{ "id": 243897, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JAMES LINDER, Appellee; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LEROY RICE, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Linder", "decision_date": "1999-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 83415; No. 84014", "first_page": "67", "last_page": "83", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 67" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55989 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57331 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821423 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295537 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "defendant who agrees to a potential range of sentences implicitly concedes that a sentence imposed within the range cannot be excessive" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209970 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456103 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182743 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780262 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821409 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260361 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544464 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 1042", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544511 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/1042-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596926 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209970 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264-65", "parenthetical": "noting procedural history of the case" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "327-28" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591661 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 897, "char_count": 29353, "ocr_confidence": 0.809, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.82746330865369e-07, "percentile": 0.9780240083495215 }, "sha256": "7579c1648783648c6052418d25fdaee3d53710b2f29bfc7c8cc5fab6d1f9740f", "simhash": "1:d12f5337e4a69477", "word_count": 4881 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:27.509523+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JAMES LINDER, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LEROY RICE, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue in these two consolidated appeals is whether a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a cap on the length of his sentence may challenge a sentence that is imposed within the range of the cap without first moving to withdraw his guilty plea. We hold that he may not.\nIn People v. Linder, James Linder was charged with three counts of armed robbery, one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking, and one count of armed violence. Linder pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery and one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking after the State agreed to dismiss the other charges and indicated that it would not seek a sentence in excess of 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. The circuit court of Lake County accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Linder to 11 years on each of the two counts, with the sentences to run concurrently.\nAlthough the sentence was within the agreed upon range, Linder filed a motion under Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) asking that the sentence be reconsidered. That motion was denied. Linder subsequently appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because his attorney failed to file the certificate required by Rule 604(d) prior to the hearing on his motion to reconsider.\nUnder Rule 604(d), defense counsel must certify that he or she has reviewed the proceedings, consulted with the defendant, and made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in the plea or sentencing proceedings. Requiring such a certificate enables the trial court to insure that counsel has reviewed the defendant\u2019s claim and considered all relevant bases for the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or to reconsider the sentence. The rule must be strictly adhered to. People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 371 (1998). Where counsel has not satisfied the rule\u2019s certification requirement, a trial court\u2019s denial of a defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider must be reversed and the cause must be remanded to the trial court to permit the filing of a new motion to reconsider and a new hearing on that motion. People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35-36 (1994).\nAlthough the requisite certificate was not filed by Linder\u2019s trial counsel, the State argued that the absence of the certificate was irrelevant. According to the State, Linder would not be entitled to relief on appeal even if such a certificate had been filed because he never moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment as required by this court\u2019s decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996).\nThe appellate court rejected the State\u2019s argument. It held Evans inapplicable because here, unlike Evans, the trial court retained some discretion in fixing the ultimate sentence. The plea agreement merely set a cap. The precise duration of the sentence was left to the judge. Under these circumstances, the appellate court believed that Linder was required only to move to reconsider his sentence, as he had done, in order to secure appellate review. He was not obliged to also file a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. Because Linder had moved for reconsideration of his sentence and because his attorney had not filed a Rule 604(d) certificate prior to the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s judgment denying Linder\u2019s motion for reconsideration of his sentence and remanded the cause for the filing of a new motion in compliance with Rule 604(d). No. 2 \u2014 96\u2014 0898 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nIn People v. Rice, Leroy Rice was charged with 11 counts of burglary. Rice agreed to plead guilty to four of the counts in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissing the other counts and recommending a maximum sentence of six years\u2019 imprisonment. The circuit court of Lake County accepted the plea and sentenced Rice to five years on each of the four counts, with the sentences to run concurrently. Rice then filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied.\nThe appellate court subsequently affirmed, rejecting an argument by Rice that the certificate filed by his trial attorney in support of the motion to reconsider did not comport with the requirements of Rule 604(d). People v. Rice, 283 Ill. App. 3d 626 (1996). Rice then filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court. Although we denied that petition, we recognized that Rice\u2019s attorney had only moved to reconsider the sentence. As with the attorney in Linder, he had not filed a motion to withdraw his client\u2019s plea of guilty and to vacate the judgment. Accordingly, we issued a supervisory order remanding the cause to the appellate court for further consideration in light of Evans.\nIn its second Rice opinion, the appellate court reached a different conclusion than the panel had in Linder. It held that Evans does apply when the plea agreement calls for the State to recommend a sentencing cap and the defendant receives a sentence within the range recommended by the State. In order to challenge the sentence and obtain appellate review, the court concluded, the defendant cannot simply move for reconsideration of the sentence. He must file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment. 291 Ill. App. 3d 9, 12.\nAlthough the appellate court construed Evans as applying to negotiated pleas involving sentencing caps, it held that application of the Evans rule to bar Rice\u2019s claims would be unfair where, as here, the proceedings to challenge the sentence were initiated well before Evans was announced. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court\u2019s judgment and remanded the cause to allow Rice to initiate new proceedings in accordance with Evans if he so desired. 291 Ill. App. 3d at 12.\nThe State petitioned for leave to appeal from the appellate court\u2019s decisions in both Linder and Rice. We allowed the State\u2019s petitions (166 Ill. 2d R. 315; 134 Ill. 2d R. 612(b)) and consolidated the two cases for argument and decision.\nResolution of both appeals turns on the first sentence of Rule 604(d). It provides:\n\u201cNo appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.\u201d 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).\nLinder and Rice contend that because they are challenging only the sentences they received, the rule requires only that they move to reconsider the sentences. They assert that moving to withdraw their guilty pleas and to vacate the circuit court\u2019s judgments is not a prerequisite to preserving their right to appeal. We disagree.\nIn People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996) our court held that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence clause of Rule 604(d) applies only to open, as opposed to negotiated, guilty pleas. When a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence, the defendant may not seek reconsideration of that sentence after it has been imposed unless he also moves to withdraw his guilty plea. As we wrote in Evans,\n\u201cfollowing the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea, even if a defendant wants to challenge only his sentence, he must move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment so that, in the event the motion is granted, the parties are returned to the status quo.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.\nWe reached this conclusion by reasoning that if a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for an agreement by the State to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence, allowing the defendant to subsequently challenge only his sentence violates basic contract law principles. In effect, the defendant would be attempting to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally reneging on or modifying the terms he had previously agreed to accept. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327.\nThe rule announced in Evans was subsequently applied by this court in People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261 (1998). In Clark the defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement to recommend a particular sentence. There was an issue, however, as to whether that sentence would be served consecutively to or concurrently with sentences imposed by another state. The State and the defendant agreed to have the issue resolved by the trial court.\nThe circuit court accepted the parties\u2019 plea agreement, then set a hearing on the question of whether the Illinois sentence should be served concurrently or consecutively. Following that hearing, the court ruled that the sentence had to be served consecutively to the other state\u2019s sentences. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. He did not seek to have his guilty plea set aside. He merely argued that making the sentence consecutive was not required by law and was too severe under the circumstances.\nThe circuit court denied defendant\u2019s motion, and he appealed. When the appeal reached us for a decision on the merits, we held that \u201ca plea agreement that leaves open only the applicability of a mandatory sentencing statute constitutes a negotiated plea agreement, as contemplated in Evans.\u201d Clark, 183 Ill. 2d at 262. Accordingly, we concluded that the defendant, who wanted to challenge the sentence imposed by the court, could not merely move to have the sentence reconsidered. Under Evans,\n\u201ceven though defendant sought to challenge only the consecutive aspect of his sentence, he was required to file a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw the guilty plea, because his plea of guilty was given in exchange for a specific sentence, regardless of whether the statute mandated a consecutive sentence. Defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider, therefore, was improper under these circumstances.\u201d Clark, 183 Ill. 2d at 268.\nWe believe that the reasoning employed by this court in Evans and followed in Clark applies with equal force where, as here, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissal of certain charges and recommendation of a cap on his sentence. By agreeing-to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, a defendant is, in effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap on the grounds that it is excessive. See People v. Catron, 285 Ill. App. 3d 36, 37 (1996) (defendant who agrees to a potential range of sentences implicitly concedes that a sentence imposed within the range cannot be excessive). While the defendant may not like the sentencing court\u2019s ultimate disposition, that is a risk he assumes as part of his bargain. A defendant who is unwilling to accept that risk should not agree to a cap rather than a fixed term. Where the sentence imposed is within the agreed upon cap, as the sentences here were, allowing the defendant to seek reconsideration of his sentence without also moving to withdraw his guilty plea unfairly binds the State to the terms of the plea agreement while giving the defendant the opportunity to avoid or modify those terms. That is precisely the situation the Evans rule was designed to prevent.\nBecause neither Linder nor Rice moved to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the circuit court\u2019s judgment, as required by Rule 604(d) and by Evans, the circuit court correctly refused to reconsider their sentences. In addition, the appellate court should not have entertained defendants\u2019 appeals. Where a defendant fails to comply with the motion requirements of Rule 604(d), as these defendants did, the appellate court must dismiss the appeal (People v. Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d 24, 28-29 (1998)), leaving the Post-Conviction Hearing Act as the defendant\u2019s only recourse (People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 471 (1996)).\nFinally, we reject the appellate court\u2019s view that Evans\u2019 construction of Rule 604(d) should not be applied in Rice because Rice arose prior to issuance of our opinion in Evans. Rice was pending when Evans was announced, and when Rice first came before us, we remanded it to the appellate court for the express purpose of having the court reconsider its decision in light of Evans. People v. Rice, 171 Ill. 2d 580 (1997). If we believed that Evans were inapplicable, we would not have ordered that remand. As a general rule, this court\u2019s decisions apply to all cases that are pending when the decision is announced, unless this court directs otherwise. People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365 (1996). The appellate court cited no authority for deviating from that general rule here.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court in Linder and affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment denying defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider his sentence. We likewise reverse the appellate court\u2019s judgment in Rice and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nNo. 83415 \u2014 Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nNo. 84014 \u2014 Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nJUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" }, { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN,\nspecially concurring:\nSince the filing of our decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), both this court and our appellate court have been beset with appeals which continue to raise questions concerning the proper application of Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) once a plea agreement has been accepted by the circuit court. The procedural history of this case is typical of these appeals. See 186 Ill. 2d at 69-71. See also People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261, 264-65 (1998) (noting procedural history of the case). That these questions continue to arise indicates, to me at least, that our previous opinions have provided inadequate guidance in this area for either bench or bar. I am concerned that today\u2019s opinion does not go far enough in interpreting the motion-to-reconsider provisions contained in the language of Rule 604(d) so as to provide this needed guidance. I, therefore, write separately to explain why I believe both of the defendants in this consolidated appeal must move to vacate their pleas in order to challenge their sentences.\nIn Evans, this court concluded that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) are inapplicable to situations where a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement to (i) dismiss other charges and (ii) recommend a specific sentence, a plea arrangement which we characterized as \u201cnegotiated.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Under these circumstances, a defendant who attempts to reduce the agreed-upon sentence seeks \u201cto hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentence\u201d earlier agreed upon. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. We noted that such a practice \u201cflies in the face of contract law principles\u201d (Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327) because \u201cthe guilty plea and the sentence \u2018go hand in hand\u2019 as material elements of the plea bargain.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Therefore, in order to avoid \u201cgamesmanship of a most offensive nature\u201d (Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327), we held that, in such situations, a defendant must first move to vacate the plea even if he or she only wishes to challenge the imposed sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. In reaching this decision, we contrasted the \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea at issue with an \u201copen\u201d guilty plea. An open guilty plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty \u201cwithout receiving any promises from the State in return.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Because the defendant receives no inducements to plead guilty from the prosecutor in such cases, \u201c[b]oth good public policy and common sense dictate that defendants who enter open guilty pleas be allowed to challenge only their sentences without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. We then held that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) apply only to open guilty pleas. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.\nUnfortunately, our use of the term \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea, without elaboration on its meaning beyond the facts in Evans, has led to a certain amount of confusion in our lower courts. The reason is simple \u2014 not all \u201cnegotiated\u201d pleas are the same. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 308 (1997) (and cases cited therein). In my view, there are four distinct plea scenarios that usually occur whenever a defendant decides to forgo the right to trial:\n(a) The \u201copen\u201d or \u201cblind\u201d plea \u2014 defendant pleads guilty without any inducement from the State, and the circuit court exercises its full discretion and determines the sentence to be imposed at the conclusion of a sentencing hearing.\n(b) The \u201cnegotiated as to charge\u201d plea \u2014 defendant pleads guilty solely in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissal of remaining or outstanding charges. This type of plea can also include situations in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s reduction of the original charge to a lesser offense. In either case, the circuit court exercises its full discretion and determines the sentence to be imposed at the conclusion of a sentencing hearing. Under this scenario, despite the existence of the agreement, the State retains its ability to argue at the sentencing hearing for a sentence from the full range of penalties provided for in the Code of Corrections including maximum sentences and extended terms.\n(c) The \u201cnegotiated as to charge and/or sentence\u201d plea\u2014 defendant pleads guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissal of remaining or outstanding charges and recommendation of a sentencing cap or range. In certain cases, defendant will only agree to plead guilty as charged in exchange for a sentence recommendation or range. Under this scenario, the State\u2019s ability to argue at the hearing for a sentence within the full range of penalties provided for in the Code of Corrections is limited by the parameters of its agreement with defendant.\n(d) The \u201cfully\u201d negotiated plea \u2014 defendant pleads guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissal of charges and agreed upon sentence, and trial court accepts plea and sentences according to the agreement. This is the situation addressed in Evans.\nThese four scenarios, by and large, represent the many variations of plea agreements which come under the scrutiny of a court of review. See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 20.1 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing history of plea bargaining and giving examples). The above scenarios demonstrate that several plea bargaining options can fall under the generic label of a \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea. A review of Illinois decisional law postdating Evans indicates that the appellate court has found the application of Rule 604(d)\u2019s motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions problematic in cases which involve \u201cnegotiated\u201d pleas which fall under the second and third scenarios. See People v. Sanders, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1042 (1997); People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1997); People v. Leach, 284 Ill. App. 3d 4 (1996).\nThe present case concerns negotiated pleas which arise under the third plea bargain scenario identified above. I agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that to allow defendants in that situation to seek reconsideration of their sentences without also moving to withdraw their pleas \u201cunfairly binds the State to the terms of the plea agreement while giving the defendant[s] the opportunity to avoid or modify those terms.\u201d 186 Ill. 2d at 74. The majority reaches this conclusion because\n\u201c[b]y agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, a defendant is, in effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap on the grounds that it is excessive. [Citation.] While the defendant may not like the sentencing court\u2019s ultimate disposition, that is a risk he assumes as part of his bargain. A defendant who is unwilling to accept that risk should not agree to a cap rather than a fixed term.\u201d 186 Ill. 2d at 74.\nI have no quarrel with this rationale; however, I believe that the majority\u2019s decision to focus primarily on defendant\u2019s view of the bargain does not go far enough in addressing the question presented for our review. Equally critical to the analysis, if not more so, are the sentencing concessions, if any, the State agrees to make as part of its bargain with a defendant. It is the existence of a sentencing concession which triggers the application of the holding in Evans to the agreements at issue today, as I explain below.\nHere, the State\u2019s sentence cap recommendations, in addition to its agreement to drop certain charges, are part and parcel of its agreements with defendants. As a result, the State, by virtue of its bargain with defendants, had limited its ability to argue at sentencing for a sentence from the full panoply of penalties contained in the Code of Corrections. Thus, when a defendant only seeks reconsideration of this type of bargained-for sentence, such actions \u201cfl[y] in the face\u201d of the contract principles enunciated in Evans and should not be condoned. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Just as the specific sentence and plea went \u201chand in hand\u201d as material elements- of the plea bargain in Evans, so too does the sentence cap and plea at issue here. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. As such, defendant has received a sentencing benefit from the agreement \u2014 the State has not sought a sentence above the cap. Thus, it is the State\u2019s sentencing concession, clearly a material component of its bargain with defendant, which distinguishes the \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea in the third scenario from the \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea contemplated in the second scenario identified above. In the latter scenario, the State has not made any facet of sentencing an element of its bargain with defendant. Stated differently, defendant in such situations pleads guilty without receiving any promises from the State with respect to sentencing in return. When the State does not provide any sentencing inducement for a defendant in its plea bargain, such a \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea,- at least for purposes of the sentencing hearing, more closely resembles the \u201copen\u201d plea than the \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea at issue in Evans. Therefore, in such cases, a defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence would not run afoul of his or her agreement \u2014 the parties never made the sentence a part of their bargain \u2014 and all contract principles are honored. None of the concerns of Evans arise in such cases, and its holding necessarily is inapplicable to them. On the other hand, the holding in Evans applies to all plea agreements in which the State, as part of its agreement, forgoes or limits its ability at sentencing to seek a sentence from the full range of penalties set forth in the Code of Corrections. These negotiated agreements raise the same type of \u201cgamesmanship\u201d concerns that were present in Evans. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327-28. Thus, even if a defendant wishes to challenge only the sentence imposed, he or she must first move to vacate the plea. If the court grants the relief, both parties would then be returned to the status quo as it existed prior to the acceptance of the plea.\nAs I noted at the beginning of this special concurrence, our decision in Evans has generated considerable questions about its applicability to various types of plea bargains. The majority today unfortunately misses the opportunity to distinguish definitively those \u201cnegotiated\u201d pleas that fall under the Evans rule from those that do not. As a result, I fear that today\u2019s opinion regarding the current motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) will not be our last.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN," }, { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE,\ndissenting:\nThe majority holds that a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a cap on the length of his sentence may not challenge a sentence that is imposed within the range of that cap without first moving to withdraw his guilty plea. This holding is not only inconsistent with this court\u2019s precedents, it is illogical as well.\nIn People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), we held that when a defendant agrees to plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissing other charges and recommending to the trial court a specific sentence, the defendant may not seek reconsideration of that sentence once imposed by the trial court unless he also moves to withdraw his guilty plea. We reached this conclusion by reasoning that, under the circumstances presented in Evans, a defendant who challenges only his sentence violates the terms of his plea agreement with the State. Such a defendant seeks to obtain the benefits of his plea agreement (the dismissal of certain charges) without fulfilling his obligations under that agreement (the acceptance of the specific sentence specified in the agreement). Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. We thus held that in order to challenge a sentence which the trial court has entered upon a specific recommendation made by the State as part of a plea agreement, a defendant must also move to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment so that, in the event the motion is granted, the parties are returned to the status quo. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.\nThe majority contends that the reasoning employed by this court in Evans also applies, to cases in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissing certain charges and recommending to the trial court a cap on his sentence. The majority argues that, just as in Evans, allowing such a defendant to seek reconsideration of his sentence without also moving to withdraw his guilty plea unfairly binds the State to the terms of the plea agreement while excusing the defendant from compliance with those terms. 186 Ill. 2d at 74. The majority is incorrect.\nWhen the instant defendants agreed to plead guilty, they did so because the State agreed to recommend that they serve no more than a particular length of time in prison. Presumably, if the State and the defendants had been able to agree on an appropriate sentence, they would have decided to recommend that specific sentence to the trial court. In the absence of such agreement, neither party was entitled to expect the entry of any particular sentence within the recommended range. In other words, at the time a plea agreement involving a sentencing cap is accepted by the trial court, the appropriate sentence, as far as the two parties are concerned, has yet to be determined. A defendant thus does not violate any term of such an agreement by seeking reconsideration of the sentence imposed by the trial court. This situation is no different than that where a defendant enters an open or blind plea, thus exposing himself to the maximum statutory sentence. In such a case, the maximum sentence is the cap. In that situation, the defendant may challenge the length of his sentence without moving to withdraw his plea of guilty. People v. Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d 59 (1991).\nThe reason this court required the defendants in Evans to move to withdraw their guilty pleas before challenging their sentences is that the specific sentences contained in the plea agreements there demonstrated that the parties had already settled on appropriate sentences. In a sentencing cap situation, however, there is no such consensus, and so a defendant does not renege on his plea agreement if he seeks to have the trial court or an appellate tribunal review the sentence initially imposed. The majority\u2019s argument implies that in agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, defendants were also agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap. No such term was ever a part of the defendants\u2019 bargains, and the majority is wrong to rewrite the agreements to include such a term.\nFor these reasons, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin E Moltz and David A. Bernhard, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 83415.\n(No. 84014.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JAMES LINDER, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LEROY RICE, Appellee.\nOpinion filed February 19, 1999.\nRehearing denied March 29, 1999.\nRATHJE, J., took no part.\nFREEMAN, C.J., specially concurring.\nHEIPLE, J., dissenting.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin E Moltz and David A. Bernhard, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0067-01", "first_page_order": 79, "last_page_order": 95 }