armed robbery.\nIII. Erroneously Admitted Evidence\nDefendant next raises several evidentiary issues. The admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling may not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991).\nTape Recordings\nDefendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the tape-recorded conversations between himself and Dye. Six hours of conversations between Dye and defendant were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The jurors were given excerpts from the transcripts and audio equipment. However, the jury did not hear the complete and unabridged recordings. The record on appeal does not include either the unabridged recordings or a transcript. Rather, during Dye\u2019s testimony, the State questioned Dye as to particular points in the recording, which the jury heard and read. The jury was instructed to consider only those portions of the excerpts to which they were directed.\nDefendant notes that during those six hours, Dye testified that defendant twice confessed to murdering the victim. However, the record shows that inaudible gaps in the recording occur at the times when Dye testified that defendant confessed. Describing the recordings as incomplete, unreliable, and prejudicial, defendant contends that the recordings are inadmissible and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting them into evidence.\nA partially inaudible sound recording is admissible unless the inaudible portions are so substantial as to render the recording untrustworthy as a whole. The admission of a recording that is partially inaudible, or that reproduces only part of a statement or conversation, is a matter within the trial court\u2019s discretion. People v. Dougherty, 160 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876 (1987); accord United States v. Robinson, 956 F.2d 1388, 1395 (7th Cir. 1992); 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence \u00a7 1238 (1994).\nIn the present case, Dye testified that one inaudible gap was caused by his bending over at the waist, blocking the microphones, and the other was caused by a recorder malfunction. The trial court correctly held that the two inaudible gaps in the recording were relevant only to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. See Robinson, 956 F.2d at 1395.\nTrue, inaudible gaps in the recording occurred when Dye testified that defendant confessed. However, despite their significance, they remain only two inaudible gaps out of the total of what the jury heard. We cannot say that the two inaudible gaps challenged here are so substantial as to render the recordings untrustworthy as a whole.\nEvidence of Other Crimes\nDefendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the conversations between himself and Dye where they discussed how each could help the other evade conviction in their pending cases. Specifically, defendant asked Dye if he could provide an alibi for defendant in his case; in return, defendant would kill or arrange to have killed the main witness in Dye\u2019s case.\nPrior to trial, defendant moved to preclude the introduction of this evidence. The State argued that the conversations were admissible: (1) to put defendant\u2019s confessions into context, i.e., to explain why defendant would confess to the Pellegrino murder to Dye; and (2) because the detailed nature of the plan of mutual assistance between defendant and Dye shows defendant\u2019s ability to reason and communicate, refuting the defense theory that defendant was merely bragging while under the influence of psychotropic drugs. The trial court ruled that the State would be precluded from questioning Dye about those conversations during his direct examination; however, defendant\u2019s cross-examination of Dye might cause the court to reconsider its ruling.\nDuring his opening statement, defense counsel described defendant as a braggart who took psychotropic drugs. Prior to Dye\u2019s testimony, the State sought the admission of the conversations, arguing that the conversations were now necessary to rebut defense counsel\u2019s comments. The trial court ruled that the State could elicit the conversation.\nThe principles are quite established. Evidence of crimes for which a defendant is not on trial is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish the defendant\u2019s disposition or propensity to commit crime. People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452 (1991); Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364. Evidence of other crimes is objectionable not because it has little probative value, but rather because it has too much. People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 485 (1992). Such evidence overpersuades a jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels that defendant is a bad person who deserves punishment. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d at 441. The law distrusts the inference that because a person has committed other crimes, he or she is more likely to have committed the current crime. \u201cAnd so, as a matter of policy, where the testimony has no value beyond that inference, it is excluded.\u201d People v. Lehman, 5 Ill. 2d 337, 342 (1955).\nHowever, evidence of the commission of other crimes committed by the defendant is admissible when such evidence is relevant to establish any material question other than the defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d at 452. When evidence of other crimes is offered, the trial judge must weigh its probative value against its prejudicial effect, and may exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 365. We note that \u201c[t]he erroneous admission of evidence of other crimes carries a high risk of prejudice and ordinarily calls for reversal.\u201d People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 140 (1980).\nAlthough the recordings as a whole are not untrustworthy, we conclude that the conversations between defendant and Dye regarding their plan of mutual assistance are inadmissible. Their probative value is clearly outweighed by their prejudicial effect.\nThe State argued that the conversations were necessary to rebut remarks in defense counsel\u2019s opening statement that defendant was a braggart taking psychotropic drugs. The State argued that the detailed nature of the plan of mutual assistance shows defendant\u2019s ability to reason and communicate. The trial judge did not make any findings for the record as to the prejudicial effect of the challenged conversations.\nWe conclude that the challenged conversations have little probative value. Dye recorded six hours of conversations. Other conversations between defendant and Dye can show that defendant can reason and communicate. Other conversations can also establish their relationship, to explain why defendant would confess to Dye.\nOn the other hand, the challenged conversations are very prejudicial. As previously noted, the evidence in the State\u2019s case is minimally sufficient. The challenged conversations show that defendant is a bad person who has a propensity to commit crime. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 34 Ill. 2d 530 (1966); People v. Radovick, 275 Ill. App. 3d 809 (1995); People v. Triplett, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1077 (1981). We hold that the trial court erred in admitting this highly prejudicial evidence. Further, based on the minimal sufficiency of the evidence, we cannot say that retrial without this evidence would produce the same result. Thus, we cannot deem the erroneous admission of this evidence to have been harmless. See People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 98 (1996); People v. Parmly, 117 Ill. 2d 386, 396 (1987).\nHearsay Testimony from the Victim\u2019s Wife\nDefendant contends the trial court abused its discretion also by admitting into evidence the following hearsay statement from the victim\u2019s wife, Joyce Pellegrino:\n\u201cJimmy had told me the last time I saw him that if he turns up dead, that I should go to the FBI a [sic] Agent Pecoraro and tell him Steve Manning killed him.\u201d\nPrior to trial, the court ruled that the State could elicit from Joyce Pellegrino only that the victim told her that he was going to meet defendant. However, the State could not elicit from her the victim\u2019s out-of-court statement that if he were killed she should tell the FBI that defendant killed him.\nAt trial, Pellegrino testified on direct examination only that the victim told her that he was going to meet defendant. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked her what she told Agent Pecoraro about her conversation with the victim. Throughout her cross-examination, she did not mention the victim\u2019s out-of-court statement. At a sidebar prior to its redirect examination, the State argued that since defense counsel questioned her regarding what she told the FBI, then the State could ask her exactly what the victim said. The trial court ruled that since the defense brought up the FBI agent, then the State could elicit the testimony.\nOn appeal, the State concedes that the victim\u2019s out-of-court statement was barred as prejudicial inadmissible hearsay. However, the State argues that defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of the victim\u2019s wife \u201copened the door\u201d to the previously barred evidence.\nThe State invokes the doctrine of \u201ccurative admissibility.\u201d If A opens up an issue and B will be prejudiced unless B can introduce contradictory or explanatory evidence, then B will be permitted to introduce such evidence, even though it might otherwise be improper. People v. Lewis, 52 Ill. App. 3d 477, 485 (1977); People v. Wilbert, 15 Ill. App. 3d 974, 984-87 (1973); accord 1 R Steigmann, Illinois Evidence Manual \u00a7 4:04 (3d ed. 1995). Specifically, in a criminal case, where the door to a particular subject is opened by defense counsel on cross-examination, the State may, on redirect, question the witness to clarify or explain the matters brought out during, or to remove or correct unfavorable inferences left by, the previous cross-examination. People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 444 (1988); Lewis, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 485-86.\nHowever, the doctrine of curative admissibility is not a panacea; it does not permit a party to introduce inadmissible evidence merely because the opponent brought out some evidence on the same subject. People v. Higgins, 71 Ill. App. 3d 912, 931 (1979). The rule is merely protective and goes only as far as is necessary to shield a party from adverse inferences. Saputo v. Fatla, 25 Ill. App. 3d 775, 783 (1975). Further:\n\u201c \u2018[T]he doctrine of curative admissibility *** is limited in scope and design to those situations where its invocation is deemed necessary to eradicate undue prejudicial inferences which might otherwise ensue from the introduction of the original evidence. The decision of whether to admit curative evidence lies within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge.\u2019 (Emphasis in original.)\u201d People v. Chambers, 179 Ill. App. 3d 565, 581 (1989), quoting Higgins, 71 Ill. App. 3d at 931.\nThe record shows that, at trial, neither the prosecution nor the trial court indicated how defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of the victim\u2019s wife prejudiced the State. On appeal, the State now argues that defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of the victim\u2019s wife left the jury with the misleading impression that she never told the FBI anything about defendant. Referring to defense counsel\u2019s opening statement, the State now argues that this cross-examination fits with the defense theory of the case: that defendant had nothing to do with the victim\u2019s murder; but rather it was committed by another; and, as proof, even the victim\u2019s wife does not implicate defendant.\nAfter carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the State was not unduly prejudiced by defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Joyce Pellegrino. Defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of the victim\u2019s wife actually brought out much information about defendant and the victim \u2014 with the exception that the victim had named defendant as his murderer. Defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination did not mislead the jury any more than the trial judge\u2019s ii limine order barring the hearsay statement. Thus, the State was not thereby unduly prejudiced. Therefore, defense counsel did not \u201copen the door\u201d to the victim\u2019s out-of-court statement and, accordingly, it remained inadmissible. See Chambers, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 580-82.\nWe note, sua sponte, that under the \u201ccompleteness doctrine,\u201d which provides that where a witness relates a conversation the opponent may bring out all of the conversation on cross-examination (People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 556 (1982)), prejudice is nonetheless required. People v. Olinger, 112 Ill. 2d 324, 337 (1986). We hold that the trial court erred in admitting this prejudicial evidence. Further, as with the evidence of other crimes, we cannot deem the erroneous admission of this evidence to have been harmless.\nBased on the erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence and the hearsay testimony of the victim\u2019s wife, defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed and the cause * remanded for a new trial. We note our previous finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We adhere to that finding even with the above-mentioned evidence excluded. This finding removes the risk of subjecting defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10 (1979). Due to our disposition of this cause, we need not address defendant\u2019s remaining contentions.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nThe majority excludes evidence of a murder scheme between defendant and jailhouse informant Thomas Dye, whereby defendant would kill a witness in Dye\u2019s case in exchange for an alibi in his own. The majority holds that this evidence is more prejudicial than probative. I disagree. Evidence is excluded only if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365 (1991). The prejudicial effect of the evidence of the plan did not substantially outweigh its probative value; in fact, this evidence is highly probative. The conversation involving the scheme was admitted at trial to place defendant\u2019s confession in context and to rebut defendant\u2019s contention that he was unable to reason and communicate coherently because of medication he was taking. The conspiracy between defendant and Dye is highly probative in establishing these two points, and although other conversations between defendant and the informant were admitted, none were as probative as the ones in which defendant and Dye formed their plan. First, no other exchange explains why defendant confessed to Dye: it was to assuage Dye\u2019s doubts that defendant was capable of performing his promise to murder the witness in Dye\u2019s case. Without this information, defendant\u2019s reason for confessing, and thus the confession itself, remains mysterious and suspect. Second, this evidence was crucial to rebut defendant\u2019s argument that his reasoning was altered by medication taken while in prison. Even though several hours of other conversations between defendant and Dye were admitted, no other discussions so fully establish that defendant was coherent and able to reason as the ones where defendant and Dye concocted their detailed scheme. This evidence demonstrates that defendant\u2019s conversation was not merely drug-induced bravado; rather, it was careful, calculated and indicative of someone unaffected by medication.\nThe admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364. Such abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court\u2019s decision was arbitrary, fanciful, or one that no reasonable person would make. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364. That standard has not been met here, as it is clear that a reasonable person could find the disputed evidence more probative than prejudicial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence, and the evidence should not be excluded now.\nI agree, however, that the evidence concerning the hearsay testimony of the victim\u2019s wife should be excluded, and that to allow such evidence was not harmless error. Therefore, defendant should be granted a new trial, but at this new trial evidence regarding his conspiracy with Dye should once again be admitted.\nJUSTICES MILLER and McMORROW join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles Schiedel, Deputy Defender, of Springfield, and Steven Clark, Assistant Defender, of Chicago, both of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Noreen M. Daly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 81393.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. STEVEN MANNING, Appellant.\nOpinion filed April 16, 1998.\nRehearing denied June 1, 1998.\nHEIPLE, J., joined by MILLER and McMORROW, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nCharles Schiedel, Deputy Defender, of Springfield, and Steven Clark, Assistant Defender, of Chicago, both of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Noreen M. Daly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0193-01", "first_page_order": 205, "last_page_order": 232 }