{ "id": 1131039, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. NIELS NIELSON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Nielson", "decision_date": "1999-06-17", "docket_number": "No. 83127", "first_page": "271", "last_page": "301", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 271" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188469 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 U.S. 206", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165005 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "fourth amendment is applicable to state officials through the fourteenth amendment" }, { "page": "1675", "parenthetical": "fourth amendment is applicable to state officials through the fourteenth amendment" }, { "page": "1442", "parenthetical": "fourth amendment is applicable to state officials through the fourteenth amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/364/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 170", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195904 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "225" }, { "page": "1742" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "225" }, { "page": "1742" }, { "page": "180-81" }, { "page": "225-26" }, { "page": "1742" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 294", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131408 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "1139" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "1139" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "1139" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "1140", "parenthetical": "holding that distance of 150 to 180 feet supports no such inference" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821396 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473-74" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "1627-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 U.S. 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175104 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102-03" }, { "page": "320-21" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "104-05" }, { "page": "321-22" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "104-06" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "326", "parenthetical": "a separation of \"more than two hours\" constitutes \"the passage of a significant period of time\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193089 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-87" }, { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603261 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 291", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182222 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300-02" }, { "page": "307-08" }, { "page": "1689-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092982 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "defendant's statement was voluntary where he initiated the conversation about the crime" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 337", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054264 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156303 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant freely and voluntarily waived his right to be present for portions of his capital sentencing hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544896 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "480-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141932 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223622 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984278 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251719 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-16", "parenthetical": "commenting on the defendant's post-arrest silence and failure to testify was not plain error" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "994 F.2d 305", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10511681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/994/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864527 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467-70" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55-57" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783181 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477030 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177-78" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55985 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198914 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1747, "char_count": 49961, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.513441348394488e-07, "percentile": 0.810752866286799 }, "sha256": "503c08dc73cd0ff594d9df9fc7fdaabe5cf3b238cf24e6cc7634589920971677", "simhash": "1:a0f8c5607488e1f3", "word_count": 8126 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:13.411978+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. NIELS NIELSON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RATHJE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Niels Nielson, was charged by indictment with six counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9\u20141(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) and two counts of concealing a homicidal death (720 ILCS 5/9\u20143.1(a) (West 1996)). A jury convicted defendant of two of the first degree murder counts and both concealment counts. The same jury sentenced defendant to death, and the circuit court of Wayne County imposed two extended 10-year prison terms for the concealment convictions. Defendant\u2019s execution has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a).\nOn appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence and to suppress statements; (2) the trial court erred in holding the capital sentencing hearing in defendant\u2019s absence; (3) the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence during the second phase of defendant\u2019s capital sentencing hearing; (4) the State made improper arguments during the second phase of defendant\u2019s capital sentencing hearing; (5) one of the capital sentencing jury instructions is confusing; (6) the trial court erred in imposing extended-term prison sentences for the concealment convictions; and (7) the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional. We will address each of these arguments, and the facts relating to them, in turn.\nBACKGROUND\nBecause defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we need not set forth a detailed account of the facts.\nDefendant was convicted of murdering his ex-wife, Sue Marshel, and her daughter, Melinda Marshel. Sue and Melinda disappeared on July 4, 1995. The next evening, in a pond in Wayne County, Sue\u2019s car was found partially submerged with a furring strip wedged between the driver\u2019s seat and the accelerator. On July 8, 1995, approximately three-quarters of a mile from where the car was found, the police discovered a duffle bag containing the charred remains of two persons, one of whom had died from at least two gunshot wounds to the head and one of whom had died from at least three gunshot wounds to the head. A .32-caliber bullet was found in one of the charred bodies, and a .32-caliber casing was found in the duffle bag. Dental records confirmed that the charred remains were those of Sue and Melinda Marshel.\nWhile searching the trailer in which defendant lived with his mother and stepfather, Joyce and George Lathrop, the police found the gun that fired the bullet found in the body. Outside the trailer, the police found a furring strip matching the one that was wedged against the accelerator of Sue\u2019s submerged car. In a burn pile located approximately 150 feet from the trailer, the police found human hair, blood, and bone fragments, as well as personal property belonging to Sue and Melinda Marshel.\nIn interviews with the police, defendant initially denied any knowledge of Sue and Melinda\u2019s whereabouts. After the bodies were found, defendant admitted to helping conceal the murders and burn the bodies but denied any participation in the actual murders.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions to suppress the evidence found in the burn pile and the statements given to the police. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of both murders and sentenced to death.\nMOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the burn pile.\nBackground\nDefendant moved \u201cto suppress the fruits of any search or seizure from an alleged burn pile located approximately 150 feet North of the residence of George Lathrup [sic], or any outbuildings, land outside the house of George Lathrup [sic].\u201d In the motion, defendant alleged that, on July 6, 1995, the police arrived at George Lathrop\u2019s trailer, located at RR 1, Box 170, in Wayne County. The police asked George to sign a consent to search form authorizing a search of the \u201cHouse,\u201d and George agreed. After completing the search of the house, and without obtaining George\u2019s consent, the police began searching the property surrounding the house, \u201cincluding an area that was 150 feet or more from the house, itself, designated as a burn pile or burn barrel.\u201d Although the police identified certain items of interest in the burn pile, they did not seize those items. Instead, they left George\u2019s property and returned two days later with a warrant to search the burn pile. Defendant asked the trial court to suppress the evidence seized from the burn pile, arguing that (1) the initial search of the burn pile exceeded the scope of George\u2019s written consent, and (2) the subsequent warrant was issued on the basis of information obtained during the initial unauthorized search.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, defendant\u2019s mother, Joyce Lathrop, testified that the family\u2019s trailer sat on approximately 20 acres of land. The Lathrops maintain three or four acres immediately surrounding the trailer for residential purposes and lease the remainder to the Neffs, a family of sharecroppers, for cultivation. \u201cCattle fencing,\u201d brush, and trees line the northern boundary of the Lathrops\u2019 property. The burn pile sits along this boundary line, approximately 150 to 175 feet from the trailer, and is surrounded by an overgrowth of tall weeds. Joyce described the area surrounding the burn pile as \u201creally a mess this year.\u201d The burn pile is visible from both a dirt lane used by the Neffs to gain access to the Lathrops\u2019 farm fields and the northern boundary line, where Joyce has seen hunters walking \u201cseveral times.\u201d The Lathrops do not post a \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d sign on their property and require neither the Neffs nor the hunters to obtain permission before entering their property.\nGeorge Lathrop testified that the burn pile sits \u201cat least\u201d 120 feet from the trailer. When asked why he did not place the burn pile closer to the trailer, George responded that the burn pile is both a fire hazard and a sanitation problem.\nHazel Neff testified that she, her husband, and her son farm the Lathrops\u2019 land. The Neffs access the Lathrops\u2019 farmland via a dirt lane that runs along the southern boundary of the Lathrops\u2019 yard, and they are free to \u201cjust come and go as [they] please.\u201d\nMerril Neff testified that he and his family do not have to ask permission to enter the Lathrops\u2019 property, but instead may go there when they need to, \u201cno problem.\u201d Merril testified that, on the afternoon of July 6, 1995, he was riding his tractor in the Lathrops\u2019 field when he noticed a garbage fire burning in the vicinity of the Lathrops\u2019 burn pile.\nTerry Neff testified that, on the afternoon of July 6, 1995, he was traveling to the Lathrops\u2019 property to help his father with the farming. Approximately 100 yards from the Lathrops\u2019 property, he noticed smoke rising from the vicinity of the Lathrops\u2019 burn pile. The smoke was \u201cbigger than a trash fire smoke,\u201d \u201cdark black,\u201d and rising in a column \u201cfour or five foot [sic] across.\u201d\nDonald Atwood, Jr., a Wayne County sheriffs deputy, testified that, on July 9, 1995, he and another deputy flew over the Lathrops\u2019 property in a helicopter at an altitude of 100 feet. The Lathrops\u2019 burn pile clearly was visible as such from the air, and Deputy Atwood estimated that the burn pile sat 175 feet from the Lathrops\u2019 trailer.\nIn addition to the testimony described above, both defendant and the State elicited testimony and called witnesses in relation to the police officers\u2019 conduct during the July 6, 1995, search of the Lathrops\u2019 property, George Lathrop\u2019s participation in that search, and the scope of George Lathrop\u2019s consent to search.\nAt the close of the testimony, defendant argued that the police exceeded the scope of George Lathrop\u2019s written consent by searching outside the house, that the burn pile sits within the trailer\u2019s curtilage, and that defendant, who had been living with the Lathrops for several months, had standing to challenge the validity of the search. In response, the State argued that the burn pile sits outside the trailer\u2019s curtilage and therefore was not protected by the fourth amendment and that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the burn pile\u2019s existence. In addition, the State argued that George Lathrop implicitly consented to the search of the burn pile.\nIn a written order, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress on the ground that George Lathrop had consented orally to the search of the burn pile.\nAnalysis\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that George Lathrop consented to a search of the Lathrops\u2019 burn pile. We need not evaluate the scope of George Lathrop\u2019s consent, however, because we agree with the State that the Lathrops\u2019 burn pile undoubtedly sits outside the trailer\u2019s curtilage.\nAs an initial matter, defendant argues that the State has defaulted the curtilage argument because, although the State raised the argument in its written response to defendant\u2019s motion, called witnesses and elicited testimony in support of the argument at the evidentiary hearing, and devoted almost its entire closing to the argument, it failed to request a specific ruling on the argument after the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion on another basis. Defendant\u2019s argument is wholly without merit, as it is well settled that the appellee may raise any argument that supports the trial court\u2019s judgment, even if the argument was not directly ruled upon by the trial court. People v. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d 298, 300 (1987).\nWe now turn to the merits. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. IV; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1675, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1442 (1960) (fourth amendment is applicable to state officials through the fourteenth amendment). Similarly, article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that the \u201cpeople shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches [and] seizures.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 6. Here, defendant explicitly invokes only the fourth amendment in support of his position, and he in no way suggests that the Illinois Constitution offers him greater protection. We therefore confine our analysis to fourth amendment jurisprudence.\nThe fourth amendment\u2019s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends not only to a person\u2019s home but also to the area immediately adjacent to the home, commonly referred to as the curtilage. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 225, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984). Conversely, no reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to the land sitting outside of the home\u2019s curtilage, commonly referred to as \u201copen fields.\u201d Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 225, 104 S. Ct. at 1742. Thus, unlike the home\u2019s curtilage, open fields are not protected by the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180-81, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 225-26, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.\nIn determining whether a particular area falls within a home\u2019s curtilage, we must ask whether the area harbors the intimate activities commonly associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 334, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987). The extent of the curtilage is determined by factors \u201cthat bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.\u201d Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 334, 107 S. Ct. at 1139. These factors include (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 334-35, 107 S. Ct. at 1139. Applying these factors to the Lathrops\u2019 burn pile, we have little difficulty in concluding that the burn pile sits outside the trailer\u2019s curtilage and therefore is not protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.\nFirst. Three witnesses estimated the distance between the Lathrops\u2019 trailer and the burn pile. Joyce Lathrop estimated the distance as between 150 and 175 feet, George Lathrop estimated the distance as \u201cat least\u201d 120 feet, and Deputy Atwood estimated the distance as 175 feet. In addition, in his motion to suppress, defendant himself asserts that the burn pile sits \u201c150 feet or more from the house.\u201d Standing in isolation, this substantial distance supports no inference that the burn pile should be treated as an adjunct of the trailer. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 335, 107 S. Ct. at 1140 (holding that distance of 150 to 180 feet supports no such inference).\nSecond. The burn pile does not lie within an enclosure that surrounds the house. Aerial photographs introduced during the suppression hearing demonstrate that nothing encloses the area that includes both the trailer and the burn pile. To be sure, cattle fencing, intermittent trees, and brush mark the northern boundary of the Lathrops\u2019 property in the vicinity of the burn pile, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that they also constitute the boundary of the trailer\u2019s curtilage. Indeed, this could not be the case, as the fencing, trees, and brush form a solitary straight line, not an enclosure surrounding the burn pile and trailer.\nThird. The burn pile is not used for \u201cthe intimate activities of the home\u201d such that it \u201cshould be treated as the home itself.\u201d On the contrary, it is used for burning garbage. Significantly, George Lathrop testified that he deliberately keeps the burn pile a long distance from the trailer because it constitutes both a fire hazard and a sanitation problem. A fire hazard and sanitation problem that is intentionally placed away from the family\u2019s living space hardly comports with a conception of \u201cthe home itself.\u201d Moreover, while the Lathrops meticulously maintained the area of their yard that they used for picnicking and sitting outside, Joyce testified that the area surrounding the burn pile was not maintained at all and in fact was \u201creally a mess.\u201d Given the care with which the Lathrops maintained the outdoor areas undoubtedly used as living spaces, the neglect of the area surrounding the burn pile further supports the conclusion that the Lathrops did not consider the burn pile as an extension of the house itself.\nFourth. The Lathrops took no steps whatsoever to protect the burn pile from observation by people passing by. The Lathrops did nothing to dissuade both friends and strangers from entering onto their property. Indeed, Joyce testified not only that the Neffs enjoyed unlimited access to the Lathrops\u2019 property, but also that local hunters were welcome to traverse the Lathrops\u2019 northern fence line and in fact had done so \u201cseveral times.\u201d The Neffs confirmed Joyce\u2019s account, explaining that they need not ask permission to cross the Lathrops\u2019 property but instead \u201cjust come and go as [they] please.\u201d Significantly, the burn pile is visible from both the dirt lane used by the Neffs and the fence line traversed by the hunters. Defendant contends that the overgrowth of weeds surrounding the burn pile represents an effort by the Lathrops to conceal the burn pile from people passing by. Nothing in the record supports this argument, however, as the Lathrops testified that the weeds are the result of neglect, not a desire for privacy. More importantly, the weeds do not conceal the burn pile from people passing by. The record establishes that the burn pile is visible from both the fence line traversed by hunters and the dirt lane used by the Neffs.\nIn sum, the burn pile constitutes both a fire hazard and a sanitation problem, and the Lathrops deliberately placed it a substantial distance from the trailer. There is nothing that encloses both it and the trailer, and the Lathrops have taken no steps to shield the burn pile from known passers-by. The burn pile fails every test for determining whether an area constitutes curtilage. We therefore hold that the burn pile lies outside the trailer\u2019s curtilage and is protected by neither the United States Constitution nor the Illinois Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures. Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was properly denied.\nMOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements. In that motion, defendant sought to suppress statements that he gave to the police on July 6, July 8, July 9, and July 10, 1995. Although the trial court denied the motion in its entirety, the State introduced only the July 10, 1995, statement at trial. Consequently, defendant confines his argument, and we confine our analysis, to the admissibility of defendant\u2019s July 10, 1995, statement.\nBackground\nThe essential facts relating to defendant\u2019s July 10, 1995, statement are not in dispute. On July 10, 1995, defendant was being held at the Wayne County jail following his arrest for theft and firearms offenses. At approximately 1 p.m., Special Agent Richard Kamminga and Officer Larry Blaize, both of the Illinois State Police, asked a jail officer to inform defendant that they would like to speak with him. When defendant arrived at the interview room, Officer Blaize read defendant his Miranda warnings. Although defendant stated that he understood his rights and was willing to talk, he refused to sign a waiver of rights form. Agent Kamminga began the interview by telling defendant that the investigation into the Marshels\u2019 murders was continuing and that the police now knew that bodies had been burned at defendant\u2019s residence. Defendant became increasingly agitated, until finally he placed his hands over his ears, looked up at the ceiling, and began repeating, \u201cnah nah nah nah nah.\u201d Defendant then stood up and announced that he was leaving. Officer Blaize told defendant to sit back down, as he did not want defendant exiting without an escort. Realizing the interview\u2019s utility was exhausted, Officer Blaize and Agent Kamminga returned defendant to his cell. The entire interview lasted approximately 15 minutes.\nBetween 1:30 and 2 p.m., Deputy Blake Adams of the Wayne County sheriffs office noticed that defendant was sitting in the jail\u2019s exercise yard. Deputy Adams offered defendant a cup of coffee, and defendant accepted. When Deputy Adams delivered the cup of coffee, defendant asked him whether he was \u201cthe deputy from Wayne City.\u201d Deputy Adams responded that he was, and a conversation ensued. Over the course of the next hour, Deputy Adams and defendant talked about such things as Deputy Adams\u2019 new house in Wayne City, Deputy Adams\u2019 recent vacation to Montana, Deputy Adams\u2019 family, and Deputy Adams\u2019 new boat. Noticing a tattoo on defendant\u2019s leg, Deputy Adams decided to ask defendant about it. Before doing so, however, he read defendant his Miranda warnings \u201cin case he did say anything.\u201d When defendant stated that he understood his rights, Deputy Adams asked defendant whether he wished to continue the conversation. Defendant stated that he did.\nThe conversation turned briefly to defendant\u2019s tattoo, which defendant obtained while in a Utah prison. Defendant then asked Deputy Adams whether he knew what was going to happen to defendant. Deputy Adams stated that he did not because, although he had been present when the Marshels\u2019 bodies were found, he was only marginally involved with the investigation. Defendant asked whether Deputy Adams had known Sue and Melinda Marshel, and Deputy Adams responded that he had met them both briefly. After beginning to cry, defendant stated, \u201cThey\u2019re going to make me out to be a Dahlmer [szc].\u201d Defendant then confessed to concealing Sue\u2019s car and carrying the bodies to the burn pile, but he denied any participation in the actual murders. Deputy Adams asked defendant why he had not told this to the police, and defendant explained that he was afraid of the actual murderer.\nWanting someone else to hear what he had to say, defendant asked to speak with Officer Blaize. Deputy Adams accompanied defendant inside the jail and informed Officer Blaize that defendant wished to make a statement. At 3:24 p.m., Officer Blaize began his conversation with defendant by once again reading him his Miranda warnings. After stating that he understood his rights, defendant signed a waiver of rights form and agreed to talk with Officer Blaize. Over the next hour, defendant gave the statement that was admitted into evidence at trial.\nDefendant moved to suppress his July 10, 1995, statement to Officer Blaize. In his motion, defendant argued that (1) he had invoked his right to remain silent during the 1 p.m. interview with Officer Blaize and Agent Kamminga, and (2) Officer Blaize and Deputy Adams violated defendant\u2019s right to remain silent by again questioning him so soon after the 1 p.m. interview concluded. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion, holding that enough time elapsed between the 1 p.m. interview and the subsequent interrogation that produced the challenged statement.\nAnalysis\nAs a general rule, this court will reverse a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress statements only if that ruling is manifestly erroneous. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 309 (1998). In this case, however, de novo review is appropriate, as neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is at issue. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 309.\nIn Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), the Supreme Court declared that if during a custodial interrogation an \u201cindividual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. *** [A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.\u201d Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723, 86 S. Ct. at 1627-28.\nHowever, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975), the Supreme Court clarified that Miranda did not create a per se proscription against any further questioning by any police officer, on any topic, once the suspect invokes his right to remain silent. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102-03, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 320-21, 96 S. Ct. at 326. Rather, the Court concluded that the admissibility of statements obtained after the defendant decides to remain silent depends upon on whether the defendant\u2019s \u201c \u2018right to cut off questioning\u2019 \u201d was \u201c \u2018scrupulously honored.\u2019 \u201d Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 321, 96 S. Ct. at 326. In deciding this question, courts should consider whether (1) the police immediately halted the initial interrogation after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent; (2) a significant amount of time elapsed between the interrogations; (3) a fresh set of Miranda warnings were given prior to the second interrogation; and (4) the second interrogation addressed a crime that was not the subject of the first interrogation. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-05, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 321-22, 96 S. Ct. at 327. The fact that the second interrogation addressed the same crime as the first interrogation does not preclude a finding that the defendant\u2019s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 86-87 (1987).\nIn this case, there is no question that defendant invoked his right to remain silent during the 1 p.m. interview with Officer Blaize and Agent Kamminga. By placing his hands over his ears, turning his head to the ceiling, and chanting \u201cnah nah nah,\u201d defendant clearly \u201cindicate[d] his desire to cut off questioning.\u201d See People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 255 (1992). Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that both Officer Blaize and Agent Kamminga interpreted defendant\u2019s conduct as an expression of his desire to terminate the interview. More importantly, defendant\u2019s conduct did in fact terminate the interview, as Officer Blaize and Agent Kamminga returned defendant to his cell immediately following the \u201cnah nah nah\u201d episode.\nThe question thus becomes whether the police scrupulously honored defendant\u2019s right to remain silent. Before we can answer this question, however, we first must determine when defendant\u2019s second interrogation commenced. Defendant argues that the second interrogation commenced between 1:30 and 2 p.m., when Deputy Adams first approached defendant in the exercise yard. The State disagrees, arguing that the second interrogation did not commence until Officer Blaize initiated his second conversation with defendant. We agree with the State.\nIn Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980), the Supreme Court offered the following guidelines for determining when an interrogation begins for purposes of Miranda:\n\u201c[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term \u2018interrogation\u2019 under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.\u201d Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 307-08, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90.\nUnder Innis, Deputy Adams\u2019 conversation with defendant in the exercise yard was not an \u201cinterrogation.\u201d Deputy Adams and defendant spent the first hour of that conversation discussing such things as Deputy Adams\u2019 new house, Deputy Adams\u2019 recent vacation, Deputy Adams\u2019 family, and Deputy Adams\u2019 new boat. Absent a refined sense of clairvoyance, Deputy Adams simply had no reason to anticipate that these topics \u201cwere reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response\u201d from defendant. The same holds true for Deputy Adams\u2019 questions relating to defendant\u2019s tattoo. To be sure, Deputy Adams administered Miranda warnings prior to inquiring about the tattoo, but we know of nothing in human experience to suggest that questioning the origins of a man\u2019s tattoo is \u201clikely to elicit an incriminating response\u201d from a homicide suspect. Deputy Adams\u2019 brief comments concerning his role in the investigation and his relationship with the victims undoubtedly related to defendant\u2019s crime, but they in no way constituted \u201ccoercive police practices\u201d from which defendant required an \u201cadded measure of protection.\u201d Indeed, defendant himself turned the conversation toward the investigation, and Deputy Adams confined his remarks to answering defendant\u2019s questions. See People v. Dalton, 91 Ill. 2d 22, 31 (1982) (defendant\u2019s statement was voluntary where he initiated the conversation about the crime). Significantly, although defendant insists that the conversation in the exercise yard was an interrogation, he identifies nothing from that conversation that was \u201clikely to elicit an incriminating response\u201d from him.\nWe therefore hold that defendant\u2019s second interrogation began no earlier than 3:24 p.m., when Officer Blaize initiated the interview that produced the challenged statement. Given this fact, we have no problem concluding that defendant\u2019s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. First, Officer Blaize and Agent Kamminga halted the 1 p.m. interrogation immediately after defendant invoked his right to remain silent. Second, the 1 p.m. interview terminated at no later than 1:15 p.m., more than two hours before Officer Blaize\u2019s subsequent interrogation of defendant. Thus, a significant amount of time elapsed between the interrogations. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 322, 96 S. Ct. at 326 (a separation of \u201cmore than two hours\u201d constitutes \u201cthe passage of a significant period of time\u201d). Third, defendant received two sets of fresh Miranda warnings in the moments preceding the second interrogation: one from Deputy Adams in the exercise yard and another from Officer Blaize in the interview room. Finally, although the second interrogation addressed the same crime as the first interrogation, this alone does not preclude a finding that the defendant\u2019s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. See Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 86-87.\nThe record demonstrates that defendant\u2019s right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. The trial court therefore properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the July 10, 1995, statement to Officer Blaize.\nCAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING: DEFENDANT\u2019S ABSENCE\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in holding the capital sentencing hearing in defendant\u2019s absence.\nBackground\nThe first day of defendant\u2019s capital sentencing hearing opened with the following colloquy:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Be seated, please. Show we\u2019re in open court without the jury being present. The defendant is here with his counsel. The State\u2019s Attorney is here.\nDEFENDANT: Yeah, why the fuck am I here?\nTHE COURT: The Attorney General is here.\nDEFENDANT: You stupid fuckin\u2019 piece of shit.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Nielson, I understand you\u2019re upset about the verdict yesterday and I understand why you would be.\nDEFENDANT: Well, imagine that, you stupid motherfucker.\nTHE COURT: I think you\u2019re overreacting to the circumstances.\nDEFENDANT: Well, fuck you.\nTHE COURT: What did you say?\nDEFENDANT: Fuck you.\nTHE COURT: Okay. It\u2019s my job to explain certain things to you.\nDEFENDANT: I don\u2019t give a shit.\u201d\nThe conversation continued in this vein for six pages of the report of proceedings, during the course of which defendant referred to the trial court as a \u201cdumb ass,\u201d a \u201cdumb fucker,\u201d a \u201cmotherfucker,\u201d a \u201cdumb motherfucker,\u201d a \u201cstupid motherfucker,\u201d and an \u201casshole.\u201d In response to the trial court\u2019s warning that defendant\u2019s belligerence would not evoke sympathy from the jury, defendant promised, \u201cI\u2019m going to act up. I\u2019ll guarantee you.\u201d The trial court then threatened defendant with contempt of court, to which defendant responded, \u201cOh, no! I can go to jail? I\u2019ve been in jail now for 10 months, you stupid motherfucker.\u201d Sensing that this was an appropriate time for a break, the trial court ordered a brief recess to allow defendant to confer with his attorneys. Defendant responded, \u201cI\u2019ll come back and tell you off again, you stupid fucker.\u201d\nWhen the proceedings reconvened, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant \u201cdoes not wish to participate in any proceedings and is willing to waive on the record his right to be present.\u201d Defense counsel explained that defendant\u2019s continued presence in the courtroom would be \u201cdetrimental to his interests as the law perceives them.\u201d\nThe trial court then admonished defendant of his rights, explaining that defendant had the absolute right to be present and to participate throughout the proceedings. The trial court reminded defendant of the sentencing hearing\u2019s purpose, and informed defendant of his right to subpoena witnesses, to confront and cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses, and to testify. If he remained in the courtroom, defendant would be able to confer with his counsel and make suggestions on how best to proceed. By removing himself from the courtroom, defendant would be giving up all of these rights, and would be denying the jury the opportunity to observe him during the hearing. The trial court insisted that, although it did not want defendant to be absent from the hearing, it would have no choice but to remove defendant from the courtroom if defendant continued to be disruptive.\nFollowing the trial court\u2019s admonitions, another colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Nielson, can you behave yourself at this point?\nDEFENDANT: Hell no.\nTHE COURT: What?\nDEFENDANT: Hell no.\nTHE COURT: I couldn\u2019t hear what you said.\nDEFENDANT: Hell no!\nTHE COURT: Okay. Are you going to act out when I bring the jury in?\nDEFENDANT: Yeah.\nTHE COURT: What are you going to do?\nDEFENDANT: Call them names.\nTHE COURT: Okay.\nDEFENDANT: Everything you don\u2019t want me to do.\u201d\nAt this point, defense counsel again explained that defendant wished to waive his right to be present. After confirming that defendant fully understood his rights, had conferred with counsel, and was acting freely and voluntarily, the trial court accepted defendant\u2019s waiver. The trial court told defendant that he was free to return to the courtroom at anytime, \u201call you have to do is tell me you\u2019re going to change your mind and we\u2019ll let you back in without any penalties at all.\u201d Defendant was then removed from the courtroom.\nSimilar events transpired each morning of defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, as the trial court administered fresh admonitions and asked defendant whether he wished to return to the courtroom. In each instance, defendant elected to stand by his waiver, vowing to disrupt the proceedings if kept in the courtroom and peppering his remarks with such monikers as \u201cdumb bastard,\u201d \u201cstupid ass,\u201d \u201cstupid fucker,\u201d \u201cmotherfucker,\u201d \u201cstupid motherfucker,\u201d and \u201casshole.\u201d The trial court accepted defendant\u2019s waivers, finding that defendant fully understood his rights, had conferred with counsel, and was acting freely and voluntarily.\nAnalysis\nThe accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom during every stage of his trial is guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970). However, like many others, this right may be waived. People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 145, 157 (1984). Thus, where a defendant voluntarily absents himself from a courtroom and refuses to be present for further proceedings, he is deemed to have waived his right and cannot claim any advantage on account of his absence. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d at 157 (holding that defendant freely and voluntarily waived his right to be present for portions of his capital sentencing hearing).\nHere, there is no question that defendant freely and voluntarily waived his right to be present for his capital sentencing hearing. On no fewer than four occasions, the trial court admonished defendant of his right to be present and participate as well as the importance of making a good impression in front of the jury. On each of these occasions, defendant not only expressly waived his right to be present but also threatened to disrupt the proceedings if he was not removed from the courtroom. And defendant\u2019s ceaseless invective demonstrates that this was no idle threat. Under these circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that defendant waived his right to be present for his capital sentencing hearing.\nNotwithstanding Owens, defendant insists that the right to be present for a capital sentencing hearing cannot be waived under any circumstances. In support, defendant points to section 115\u20144.1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which provides:\n\u201cIf a defendant absents himself before trial on a capital felony, trial may proceed as specified in this Section provided that the State certifies that it will not seek a death sentence following conviction.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115\u2014 4.1(a) (West 1996).\nAccording to defendant, section 115\u2014 4.1(a) represents \u201can absolute, unambiguous prohibition against sentencing an absent capital defendant.\u201d We disagree.\nDefendant insists that we confine our analysis to section 115\u20144.1(a)\u2019s plain language, and so we shall. Section 115\u2014 4.1(a) in no way prohibits the sentencing of an absent capital defendant. It prohibits only the commencement of a capital trial against a defendant who absents himself before trial. Defendant did not absent himself before trial. On the contrary, defendant was present throughout his trial, absenting himself only after the jury found him guilty. Accordingly, section 115\u20144.1(a) is wholly inapplicable to this case.\nIn sum, we conclude that defendant freely and voluntarily waived his right to be present for his capital sentencing hearing. The trial court therefore committed no error by conducting that hearing in defendant\u2019s absence.\nAGGRAVATION EVIDENCE\nDefendant next argues that, during the second phase of his capital sentencing hearing, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence of defendant\u2019s misconduct in the Wayne County jail.\nBackground\nDefendant objects to the testimony of Kathy Moats, a Wayne County corrections officer. Moats testified that, while incarcerated in the Wayne County jail awaiting trial, defendant activated the fire alarm in his cell at least four times in one night; incited other inmates to throw things at the guards; banged on his cell door for hours at a time; vandalized his cell; smeared excrement on his cell window; refused to \u201clock down\u201d when ordered; flooded his cell with water; urinated on his cell floor; and made crude and vulgar remarks to Moats. Defendant contends that Moats\u2019 testimony related solely to \u201ctrivial violations of jail rules\u201d and therefore was \u201cnot relevant to the question of whether Mr. Nielson should be executed.\u201d\nIt is well settled that the evidentiary rules applicable at trial are not applicable during the aggravation/ mitigation phase of a death penalty hearing. People v. Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d 444, 472 (1997). This is to ensure that the sentencing authority possesses the fullest information possible about not only the circumstances of the particular crime, but also about the defendant\u2019s life, character, and criminal record. Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d at 472. The only rule regarding the admissibility of evidence at this stage is that it be relevant and reliable, the determination of which lies within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d at 472.\nUnder remarkably similar facts, this court held that evidence of a defendant\u2019s misconduct while in jail awaiting trial, reflects upon the defendant\u2019s character and therefore is admissible at a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 68-69 (1984). In Stewart, the defendant objected to testimony that, while in jail awaiting trial, he kicked a jailer, called several police officers names, and smeared excrement on his cell wall. The defendant argued that \u201chis conduct in jail was an irrelevant matter and that the jury should not have considered it in determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.\u201d Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d at 68. The court rejected this argument, holding that \u201cthe evidence *** under consideration was properly admitted as reflecting on the character of the defendant.\u201d Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d at 69.\nLike the evidence in Stewart, the evidence of defendant\u2019s misconduct while in jail awaiting trial in this case reflected on defendant\u2019s character. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence at defendant\u2019s capital sentencing hearing.\nCAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING: CLOSING ARGUMENTS\nDefendant next argues that the State made several improper arguments during the closing of the second phase of defendant\u2019s capital sentencing hearing. Specifically, defendant argues that the State (1) misstated the burden of proof; (2) speculated that defendant was likely to kill in the future; (3) speculated as to what 13-year-old Melinda Marshel\u2019s life might have been like in the future; (4) unduly emphasized the way in which defendant disposed of the bodies; (5) asserted that \u201cMr. Nielson\u2019s life is irrelevant in this case\u201d; and (6) suggested that natural life in prison would diminish the value of the victims\u2019 lives.\nDefendant concedes that he has waived this issue. It is well-settled that, to preserve an issue for review, a defendant must both contemporaneously object and raise the issue in a post-sentencing motion. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 322 (1998). Defendant did not object to any of the arguments described above, nor did he challenge their propriety in his post-sentencing motion. Accordingly, we agree with defendant that he has waived review of this issue.\nDefendant nevertheless argues that we should consider this issue as plain error. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides that plain errors affecting substantial rights may be reviewed on appeal, though not objected to at trial and in a post-trial motion. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). This court has held that the plain error rule may be invoked in two limited circumstances. First, the plain error rule is proper where the evidence is closely balanced, so as to preclude the argument that an innocent person may have been wrongly convicted. People v. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363 (1996). Second, a reviewing court may invoke the plain error rule where the error is of such magnitude that there is a substantial risk that the accused was denied a fair and impartial trial, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d at 363. Relief under the second prong of the plain error rule is proper only if the error is so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process that the trial court could not have cured the error by sustaining an objection or instructing the jury to disregard the error. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d at 364.\nWe decline defendant\u2019s invitation to consider this issue under the plain error rule. As we frequently have noted, the prompt sustaining of an objection combined with a proper jury instruction usually is sufficient to cure any prejudice arising from an improper closing argument. See People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 298 (1994); People v. Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d 19, 30 (1979); see also People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 214-16 (1990) (commenting on the defendant\u2019s post-arrest silence and failure to testify was not plain error). Prejudice is even less likely where, as here, the trial court properly instructs the jury on the purpose of closing argument. See Childress, 158 Ill. 2d at 298.\nHere, defendant\u2019s plain error argument consists of a single sentence asking us to employ the plain error rule. The balance of his argument on this issue consists solely of explaining why the alleged arguments constitute error, not plain error. He neither argues that the evidence in this case was closely balanced nor explains why the trial court could not have cured the alleged errors by sustaining a timely objection and instructing the jury to disregard the error. Accordingly, we find the issue waived.\nJURY INSTRUCTIONS\nDefendant next argues that Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7C.05 (3d ed. 1992), is unconstitutionally vague and confusing. In support, defendant relies upon a passage from Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois\u2019 capital sentencing instructions are not unconstitutionally vague or confusing. Gacy, 994 F.2d at 314.\nFaced with arguments identical to the one defendant raises, this court repeatedly has held that Illinois\u2019 capital sentencing instructions are not unconstitutionally vague or confusing. See People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 467-70 (1998); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 55-57 (1996); People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 59 (1994). Significantly, we cited Gacy in each of these cases. See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 468; Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 57; Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 59. Defendant provides no persuasive reasons to reconsider these holdings, and we therefore reject his argument.\nEXTENDED-TERM SENTENCES\nDefendant next argues that he should not have received extended-term prison sentences for concealing the Marshels\u2019 deaths. We agree.\nA Class 3 felony, concealment of a homicidal death carries a prison term of two to five years. 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(a)(6) (West 1996). The trial court, however, imposed an extended term of 10 years\u2019 imprisonment for each of defendant\u2019s convictions, concluding that defendant\u2019s abuse and mutilation of the bodies demonstrated \u201cexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d See 730 ILCS 5/5\u20145\u20143.2(b)(2) (West 1996).\nWe agree with defendant that the concealment of a homicidal death cannot be exceptionally brutal or heinous and indicative of wanton cruelty. This court defines \u201cheinous\u201d behavior as behavior that is \u201c \u2018 \u201chatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad: enormously and flagrantly criminal.\u201d \u2019 \u201d People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 445 (1989), quoting People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 501 (1981), quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1050 (1971). \u201cBrutal\u201d behavior is behavior that is \u201c \u2018 \u201cgrossly ruthless, devoid of mercy or compassion: cruel and cold-blooded.\u201d\u2019\u201d Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 445, quoting La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 501, quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 286 (1971). Finally, \u201cwanton cruelty\u201d requires \u201cproof that the defendant consciously sought to inflict pain and suffering on the victim of the offense.\u201d People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189, 194 (1995).\nCertainly, the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant acted brutally and heinously when he burned the Marshels\u2019 bodies, stuffed them into a duffle bag, and sank them in a pond. Such behavior is undoubtedly hateful and evil, evincing a complete lack of compassion and mercy. However, to justify an extended-term sentence, defendant also must have demonstrated wanton cruelty, which, as we define it, cannot be perpetrated on a corpse. One simply cannot consciously seek to inflict pain and suffering on a dead body, as a dead body feels nothing.\nAccordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in imposing extended-term sentences for defendant\u2019s concealment convictions. Defendant\u2019s behavior was undoubtedly brutal and heinous, but it could not have evinced wanton cruelty as this court defines it. As the trial court clearly intended to impose the maximum sentence available, we modify the trial court\u2019s judgment and reduce the sentences for defendant\u2019s concealment convictions from 10 years\u2019 to 5 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence, allows the sentencer to weigh a vague aggravating factor, and fails to minimize sufficiently the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death sentences. This court has previously considered and rejected each of these claims. See People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 177-78 (1998); People v. Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d 444, 480-81 (1997); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 522-23 (1996); People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439-40 (1995). Defendant offers no compelling reason why this court should reconsider these decisions, and we therefore reject defendant\u2019s claims. See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 178.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court is affirmed as modified. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Tuesday, November 16, 1999, as the date on which the sentence of death, entered by the circuit court of Wayne County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119\u20145 (West 1996)). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.\nAffirmed as modified.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RATHJE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree that Nielson\u2019s convictions should not be disturbed and that we should reduce the sentences on his concealment convictions to five years\u2019 imprisonment. In my view, however, we should also set aside Nielson\u2019s death sentence. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), this state\u2019s present death penalty law does not meet the requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) or article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2). Because the law is unconstitutional, Nielson should be resentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9\u20141(j) (West 1996). Because he was found guilty of murdering more than one victim, the term of his imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996).", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Kevin C. Kakac, State\u2019s Attorney, of Fairfield (William L. Browers and Steven J. Zick, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 83127.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. NIELS NIELSON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed June 17, 1999.\nRehearing denied October 4, 1999.\nHARRISON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nCharles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Kevin C. Kakac, State\u2019s Attorney, of Fairfield (William L. Browers and Steven J. Zick, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0271-01", "first_page_order": 283, "last_page_order": 313 }