{ "id": 243879, "name": "KATHY CARVER, Appellant, v. ROBERT NALL, Sheriff of Adams County, et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Carver v. Nall", "decision_date": "1999-07-01", "docket_number": "No. 86641", "first_page": "554", "last_page": "563", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 554" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "188 U.S. 505", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11727630 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1903, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/188/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5364134 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945903 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469810 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 1070", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3177844 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1071-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/1070-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464396 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618-19" }, { "page": "620", "parenthetical": "Jiganti, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781336 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615464 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2688650 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3582044 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3629040 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2960135 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114487 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403-04" }, { "page": "404" }, { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516145 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260081 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544917 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544916 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221538 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" }, { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0810-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 15510, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.2768651098578175e-07, "percentile": 0.8705293242965131 }, "sha256": "898518bafd248ce4a50c3663288ae16be14ffd6dafdaf71a30be3ab4e8be2e74", "simhash": "1:b1aa15967cd95a24", "word_count": 2526 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:27.509523+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KATHY CARVER, Appellant, v. ROBERT NALL, Sheriff of Adams County, et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nElaintiff, Kathy Carver, appeals the dismissal by the circuit court of Adams County of her complaint for administrative review against defendants, Adams County Sheriff Robert Nall and the members of the Adams County sheriffs merit commission (hereinafter referred to collectively as Commission). See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 1996). The circuit court dismissed the action because Carver failed to have summons timely issue. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 1996). The appellate court affirmed. 299 Ill. App. 3d 810. We allowed Carver\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nThis cause is before us following a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a) (West 1996)). The motion admits all well-pled allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts. Fireman\u2019s Fund Insurance Co. v. SEC Donahue, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 160, 161 (1997). The appellate court detailed the facts of this case. We repeat only those facts that are necessary for our disposition of the issues presented in this appeal.\nCarver was an Adams County deputy sheriff. Following a hearing, the Commission suspended her for 10 days without pay. On October 22, 1997, the Commission mailed its decision to Carver. The decision did not notify Carver of her right under the Administrative Review Law (Act) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1996)) to judicial review of the Commission\u2019s decision and of the 35-day time limit for exercising that right.\nOn November 25, 1997, Carver\u2019s attorney sent eight copies of the complaint to the clerk of the Adams County circuit court. In a cover letter, the attorney directed the circuit court clerk to return seven file-stamped copies to the attorney\u2019s office. The letter also stated: \u201cIt is imperative that this Complaint is filed no later than November 26, 1997\u201d (emphasis in original), which was 35 days after the Commission mailed its decision to Carver. The letter did not request the circuit court clerk to issue summons; Carver\u2019s attorney assumed that the clerk would prepare summonses to serve with the complaint.\nOn December 3, 1997, Carver\u2019s attorney learned that the circuit court clerk did not issue the summonses. Carver\u2019s attorney returned the seven file-stamped copies of the complaint to the circuit court clerk with prepared summonses. In a cover letter, he directed the clerk to forward the complaints and the summonses to the appropriate offices for service.\nOn the Commission\u2019s motion, the circuit court dismissed the complaint because Carver failed to have summons issue within 35 days of her being notified of the Commission\u2019s decision. The appellate court upheld the dismissal. 299 Ill. App. 3d 810. The appellate court rejected Carver\u2019s arguments that: (1) she made a good-faith effort to have summons issue within the 35-day filing period; and (2) the Commission was required to notify her that she had a statutory right to administrative review, which she must exercise within 35 days of the Commission\u2019s decision. Carver appeals.\nDISCUSSION\nSection 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure permits dismissal where, inter alia, \u201cthe action was not commenced within the time limited by law\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(5) (West 1996)) and where \u201cthe claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619(a)(9) (West 1996)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The court should grant the motion only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support a cause of action. On appeal, review is de novo. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997).\nThis appeal involves the timeliness requirements of the Act. Section 3 \u2014 102 mandates that \u201c[ujnless review is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein provided, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 1996). Section 3 \u2014 103 of the Act provides:\n\u201cEvery action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 1996).\nIn an administrative review action, the circuit court clerk \u201cshall issue summons upon request of the plaintiff.\u201d See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 201 (West 1996); see also 166 Ill. 2d R. 101. The clerk serves summons via certified or registered mail. The clerk knows the defendant\u2019s address because \u201c[t]he plaintiff shall, by affidavit filed with the complaint, designate the last known address of each defendant upon whom service shall be made.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 105 (West 1996). This court has recognized that the Act is a departure from common law. Therefore, a party seeking judicial review of an administrative decision must strictly adhere to the Act\u2019s procedures. Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990).\nIn this case, Carver failed to have summons issue within the 35-day filing period. Thus, the appellate court correctly reasoned that an applicable exception to this timeliness requirement must exist for her to prevail. 299 Ill. App. 3d at 813. Before this court, Carver relies on two exceptions to this timeliness requirement. First, Carver contends that her delay in having summons issue within the 35-day filing period should be excused due to her good-faith effort to do so. Second, Carver contends that the filing period was tolled because the Commission\u2019s notice to her was statutorily and constitutionally inadequate.\nI. Good-Faith Effort\nThe good-faith-effort exception to the requirement that summons timely issue is established, but narrow. This court has emphasized that section 3 \u2014 103 of the Act requires that an action for administrative review \u201cbe commenced \u2018by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days\u2019 of receipt of the decision being appealed. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.)\u201d Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 354. This court has distinguished the requirement of a timely filed complaint, which is jurisdictional, from the requirement of summons timely issued:\n\u201cThe 35-day period for the issuance of summons, on the other hand, is mandatory, not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with that requirement will not deprive the court of jurisdiction. (City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 378, 382; Cox v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 399, 403-04.) However, as the 35-day period is intended to \u2018hasten the procedure\u2019 of administrative review and avoid undue delay, a litigant must show a good-faith effort to file the complaint and secure issuance of summons within the 35 days in order to avoid dismissal. (City National Bank & Trust Co., 97 Ill. 2d at 382; Cox, 96 Ill. 2d at 404.) In cases where the 35-day requirement has been relaxed, the plaintiffs had made a good-faith effort to issue summons within the statutory period. Nevertheless, due to some circumstance beyond their control, summons was not issued within the statutory period. See City National Bank & Trust Co., 97 Ill. 2d at 382; Cox, 96 Ill. 2d at 404 (cases in which the plaintiffs had filed their complaints for administrative review and summons with the clerk of the circuit court within the 35-day period but, due to problems at the clerk\u2019s office which were beyond the plaintiff\u2019s control, the summonses were not issued until after the 35-day period).\u201d Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 355.\nCarver argues, as she did in the appellate court, that her attorney\u2019s assumption that the circuit court clerk would issue summons constitutes a \u201cgood-faith effort\u201d to comply with the Act. We agree with the appellate court that such an assumption, by itself, does not constitute a \u201cgood-faith effort.\u201d 299 Ill. App. 3d at 814.\nThis case does not resemble those cases where plaintiffs made efforts to secure issuance of summons, but, \u201cdue to some circumstance beyond their control, summons was not issued within the statutory period.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 355 (and cases cited therein). Rather, this case more closely resembles those cases where plaintiffs did not diligently seek issuance of summons in accordance with the Act. See, e.g., Johnson v. Department of Public Aid, 251 Ill. App. 3d 604 (1993); Moretti v. Department of Labor, 119 Ill. App. 3d 740 (1983).\nThis case is distinguishable from Azim v. Department of Central Management Services, 164 Ill. App. 3d 298 (1987), upon which Carver relies. In that case, plaintiffs attorney told an employee in the circuit court clerk\u2019s office via telephone that the complaint needed to be \u201cfile-stamped and served\u201d that day. However, the employee did not indicate that the plaintiff needed to prepare the summonses before they would be issued. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the action, concluding:\n\u201c[T]he record before us supports a finding that the plaintiffs, in good faith, exercised due diligence in seeking issuance of summons in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the statute. The delay in the issuance of summonses was caused solely by errors committed by personnel in the clerk\u2019s office. *** [W]e find that the errors of ministerial officers whom the plaintiffs cannot control should not serve to deprive them of their right to appeal.\u201d Azim, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 303.\nIn this case, however, Carver did nothing but assume that the clerk\u2019s office would issue summons. She did not ask the clerk to issue summons, or even provide the clerk with the addresses of Commission members. Regarding the issuance of summons, she made no efforts whatsoever, much less those that could be considered diligent or made in good faith. We conclude that the \u201cgood-faith effort\u201d exception to this timeliness, requirement does not apply to this case.\nII. Adequacy of Notice\nCarver asserts another exception to the timeliness requirements of section 3 \u2014 103 of the Act. Carver contends that the 35-day filing period was tolled because the Commission\u2019s notice to her was statutorily and constitutionally inadequate.\nA. Statutory Adequacy\nCarver contends that the Commission provided her with statutorily inadequate notice of its decision. She points to section 10 \u2014 50(b) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Procedure Act), which mandates: \u201cAll agency orders shall specify whether they are final and subject to the Administrative Review Law.\u201d 5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 50(b) (West 1996). The Commission\u2019s decision did not include this information. Thus, according to Carver, the Commission\u2019s failure to follow this provision tolls the 35-day filing period.\nWe cannot accept this argument. The Commission was not required to inform Carver that its decision was reviewable under the Act. The Procedure Act applies to every \u201cagency,\u201d as defined therein (5 ILCS 100/1 \u2014 5 (West 1996)), and defines \u201cagency\u201d as, inter alia, \u201ceach administrative unit or corporate outgrowth of the State government that is created by or pursuant to statute, other than units of local government and their officers, school districts, and boards of election commissioners ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 100/1 \u2014 20 (West 1996). \u201cCounties\u201d are \u201c[u]nits of local government.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a7 1; 5 ILCS 70/1.28 (West 1996).\nIn this case, the Adams County board, and not the state, created the Commission. See 55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8002 (West 1996). Thus, the Commission is an agency of Adams County \u2014 a unit of local government \u2014 and not an agency of the state. Accordingly, the requirements of the Procedure Act do not apply to the Commission. See Bethune v. Larson, 188 Ill. App. 3d 163, 170 (1989); County of Macon v. Board of Education of Decatur School District No. 61, 165 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1987).\nWe note Carver\u2019s argument that the list of exempted entities \u2014 units of local government, school districts, and boards of election commissioners \u2014 is exclusive. According to Carver, had the legislature intended to exclude county sheriffs merit commissions from the Procedure Act\u2019s definition of agency, it would have expressly done so. However, this rule of statutory construction, that the enumeration of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of all others (see Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 260 (1994)), does not apply here. The list of exempted entities does not exclude the Commission. As an agency of local government, the Commission falls squarely within the exemption for units of local government. In sum, although the Commission\u2019s decision was reviewable under the Act (55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8014 (West 1996)), the Commission was not statutorily required to inform Carver of the same.\nB. Constitutional Adequacy\nSince we find no statutory requirement that the Commission inform Carver of her right to judicial review of its decision and the time limit to do so, we must now address the constitutional issue presented. Carver argues that the Commission\u2019s decision was constitutionally inadequate. She relies on Johnson v. State Employees Retirement System, 155 Ill. App. 3d 616 (1987), which held that when an administrative agency renders a decision: (1) procedural due process requires the agency to inform the affected party of the right to administrative review and the 35-day time limit for exercising that right; and (2) an agency\u2019s decision that fails to inform a party of this right is constitutionally inadequate and tolls the 35-day filing period. Johnson, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 618-19.\nWe cannot accept this argument. The text of the Illinois Constitution does not recognize a right to appeal from administrative proceedings. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7\u00a7 6, 9; see Glasco Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1071-72 (1980), aff\u2019d, 86 Ill. 2d 346 (1981); Board of Education of Addison School District No. 4 v. Gates, 22 Ill. App. 3d 16, 20 (1974). Further, the right to appeal from an administrative decision is not essential to due process of law. Rather, the right \u201cmay or may not be granted in a given situation as the legislature deems appropriate *** without sacrificing uniformity as to proceedings and practice, and without enacting special legislation.\u201d Board of Education of Gardener School District No. 112 v. County Board of School Trustees, 28 Ill. 2d 15, 18 (1963); accord Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508, 47 L. Ed. 563, 566, 23 S. Ct. 390, 392 (1903); see Johnson, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 620 (Jiganti, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Johnson v. State Employees Retirement System, 155 Ill. App. 3d 616 (1987), is hereby overruled.\nWe conclude that the Commission provided adequate notice to Carver. Thus, the Act\u2019s 35-day filing period was not tolled.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard D. Frazier, of Metnick, Cherry & Frazier, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Matthew A. Hutmacher, of Hutmacher, Rapp & Ortbal, EC., of Quincy, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 86641.\nKATHY CARVER, Appellant, v. ROBERT NALL, Sheriff of Adams County, et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed July 1, 1999.\nRichard D. Frazier, of Metnick, Cherry & Frazier, of Springfield, for appellant.\nMatthew A. Hutmacher, of Hutmacher, Rapp & Ortbal, EC., of Quincy, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0554-01", "first_page_order": 566, "last_page_order": 575 }