{ "id": 926959, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. JOHN R. LUMPKIN, Director of Public Health, Appellant, v. DANIEL CASSIDY et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy", "decision_date": "1998-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 83289", "first_page": "117", "last_page": "129", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 117" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801349 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599674 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "879 F.2d 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10531316 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/879/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783185 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603208 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477908 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333084 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069839 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223608 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570195 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477012 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57339 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801342 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2583513 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/365/0185-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 945, "char_count": 20595, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.068699987644032e-07, "percentile": 0.757467906430066 }, "sha256": "6bb52940b1eb754fd4067d8e7f3dd6c9cf3102fb30f3ee9142b4dbb40ad6044f", "simhash": "1:f5b16d9f330704e0", "word_count": 3291 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:23.867941+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. JOHN R. LUMPKIN, Director of Public Health, Appellant, v. DANIEL CASSIDY et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nUnder the Illinois Plumbing License Law (225 ILCS 320/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)), lawn sprinkler systems can only be installed by licensed plumbers; licensed apprentice plumbers under the supervision of a licensed plumber; or, where a single family residence is involved, by the owner, owner occupant or lessee occupant of the residence. The issue in this case is whether that limitation is constitutional and can be enforced by the State to prevent a lawn sprinkler company from using unlicensed laborers to install the pipes and sprinkler heads in its lawn sprinkler systems where the system includes a back-flow prevention device installed by a licensed plumber to prevent contamination of the water supply. The circuit court answered this question in the negative, holding that the limitation in the statute as applied in this case constitutes an \u201cunreasonable interference with personal and property rights *** within the meaning of the State and Federal Constitutions.\u201d The State brought a direct appeal to this court under our Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). We now reverse and remand.\nThe litigation before us commenced when the State filed suit in the circuit court of Du Page County to enjoin Daniel Cassidy and his business, KADC Corporation, d/b/a Sundance Irrigation (hereinafter referred to collectively as Cassidy), from using laborers rather than licensed plumbers to install the pipes and sprinkler heads in its lawn sprinkler systems. The basis for the State\u2019s suit was that the use of laborers violated the Illinois Plumbing License Law (225 ILCS 320/0.01 et seq, (West 1996)).\nThe Illinois Plumbing License Law mandates that \u201call plumbing shall be performed only by plumbers licensed under the provisions of this Act hereinafter called \u2018licensed plumbers\u2019 and \u2018licensed apprentice plumbers.\u2019 \u201d 225 ILCS 320/3(1) (West 1996). As used in the statute, \u201c \u2018plumbing\u2019 means the actual installation, repair, maintenance, alteration or extension of a plumbing system by any person\u201d and is defined to include \u201clawn sprinkler systems.\u201d 225 ILCS 320/2 (West 1996). Accordingly, the law in Illinois is that lawn sprinkler systems can only be installed by a licensed plumber or a licensed apprentice plumber. Where the work is done by a licensed apprentice plumber, the apprentice must be supervised by a licensed plumber. 225 ILCS 320/3(4)(a) (West 1996).\nThe statute recognizes an exception to these rules for the owner occupant or lessee occupant of a single family residence or the owner of a single family residence under construction for his or her occupancy. Such owner, owner occupant or lessee occupant is not prohibited\n\u201cfrom planning, installing, altering or repairing the plumbing system of such residence, provided that (i) such plumbing shall comply with the minimum standards for plumbing contained in the Illinois State Plumbing Code, and shall be subject to inspection by the Department or the local governmental unit if it retains a licensed plumber as an inspector; and (ii) such owner, owner occupant or lessee occupant shall not employ other than a plumber licensed pursuant to this Act to assist him or her.\u201d 225 ILCS 320/3(2) (West 1996).\nThe Illinois Plumbing License Law provides that persons violating the act or a rule or regulation promulgated thereunder\n\u201cshall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and a fine of $500 for the first offense; and a second or subsequent violation of this Act shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor with a fine of $1,000.\u201d 225 ILCS 320/29(1) (West 1996).\nThe State\u2019s Attorney of the county in which the violation occurred or the Attorney General, acting in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, is responsible for bringing enforcement actions. In such actions, the court may enjoin the use of plumbing installed in violation of the law or a rule or regulation promulgated thereunder until it has been corrected. 225 ILCS 320/29(1) (West 1996). In addition,\n\u201c[i]f it is established that the defendant contrary to this Act has been or is engaging in or about to engage in plumbing without having been issued a license or has been or is engaged in or is about to engage in plumbing after his or her license has been suspended or revoked or after his license has not been renewed, the Court may enter a judgment perpetually enjoining the defendant from further engaging in plumbing contrary to this Act. In case of violation of any injunction entered under this Section, the Court may summarily try and punish the offender for contempt of Court. Such injunction proceedings shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, all penalties and other remedies in this Act provided.\u201d 225 ILCS 320/29(2) (West 1996).\nIn the matter before us, the State has not attempted to prosecute Cassidy for any past violations of the Illinois Plumbing License Law. It merely seeks to enjoin him from violating the statute in the future.\nThe State\u2019s enforcement action was originally commenced in the circuit court of Du Page County, hut was subsequently transferred to Kane County, where Cassidy had brought a related action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the City of Aurora. The State and Cassidy each filed motions for summary judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005 (West 1996). The materials presented to the circuit court in support of the parties\u2019 respective motions showed that Cassidy is in the business of designing and installing \u201clawn sprinkler systems\u201d as that term is defined by section 2 of the Illinois Plumbing License Law (225 ILCS 320/2 (West 1996)).\nCassidy\u2019s lawn sprinkler systems consist of underground pipes and sprinkler heads connected to a customer\u2019s potable water supply by means of a reduced pressure zone backflow prevention device, known as an RPZ valve. RPZ valves are necessary because without them, changing pressure could pull contaminated water from a customer\u2019s lawn into the house\u2019s water supply. Among the type of contaminates that must be guarded against in a lawn sprinkler system are fertilizers, insects, pesticides, and fecal matter from animals.\nWhen an RPZ valve is installed and operating properly, there is no threat of backflow contamination to the potable water supply. Cassidy always uses licensed plumbers to install the RPZ valves on his systems. That is not the case with every lawn sprinkler company. Some do not use licensed plumbers to install the valves, and some do not use the valves at all.\nAfter considering the parties\u2019 respective positions, the circuit court ultimately granted Cassidy\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied the motion for summary judgment filed by the State. The circuit court held that the Illinois Plumbing License Law was designed to guard \u201cthe public\u2019s right to a protected potable water supply, free of contamination resulting from inadequate installation procedures.\u201d In the court\u2019s view, this interest was adequately served by Cassidy\u2019s use of licensed plumbers to install RPZ valves on his lawn sprinkler systems. Once an RPZ has been properly installed, the court held, it constitutes \u201can absolute deterrent to the contamination of potable water within the system.\u201d Accordingly, the court believed that requiring Cassidy to also use licensed plumbers, rather than laborers, to install the pipes and sprinkler heads could do nothing to advance the purposes of the Illinois Plumbing License Law and lacked any rational basis. The court therefore ruled that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Cassidy and his company.\nThe State has now appealed. Because the circuit court found that the statute, as applied to Cassidy and his company, is unconstitutional, the State\u2019s appeal lies directly to this court under our Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225, 228 (1997).\nWe review de novo the circuit court\u2019s decision with respect to a statute\u2019s constitutionality. Brown\u2019s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 420 (1996). The party challenging the validity of a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing any constitutional invalidity. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and when construing a statute, a court should uphold the statute\u2019s validity if reasonably possible. People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1995).\nCassidy contends that the statute violates substantive due process guarantees under the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2. He further argues that the statute contravenes our state constitution\u2019s prohibition against special legislation. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV \u00a7 13.\nAlthough expressed in slightly different language, the standard used to determine whether a statute violates substantive due process is identical to the standard for assessing whether a statute denies equal protection. People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 362 (1989). Where, as here, the legislation does not affect a suspect class or fundamental right and does not differentiate based on illegitimacy or gender, it is subject to a rational basis test. Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (1996). Such legislation will survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it is reasonably designed to remedy the evils the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety, and general welfare. People v. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d 410, 417 (1980). The statute need not be the best means of accomplishing the legislature\u2019s objectives. See Shelton v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 267 Ill. App. 3d 211, 218 (1994). As long as the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, it will be upheld. People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 237 (1994).\nWhether a statute is wise and whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result are matters left to the legislature, and not the courts. People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 503 (1992). The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 421-22 (1994). Under the rational basis test, the court may hypothesize reasons for the legislation, even if the reasoning advanced did not motivate the legislative action. See Illinois Health Care Ass\u2019n v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 879 F.2d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 1989). If there is any conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 216 (1992).\nAs previously indicated, Cassidy contends that the Illinois Plumbing License Law, as applied to him, also. violates the special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution. That provision states:\n\u201cThe General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. TV, \u00a7 13.\nThe special legislation clause expressly prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated. The purpose of this clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis. As with substantive due process, a special legislation challenge is generally judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge. Accordingly, the issue here, as with Cassidy\u2019s due process claim, is whether the Illinois Plumbing License Law satisfies the rational basis test. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 393 (1997).\nThe Illinois Plumbing License Law is premised on the principle \u201cthat the regulation of plumbing and the plumbing trade is necessary for the protection of the public health, convenience, and welfare.\u201d 225 ILCS 320/1 (West 1996). Cassidy does not question this principle, nor does he deny that requiring the use of a licensed plumber to install the RPZ valve on a lawn sprinkler system is rationally related to the state\u2019s interest in protecting the public. The dispute in this case centers solely on Cassidy\u2019s failure to also use licensed plumbers for the installation of the sprinkler systems\u2019 pipes and sprinkler heads. Cassidy argues that because a properly installed RPZ valve effectively eliminates the risk that the potable water supply will be contaminated, requiring that licensed plumbers also be used to install the pipes and sprinkler heads does nothing to advance the purpose of the statute.\nThe problem with Cassidy\u2019s argument is twofold. First, it erroneously assumes that the presence of an RPZ valve renders deficiencies in the piping system irrelevant from a public health standpoint. While it is undisputed that an RPZ valve is effective in preventing contamination of a homeowner\u2019s water supply, it is also true that such valves can fail or be bypassed or disabled. Answers to interrogatories filed by the State indicate that where the backflow device is inoperable, the way in which the pipes have been installed can serve as a \u201csecondary safeguard for water quality.\u201d In addition, if pipes are not. properly installed, leaks can pose a threat to the groundwater table. The design and workmanship of the piping system may therefore have important public health consequences. The legislature could certainly have concluded that such work should not be entrusted to those who do not possess the skill, experience and scientific knowledge required of licensed plumbers.\nThe second problem with Cassidy\u2019s argument is that it fails to recognize that avoiding contamination of the potable water supply is not the sole purpose of the Illinois Plumbing License Law. As previously indicated, the statute is, by its own terms, intended to serve the broader objective of protecting \u201cthe public health, convenience, and welfare.\u201d 225 ILCS 320/1 (West 1996). Requiring the use of licensed plumbers serves this broader objective by affording greater protection to consumers.\nWhen a consumer installs a lawn sprinkler system at his own home or a home he leases, he proceeds at his own risk. When he hires a company to do the installation for him, on the other hand, he must rely on the expertise of others. Because of the extensive training and experience necessary to become a licensed plumber, the legislature could reasonably have believed that requiring the use of such plumbers would result in higher quality installations less prone to leaks and other problems. The importance of such protection is manifest considering that a defective or improperly installed lawn sprinkler system can damage a consumer\u2019s lawn or the foundation of his home.\nCassidy argues that licensed plumbers may not receive specific instruction on lawn sprinkler systems as part of their training and apprenticeship. Although he is correct, all plumbers do learn the skills, theories, and general principles involved in the installation of such systems. With an unlicensed laborer, by contrast, consumers have no assurance of even the most rudimentary plumbing skills.\nAnother benefit of the licensure requirement is that it provides consumers with significantly greater recourse in the event of a problem. If a lawn sprinkler is designed or installed improperly, civil remedies are available regardless of whether the installer was licensed or not. Criminal fines may also be imposed. 225 ILCS 320/29 (West 1996). Where the installer is licensed, however, there are important additional administrative remedies. If work is performed negligently or incompetently or if the installer willfully violates \u201cany law of this State or any rule, regulation or code promulgated thereunder regulating plumbing,\u201d that individual is subject to having his or her licensed suspended or revoked. 225 ILCS 320/20(l)(b), (l)(c) (West 1996). Where the installer has no financial resources, this may be the only real punishment available and the only effective mechanism for protecting the public from incompetent or unscrupulous installers.\nIn making this observation, we do not mean to cast any aspersions on Cassidy or his company. No claim has been made that the systems he installs are defective or dangerous in any way. The only problem with them is that Cassidy does not use licensed plumbers to install the pipes and sprinkler heads as the law requires. The licensure requirement may be imperfect; it may not guarantee that consumers will always receive the safest or best-built lawn sprinkler systems possible. For the reasons we have just discussed, however, it is rationally related to a legitimate state goal, and that is all the federal and state constitutions require.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court declaring the Illinois Plumbing License Law unconstitutional as applied to Cassidy and granting summary judgment in his favor. We remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE,\ndissenting:\nDefendant Daniel Cassidy has since 1986 been engaged in the occupation of installing lawn sprinkling systems. The Illinois Department of Public Health now seeks to enjoin him from pursuing his occupation because the Illinois Plumbing License Law (225 ILCS 320/0.01 (West 1992)) requires that only licensed plumbers install such systems. Because I agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that this requirement is unconstitutional, I respectfully dissent from this court\u2019s opinion reversing the trial judge.\nIn Scully v. Hallihan, 365 Ill. 185 (1936), this court held unconstitutional a statute which provided that only licensed plumbers could lay and connect tile, concrete, and other norimetallic piping for drainage systems and sewers, an activity known as \u201cdrain-laying.\u201d The court noted that little of the traditional skills or training of a plumber was required to perform drain-laying safely and effectively. Scully, 365 Ill. at 192. We therefore held the statutory requirement to be an unreasonable exercise of the state\u2019s police power and a violation of a citizen\u2019s \u201cinalienable right to follow any legitimate trade, occupation or business which he sees fit.\u201d Scully, 365 Ill. at 191.\nThis same rationale applies to the instant case. As defendant notes, installing a lawn sprinkling system requires few of the skills for which plumbers are trained and licensed. The job is not much more difficult than running a hose across a lawn after connecting it to a faucet. There is thus no reasonable justification for requiring sprinkler installers such as defendant to undergo the extensive training and certification process required of plumbers.\nThe State argues that contamination of potable water may occur through \u201cbackflow\u201d at the site of a sprinkling system\u2019s connection to the main water source. Defendant does not contest, however, the State\u2019s authority to regulate this legitimate health concern through its existing requirement that a plumber install an approved backflow prevention device at the sprinkling system\u2019s origination point. See 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 890.1140 (1996). Defendant argues only that there is no rational reason to require that plumbers perform the separate task of laying the sprinkling system itself.\nThe State also argues that employing licensed plumbers to perform the entire operation may help prevent leaks in the sprinkling system, and will make it easier for customers to seek recourse against plumbers who have installed a sprinkling system unsatisfactorily, since the state maintains current addresses of all licensees. These groping speculations are insufficient, however, to justify depriving an individual of his livelihood when no clear threat to the public welfare is evident. \u201cNo citizen should be legislated out of his trade and have it awarded to another craft under the garb of a health measure where [the statute] is not definitely related to such measure.\u201d Scully, 365 Ill. at 192.\nFor these reasons, I would affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nJUSTICE NICKELS joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Marcia L. McCormick, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Alfred Y. Kirkland, Jr., of Brady & Jensen, of Elgin, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 83289.\nTHE PEOPLE ex rel. JOHN R. LUMPKIN, Director of Public Health, Appellant, v. DANIEL CASSIDY et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed September 24, 1998.\nRehearing denied November 30, 1998.\nHEIPLE, J., joined by NICKELS, J., dissenting.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Marcia L. McCormick, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nAlfred Y. Kirkland, Jr., of Brady & Jensen, of Elgin, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0117-01", "first_page_order": 129, "last_page_order": 141 }