{ "id": 536098, "name": "FREEMAN UNITED COAL MINING COMPANY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Thomas Lefler, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1999-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 86438", "first_page": "243", "last_page": "252", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 243" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596434 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927643 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3585968 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/170/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473917 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5665368 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55978 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545084 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591947 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222760 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222746 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0385-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 611, "char_count": 15454, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9025284912173805e-07, "percentile": 0.7304671044528078 }, "sha256": "f61c70c43586a0a82d473f06533289968d306a91a5dc4bd251b3f061e6876aae", "simhash": "1:c4a7af8bf3004fff", "word_count": 2462 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:35:43.350195+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FREEMAN UNITED COAL MINING COMPANY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Thomas Lefler, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant, Thomas Lefler, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Occupational Diseases Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 172.36 et seq.) alleging that he had contracted an occupational disease, coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), arising out of and in the course of his employment with Freeman United Coal Mining Company (the employer). The arbitrator denied Lefler\u2019s claim, finding that Lefler had failed to prove that he had been exposed to coal dust, the hazard upon which his claim was based, or that coal dust exposure was causally related to the impairment he claimed.\nThe Industrial Commission affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, with one commissioner dissenting. On administrative review, the circuit court of Franklin County set aside the Commission\u2019s decision, holding that \u201cthe decision of the arbitrator was against the manifest evidence on the issue of exposure and disease.\u201d The court then remanded the cause to the Industrial Commission for reconsideration.\nOn remand, the Industrial Commission reversed the arbitrator\u2019s decision. It ruled that Lefler\u2019s condition was, in fact, causally related to an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment and that he was permanently totally disabled. Accordingly, the Commission ordered the employer to pay Lefler $261.57 per week for life and awarded him other relief.\nThe circuit court subsequently confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision. Over the dissent of two justices, the Industrial Commission Division of the appellate court reversed. No. 5 \u2014 97\u20140354WC (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In its order, as modified on denial of rehearing, the court held that the Commission\u2019s initial decision denying Lefler\u2019s claim based on the arbitrator\u2019s findings regarding lack of exposure and causation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and should not have been set aside. It therefore reversed the circuit court\u2019s judgment and reinstated the Commission\u2019s initial decision.\nThe two dissenting appellate court justices filed a statement that the case involves a substantial question which warrants consideration by our court. Lefler then petitioned us for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We granted review. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the appellate court for further proceedings.\nBefore a reviewing court may overturn a decision of the Industrial Commission, it must find that the award was contrary to law or that the Commission\u2019s factual determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fitts v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 172 Ill. 2d 303, 307 (1996). In this case, the Industrial Commission\u2019s initial decision denying Lefler\u2019s claim was contrary to law, as the circuit court correctly determined.\nAs we have indicated, the Industrial Commission based its original determination on the decision of the arbitrator, who held that Lefler had adduced no evidence regarding the duration, extent or frequency of his exposure to coal dust and had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was exposed to coal dust. Under the Workers\u2019 Occupational Diseases Act, however, Lefler was not required to present evidence regarding the amount, time and duration of his exposure to the hazards of an occupational disease. Section 1(d) of the Act expressly provides that an employee\n\u201cshall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when, for any length of time however short, he or she is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 172.36(d).\nThese conditions were satisfied here. There is no dispute that coal mining is an occupation in which the hazard of coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis is present. There is also no dispute that Lefler was employed as a coal miner. According to the record, Lefler worked as a coal miner for 33 years and was employed at a mine operated by Freeman United Coal Mining Company at the time he stopped working. Under these circumstances, the arbitrator should have taken Lefler\u2019s exposure to the hazard of coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis as having been conclusively established. Lefler was not obligated to present further evidence on the point, and it was not subject to challenge by the employer. See U.S. Industrial Chemical Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 143 Ill. App. 3d 881, 890-91 (1986).\nIn an effort to validate the arbitrator\u2019s decision, the employer argues that evidence as to the timing and extent of Lefler\u2019s exposure was properly considered because he was required to establish that he suffered medically significant exposure to coal dust on the final day of his employment. We disagree. The Act does specify that compensation is only payable where disablement \u201coccurs within two years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease,\u201d except in circumstances not relevant here. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 172.36(f). In addition, where the disability was caused by coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis, the law provides that the application for compensation must be filed with the Commission within five years after the employee was last exposed where no compensation has been paid, or within five years after the last payment of compensation where such payments have been made. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 172.41(c). Nothing in the Act, however, makes an employer\u2019s liability contingent on a claimant\u2019s ability to link his condition to exposure on the final day of his employment with that employer.\nClaimants such as Lefler are apt to have been exposed to the hazards of coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis over a prolonged period of time in a variety of work settings. Under the Act, they are not required to establish which exposure led to their disease. They are not even required to identify the employer for whom they were working when they sustained the exposure that produced their disease. The employer who is liable is simply the \u201cemployer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease claimed upon regardless of the length of time of such last exposure.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 172.36(d). There is no dispute that the employer in this case met that description. Freeman United Coal Mining Company was \u201cthe employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease claimed\u201d within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, whether Lefler was actually exposed to coal dust on his last day of work and whether that exposure, if any, was medically significant, are not determinative of the employer\u2019s liability.\nThermos Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 83 Ill. 2d 54 (1980), cited by the employer, does not mandate a contrary result. In that case it was necessary to determine \u201cthe date of the last exposure which caused the claimant\u2019s incapacity.\u201d Thermos Co., 83 Ill. 2d at 58. Such a determination, however, was not necessary in order to\u201e impose liability on the employer. It pertained to the wholly separate issues of when compensation should commence and which of the employer\u2019s multiple insurance carriers were required to pay that compensation. See H&H Plumbing Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 170 Ill. App. 3d 706, 719 (1988). Those matters are not in dispute here.\nBecause the Industrial Commission based its original determination on an arbitration decision that was incorrect as a matter of law, the circuit court properly reversed that decision and remanded the cause to the Commission for further consideration. There is no merit to the appellate court\u2019s view that the Commission\u2019s decision should have been sustained despite this error on the grounds that Lefler had failed to prove that his exposure was the proximate cause of his physical ailments. Although the Commission was initially willing to accept the arbitrator\u2019s conclusion that Lefler\u2019s physical condition was not causally related to his exposure to coal dust while working for the employer, it squarely rejected that conclusion in its subsequent decision based on the same evidence.\nTo accept the appellate court\u2019s position would require us to hold, in effect, that the Commission\u2019s initial factual determination is entitled to greater deference than the factual determination it made following remand from the circuit court. We know of no principle of logic or judicial review that would support such a result. Where the Commission has had the opportunity to review the evidence in a proceeding for a second time, it is the Commission\u2019s ultimate determination that should be accorded deference, not the determination it made initially.\nThat is particularly true in the case before us today. As we have noted, the Commission\u2019s initial decision was based on the legally erroneous determination that Lefler had not even been exposed to coal dust. Because the Commission believed that Lefler had not been exposed, it could never have found that Lefler\u2019s condition was caused by coal dust exposure. Without exposure, causation would be impossible, medically and as a matter of law. The Commission\u2019s erroneous finding as to exposure was therefore inextricably linked to its initial finding as to causation. As a result, once the Commission\u2019s original determination as to exposure was rejected, as the law required it to be, its finding as to causation could no longer stand.\nThe connection between the Commission\u2019s view on exposure and its original finding as to causation was confirmed by the subsequent proceedings in the case. Once the Commission applied the law correctly on remand and recognized that there had been exposure, it reversed its initial holding and found that Lefler\u2019s \u201cpresent condition of ill-being was causally connected to his exposure to coal dust while working for [the employer].\u201d That finding underlies the decision which gave rise to this appeal, and there is no basis for setting it aside.\nThe determination of causation is a question of fact for the Commission. Beattie v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 276 Ill. App. 3d 446, 449 (1995). The Commission\u2019s determination in this case was amply supported by the record. Where a miner suffering from pneumoconiosis was employed in one or more coal mines for 10 years or more, as Lefler was, there is a statutory presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of his employment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 172.36(d). Under the terms of the statute, the presumption is rebuttable. The employer in this case, however, failed to rebut the presumption. Although a physician who examined Lefler on behalf of the employer testified in his deposition that Lefler suffered from asthma and emphysema caused by smoking rather than from coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis caused by exposure to coal dust, two other physicians diagnosed Lefler as having coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis in addition to other lung conditions, including emphysema and bronchitis. Moreover, those doctors opined that while smoking was a factor in producing Lefler\u2019s other lung conditions, exposure to coal dust was responsible for those conditions as well. The appellate court was therefore wrong to reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment on the grounds that Lefler had failed to prove that his physical ailments were causally related to coal dust exposure.\nIn the appellate court, the employer argued, in the alternative, that even if the Commission was correct in finding exposure and causation following remand, the record failed to support its determination that Lefler was permanently and totally disabled. Because the appellate court agreed with the employer that Lefler had failed to properly establish coal dust exposure and causation, the court did not reach this argument. Now that we have found the appellate court\u2019s treatment of the exposure and causation issues to be incorrect, however, the Commission\u2019s finding as to Lefler\u2019s permanent and total disability is subject to review. Accordingly the matter is remanded to the appellate court for consideration of that issue. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 145 Ill. 2d 345, 352 (1991).\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER,\ndissenting:\nI do not agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the Industrial Commission\u2019s second decision in this case, on remand from the circuit court, is entitled to greater deference than its initial decision. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.\nIn this case, the circuit court reversed the Commission\u2019s initial decision, finding that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. On reconsideration of the same record \u2014 the parties did not present any additional evidence \u2014 the Commission then reached a different result. The majority concludes from this chronology that the Commission\u2019s later decision is entitled to greater deference because it represents the Commission\u2019s last word on the subject. I do not agree.\nReading the circuit court\u2019s initial order, the Commission understandably believed that it was to reach a different result on remand, and it did so. Accordingly, I do not agree with the majority that the Commission\u2019s later decision should command more deference than its original one. In my view, the Commission\u2019s first decision, which represents the Commission\u2019s original view of the evidence, is entitled to greater deference. In its first decision, the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator, who concluded that the claimant\u2019s respiratory condition was not caused by exposure to coal dust. The arbitrator\u2019s decision carefully reviewed the testimony of the three expert witnesses in the case, who disagreed on the question whether the claimant was suffering from coal worker\u2019s pneumoconiosis, but who all found the claimant\u2019s history of smoking to be significant.\nIt is within the province of the Commission to judge the credibility of witnesses, to draw reasonable inferences from their testimony, and to determine what weight the testimony is to be given. Parro v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 167 Ill. 2d 385, 396 (1995). Accordingly, the decision of the Industrial Commission on a question of fact will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Lee v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 167 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (1995); Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 143 Ill. 2d 542, 549 (1991); Orsini v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44 (1987). I do not believe that the Commission\u2019s first decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court, Industrial Commission division, which upheld the Commission\u2019s original decision in this case.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Bruce R. Wissore and Harold B. Gulley, Jr., of Gulley & Wissore, of Raleigh, for appellant.", "Kenneth F. Werts and Julie A. Webb, of Craig & Craig, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 86438.\nFREEMAN UNITED COAL MINING COMPANY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Thomas Lefler, Appellant).\nOpinion filed October 21, 1999.\nRehearing denied November 29, 1999.\nMILLER, J., dissenting.\nBruce R. Wissore and Harold B. Gulley, Jr., of Gulley & Wissore, of Raleigh, for appellant.\nKenneth F. Werts and Julie A. Webb, of Craig & Craig, of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0243-01", "first_page_order": 377, "last_page_order": 386 }