{ "id": 864540, "name": "SUN CHOI, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Ravenswood Hospital et al., Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Choi v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1998-05-21", "docket_number": "No. 82887", "first_page": "387", "last_page": "400", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 387" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448305 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2495145 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641-42" }, { "page": "642" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295827 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576113 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "120-21" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "118-19" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5450447 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291541 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "\"ability to do light work does not necessarily preclude a finding of temporary total disability\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 918", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515077 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801353 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781336 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045304 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0538-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 773, "char_count": 23014, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4461014044377054e-07, "percentile": 0.6541159349444697 }, "sha256": "683ca4a6433d814de29d9b181e049ee9591971c5b3d1dd8d881c56551e15f4c6", "simhash": "1:c8efc9b6c7d2c5e9", "word_count": 3770 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:59:33.883421+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SUN CHOI, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Ravenswood Hospital et al., Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSection 19(b \u2014 1) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(b \u2014 1) (West 1994)) provides that employees who are not receiving temporary total disability benefits pursuant to section 8(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West 1994)) or other benefits pursuant to section 8(a) (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 1994)) may file a petition before the Industrial Commission (the Commission) requesting an expedited hearing to determine whether they are entitled to such benefits. At issue in this appeal is paragraph (x) of section 19(b \u2014 1), which directs that certain documents be attached to the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. The appellate court held that under paragraph (x), an employee must attach documents to the petition which establish that the employee is \u201cunable to work at all\u201d before the petition may be considered by the Commission. 286 111. App. 3d 536, 539. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and hold that paragraph (x) does not require an employee to attach documents to the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition which establish a complete incapacity to perform all work.\nBackground\nOn August 5, 1992, the claimant, Sun Choi, filed a petition for immediate hearing before the Commission pursuant to section 19(b \u2014 1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/ 19(b \u2014 1) (West 1994)). According to the petition, claimant injured her back during the course of her employment with the respondent, Ravenswood Hospital, when she lifted a patient in respondent\u2019s intensive care unit. Claimant was granted permission to withdraw her section 19(b \u2014 1) petition in September 1992. The petition was subsequently refiled on March 1, 1993.\nIt is undisputed that three documents relating to the requirements set forth in paragraph (x) of section 19(b \u2014 1) were attached to the petition filed in 1993. The first document was a protest letter dated July 31, 1992, from respondent to the Illinois Department of Employment Security, in which respondent questions claimant\u2019s eligibility for unemployment benefits. The letter notes that claimant \u201cwas involved in a[n] injury on the job and restricted to light duty only.\u201d The letter also states that \u201cbased on the claimant\u2019s current medical condition,\u201d she is not allowed to \u201cwork full time for our organization\u201d and has \u201cnot been released to return to full time duty without restrictions.\u201d The second document attached to claimant\u2019s petition was a letter from one of claimant\u2019s treating physicians, Dr. Dennis Mess, to respondent, dated March 19, 1992. In this letter, Dr. Mess states that he saw claimant on March 18, 1992, and that she was diagnosed as having \u201cL4-5, L5-S1 disc degeneration with a small central herniation at L5-S1.\u201d Dr. Mess also opined:\n\u201cI don\u2019t feel [claimant] will ever be able to resume her nursing duties. She is capable of sedentary work with the ability to periodically work while standing as in the past.\u201d\nThe final document attached to claimant\u2019s petition was a note from another of claimant\u2019s physicians, Dr. Edward Abraham. In this note, dated August 24, 1992, Dr. Abraham states:\n\u201c[Claimant] has lumbar disc disease. She is capable only of sedentary clerical work. I don\u2019t expect any change in her condition.\u201d\nOn August 24, 1992, respondent filed a response to claimant\u2019s first filing of her section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. In this response, respondent admitted that claimant had been injured in its intensive care unit, and admitted that it had refused to provide claimant with benefits under either section 8(a) or 8(b) of the Act. However, respondent disputed claimant\u2019s description of the nature of her injury, and her description of the accident which caused the injury. In addition, respondent contended that claimant\u2019s petition was defective because she had failed \u201cto attach [a] medical report showing [her] total inability to work.\u201d Attached to the response to claimant\u2019s section 19(b \u2014 1) petition were two documents. The first document was a note written by Dr. Abraham and dated January 22, 1992. The note states that \u201cMs. Choi may resume her previous work duties on 1/29/92.\u201d The second document was a letter written by Dr. Leonard Smith and dated October 24, 1991. In the letter, Dr. Smith describes the nature and extent of claimant\u2019s injury and then concludes:\n\u201c[L]ifting should be confined to 30 pounds and carrying to 30 pounds. Other than this, [claimant] can perform the usual and customary duties of a nurse.\u201d\nClaimant\u2019s section 19(b \u2014 1) petition was brought before an arbitrator for a hearing on March 30, 1993. At the start of the hearing, respondent repeated its argument that claimant\u2019s petition should be dismissed because it did not contain \u201ca report from the physician which, in fact, states that [claimant] cannot work.\u201d The arbitrator disagreed with respondent and, at the conclusion of the hearing, awarded claimant temporary total disability benefits pursuant to section 8(b) of the Act and vocational rehabilitation pursuant to section 8(a). Upon review, the Commission dismissed claimant\u2019s petition and vacated the arbitrator\u2019s award of benefits without considering the merits of claimant\u2019s request for benefits. The Commission concluded that claimant\u2019s petition was subject to dismissal because there was \u201cno recent medical report attached to the \u00a7 19(b \u2014 1) Petition which stated that the [claimant] was incapable of work.\u201d The circuit court confirmed the decision of the Commission.\nThe appellate court, with two justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Relying on E.L. Kaplan Trucking Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 195 Ill. App. 3d 640 (1990), the appellate court held that claimant\u2019s petition was defective and therefore could not be considered by the Commission, because the documents which claimant had attached to the petition \u201conly established she was unable to return to work in her previous position, not that she was currently unable to work at all.\u201d 286 Ill. App. 3d at 539. The two dissenting justices certified the cause for further review, and we granted claimant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nAnalysis\nSection 19(b \u2014 1) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(b \u2014 1) If the employee is not receiving medical, surgical or hospital services as provided in paragraph (a) of Section 8 or compensation as provided in paragraph (b) of Section 8, the employee, in accordance with Commission Rules, may file a petition for an emergency hearing by an Arbitrator on the issue of whether or not he is entitled to receive payment of such compensation or services as provided therein. Such petition shall have priority over all other petitions and shall be heard by the Arbitrator and Commission with all convenient speed.\nSuch petition shall contain the following information and shall be served on the employer at least 15 days before it is filed:\n* * *\n(x) a copy of a signed report by a medical practitioner, relating to the employee\u2019s current inability to return to work because of the injuries incurred as a result of the accident or such other documents or affidavits which show that the employee is entitled to receive compensation pursuant to paragraph (b) of Section 8 of this Act or medical, surgical or hospital services pursuant to paragraph (a) of Section 8 of this Act. Such reports, documents or affidavits shall state, if possible, the history of the accident given by the employee, and describe the injury and medical diagnosis, the medical services for such injury which the employee has received and is receiving, the physical activities which the employee cannot currently perform as a result of any impairment or disability due to such injury, and the prognosis for recovery.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/19(b \u2014 1) (West 1994).\nThe principal issue presented for review in this appeal is the meaning of the phrase \u201cinability to return to work\u201d found in the first sentence of paragraph (x) of section 19(b \u2014 1). As this issue is one of statutory construction, our review is de novo. Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (1997).\nRespondent argues that as a matter of policy, the phrase \u201cinability to return to work\u201d should be construed as meaning a total inability to perform all work and, therefore, that the employee must attach documents to the petition which establish that he or she is incapable of performing all work. In support of this contention, respondent highlights several features of section 19(b \u2014 1). Respondent notes that a section 19(b \u2014 1) petition is \u201cfor an emergency hearing,\u201d and that the petition \u201cshall have priority over all other petitions and shall be heard by the Arbitrator and Commission with all convenient speed.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(b \u2014 1) (West 1994). Respondent further notes that once the petition is filed, the conduct of the employer in defending the petition is restricted. Specifically, an employer who does not \u201ctimely file and serve a written response without good cause may not introduce any evidence to dispute any claim of the employee.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(b \u2014 1) (West 1994). Respondent contends that because of the conditions and burdens imposed under section 19(b \u2014 1), the legislature must have intended to restrict the use of the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition to those situations in which the employee is totally incapable of performing all work. Because claimant in the instant case did not include attachments which established that she was completely unable to work, respondent contends that the Commission properly dismissed her petition. We disagree.\nSection 19(b \u2014 l)(x) provides that an employee requesting an immediate hearing must provide a medical report relating to his or her current inability to return to work or \u201csuch other documents or affidavits which show that the employee is entitled to receive compensation pursuant to paragraph (b) of Section 8 of this Act or medical, surgical or hospital services pursuant to paragraph (a) of Section 8 of this Act.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(b \u2014 l)(x) (West 1994). Paragraph (b) of section 8 governs the awarding of benefits for temporary total disability. See 820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West 1994).\n\u201cTotal disability,\u201d as that term is used in the Act, does not mean total physical and mental incapacity. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 138 Ill. 2d 107,120 (1990). Rather, an employee is considered totally disabled when, because of a work-related injury, he or she is able only to perform services which are so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a \u201c \u2018reasonably stable labor market\u2019 \u201d for them does not exist. J.M. Jones Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 71 Ill. 2d 368, 373 (1978), quoting E.R. Moore Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 71 Ill. 2d 353, 362 (1978); see generally 4 A. Larson, Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 57.51 (1997). Thus, \u201c[e]vidence that the employee has been or is able to earn occasional wages or to perform certain useful services neither precludes a finding of total disability nor requires a finding of partial disability.\u201d E.R. Moore Co., 71 Ill. 2d at 361; Archer Daniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. 2d at 121; 4 A. Larson, Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 57.51(a), at 10 \u2014 283 through 10 \u2014 286 (1997); see also Whitney Productions, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 274 Ill. App. 3d 28, 31 (1995) (\u201cability to do light work does not necessarily preclude a finding of temporary total disability\u201d). Accordingly, because \u201ctotal disability\u201d does not mean a complete inability to perform all work, an employee may satisfy the requirements of paragraph (x), under the plain terms of the statute, without establishing that he or she is completely unable to perform all work.\nIn addition to being at odds with the plain language of the statute, respondent\u2019s contention that paragraph (x) requires an employee to establish that he or she is unable to perform all work is also contrary to the purpose of the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. Section 19(b \u2014 1) was enacted to address the possibility that an unscrupulous employer or insurance company might withhold all workers\u2019 compensation benefits from a temporarily totally disabled employee in an attempt to pressure that employee into accepting a settlement. Section 19(b \u2014 1) seeks to eliminate this situation by providing a means of quickly resolving the single question of whether the employee is entitled to receive workers\u2019 compensation benefits. See 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 16, 1983, at 28-29 (statements of Representative McPike) (discussing originally enacted version of section 19(b \u2014 1)). Adopting respondent\u2019s interpretation of paragraph (x) would remove the option of proceeding under section 19(b \u2014 1) for all those injured employees who are not completely incapacitated, but who can nevertheless demonstrate that they are temporarily totally disabled because they cannot perform any services except those for which no reasonably stable labor market exists. Such a result is incompatible with the purpose of section 19(b \u2014 1). Furthermore, we note that it would make little sense to construe paragraph (x) as requiring an employee to submit documents which establish that he or she is completely incapable of performing all work in order to obtain a hearing on whether the employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits, when the employee is not required to prove a complete inability to perform all work in order to actually receive those benefits.\nIn support of its contention that paragraph (x) requires the employee to establish a complete incapacity to perform all work, respondent relies, as did the appellate court, on E.L. Kaplan Trucking Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 195 Ill. App. 3d 640 (1990). In Kaplan, the injured employee was awarded temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses following a hearing brought pursuant to section 19(b \u2014 1). The employer appealed, arguing that \u201cthe Commission erred in allowing [the employee\u2019s claim] to be heard on an expedited basis because claimant failed to present any evidence that at the time of the hearing [he] was temporarily totally disabled.\u201d Kaplan, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 641-42. The appellate court, after reviewing the pertinent statutory language, determined that paragraph (x) requires a claimant to \u201cshow a present or \u2018current inability to work in order to be entitled to the emergency and expedited benefits of section 19(b \u2014 1).\u201d Kaplan, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 642. The court then concluded that the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition at issue before it was deficient because the evidence presented with the petition failed to show a current inability to work, or temporary total disability, and, in fact, showed that the employee was working at the time he filed his section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. Kaplan, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 643. Thus, Kaplan holds that an employee who is regularly employed at the time of filing a section 19(b \u2014 1) petition cannot demonstrate a \u201ccurrent inability to return to work\u201d (emphasis added) (820 ILCS 305/ 19(b \u2014 l)(x) (West 1994)) and, therefore, is not entitled to an expedited hearing under section 19(b \u2014 1). Kaplan does not stand for the proposition that an employee must establish a complete inability to perform all work in order to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (x). Cf. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 174 Ill. App. 3d 918, 925 (1988), affd in part & rev\u2019d in part, 138 Ill. 2d 107 (1990). In the case at bar, respondent concedes that claimant was not working at the time she filed or refiled her section 19(b \u2014 1) petition.\nWe have a duty to construe the language of paragraph (x) so that the statute\u2019s purpose is given effect. In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 195 (1997). We must also presume that in enacting paragraph (x), the legislature did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust results. Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 262 (1994). In light of these principles, we believe that the phrase \u201cinability to return to work,\u201d as used in paragraph (x), should be construed to equate to the term \u201ctemporarily totally disabled.\u201d This interpretation of the phrase \u201cinability to return to work\u201d avoids the inconsistencies and contradictions which are created by respondent\u2019s proposed construction of the phrase. In addition, equating the phrase \u201cinability to return to work\u201d with the term \u201ctemporarily totally disabled\u201d insures that full effect is given to the underlying purpose of the statute.\nParagraph (x) thus mandates that an employee filing a section 19(b \u2014 1) petition attach to the petition a signed report by a medical practitioner or other documents or affidavits which relate to, or show, that the employee is entitled to receive compensation for temporary total disability or to receive other benefits under section 8(a) of the Act. The \u201creports, documents or affidavits [attached to the petition] shall state, if possible, the history of the accident given by the employee, and describe the injury and medical diagnosis, the medical services for such injury which the employee has received and is receiving, the physical activities which the employee cannot currently perform as a result of any impairment or disability due to such injury, and the prognosis for recovery.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(b \u2014 l)(x) (West 1994). Claimant in the instant case attached two statements from her physicians, and one letter from respondent, to her section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. These documents described claimant\u2019s injury, the physical activities which she could not perform, and her medical diagnosis. The documents did not have to establish that claimant was totally unable to work.\nAt oral argument, respondent contended that claimant\u2019s petition was also subject to dismissal because no documents were attached to the petition which showed that she could not find work. Respondent\u2019s argument on this point evidently relates to the burden faced by an employee who has been injured on the job and who is seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits, but who is not manifestly unemployable:\n\u201cIf the claimant\u2019s disability is limited in nature so that he is not obviously unemployable or if there is not medical evidence to support a claim of total disability j the burden is upon the claimant to establish the unavailability of employment to a person in his circumstance. [Citation.] Once a claimant shows that he is unable to perform and obtain regular and continuous employment for which he is qualified, the burden shifts to the employer, who must come forward with evidence to establish \u2018that the employee is capable of engaging in some type of regular and continuous employment\u2019 and that \u2018such employment is reasonably available.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Archer Daniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. 2d at 120-21.\nSee also Valley Mould & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 84 Ill. 2d 538, 546-47 (1981); 4 A. Larson, Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7\u00a7 57.61(c), (d) (1997).\nNowhere in paragraph (x) is it stated that an injured employee who is not obviously unemployable must attach documents to the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition which establish the unavailability of employment. If an injured employee is faced with the burden of proving that employment is unavailable, then that burden must be met during the hearing before the arbitrator, not in the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. Parenthetically, we note that if the employee intends to use documents at the hearing to help establish the unavailability of employment, then such documents must be attached to the petition pursuant to paragraph (xi) of section 19(b \u2014 1). See 820 ILCS 305/19(b \u2014 l)(xi) (West 1994). Respondent does not contend that claimant failed to comply with this paragraph.\nRespondent also argues briefly that claimant\u2019s injury had become permanent by the time she filed her petition in 1993, and, because section 19(b \u2014 1) is not available for employees seeking permanent disability benefits, claimant\u2019s petition was therefore properly dismissed. In support of this contention, respondent points to the note written by Dr. Edward Abraham, dated August 24, 1992, in which he states that he does not \u201cexpect any change in [claimant\u2019s] condition.\u201d\nAn employee is temporarily totally disabled \u201cfrom the time an injury incapacitates him for work until such time as he is as far recovered or restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit.\u201d Archer Daniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. 2d at 118. \u201cThe time during which a worker is temporarily totally disabled presents a question of fact to be determined by the Industrial Commission, and the Commission\u2019s decision will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Archer Daniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. 2d at 118-19. In the instant case, the only issue which was considered by the Commission, and the only issue which is before this court, is the adequacy of claimant\u2019s section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. Although evidence was presented at the hearing before the arbitrator regarding the permanency of claimant\u2019s condition, that evidence may not be used to determine whether claimant\u2019s petition is subject to dismissal. In addition, we cannot say that the single statement made by Dr. Abraham is sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that claimant \u201cis as far recovered or restored as the permanent character of [her] injury will permit.\u201d Archer Daniels Midland Co., 138 Ill. 2d at 118. We therefore express no opinion on the question of the permanency of claimant\u2019s condition.\nIt is undisputed that claimant was not working and was not receiving workers\u2019 compensation benefits under either section 8(a) or 8(b) when she filed her section 19(b \u2014 1) petition in 1993. The documents which claimant attached to her petition confirmed that she had been injured and adequately described the nature of the injury. In its response to claimant\u2019s petition, respondent disputed the extent of claimant\u2019s injury, but admitted that she had been injured while working in its intensive care unit. Under paragraph (x), the documents attached to claimant\u2019s section 19(b \u2014 1) petition did not have to establish that she was completely incapable of performing all work. In addition, while claimant may have to prove to the Commission that employment was unavailable to someone in her circumstance in order to ultimately qualify for temporary total disability benefits, she was not required to meet that burden in the section 19(b \u2014 1) petition. Accordingly, the Commission erred when it dismissed claimant\u2019s petition.\nConclusion\nThe judgments of the appellate court and circuit court are reversed and the decision of the Industrial Commission is set aside. The cause is remanded to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAppellate court judgment reversed;\ncircuit court judgment reversed;\nCommission decision set aside;\ncause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "James L. Kaplan, of Kaplan & Sorosky, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Stuart M. Pellish, of Purmal, Barnes & Cohen, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 82887.\nSUN CHOI, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Ravenswood Hospital et al., Appellees).\nOpinion filed May 21, 1998.\nJames L. Kaplan, of Kaplan & Sorosky, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nStuart M. Pellish, of Purmal, Barnes & Cohen, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0387-01", "first_page_order": 399, "last_page_order": 412 }