{ "id": 209986, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY LAUBSCHER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Laubscher", "decision_date": "1998-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 83518", "first_page": "330", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 330" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228931 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 A.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8028798 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/326/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 A.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7383385 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/570/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 A.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8058810 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/283/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S.W. 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1898, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ark. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 609242 ], "year": 1898, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/65/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 S.E. 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659721 ], "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/120/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2718996 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596932 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541415 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 1060", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2810790 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5197897 ], "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/328/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597015 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0438-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 660, "char_count": 11812, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.971995682658776e-07, "percentile": 0.9046873003020639 }, "sha256": "dbbc0e254692ecaa966e90ac56c1f7e6a403a1019bed57e87c80e6ad4d13802a", "simhash": "1:233d62620901dc0e", "word_count": 1972 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:04:52.407821+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY LAUBSCHER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Anthony Laubscher, was found guilty by the circuit court of Champaign County of unlawful use of a weapon and aggravated assault following a dispute on the premises of his residence. Defendant appealed from his conviction for unlawful use of a weapon, and the appellate court reversed, concluding that the State failed to prove that at the time defendant possessed the weapon, he was not either \u201con his land\u201d or in his \u201cfixed place of business\u201d as provided in the exceptions to the unlawful use of weapons statute (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1994)). 288 Ill. App. 3d 438. We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm the appellate court.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe altercation giving rise to this case transpired on September 10, 1995, on the lawn area abutting an apartment building located at 807 South Randolph in Champaign, Illinois. Both defendant and complainant, Chris Darvin, resided in the building. Defendant lived in \u201cunit 3\u201d and Darvin resided in an apartment on the second floor. The State\u2019s case consisted of the testimony of Darvin, defendant\u2019s friend Amanda Hinkle, and Officer Chase Leonhard. Darvin testified that the two-story apartment building contained eight units, and a balcony that ran the length of the second floor. From the section of the balcony outside his apartment, Darvin could see over bushes onto the lawn area, which also ran the length of the building and extended from the side of the building to the sidewalk. Darvin testified that there was no fence enclosing the lawn area, and that it was commonly used by people to traverse from the street to the apartment building.\nAt approximately 8:30 on the night of the occurrence, Darvin noticed defendant engaged in an argument with two young males on the lawn area. Darvin testified that he had just moved into the building at that time and had had no prior contact with defendant. Darvin approached defendant and the young males in an effort to break up the fight, but defendant warned him to \u201cstand back and stand fast.\u201d As Darvin began backing up towards the building,- he saw a gun protruding from the rear waistband of defendant\u2019s pants. Darvin testified that although he did not hear the entire argument, he heard defendant yell to the boys, \u201cIf you have a problem with it, I got something for you.\u201d Darvin believed defendant was intoxicated, so he ran up behind defendant and pulled the gun out of his waistband. Defendant and the two boys then fled in opposite directions, and Darvin went to a nearby first-floor apartment and discussed the occurrence with two female occupants. Darvin testified that after about 30 to 45 seconds, defendant emerged from another apartment with an SKS rifle in his hands and ran towards Darvin. Darvin fled around the building in an effort to outrun defendant, while defendant continued chasing Darvin with the rifle. Darvin eventually succeeded in escaping into his own apartment, where his fiancee telephoned the police. The police arrived and placed hand restraints on defendant and Darvin, who still had defendant\u2019s .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol. Darvin testified that when he was on the ground in restraints he noticed that defendant\u2019s gun was \u201ccocked back\u201d and loaded. Darvin testified that he had seen defendant around the apartment \u201ccomplex\u201d since the occurrence, but that at the time of the incident, he was unaware defendant lived in the building.\nThe State then presented the testimony of Amanda Hinkle, who indicated only that she was present in defendant\u2019s apartment at the time of the occurrence, and that defendant lived at the apartment building.. Finally, Officer Leonhard indicated that he responded to the call regarding the altercation, and testified regarding his search of defendant\u2019s apartment and confiscation of the weapons wielded by defendant. The defense rested without presenting any evidence.\nFollowing arguments, the court found defendant guilty of unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault, sentencing him to 24 months\u2019 probation and 150 hours of public service. The appellate court reversed the unlawful use of weapons conviction, finding that the State failed to prove that at the time defendant was observed in possession of the weapon, he was not either \u201con his land\u201d or in his \u201cfixed place of business\u201d as provided in the exceptions to the unlawful use of weapons statute. 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1994).\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe State initially asserts that it presented sufficient evidence that defendant was not on his land at the time Darvin observed him with the weapon. Section 24\u2014 1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:\n\u201c(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:\n* * *\n(4) Carries or possesses *** concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1994).\nAs can be seen, the legislature has included the above-italicized exceptions within the statutory definition of the offense of unlawful use of weapons. When an exception appears as part of the body of a substantive offense, the State bears the burden of disproving the existence of the exception beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction for the offense. Cf. People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 500-01 (1927); People v. Chmilenko, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1062 (1976); see generally Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975). It is well established that, in sustaining this burden, the State may rely upon circumstantial evidence, as long as it provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime charged. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 379 (1992). However, there must be some evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt; the State may not leave to conjecture or assumption essential elements of the crime. See In re Whittenburg, 37 Ill. App. 3d 793, 795 (1976).\nIn reversing defendant\u2019s conviction, the appellate court noted a complete lack of evidence regarding the nature of defendant\u2019s interest in the land encompassing the apartment building. The court concluded that, although it was not unreasonable for the trial court to assume defendant had no ownership interest in the premises, permitting such an inference without any evidentiary basis would effectively shift the burden to defendant to prove that he was on his land or that he otherwise fell within an exception to section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4). We agree with the appellate court\u2019s reasoning. The sole evidence offered by the State regarding defendant\u2019s connection with the property was that he \u201clived in the building.\u201d There was no proof of his interest in his unit or the surrounding land, or as to the ownership of the property in general. Although, on one occasion, Darvin loosely referred to occupants of the building as \u201ctenants,\u201d this was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt defendant\u2019s particular interest in the premises.\nThe State alternatively asserts that, even if defendant did possess some fee interest in the premises, he would still not be protected under the \u201con his land\u201d exception because the lawn was a common area of the property that was readily accessible to the public and residents of the building. In support of this position, the State points to Darvin\u2019s testimony that the lawn area was commonly traversed by people to get to and from their apartments.\nIn several jurisdictions with statutory language comparable to that of section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4), courts have construed the phrase \u201con his own premises\u201d or \u201con his own lands\u201d to exclude public lands, including those portions of an individual\u2019s property which that individual has opened to the public. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 120 N.C. 580, 26 S.E. 915 (1897); Moss v. State, 65 Ark. 368, 45 S.W. 987 (1898). One court has held that an exception for any individual carrying a weapon on \u201cland possessed by him\u201d did not encompass the common areas of that individual\u2019s apartment building or areas of the premises over which the accused lacked \u201cexclusive control and possession.\u201d White v. United States, 283 A.2d 21, 24 (D.C. 1971); see also Fortune v. United States, 570 A.2d 809 (D.C. 1990); Hines v. United States, 326 A.2d 247 (D.C. 1974). We find that the interpretation advanced by these courts is not justified under the plain meaning of section 24 \u2014 1(a). The legislature\u2019s intent in enacting a statute must first be ascertained by reference to the statutory language itself. Where an enactment is clear and unambiguous, this court is not at liberty to read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express; nor should this court search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). Further, because section 24 \u2014 1 is a penal statute, it must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 444; People v. Shinkle, 128 Ill. 2d 480, 486 (1989).\nSection 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) broadly excepts from culpability any individual carrying a weapon while on \u201chis land,\u201d meaning land over which he enjoys some ownership interest. There is nothing in the statute limiting the meaning of this phrase based upon the exclusivity of the individual\u2019s possession of the land, or the degree of public access he permits on the property. We believe that, had the legislature intended such a restriction, it would have explicitly provided for it. Further, to interpret this exception as the State suggests would be to expand the scope of the offense of unlawful use of weapons beyond the clear intent of the legislature.\nThe interpretation proposed by the State is further undermined by section 24 \u2014 l(a)(10) of the statute, which makes it a criminal offense for an individual to \u201c[carry or possess] *** upon any public street, alley, or other public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village or incorporated town, *** except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 l(a)(10) (West 1994). This section would permit an individual to carry or possess a firearm even on land classified as \u201cpublic,\u201d as long as that individual had an ownership interest in the property. Seemingly, section 24 \u2014 l(a)(10) was intended to eliminate any restriction of a person\u2019s right to carry a weapon on areas of his property which are readily accessible to or open for use by the public. Construed together, sections 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) and (a)(10) provide no basis for the interpretation argued by the State. Thus, the State\u2019s argument must fail. In light of our decision on this issue, we do not reach the question of whether defendant was in his fixed place of business under section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Catherine F. Glenn and Stephen F. Potts, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman and Thomas R. Dodegge, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.", "Andrea Georgelos and Robert G. Kirchner, of Lerner & Kirchner, of Champaign, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 83518.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY LAUBSCHER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed September 24, 1998.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Catherine F. Glenn and Stephen F. Potts, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman and Thomas R. Dodegge, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.\nAndrea Georgelos and Robert G. Kirchner, of Lerner & Kirchner, of Champaign, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0330-01", "first_page_order": 346, "last_page_order": 354 }