{ "id": 926968, "name": "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee, v. EDWIN ROMAN, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Roman", "decision_date": "1998-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 84268", "first_page": "504", "last_page": "520", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 504" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 919", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872468 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520959 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152375 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2967009 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court system" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5472805 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193336 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5200800 ], "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/329/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2769106 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2644929 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48, 50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/93/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738292 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "187-88" }, { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569893 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926305 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469532 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3315708 ], "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/214/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 U.S. 160", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354020 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166-67" }, { "page": "821-22" }, { "page": "648-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/330/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715584 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132-38" }, { "page": "342-46" }, { "page": "434-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156828 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054506 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 519", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541745 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5783330 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2891357 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564880 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725016 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0546-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1200, "char_count": 28014, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.015915925470754e-07, "percentile": 0.9064422288712585 }, "sha256": "8a6093add3dbd3664cd8acf6b5a48717165724ebf5031d71586730e1527c7a28", "simhash": "1:f337ab39aa79c2fd", "word_count": 4603 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:23.867941+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee, v. EDWIN ROMAN, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Edwin Roman, was convicted of the Chicago municipal offense of assault against the elderly. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 8\u20144\u2014080 (1990). The circuit court imposed a sentence that was less than the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by the ordinance. The City appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with the ordinance. 292 Ill. App. 3d 546. We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nThe City\u2019s evidence at trial was essentially as follows. On August 23, 1994, Anthony Pupius (also spelled \u201cPuprus\u201d in the record) was 60 years old. On that day, he and a visitor, Violeta Valaityte, saw a rental truck enter an alley (also referred to as an \u201cunpaved street\u201d in the record) near his home in Chicago. They came out from his house, and saw defendant and Ricardo Diaz removing packing material, i.e., cardboard cartons and styrofoam, and dumping it in the alley.\nPupius approached defendant and told him to stop dumping garbage. Using abusive language, defendant told Pupius that what they were doing was none of his business, and that he should leave.\nPupius returned to his house and telephoned \u201c911.\u201d He went back to the alley with a camera and took pictures of defendant. When defendant saw Pupius photographing him, he, according to Pupius, \u201cbecame very violent.\u201d Defendant, while swearing at Pupius, picked up a stick or tree branch approximately four feet long and two fingers wide and tried to hit Pupius, who was standing four or five feet away from defendant.\nPupius, fearful that defendant would hit him with the stick, backed away from defendant and retreated into his house. He again telephoned \u201c911.\u201d During this time, defendant returned some of the packing material to the truck. Pupius again came outside with his camera, hoping to take more pictures. By then, defendant had backed the truck around to the front of Pupius\u2019 house. The truck stopped as Pupius approached. Defendant and Diaz exited the truck. Defendant approached Pupius, who was backing off; Diaz stood by the truck. Defendant swore at and threatened Pupius, saying that defendant knew what Pupius looked like and where he lived.\nEventually, defendant and Diaz reentered the truck and drove approximately one block down the street, where they stopped and rearranged their cargo. Chicago police arrived, spoke with Pupius, and then stopped defendant and Diaz.\nDefendant and Diaz were arrested and charged with dumping garbage in violation of section 221b of the Criminal Jurisprudence Act (740 ILCS 55/221b (West 1992)). Defendant was also charged with assault against the elderly, i.e., Pupius, in violation of section 8\u20144\u2014080 of the Municipal Code of Chicago. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 8\u20144\u2014080 (1990).\nThe defense case was essentially as follows. Defendant and Diaz were delivering home furnishings for Harlem Furniture. They made a delivery on Pupius\u2019 street. Defendant admitted placing the packing material in the alley. However, he intended to cut it down in size, return it to the truck, and rearrange it with the remaining furniture. Harlem Furniture was paid for returning and recycling the packaging.\nAfter defendant had put the packing material in the alley, and as he was getting his utility knife, Pupius came out of his house with a camera and accused defendant of dumping garbage. Defendant approached Pupius to explain his actions, but Pupius warned defendant that if he touched Pupius, defendant would be arrested.\nDefendant told Diaz that Pupius was acting crazy, and that they should quickly reload the truck with the packing material. They would do their cutting in front of the customer\u2019s house. As they began driving, Pupius jumped in front of the truck. Defendant admitted that he exited the truck and exchanged words with Pupius. However, defendant denied ever threatening Pupius either verbally or with a stick.\nAt the close of the evidence, the circuit court found defendant and Diaz not guilty of garbage dumping, but found defendant guilty of assault against the elderly.\nThe circuit court subsequently denied defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider the finding of guilty on the assault charge. Also, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to declare Chicago Municipal Code section 8 \u2014 4\u2014080 unconstitutional in its entirety. However, the court ruled that the mandatory minimum sentence that the ordinance prescribes \u2014 imprisonment for 90 days \u2014 exceeds the City\u2019s home rule authority. At the close of the sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 10 days of community service and to one year of probation.\nThe City appealed. After finding jurisdiction, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause for resentencing. The appellate court initially determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the City\u2019s appeal. 292 Ill. App. 3d at 550. Addressing the merits, the appellate court concluded that (1) it was within the City\u2019s constitutional powers as a home rule unit to have a sentencing scheme different from that of the state, and (2) state law does not prevent or restrict the City from prescribing mandatory imprisonment as a penalty in the ordinance. 292 Ill. App. 3d at 550-53.\nDefendant appeals to this court. We note that we allowed the Illinois Municipal League leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the City (155 Ill. 2d R. 345).\nDISCUSSION\nI. Preliminary Matters\nPrior to reaching the merits, we must first determine whether: (A) the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the City\u2019s appeal from defendant\u2019s sentence, and (B) the appeal placed defendant in double jeopardy.\nA. The City\u2019s Appeal\nDefendant first contends that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the City\u2019s appeal from his sentence. He argues that a municipality lacks the authority to appeal from a sentence imposed on a criminal ordinance violation.\nDefendant invokes Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) as a bar to the City\u2019s appeal. That rule provides in pertinent part:\n' \u201c(a) Appeals by the State.\n(1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge ***; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.\u201d 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).\nSee People v. DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486, 494-96 (1989). This rule does not allow the State to contest the propriety of a sentence imposed on a criminal defendant. People v. Hatfield, 257 Ill. App. 3d 707, 711 (1994); People v. Davilla, 236 Ill. App. 3d 367, 389 (1992).\nThis case, however, involves a void judgment. A void judgment is one entered by a court that lacks, inter alia, the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. A void judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally. People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987).\nIn Illinois, a trial court, upon determination of guilt, must impose the criminal penalties that the legislature mandated, and has no authority to impose punishment other than that provided by statute. The court exceeds its authority if it orders a lesser sentence than what the statute mandates. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d at 6.\nIn the present case, section 8\u20144\u2014080 mandates a minimum term of imprisonment of 90 days. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 10 days of community service and to one year of probation. Thus, defendant\u2019s sentence was illegal and void. Consequently, \u201cthe appellate court had the authority to correct it at any time [citation], and the actions of the appellate court were not barred by our rules which limit the State\u2019s right to appeal.\u201d People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).\nB. Double Jeopardy\nIncidental to the question of whether the City can appeal defendant\u2019s sentence is the question of whether the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy (U.S. Const., amends. V, XTV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 10) bars a new sentencing hearing for defendant. Defendant and the City agree that double jeopardy principles apply to municipal ordinance prosecutions where imprisonment is the penalty. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 25 L. Ed. 2d 435, 90 S. Ct. 1184 (1970).\nWe conclude that this appeal does not present a double jeopardy problem. We have previously concluded that defendant\u2019s sentence was illegal and void.\nIt is settled that \u201c[tjhere is no double jeopardy prohibition against resentencing a defendant to correct an illegal sentence. [Citations.] Double jeopardy rights are not implicated even if the correction of the illegal sentence increases the punishment.\u201d People v. Woolsey, 278 Ill. App. 3d 708, 710 (1996); accord United States v. Di-Francesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132-38, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328, 342-46, 101 S. Ct. 426, 434-38 (1980); Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67, 91 L. Ed. 818, 821-22, 67 S. Ct. 645, 648-49 (1947).\nDefendant attempts to avoid these principles and their necessary result. He argues that these principles apply only to statutes and not to municipal ordinances. We cannot accept this argument. A municipal ordinance has the force of law over the community in which it is adopted and, within the corporate limits, operates as effectively as a law passed by the legislature. Hope v. City of Alton, 214 Ill. 102, 105 (1905); accord 5 McQuillen on Municipal Corporations \u00a7 15.14, at 92 (3d rev. ed. 1996). We agree with the appellate court that the City could appeal from defendant\u2019s sentence, which appeal could not place defendant in double jeopardy.\nII. Section 8 \u2014 4\u2014080\nTurning to the merits, defendant contends that the penalty prescribed in section 8 \u2014 4\u2014080 exceeds the authority granted the City as a home rule unit. Section 8 \u2014 4\u2014080 provides as follows:\n\u201c(1) Definitions. The following definitions are applicable strictly in the context of this ordinance:\n(A) \u2018Elderly\u2019 refers to any person 60 years of age or older.\n***\n(D) \u2018Battery\u2019 means as defined in [720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3 (West 1992)].\n(2) There is hereby created the offense of assault against the elderly, developmental^ disabled, or handicapped. A person commits assault against the elderly *** when he engages in conduct which places a person as defined above in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. Upon conviction of this offense, a mandatory sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed, not to be less than 90 days nor more than 180 days.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 8 \u2014 4\u2014\u2022 080 (1990).\nDefendant asserts that it is beyond the power of a home rule unit to enact an ordinance imposing mandatory minimum imprisonment.\nA. Power\nThe City is a home rule unit of local government under the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The \u201c \u2018concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the 1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship which previously existed between the local and State government.\u2019 \u201d City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 107 (1981), quoting Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166 (1972); accord Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 230 (1989). Article VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cExcept as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(a).\nAs a result of section 6(a), Chicago draws its power to regulate for the protection of public safety directly from the constitution. This power does not depend on any grant of authority by the General Assembly, as was the case prior to 1970. Triple A Services, 131 Ill. 2d at 230. Section 6(a) gives home rule units the broadest powers possible. Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992).\nSection 6(i) provides:\n\u201cHome rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State\u2019s exercise to be exclusive.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(i).\nAlso, section 6(m) provides that \u201c[pjowers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(m). As a result of these constitutional provisions, \u201c[h]ome rule units thus have the same powers as the sovereign, except where such powers are limited by the General Assembly.\u201d Triple A Services, 131 Ill. 2d at 230.\nDefendant agrees with the City \u201cthat it has the power to define the offense\u201d of assault against the elderly. However, defendant contends that the City\u2019s home rule power is limited to defining that offense and does not extend to prescribing a mandatory minimum punishment.\nThis contention lacks merit. Inherent in defining a crime is prescribing a penalty. A crime consists of two parts: prohibited conduct and a penalty for an infraction. In other words, a prescribed penalty is as necessary to constitute a crime as its definition. A statute that prohibits conduct without a penalty is a nullity. People v. Graf, 93 Ill. App. 2d 43, 48, 50 (1968); accord 1W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 1.2(d), at 12-13 (1986); 1 W. Burdick, The Law of Crime \u00a7 70, at 69-70 (1946).\nArticle VII, section 6(d)(2), of the Illinois Constitution specifically provides that \u201c[a] home rule unit does not have the power *** (2) to define and provide for the punishment of a felony.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(d)(2). The Committee on Local Government of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention explained that this provision \u201cspecifically withholds from home-rule units the power to define and punish felonies, but leaves them free to impose fines and jail sentences for less serious offenses.\u201d 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1602 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings).\nAdditionally, article VII, section 6(e), specifically provides that \u201c[a] home rule unit shall have only the power that the General Assembly may provide by law (1) to punish by imprisonment for more than six months.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(e). \u201cIt would seem that implicit in the Constitutional limitation, taken together with the grant of power in the last sentence of Subsection 6(a), is the power of home rule units, without statutory authority, to punish by imprisonment for less than six months.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. VII, \u00a7 6(e), Constitutional Commentary, at 515 (Smith-Hurd 1993).\nImplicit in the power of a home rule unit to establish a term of incarceration for less than six months is the power to establish a mandatory minimum term. Unquestionably, the nature, character, and extent of the penalties for a particular criminal offense are matters for the legislature, which may describe definite terms of imprisonment or fix the minimum and maximum limits thereof (People v. Smith, 14 Ill. 2d 95, 97 (1958)), notwithstanding a court\u2019s finding that a penalty is unwise or absurd. People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 457 (1927). Based on these principles, this court has regularly upheld various statutes that prescribe mandatory minimum sentences. See People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1988); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542-44 (1981). Since the legislature is so empowered, then a home rule municipality has the same power.\nWe note that this case does not involve local regulation of a state institution. See, e.g., Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537 (1975) (court system). Also, the possibility that different home rule units may adopt similar ordinances with differing mandatory minimum sentences should be of no concern. \u201cThe grant of home rule powers contemplates that different communities which perceive a problem differently may adopt different measures to address the problem, provided that the legislature has taken no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be taken and that the measures taken are reasonable.\u201d Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05 (1984).\nB. Total Exclusion or Preemption\nNow that we have determined that the City has the power to prescribe the 90-day mandatory minimum sentence in section 8 \u2014 4\u2014080, we must next determine whether the legislature has specifically limited the concurrent exercise of this power or specifically declared that the state\u2019s exercise of this power is exclusive. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 \u00a7 6(h), (i).\nDefendant points to, inter alia, the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1992)) and the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq. (West 1992)). Defendant notes that section 5 \u2014 1\u201415 of the Code of Corrections defines an \u201coffense\u201d as conduct for which a penalty is provided by any state law or, inter alia, \u201cby any law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this State.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1\u201415 (West 1992). Defendant cites several provisions of the Code of Corrections that regulate the character, nature, and extent of punishment under the Code. One such provision is section 5 \u2014 5\u20143, which lists authorized dispositions for \u201c[e]very person convicted of an offense.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(a) (West 1992). The list of sentencing options includes probation, conditional discharge, fine, an order to clean up and repair damage, and restitution to the victim. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(b) (West 1992). According to defendant, state legislation specifically defines the offense of assault against the elderly in the form of aggravated assault and defines the offense as a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 2(a)(12), (b) (West 1992)), which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 364 days (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20143(a)(1) (West 1992)) and also by a sentence of probation or conditional discharge (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20141 (West 1992)). Describing these statutes as \u201ccomprehensive,\u201d defendant contends that state criminal law evinces the legislative intent to preempt the City\u2019s home rule power to establish a mandatory minimum sentence for an ordinance violation.\nWe cannot accept defendant\u2019s contention. Section 6(h) of the Illinois Constitution states: \u201cThe General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit ***.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(h). Section 6(i), previously quoted, provides that home rule units may exercise any power of the sovereign concurrently with the state \u201cto the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State\u2019s exercise- to be exclusive.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(i).\nIn Scadron, this court observed:\n\u201cThe purpose of section 6(i) \u2018is to eliminate or at least reduce to a bare minimum the circumstances under which local home rule powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention.\u2019 [Citation.]\n*** If the legislature intends to exclude local action, it must do so in a specific manner. \u2018If it does not, then section 6(i) makes clear that the home rule units may exercise any nonexclusive power concurrently with the state,\u2019 provided such power has not been specifically limited.\u201d Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 186, quoting D. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part II): Legislative Control, Transition Problems, and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 559, 571, 568.\nThe court in Scadron held:\n\u201cUnder section 6(i), the General Assembly can restrict the concurrent exercise of a home rule unit\u2019s power by enacting a law which specifically limits such power. But, unless a State law specifically states that a home rule unit\u2019s power is limited, then the authority of a home rule unit to act concurrently with the State cannot be considered restricted. This interpretation supports the home rule provisions of our constitution \u2018which favor concurrent exercise of power by the state and by home rule units and attempt to avoid implied \u201cpreemption\u201d by judicial decisions. The Illinois approach places almost exclusive reliance on the legislature rather than the courts to keep home rule units in line.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 187-88.\nFurther, \u201ccomprehensive\u201d legislation is insufficient to declare the state\u2019s exercise of power to be exclusive. To \u201cmeet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain express language that the area covered by the legislation is to be exclusively controlled by the State. [Citations.] It is not enough that the State comprehensively regulates an area which otherwise would fall into home rule power.\u201d Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co., 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138 (1994). After Citizens Utilities, \u201ccomprehensive scheme\u201d preemption is \u201cno longer the law of this state.\u201d Board of Trustees of the Barrington Police Pension Fund v. Village of Barrington Ethics Board, 287 Ill. App. 3d 614, 619 (1997). \u201cThe General Assembly cannot express an intent to exercise exclusive control over a subject through coincidental comprehensive regulation.\u201d American Health Care Providers, Inc. v. County of Cook, 265 Ill. App. 3d 919, 928 (1994).\nWhen the General Assembly intends to preempt or exclude home rule units from exercising power over a matter, that body knows how to do so. In many statutes that touch on countless areas of our lives, the legislature has expressly stated that, pursuant to section 6(h) or 6(i), or both, of article VII of the Illinois Constitution, a statute is declared to be an exclusive exercise of power by the state and that such power shall not be exercised by home rule units. E.g., 20 ILCS 3960/17 (West 1992) (Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act); 215 ILCS 5/2.1 (West 1992) (Illinois Insurance Code); 220 ILCS 10/21 (West 1992) (Citizens Utility Board Act); 225 ILCS 60/6 (West 1992) (Medical Practice Act of 1987); 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 18 (West 1992) (Liquor Control Act of 1934); 325 ILCS 55/7 (West 1992) (Missing Children Registration Law); 410 ILCS 5/2 (West 1992) (Burial of Dead Bodies Act); 410 ILCS 80/11 (West 1992) (Illinois Clean Indoor Air Act); 520 ILCS 5/2.1 (West 1992) (Wildlife Code); 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 208.2 (West 1992) (Illinois Vehicle Code); 625 ILCS 5/13A \u2014 114 (West 1992) (Vehicle Emissions Inspection Law).\nApplying these principles to the present case, neither the Criminal Code nor the Unified Code of Corrections specifically excludes home rule units from establishing criminal penalties. Further, the comprehensiveness of these codes is irrelevant to this conclusion. Certainly, the Code of Corrections is, and was intended to be, comprehensive. Section 5 \u2014 1\u201415 promotes this comprehensiveness by including municipal ordinance violations within the scope of the Code. However, as this court held in Citizens Utilities, and as the legislature has repeatedly shown, even a high degree of comprehensiveness does not equal an express statement that home rule units are excluded from exercising power. Such a statement is lacking in the Code of Corrections. Therefore, home rule units may act concurrently with the state.\nSome might believe that the courts play an important role in invalidating home rule ordinances that are inconsistent with statutes or that invade a field fully occupied by state legislation. By applying judicial doctrines relating to conflict, inconsistency, and occupation of the field, the courts can, inter alia, promote uniformity of law. However, for several reasons, the 1970 Constitutional Convention was strongly opposed to \u201cjudicial \u2018preemption\u2019 \u201d and sought a means to reduce its importance. 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 572.\nOf course, home rule as provided in the Illinois Constitution will not remove all disagreements between state government and home rule units. As Professor Baum explained:\n\u201cSome difficult, perhaps insoluble, problems remain. It may happen that a state statute and a home rule ordinance are in direct and immediate conflict and cannot reasonably stand together. ***\n*** Since the state always can vindicate its interests by legislating in the proper form, it seems unwise to sustain state legislation at the expense of home rule ordinances except when a state statute is in the required form or in those few cases where vital state interests would be sacrificed by permitting the local legislation to prevail until the next session of the General Assembly.\u201d 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 572-73.\nWe hold that the Unified Code of Corrections does not preempt section 8 \u2014 4\u2014080 of the Chicago Municipal Code.\nC. Partial Exclusion or Conformity\nIf the Code of Corrections does not totally exclude or preempt the City\u2019s home rule power to establish a mandatory minimum sentence for an ordinance violation, then does the Code at least limit or partially exclude such power to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Code? It does not.\nThe General Assembly can not only specifically declare the state\u2019s exercise of power to be exclusive, but it can also specifically limit by law the home rule unit\u2019s concurrent exercise of power. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 6(i). The Committee on Local Government explained that the legislature can \u201cpermit concurrent local legislation, but only within limits that are consistent with the state statutory scheme. Surely if the state is permitted to exclude local governments from areas where the state has acted, it also should be able to restrict the nature and extent of concurrent local activity.\u201d 7 Proceedings at 1644; accord 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 574.\nAgain, however, the General Assembly must specifically so limit a home rule unit\u2019s concurrent exercise of power. Accord Citizens Utilities, 158 Ill. 2d at 138. Again, the General Assembly knows how to accomplish this, and has done so countless times, expressly stating that, pursuant to article VII, section 6(i), of the Illinois Constitution, a statute constitutes a limitation on the power of home rule units to enact ordinances that are contrary to or inconsistent with the statute. E.g., 605 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 919 (West 1992) (Illinois Highway Code); 510 ILCS 45/8 (West 1992) (Carrier and Racing Pigeon Act of 1984).\nAgain, in the present case, the Corrections Code, although quite comprehensive, does not expressly limit the concurrent exercise of the City\u2019s home rule power or require such exercise to conform to or be consistent with the Code. We repeat that \u201c \u2018[t]he Illinois approach [to home rule] places almost exclusive reliance on the legislature rather than the courts to keep home rule units in line.\u2019 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 579.\u201d Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 188. We hold that the Unified Code of Corrections does not partially preempt Chicago Municipal Code section 8 \u2014 4\u2014080 or require that the ordinance conform to the Code.\nCONCLUSION\nSince the City had the home rule authority to establish a 90-day mandatory minimum sentence, and since the General Assembly has not specifically preempted or limited that authority, then the prescribed penalty in section 8\u20144\u2014080 constitutes a valid exercise of the City\u2019s home rule power. Thus, the circuit court was without authority to impose a sentence below what the ordinance prescribes.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Lester Finkle, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Brian L. Crowe, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon and Timothy W Joranko, of counsel), for appellee.", "Beth Anne Janicki, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 84268.\nTHE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee, v. EDWIN ROMAN, Appellant.\nOpinion filed December 17, 1998.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Lester Finkle, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nBrian L. Crowe, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon and Timothy W Joranko, of counsel), for appellee.\nBeth Anne Janicki, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League." }, "file_name": "0504-01", "first_page_order": 516, "last_page_order": 532 }