{ "id": 864539, "name": "In re PHYLLIS P. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Phyllis P. et al., Appellants)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Phyllis P.", "decision_date": "1998-05-21", "docket_number": "No. 84026", "first_page": "400", "last_page": "403", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 400" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2881261 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ill. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4997547 ], "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/304/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592134 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "mental illness does not, ipso facto, raise a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness to stand trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574172 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 Ill. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307617 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/401/0435-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 331, "char_count": 4837, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1841742441166108e-07, "percentile": 0.5893816589306944 }, "sha256": "3522b06fb2f6294408d008fe32e7fe4ca843f97ed1b39ba0843e3904ad29aeb7", "simhash": "1:20a6da81f0a4ca92", "word_count": 768 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:59:33.883421+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re PHYLLIS P. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Phyllis P. et al., Appellants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt issue is whether a respondent may dismiss his appeal from an order requiring him to submit to involuntary mental health treatment without first filing an affidavit from a medical doctor attesting to his competency. Respondents Phyllis P., Phuong T., and Ande F. moved to dismiss their appeals after their Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission (GAC) attorneys explained the appellate process to them, the likelihood of succeeding on their appeals, and the consequences of dismissing their appeals. The appellate court denied the motions without prejudice, provided that, upon refiling, the respondents attach a medical doctor\u2019s affidavit attesting that the respondents were competent to dismiss their appeals. The appellate court further instructed the GAC to file these affidavits in all future cases. Nos. 2 \u2014 97\u20140503, 2 \u2014 97\u20140171, 2 \u2014 97\u20140113 cons. The appellate court granted a motion for a certificate of importance on the question of medical doctor affidavits, and this court allowed the appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 316.\nInitially, we note that all adults are presumed legally competent to direct their legal affairs. People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau, 34 Ill. 2d 84, 95 (1966). This presumption extends to the right afforded all appellants to dismiss their appeals. Vincent v. McElvain, 304 Ill. 160, 163 (1922). Although all three of the instant respondents were adjudicated mentally ill pursuant to either section 1 \u2014 119 or section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, they nevertheless enjoy a presumption of competency to direct their legal affairs. As the Mental Health Code explicitly provides, \u201c[n]o recipient of services shall be presumed legally disabled ***.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101 (West 1996). Underlying this presumption is the distinction between mental illness and the specific decisional capacity to exercise or waive legal rights. Indeed, the presumption of legal competency notwithstanding mental illness attaches even in the criminal context. See People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 519 (1991) (mental illness does not, ipso facto, raise a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial). Requiring the instant respondents to file a medical doctor\u2019s affidavit before they may dismiss their appeals is contrary to the competency presumption to which they are entitled.\nFurthermore, the affidavit requirement imposed by the appellate court is inconsistent with provisions of the Mental Health Code. For example, respondents to involuntary commitment actions are entitled to have a jury determine whether they are mentally ill (405 ILCS 5/3\u2014 802 (West 1996)), but may waive this right without first establishing their competence to do so. As this court has previously held, where a trial court has implicitly found that a respondent had the capacity to waive the right to a jury trial, as with the instant respondents, there is a strong indication that the respondent is competent to waive the right to appeal. People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990).\nFinally, we note that the doctor affidavit requirement is inconsistent with the common law rule that the opinion of a medical doctor is entitled to no greater weight than that of a lay person, especially that of a respondent\u2019s lawyer, in determining whether respondent is competent to make legal decisions. Tyler v. Tyler, 401 Ill. 435, 441 (1948). Here the GAC attorneys worked directly with the respondents and were in a unique position to apprise the court of any concerns regarding respondents\u2019 capacity to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently decide to dismiss their appeals. That the GAC lawyers did not do so supports the presumption that respondents were competent to so.\nIn conclusion, an adjudication of mental illness is not an adjudication of incompetence to direct one\u2019s legal affairs. The appellate court\u2019s medical doctor affidavit requirement is inconsistent with the common law presumption of legal competency, the Mental Health Code as a whole, and the common law rule that a lay person\u2019s opinion as to a respondent\u2019s capacity to make legal decisions is entitled to as much weight as that of a medical practitioner. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court\u2019s orders in this case and remand to that court for proceedings in accordance with our opinion herein.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. Coffin, of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellants.", "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 84026.\nIn re PHYLLIS P. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Phyllis P. et al., Appellants).\nOpinion filed May 21, 1998.\nWilliam E. Coffin, of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellants.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, for the People." }, "file_name": "0400-01", "first_page_order": 412, "last_page_order": 415 }