{ "id": 122021, "name": "ALAN P. JACOBSON, Appellee, v. KNEPPER & MOGA, P.C., Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C.", "decision_date": "1998-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 84740", "first_page": "372", "last_page": "379", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 372" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5595644 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498-99" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3503397 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847484 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236738 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138751 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994390 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477029 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192772 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469094 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555467 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5595644 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "Freeman, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0492-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 11659, "ocr_confidence": 0.818, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.104668675130348e-07, "percentile": 0.8595775274929156 }, "sha256": "743a02fdbda5284db8335ed76ed6289373a229f7ee21bd5ee0a39cb3e84a10c2", "simhash": "1:cb2c7045f7ccdc6b", "word_count": 1860 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:01:39.203869+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ALAN P. JACOBSON, Appellee, v. KNEPPER & MOGA, P.C., Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NICKELS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe are asked here to consider the issue of whether an attorney who has been discharged by his law firm employer should be allowed the remedy of an action for retaliatory discharge. We hold that an attorney may not maintain such an action.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiff, Alan P Jacobson, filed a one-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the law firm of Knepper & Mtoga, EC. (hereinafter, the firm), alleging that he had been wrongfully discharged in retaliation for reporting the firm\u2019s illegal practices to a principal partner of the firm. In his complaint, plaintiff made the following factual allegations. In July 1994, plaintiff was hired as an associate attorney of the firm. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff discovered that the firm was filing consumer debt collection actions in violation of the venue provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1692i(a)(2)(B) (1988)) and the Illinois Collection Agency Act (225 ILCS 425/9(20) (West 1994)). Plaintiff spoke with James Knepper, one of the firm\u2019s principal partners, regarding the filing practice and was advised that the matter would be remedied.\nIn April 1995, plaintiff was given the responsibility of reviewing and signing all complaints filed by the firm in consumer debt collection cases. In this role, plaintiff learned that the firm continued to file actions in violation of the venue provisions of the above-referenced acts. Plaintiff reiterated his complaint to Knepper, who again assured plaintiff that the practice would be corrected. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was relieved of the responsibility to review and sign complaints in consumer debt collection cases. Less than three months later, plaintiff discovered that the firm had not ceased the practice of filing complaints in the improper venue. Plaintiff approached Knepper regarding the matter for a third time. Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff was terminated.\nPlaintiffs complaint alleged that he had been discharged in retaliation for his insistence that the firm cease its practice of filing consumer debt collection actions in the wrong venue. The firm filed a motion to dismiss the action pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615(a) (West 1994)). Citing Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 Ill. 2d 492 (1991), and Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance, 150 Ill. App. 3d 21 (1986), in support of its motion, the firm argued that Illinois courts have refused to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to employees who are licensed attorneys.\nThe circuit court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. However, the circuit court certified the following question of law for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308):\n\u201cDo the holdings in [Herbster] and [Balla] prevent an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Illinois from maintaining a cause of action for the Tort of Retaliatory Discharge against his non-client law firm employer due to the pre-eminence of the Rules of Professional Conduct?\u201d\nThe appellate court denied the firm\u2019s Rule 308 application for leave to appeal. The firm then filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court (166 Ill. 2d R. 315), which was denied. However, this court issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to consider defendant\u2019s appeal on its merits (155 Ill. 2d R. 383). Subsequently, the appellate court held that plaintiff was not precluded from maintaining an action for retaliatory discharge against his employing firm. 293 Ill. App. 3d 565. We granted the firm\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. We reverse.\nANALYSIS\nGenerally, an employer may fire an employee-at-will for any reason or no reason at all. Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 505 (1991); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525 (1985). Nevertheless, this court has recognized the limited and narrow tort of retaliatory discharge as an exception to the general rule of at-will employment. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 Ill. 2d 492, 498-99 (1991), citing Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172 (1978). To establish a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he was discharged in retaliation for his activities; and (2) the discharge is in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 35 (1994).\nWhile there is no precise definition of what constitutes clearly mandated public policy, a review of Illinois case law reveals that retaliatory discharge actions are allowed in two settings. The first situation is when an employee is discharged for filing, or in anticipation of the filing of, a claim under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)). See Hinthorn v. Roland\u2019s of Bloomington, Inc., 119 Ill. 2d 526 (1988); Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d 172. The second situation is when an employee is discharged in retaliation for the reporting of illegal or improper conduct, otherwise known as \u201cwhistle blowing.\u201d See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124 (1981). Here, it is plaintiffs contention that the enactment of the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act and the Illinois Collection Agency Act, violations of which are alleged in the complaint, articulate a clearly mandated public policy. Plaintiff argues that, because he alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for his reporting of the firm\u2019s violations of these acts, his complaint states a cause of action.\nThe tort of retaliatory discharge is a limited cause of action which \u201cseeks to achieve \u2018 \u201ca proper balance *** among the employer\u2019s interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee\u2019s interest in earning a livelihood, and society\u2019s interest in seeing its public policies carried out.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Balla, 145 Ill. 2d at 501, quoting Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d at 507, quoting Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 129. In this case, the public policy to be protected, that of protecting the debtor defendants\u2019 property and ensuring them due process, is adequately safeguarded without extending the tort of retaliatory discharge to employee attorneys.\nPlaintiff was a licensed attorney at all times throughout this controversy and, as such, he was subject to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d Rs. 1.1 through 8.5). The firm\u2019s conduct of intentionally filing collection actions against debtors in a county in which it knows venue is improper clearly violates Rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 3.3(a)(1) (lawyer shall not make a statement of material fact or law to a tribunal which the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is false); see also ISBA Op. No. 86 \u2014 10 (March 27, 1987) (clear violation of rules of conduct for lawyer to file a complaint which pleads that venue is proper when lawyer knows venue is not appropriate under the statute). Further, the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 155 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(4). Because plaintiff possessed unprivileged knowledge that the firm engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, he was required to report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 8.3(a); In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 541 (1988); ISBA Op. No. 89 \u2014 9 (November 28, 1989).\nTherefore, the attorney\u2019s ethical obligations serve to adequately protect the public policy established by the collection statutes. Because sufficient safeguards exist in this situation, it is unnecessary to expand the limited and narrow tort of retaliatory discharge to the employee attorney. As this court has previously observed, \u201c[a]n attorney\u2019s obligation to follow these Rules of Professional Conduct should not be the foundation for a claim of retaliatory discharge.\u201d Balla, 145 Ill. 2d at 505. Although plaintiff attempts to limit the application of Balla to in-house counsel, the Balla court based its decision \u201cas much on the nature and purpose of the tort of retaliatory discharge, as on the effect on the attorney-client relationship that extending the tort would have.\u201d Balla, 145 Ill. 2d at 501. Attorneys employed by law firms have the same ethical obligations as those imposed upon in-house counsel.\nThus, we hold that plaintiff, as a licensed attorney employed as such by the defendant law firm, cannot maintain a cause of action for retaliatory discharge because the ethical obligations imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct provide adequate safeguards to the public policy implicated in this case. The circuit court certified the question of whether an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Illinois is prevented from maintaining a cause of action for the tort of retaliatory discharge against his nonclient law firm employer due to the preeminence of the Rules of Professional Conduct. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and remand this cause with directions that defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss be granted.\nCertified question answered; appellate court reversed; circuit court reversed; cause remanded with directions.\nJUSTICE HARRISON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NICKELS" }, { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent.\nThe majority concludes that an attorney\u2019s obligation to follow the Rules of Professional Responsibility should not be the foundation for a claim of retaliatory discharge. I note that, in resolving this issue, the majority relies primarily on our 1991 decision in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 Ill. 2d 492 (1991), which involved an in-house attorney\u2019s attempt to sue his corporate employer for retaliatory discharge after the attorney advised his employer that it failed to comply with certain federal regulations promulgated by the Federal Food and Drug Administration. I dissented in Balia, arguing, inter alia, that the court\u2019s confidence in the Rules\u2019 existence as a shield from an employer\u2019s illegal acts was unwise and misplaced. I warned then that the court\u2019s decision did \u201cnothing to encourage respect for the law by corporate employers nor [did it] encourage respect by attorneys for their ethical obligations.\u201d Balla, 145 Ill. 2d at 516 (Freeman, J., dissenting). Seven years later, these concerns unfortunately still ring true, as the facts in this case sadly demonstrate. Nevertheless, my colleagues today now extend the Balia holding to law firms and their employee attorneys. Thus, one class of employees in this state, attorneys, has been stripped of a remedy which Illinois clearly affords to all other employees in such \u201cwhistle-blowing\u201d situations. Today\u2019s opinion serves as yet another reminder to the attorneys in this state that, in certain circumstances, it is economically more advantageous to keep quiet than to follow the dictates of the Rules of Professional Conduct. For this reason, and the reasons expressed in my dissent in Balia, I would answer the certified question in the negative and would affirm the judgments of both the appellate and circuit courts.", "type": "dissent", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward A. Burmila, Jr., of Burmila & Thomas, EC., of Joliet, for appellant.", "Richard J. Lofgren, of Ellison, Nielsen & Lofgren, EC., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 84740.\nALAN P. JACOBSON, Appellee, v. KNEPPER & MOGA, P.C., Appellant.\nOpinion filed December 31, 1998.\nHARRISON, J., took no part.\nFREEMAN, C.J., dissenting.\nEdward A. Burmila, Jr., of Burmila & Thomas, EC., of Joliet, for appellant.\nRichard J. Lofgren, of Ellison, Nielsen & Lofgren, EC., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0372-01", "first_page_order": 382, "last_page_order": 389 }