{ "id": 243909, "name": "In re ESTATE OF SOFIA GEBIS, a Disabled Person (Joseph Gebis, Appellant, v. Evelyn Swietek, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Gebis v. Swietek", "decision_date": "1999-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 85909", "first_page": "188", "last_page": "198", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 188" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480356 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256-57", "parenthetical": "noting this court's long recognized authority to take judicial notice of public records" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2533556 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "claims against a ward are filed against the ward if she is living and against her estate if she is dead" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4792700 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/268/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822355 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2919810 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223612 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780265 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228507 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "66" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991333 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864523 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 629, "char_count": 14645, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.772546277971806e-07, "percentile": 0.8961920173724414 }, "sha256": "3bae7d06cfeb087bbbe9783f200eda3fad0454ba6ebb7d6dfcadf7836b904fc7", "simhash": "1:ab76facf561b0ed8", "word_count": 2367 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:27.509523+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF SOFIA GEBIS, a Disabled Person (Joseph Gebis, Appellant, v. Evelyn Swietek, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RATHJE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the statutory custodial claim established in section 18 \u2014 1.1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1.1 (West 1996)) is constitutional. The trial court held that it was not, concluding that section 18 \u2014 1.1 violated substantive due process, equal protection, and special legislation principles. Appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment lies directly with this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Because the trial court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a statutory custodial claim, we vacate its judgment.\nBACKGROUND\nJoseph Gebis and Evelyn Swietek are the son and daughter of Sofia Gebis. In 1994, Joseph and Evelyn filed a petition with the trial court to have Sofia declared a disabled person. The trial court granted the petition and appointed Joseph and Evelyn as coguardians of Sofia\u2019s estate.\nSofia died on February 8, 1997. On July 14, 1997, and pursuant to section 18 \u2014 1.1 of the Probate Act, Joseph filed a verified claim against the guardianship estate seeking $361,320 in compensation for caring for Sofia during the final years of her life. Joseph alleged that, for 11 years prior to Sofia\u2019s death, he lived with Sofia and devoted himself to her care. As a result of personally caring for Sofia, Joseph limited his lifestyle choices and opportunities, limited his chiropractic practice and professional engagements, and suffered emotional distress.\nEvelyn, individually and as coguardian of Sofia\u2019s estate, moved to dismiss Joseph\u2019s claim on numerous grounds. Evelyn first attacked the factual basis for Joseph\u2019s claim, arguing that, as coguardians of Sofia\u2019s estate and person, she and Joseph hired and paid for full-time professional care for Sofia throughout the course of her disability. Evelyn next attacked section 18\u2014 1.1\u2019s constitutionality, arguing that section 18 \u2014 1.1 violated both substantive and procedural due process principles (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2); the equal protection clause (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2); the prohibition against special legislation (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV \u00a7 13); and the separation of powers doctrine (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a71).\nIn a written opinion, the trial court granted Evelyn\u2019s motion to dismiss, holding that section 18 \u2014 1.1 violates substantive due process principles, violates the equal protection clause, and constitutes special legislation. This timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nAlthough neither party raises the issue, we have an obligation to consider, sua sponte, whether the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Joseph\u2019s statutory custodial claim. See People v. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998); Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 570 (1979).\nSubject matter jurisdiction refers to a court\u2019s power both to adjudicate the general question involved and to grant the particular relief requested. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993). Under the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the circuit court enjoys, with limited exceptions, \u201coriginal jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 9. Although the legislature may not limit the circuit court\u2019s original jurisdiction to hear a justiciable matter, it may create a justiciable matter by creating rights or duties that have no counterpart in common law or equity. See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 65; Board of Education of Warren Township High School District 121 v. Warren Township High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504, 128 Ill. 2d 155, 165-66 (1989). In such instances, while the circuit court\u2019s original jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter derives from the constitution, the justiciable matter itself is defined by the legislature. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 65. The legislature may define the \u201cjusticiable matter\u201d in such a way as to limit or preclude the circuit court\u2019s authority. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 65. When the circuit court\u2019s power to act is controlled by statute, the circuit court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction and must proceed within the statute\u2019s strictures. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66. Any action taken by the circuit court that exceeds its jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time. In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994).\nWith these principles in mind, we must decide whether, following Sofia\u2019s death, the trial court presiding over Sofia\u2019s guardianship proceeding had the jurisdiction to adjudicate a statutory custodial claim filed against Sofia\u2019s guardianship estate. We hold that it did not.\nThe general rule is that, upon the ward\u2019s death, both the guardianship and the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to supervise the ward\u2019s estate necessarily terminate. See In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 350 (1996); In re Estate of Nelson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (1993). The Probate Act accords with this general rule, providing that, with the sole exception of the powers and duties set forth in section 24 \u2014 19 of the Probate Act, \u201c[t]he office of the representative of a ward terminates *** when the ward dies.\u201d See 755 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 12 (West 1996). Section 24 \u2014 19, which governs the administration of a deceased ward\u2019s estate, provides that, \u201cuntil the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration[,] *** a representative of the estate of a deceased ward has the powers and duties of an administrator to collect.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 19(a) (West 1996). Under the Probate Act, an administrator to collect \u201chas the power to sue for and collect the personal estate and debts due the decedent *** and by leave of court to exercise the powers vested by law in an administrator.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 4 (West 1996). This court has held that, so defined, the authority of an administrator to collect is confined to preserving the estate until an executor or administrator is appointed. See In re Estate of Breault, 29 Ill. 2d 165, 179 (1963). An administrator to collect has no power to pay claims filed against the guardianship estate. See Jacob Wener & Co. v. Freilich, 268 Ill. 58, 60-61 (1915).\nThus, even if a person filing a statutory custodial claim against a deceased ward\u2019s guardianship estate could prove that he is entitled to that claim, he could never enforce that claim because the guardian is statutorily prohibited from paying it. Certainly, if the claimant is powerless to enforce and the guardian is powerless to pay a statutory custodial claim filed against a deceased ward\u2019s guardianship estate, the trial court supervising the guardianship estate is powerless to adjudicate such claims, as jurisdiction lies only where the court can grant the particular relief requested. See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 64.\nThis is not to say that the creditors of a deceased ward are without remedy. On the contrary, they, like the creditors of any decedent, may file a claim against the decedent\u2019s estate once an executor or administrator is appointed and the decedent\u2019s estate is opened. See 755 ILCS-5/18 \u2014 1 (West 1996). Or, if the deceased ward\u2019s estate is not yet open, a deceased ward\u2019s creditors, again like any decedent\u2019s creditors, may petition the circuit court either for admission of the decedent ward\u2019s will to probate (see 755 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 2 (West 1996)) or for letters of administration (see 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 1996)). What a deceased ward\u2019s creditors may not do is file a claim against the guardianship estate. Once a disabled person dies, the guardianship terminates and the court supervising the guardianship estate loses jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim filed against that estate. The decedent\u2019s estate is the only avenue for recovery. See generally Nonnast v. Northern Trust Co., 374 Ill. 248, 268 (1940) (claims against a ward are filed against the ward if she is living and against her estate if she is dead).\nThe particular claim at issue in this case, section 18 \u2014 1.1\u2019s statutory custodial claim, may be filed only against a decedent\u2019s estate. On its face, section 18 \u2014 1.1 provides that certain classes of caregivers are entitled to \u201ca claim against the estate upon the death of the disabled person.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1.1 (West 1996). Thus, the statutory custodial claim matures and may be filed only after a disabled person dies. Significantly, article 18 of the Probate Act recognizes only two classes of estates against which claims may be filed, those belonging to wards and those belonging to decedents. Once a disabled person dies, she by definition ceases to be a \u201cward\u201d and instead becomes a \u201cdecedent.\u201d Thus, it is against the decedent\u2019s estate that the custodial claim must be filed. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that section 18 \u2014 10 of the Probate Act, which prioritizes claims against a decedent\u2019s estate, specifically classifies section 18 \u2014 1.1\u2019s statutory custodial claim as a claim against a decedent\u2019s estate. See 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 10 (West 1996).\nThere is no question that Joseph filed his statutory custodial claim not against Sofia\u2019s decedent\u2019s estate but against Sofia\u2019s guardianship estate. All of the pleadings relating to Joseph\u2019s statutory custodial claim, including the briefs filed with this court, bear the caption \u201cIn re Estate of Sofia Gebis, a disabled person.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Similarly, all of the pleadings relating to Joseph\u2019s statutory custodial claim bear the case number for Sofia\u2019s guardianship proceeding, \u201c94 \u2014 P\u20146222.\u201d Moreover, Evelyn contested Joseph\u2019s statutory custodial claim before both the trial court and this court not only in her individual capacity but also as coguardian of Sofia\u2019s estate. A decedent\u2019s estate does not have a \u201cguardian.\u201d Finally, Joseph\u2019s brief before this court opens by explaining that \u201c[t]his appeal arises out of a [statutory custodial claim], filed by Joseph in this disabled person\u2019s estate.\u201d (Emphasis added.) These facts leave no doubt that Joseph\u2019s claim is targeted against Sofia\u2019s guardianship estate and not against her decedent\u2019s estate.\nIn fact, Joseph\u2019s claim could not have been filed against Sofia\u2019s decedent\u2019s estate because, according to the record and the parties, such an estate has not yet been opened. The record on appeal in case number 94\u2014 P \u2014 6222 contains not a single pleading relating to the opening of a decedent\u2019s estate in Sofia\u2019s name, the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration for such an estate, or the admission of Sofia\u2019s will to probate. Nor is there any indication that notice of either Sofia\u2019s death or the right to file claims against Sofia\u2019s estate was ever published. See 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 3 (West 1996). There is one order in the record suggesting that Sofia executed a will and that Joseph filed that will with the circuit court, but Evelyn\u2019s counsel explained at oral argument that that filing took place outside of the proceedings in case number 94 \u2014 P\u20146222. Finally, we take judicial notice of the fact that, although Sofia\u2019s will has been filed with the circuit court of Cook County, a decedent\u2019s estate in Sofia\u2019s name has not yet been opened. See In re W.S., 81 Ill. 2d 252, 256-57 (1980) (noting this court\u2019s long recognized authority to take judicial notice of public records).\nGiven these facts, we have no choice but to conclude that the trial court in case number 94 \u2014 P\u20146222 lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Joseph\u2019s statutory custodial claim. When Sofia died in February 1997, the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction in case number 94 \u2014 P\u20146222 was confined to supervising the preservation of Sofia\u2019s estate until Sofia\u2019s will was admitted to probate or letters of administration issued. Joseph filed his statutory custodial claim in case number 94 \u2014 P\u20146222 on July 14, 1997, more than five months after Sofia\u2019s death. Until Sofia\u2019s will is admitted to probate or letters of administration issue, the trial court lacks any authority to adjudicate Joseph\u2019s claim. The trial court\u2019s only choice, in fact, was .to dismiss Joseph\u2019s claim for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If Joseph then wished to pursue his claim, he was fully entitled both to petition the trial court for the opening of Sofia\u2019s estate and to file his claim against that estate once it was opened. Regardless, following Sofia\u2019s death, the trial court in case number 94 \u2014 P\u20146222 did not possess the jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of Joseph\u2019s claim. Its order doing so therefore is void, and we have no choice but to vacate it.\nAlthough at first this decision may appear unduly technical, the consequences of the contrary result are significant. Article 18 of the Probate Act establishes detailed procedures for the adjudication of claims against a decedent\u2019s estate. Among these procedures is a schedule setting forth the priority in which claims against a decedent\u2019s estate, including section 18 \u2014 1.1\u2019s statutory custodial claim, must be paid. 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 10, 18 \u2014 13 (West 1996). If a custodian were allowed to file a statutory custodial claim against the guardianship estate, that person effectively could circumvent the priority schedule established in sections 18 \u2014 10 and 18 \u2014 13. Statutory custodial claims currently share first priority with funeral and burial expenses and administration expenses. 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 10 (West 1996). If the custodian files his statutory claim against the decedent\u2019s estate, and that claim equals or exceeds the value of the decedent\u2019s estate, sections 18 \u2014 10 and 18 \u2014 13 would require the custodian to share the decedent\u2019s estate with the funeral home and the administrator. Sections 18 \u2014 10 and 18 \u2014 13 are undermined, however, if a statutory custodial claim can be filed against a guardianship estate, because a guardianship proceeding is not governed by the priority schedule established in sections 18 \u2014 10 and 18 \u2014 13. Thus, following the ward\u2019s death, a custodian possessing a valid statutory claim could decimate the guardianship estate before the decedent\u2019s estate is opened, leaving the funeral home, the administrator, and every other creditor of the decedent\u2019s estate without recourse. This clearly is not the result that the legislature intended.\nCONCLUSION\nWe vacate the circuit court\u2019s judgment declaring section 18 \u2014 1.1 of the Probate Act unconstitutional and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nJudgment vacated; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RATHJE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kerry R. Peck, of Peck, Bloom, Miller & Mitchell, LLC, and David L. Cwik, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Michael W Rathsack, of Chicago, and Benjamin Daidone, of Niles, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 85909.\nIn re ESTATE OF SOFIA GEBIS, a Disabled Person (Joseph Gebis, Appellant, v. Evelyn Swietek, Appellee).\nOpinion filed March 18, 1999.\nKerry R. Peck, of Peck, Bloom, Miller & Mitchell, LLC, and David L. Cwik, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael W Rathsack, of Chicago, and Benjamin Daidone, of Niles, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0188-01", "first_page_order": 200, "last_page_order": 210 }