{ "id": 536169, "name": "In re GEORGE C. HOWARD, JR., Attorney, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "In re Howard", "decision_date": "1999-12-02", "docket_number": "No. 86982", "first_page": "423", "last_page": "444", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 423" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3161126 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557439 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5539065 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5314704 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455263 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465043 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "one year" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5449351 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "six months" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102299 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "one year" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5556971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193855 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778582 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" }, { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188447 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "428-29", "parenthetical": "disbarment destroys professional life, character and livelihood and must be imposed sparingly" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542454 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5258885 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/344/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2730443 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2733016 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2635780 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477863 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "focus of inquiry whether activity in question required legal knowledge and skill so as to apply legal principles and precedent" }, { "page": "524-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493936 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "restitution never excuses improper conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255019 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "913 P.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10324861 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nine-month delay after promising to return funds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/913/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Cal. Rptr. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "attorney delayed 10 months in returning client funds despite repeated requests" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "648 P.2d 942", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "attorney delayed 10 months in returning client funds despite repeated requests" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Cal. 3d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1950680 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "attorney delayed 10 months in returning client funds despite repeated requests" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/32/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.Y.S.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discharged attorney delayed 22 months in refunding unearned fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 A.D.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 5546313, 5546334 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discharged attorney delayed 22 months in refunding unearned fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/75/0676-02", "/ad2d/75/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 S.W.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9967717 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/731/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549935 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "409-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307251 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555145 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "Hearing Board findings entitled to deference by Review Board as well as this court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783178 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 10", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330519 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "993 F.2d 1419", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10518980 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/993/1419-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1318, "char_count": 35775, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1996478274779947e-07, "percentile": 0.5933239737142977 }, "sha256": "01030207048bb073ca30731472e3ecec9459880f9be3bb9cb91d3229bbfe4be0", "simhash": "1:522d83a1d76d6e7a", "word_count": 5717 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:35:43.350195+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re GEORGE C. HOWARD, JR., Attorney, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case arises from an action filed by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (Commission) against respondent, George C. Howard, Jr., pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(b) (166 Ill. 2d R. 753(b)). The five-count complaint charged respondent with making a misrepresentation concerning a past suspension in a petition to practice pro hoc vice in another jurisdiction; neglecting a criminal appeal; engaging in the practice of law while under a prior suspension by this court; and failing to promptly refund unearned fees. With regard to some of these alleged acts, the complaint also charged respondent with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. A panel of the Hearing Board found the charges proven, with the exception of the allegations of dishonesty, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. The Review Board adopted the factual findings of the Hearing Board, but reduced the recommended suspension to a period of three months. On leave of this court, the Administrator has filed exceptions (166 Ill. 2d R. 753(e)), contending that in reducing the recommended sanction, the Review Board erroneously downplayed the gravity of respondent\u2019s current misconduct and prior disciplinary record.\nBACKGROUND\nRespondent was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1962, and has practiced predominantly in the specialty of criminal defense. His disciplinary problems in this state began on December 12, 1984, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that he had neglected three criminal appeals and ordered his name stricken from its roll of practicing attorneys. Respondent was reinstated by the Seventh Circuit about five years later and permitted to resume practice effective January 1, 1990. In the meantime, in 1988, the Review Board issued a reprimand against respondent based upon his Seventh Circuit suspension and, in addition, his neglect of another criminal case. Then, on September 29, 1995, this court disciplined respondent for failing to communicate with clients; failing to refund unearned fees; converting funds; and neglecting two more criminal appeals. The behavior giving rise to the September 1995 discipline occurred between 1990 and late 1993. This court sanctioned respondent by suspending him from the practice of law for 24 months, but staying all of this period except the first five months, placing respondent on a period of probation subject to certain conditions. As a result, respondent was suspended from the practice of law from September 29, 1995, until February 28, 1996. In re George Howard, MR No. 11563 (September 29, 1995).\nOn June 11, 1997, the Administrator brought the complaint presently at issue. Count I charged respondent with knowingly failing to report his Seventh Circuit suspension in a petition to practice pro hac vice before the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. In proceedings before the Alaska court, Reshat Shabani had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He subsequently retained respondent to represent him in matters arising from the conviction. On June 5, 1991, respondent filed a verified petition to appear pro hac vice on Shabani\u2019s behalf in the Alaska court. In the petition, respondent averred that he had \u201cnot been suspended for misconduct or any other causes,\u201d failing to disclose his Seventh Circuit suspension of December 1984. Thus, count I charged respondent with making a false statement of fact to a tribunal, in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct; offering false evidence, in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(4); making a false statement in connection with an application for admission to the bar, in violation of Rule 8.1(a); engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4); and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(5), or conduct tending to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).\nIn count II, the Administrator alleged that respondent had neglected Shabani\u2019s case by failing to file an appellate brief and failing to return a $25,000 unearned fee Shabani had advanced to him for that case. Thus, count II charged respondent with failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, in violation of Rule 1.3; failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the client\u2019s interest, in violation of Rule 3.2; failing to promptly refund unearned fees on withdrawal from the case, in violation of Rule 1.16(e); and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(5) and Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).\nIn counts III through V, the Administrator alleged that during the period of respondent\u2019s suspension from September 29, 1995, to February 28, 1996, he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by accepting fees from and providing legal advice to three criminal defendants, Clarence Williams, Ralph Williams, and Raymond Olivarez. The complaint further alleged that throughout his consultations with each of these defendants, respondent failed to disclose that he was under suspension. Counts III through V accordingly charged respondent with practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction in violation of Rule 5.5(a); and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4), and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(5) and Supreme Court Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).\nHEARING BOARD PROCEEDINGS\nCounts I & II: The Shabani Case\nWith regard to the pro hoc vice petition, the Hearing Board found clear and convincing evidence that respondent had made a false statement in failing to disclose his suspension and that he had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. However, the Board found insufficient evidence that the misstatement was either knowing or intentional or that respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud or deceit.\nRespondent admitted that at the time he executed the pro hac vice petition, he was cognizant of his recent suspension and that the Alaska court required its disclosure. However, the petition was prepared by his local counsel and presented to him along with other documents for signature. Respondent testified that, in the haste of reviewing and signing documents, he had neglected to read the petition, but that if someone had called the misstatement to his attention, he would have acknowledged the suspension. The Board considered it mitigating that the misstatement involved a prior suspension rather than a present one, as, at the time respondent filed the petition, he had been reinstated in the Seventh Circuit for 18 months. The Board also accepted respondent\u2019s testimony that, in any event, the suspension would not have hindered his admission to appear before the Alaska court: the suspension barred his practice only within the Seventh Circuit, and, at the time he signed the pro hac vice petition, he was a member in good standing of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompassed the district court of Alaska. Further, according to respondent, he had been admitted to practice in the Ninth Circuit subsequent to his suspension from the Seventh Circuit, and also had appeared pro hac vice before the district court of Alaska on other matters several times between the years of 1971 and 1991.\nAs to count II, the Board found clear and convincing evidence that respondent had neglected Shabani\u2019s appeal and failed to promptly return unearned fees upon his withdrawal from Shabani\u2019s case. When Shabani retained respondent in May of 1991, Shabani\u2019s brother, Nick, advanced respondent a $25,000 retainer on Shabani\u2019s behalf. Respondent initially pursued post-trial relief in Shabani\u2019s case, and when that proved unsuccessful, filed an appeal before the Ninth Circuit. However, he then failed to file an opening brief by the September 16, 1991, due date. On February 11, 1992, the Ninth Circuit issued an order to show cause why respondent should not be sanctioned for his failure to file the brief and mandating that the brief be filed within 11 days in order to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Replying to the order, respondent explained that he had been \u201cconstantly on trial\u201d since filing the appeal and had delegated responsibility for all of his appeals to \u201cother personnel\u201d in his office. Respondent stated that he had not learned until February 10, 1992, that the brief was never filed. Attorney Elreta Dickinson testified that respondent had given her responsibility for his appeals during this time period, but could not recall specifically being delegated the Shabani case. Dickinson testified that respondent was upset when he learned the brief had not been done and that he temporarily ceased assigning her appeals as a result of this occurrence. At the end of February or early March 1992, respondent withdrew from Shabani\u2019s appeal, and Alan M. Caplan was substituted as Shabani\u2019s counsel. Caplan completed Shabani\u2019s appeal, securing a reversal of his conviction by the Ninth Circuit (United States v. Shabani, 993 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1993)), although the conviction was later reinstated by the United States Supreme Court (United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 130 L. Ed. 2d 225, 115 S. Ct. 382 (1994)).\nIn February 1992, when he was substituted as counsel in Shabani\u2019s case, Caplan wrote a letter to respondent requesting a return of the $25,000 retainer. When the refund was not forthcoming, Caplan sent three more demand letters to respondent on March 19, 1992, April 15, 1992, and June 2, 1992, on behalf of Nick and Reshat Shabani, again to no avail. Over one year later on October 1, 1993, respondent entered into a written agreement with Nick under which respondent promised to repay $20,000 of the funds. The agreement stated that Nick had advanced $25,000 to respondent to represent his brother \u201cin certain post-trial proceedings.\u201d The agreement noted that with regard to the post-trial matters, respondent had made two trips to Alaska, but had then failed to prepare an appellate brief. Accordingly, respondent promised to return $20,000 of the original amount, with $5,000 due at execution of the agreement, and the $15,000 balance by December 1, 1993. The Hearing Board observed that as of the November 20, 1997, hearing before it, $5,000 was still unpaid.\nCounts III through V: Practicing Law While Under Suspension\nThe Hearing Board concluded that respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law under Rule 5.5(a), and committed acts prejudicial to the administration of justice under Rule 8.4(a)(5) and Supreme Court Rule 771, by giving legal advice for consideration to Clarence Williams, Ralph Williams, and Raymond Olivarez, while under suspension by this court. However, the Board disbelieved testimony on behalf of the three defendants that respondent had never informed them that he was under suspension. Accordingly, the Board found insufficient proof to support the charge that respondent had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation with regard to the three defendants.\nThe Board consolidated its findings on counts III, IV and V noting that there was similar proof as to each charge. The Board first concluded that, by respondent\u2019s own admission, he had consulted with each of the three defendants while under suspension and engaged in \u201cdiscussions which required legal knowledge and skill.\u201d Respondent had also accepted legal fees from these individuals and deposited them into his personal account. However, the Board also recognized respondent\u2019s position that he had consulted with these individuals out of a sense of responsibility to his firm and a need to ensure that matters were handled correctly during his suspension. Thus, the Board concluded that, \u201c[wjhether intentionally or not,\u201d respondent engaged in the practice of law during his suspension.\nAt the hearing, Clarence Williams testified that he contacted respondent in late November 1995. Respondent met briefly with him at the Cook County jail, took notes about his case, and told him that he would be filing a motion to suppress in his case, based upon an unlawful police search. Respondent also took a retainer fee on Clarence\u2019s behalf and promised to appear at a December 19, 1995, court date. Although respondent eventually refunded the fee, he neither filed the motion nor appeared at the December hearing. Clarence retained a public defender and pied guilty to the charge against him, receiving a six-year sentence.\nRalph Williams was taken into custody in December 1995 on charges of robbery and armed robbery. His mother, Dorothy, contacted respondent on Ralph\u2019s behalf, and respondent agreed to \u201ctake care of\u2019 the matter, accepting a retainer fee from Dorothy. Ralph testified that respondent met with him in jail in January or early February 1996 and discussed the charges against him. Following his suspension, respondent represented Ralph to the conclusion of his case.\nOn November 3, 1995, Raymond Olivarez pied guilty to conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and received a sentence of 70 months in prison. Olivarez\u2019s daughter, Rachel Fernandez, testified that she called respondent\u2019s office in January 1996 and spoke to respondent, who scheduled a meeting with her in his office the following Saturday. At the meeting, Fernandez presented respondent with pertinent court documents. According to Fernandez, respondent consulted some \u201cbig law books,\u201d and advised her that her father had been sentenced in too high a range and that his sentence could be reduced. He requested a retainer, which Fernandez paid the following Monday. On February 2, 1996, respondent told Fernandez he was planning to \u201cfile a motion.\u201d\nBefore the Board, respondent admitted providing legal advice to the three defendants, but argued, \u201c[A]t no time *** did I appear in any court, did I file any motion in any court, *** take any deposition ***.\u201d Respondent also provided evidence that he and his office staff had informed each of the three defendants that he was suspended and that he could not give legal advice or appear in court during this period; nonetheless, the defendants demanded his services. The Hearing Board accepted respondent\u2019s position on this point, and reasoned that, because of the relative brevity of his suspension, his reputation, and the fact that he had others in his office handling most of his cases, the three defendants likely elected to hire him despite the suspension.\nRecommendation\nThe Administrator asserted that in light of respondent\u2019s behavior and prior discipline, disbarment was warranted. Respondent offered no alternative sanction. In mitigation, the Hearing Board recognized respondent\u2019s life of service to others, as evidenced by the accolades, awards and letters of appreciation he received. Respondent volunteered in his community, his church, and various social organizations, and had provided pro bona representation to his church for 20 years, as well as to many individuals. He had also lectured free of charge at local law schools. The Board also emphasized that, in contrast to other cases before it in which disbarment was recommended, the conduct at issue involved no dishonest motive or moral turpitude. In aggravation, the Board noted the \u201cseriously aggravating impact\u201d of respondent\u2019s prior discipline by the Seventh Circuit, the Review Board, and this court, the fact that he had never repaid $5,000 of the unearned retainer advanced by Shabani, and the seriousness of his unauthorized practice of law. The Board recommended a two-year suspension.\nDETERMINATION OF THE REVIEW BOARD\nIn reducing respondent\u2019s recommended sanction, the Review Board noted that, inter alla, by the time this case was being briefed before it, respondent had made full restitution of Shabani\u2019s fee advance. The Review Board further observed that respondent\u2019s behavior, both in this case and his prior disciplinary cases, involved no dishonesty; that his failure to promptly return Shabani\u2019s funds was attributable to respondent\u2019s cash flow problems; and that the Hearing Board had failed to find that respondent\u2019s practice of law, though unauthorized, was intentional. Thus, in light of the significant evidence in mitigation, the Review Board recommended that respondent be subjected to three months\u2019 suspension.\nANALYSIS\nThe sole issue in this case concerns the appropriate sanction to impose upon respondent. The Administrator argues that, in reducing the recommended sanction from two years\u2019 to three months\u2019 suspension, the Review Board erroneously downplayed several incidences of serious misconduct proven to have occurred in this case. She further asserts that in light of significant history of prior discipline, disbarment is the more appropriate sanction. At the very least, the Administrator urges, we should adopt the suspension recommended by the Hearing Board.\nAlthough, in arriving at a sanction, this court affords deference to the recommendations of the Hearing and Review Boards, such recommendations are merely advisory, and the ultimate responsibility for imposing discipline rests with this court. In re Chandler, 161 Ill. 2d 459, 472-73 (1994). We approach our analysis with the recognition that, in any disciplinary proceeding, our goal is not to punish the attorney but rather to protect the public from incompetent or unscrupulous attorneys, to maintain the integrity of the profession, and to protect the administration of justice from reproach. In re Bell, 147 Ill. 2d 15 (1992).\nThe Shabani Case\nThe Administrator first argues that, in reducing respondent\u2019s recommended sanction, the Review Board incorrectly downplayed the fact that respondent made an affirmative misstatement in his pro hoc vice petition. According to the Administrator, the Review Board focused upon the finding that the misstatement was the result of a mistake, and ignored the Hearing Board\u2019s admonishment that respondent nonetheless had a duty to find and correct the error. Further, in failing to apprise the Alaska court of his suspension, respondent essentially deprived that court of information highly relevant to its decision to deny or possibly restrict his admission.\nWe find no evidence that the Review Board unduly downplayed this aspect of respondent\u2019s misconduct. Giving appropriate deference to the Hearing Board\u2019s credibility findings (see, e.g., In re Holz, 125 Ill. 2d 546, 557 (1988) (Hearing Board findings entitled to deference by Review Board as well as this court)), the Review Board noted respondent\u2019s testimony that, had he noticed the inaccuracy in the petition, he would have corrected it to reflect the suspension. The Review Board also considered evidence that disclosure of the prior suspension probably would not have adversely affected respondent\u2019s Alaska petition: it was confined only to the Seventh Circuit\u2019s jurisdiction, and at the time of the petition, respondent was already a member in good standing of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompassed the Alaska district court. Further, he had practiced before the Alaska federal court on other occasions since the suspension without repercussions.\nNext, the Administrator maintains that the Review Board improperly considered as a mitigating circumstance the fact that respondent eventually completed making restitution of Shabani\u2019s $25,000 fee advance. The Administrator argues that the Review Board completely disregarded respondent\u2019s initial refusal to return the funds despite Shabani\u2019s repeated demands, and the fact that the full refund did not occur until this case was being briefed before the Review Board in late 1997 or early 1998.\nRule 1.16(e) states that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged from a case must promptly refund any portion of a fee advance that has not been earned. 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.16(e). The failure to promptly return client funds will be subject to discipline. See In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269 (1995); In re Fox, 122 Ill. 2d 402, 410 (1988); In re Dorsey, 731 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1987); ABA Lawyer\u2019s Manual on Professional Conduct 45:1202 (1997) (citing cases). Although there is scant guidance as to what time period is deemed \u201cprompt\u201d under the rules, it is readily apparent that a delay measured in years will fail the promptness test. ABA/BNA Lawyer\u2019s Manual on Professional Conduct 45:1103-04 (1997), citing, among other authorities, In re Jennings, 75 A.D.2d 676, 426 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1980) (discharged attorney delayed 22 months in refunding unearned fees). Delays of a shorter period also may be subject to disciplinary sanctions, especially when the lawyer has displayed indifference to repeated demands by the client for return of the funds. Doyle v. State Bar, 32 Cal. 3d 12, 648 P.2d 942, 184 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982) (attorney delayed 10 months in returning client funds despite repeated requests); People v. Coyne, 913 P.2d 12 (Colo. 1996) (nine-month delay after promising to return funds).\nWe agree that the Review Board failed to properly consider respondent\u2019s clear violation of Rule 1.16(e). Respondent withdrew from Shabani\u2019s case in late February of 1992. Thereafter, he failed to respond to four letters from Shabani\u2019s new counsel demanding return of the $25,000 advance. It was not until October of 1993, over 18 months after he withdrew from the case, that respondent entered into a written agreement with Shabani admitting that he owed $20,000, and promising to pay $5,000 at execution of the agreement and the remaining $15,000 by December 1, 1993. Even then, however, respondent disregarded his promise, and did not refund $5,000 until late 1997 or early 1998, when this case was being briefed before the Review Board.\nIn its discussion of mitigating factors, the Review Board pointed out that respondent had completed full restitution to the Shabanis, and that his failure to more promptly deliver the funds was \u201ccaused by cash flow problems related to the number of repayments owed\u201d rather than any corrupt motive. Making full restitution has been considered a proper mitigating circumstance. In re Rotman, 136 Ill. 2d 401, 422 (1990); but see In re Feldman, 89 Ill. 2d 7, 13 (1982) (restitution never excuses improper conduct). However, this is not so where the client\u2019s repeated demands for repayment have gone unheeded for 18 months, and funds are forthcoming only after the client is forced to resort to proceedings before the attorney disciplinary system. Rotman, 136 Ill. 2d at 422-23; Fox, 122 Ill. 2d at 410. Although Rotman was a case involving the conversion of client funds, we find its logic equally applicable to the withholding of unearned fees. Further, we fail to view respondent\u2019s \u201ccash flow problems\u201d as a justification for his failure to even reply to Shabani\u2019s requests for his money, or, after finally executing an agreement, to reasonably honor his promise to pay.\nPractice of Law\nThe Administrator next argues that the Review Board understated the seriousness of respondent\u2019s conduct in practicing law during his suspension. In particular, the Administrator claims, the Review Board erroneously considered as \u201csubstantially mitigating\u201d the fact that the Hearing Board stopped short of finding that respondent had \u201cintentionally\u201d practiced law.\nDetermining what conduct constitutes \u201cpracticing law\u201d defies mechanistic formulation. In re Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d 515, 523 (1994); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 256 (1950). However, as we have consistently held, the practice of law encompasses not only court appearances, but also services rendered out of court (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 414 (1961)), and includes the giving of any advice or rendering of any service requiring the use of legal knowledge (In re Bodkin, 21 Ill. 2d 458, 461 (1961); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 475-76 (1931); see also Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d at 523 (focus of inquiry whether activity in question required legal knowledge and skill so as to apply legal principles and precedent)).\nIt is clear that respondent engaged in the type of conduct unequivocally precluded under our cases. He met with three clients, accepted fee advances from them and deposited these advances into his personal account. Then, after obtaining pertinent information from them, he exercised professional judgment with regard to their cases and advised them accordingly. Respondent considered Clarence Williams\u2019 case and told him that a motion to suppress was necessary and would be filed. He met with Ralph Williams in jail and, after taking notes of the meeting, advised him concerning future action in his case. Finally, he consulted with Rachel Fernandez, and, after examining what she believed were legal references, apprised her that he would seek a reduction in her father\u2019s prison sentence. These functions required the employment of legal discretion, knowledge and skill.\nWith this in mind, there can be no doubt that respondent \u201cintentionally\u201d practiced law. It is suggested by both the Review Board and respondent, however, that respondent is due a \u201clesser sanction,\u201d owing to the following language by the Hearing Board:\n\u201cThe evidence was clear and convincing that in connection with each of the three criminal defendants, Respondent provided legal advice and accepted a fee for legal services. Whether intentionally or not, Respondent engaged in the practice of law during his suspension and thereby violated Rules 5.5(a) and 8.4(a)(5) of the *** Rules *** and Supreme Court Rule 771.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe do not believe that this language was intended as a \u201cfinding\u201d of diminished culpability with regard to respondent\u2019s actions in this case. To the extent it was, it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. If the testimony of the three clients was not enough, respondent admitted in his own testimony that he gave legal advice to these individuals knowing that it was disallowed under the Rules. There can be no clearer proof of intent. As this court has previously stated, \u201c[a] common maxim holds that ignorance of the law is no excuse, and this is particularly true in a case where the person who claims lack of knowledge of a relevant directive is a practicing attorney.\u201d In re Cheronis, 114 Ill. 2d 527, 535 (1986).\nRespondent further urges that while his conduct may have gone \u201cover the line,\u201d he was merely attempting to keep his practice afloat during his relatively brief suspension. He argues that the three defendants at issue compelled his immediate attention, and that he was not subject to the strictures of our Rule 764 (134 Ill. 2d R. 764).\nWe recognize that, under certain circumstances, it remains unclear what tasks may be undertaken by attorneys who are suspended yet not subject to Rule 764. Indeed, the imposition of a brief suspension does not mandate that the attorney give up on his or her future livelihood. However, in this case, there should never have been a question that respondent\u2019s conduct exceeded permissible boundaries. Our precedent has universally condemned the unauthorized giving of legal advice for consideration; this maxim has never been subject to exception or qualification. It is the character of the respondent\u2019s activity that determines whether the practice of law has occurred, and it does not matter whether considerations of business expediency would be better served by a different rule. Discipio, 163 Ill. 2d at 524-25; In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d 417, 427 (1987). Thus, we find respondent\u2019s argument unavailing.\nWe now turn to the question of a proper sanction. The Administrator argues that respondent\u2019s conduct in this case, coupled with his significant history of prior misconduct, demands a sanction far in excess of the three months advocated by the Review Board. We agree.\nIn order to ensure predictability and fairness, this court strives to impose sanctions consistent with those imposed in other cases involving comparable misconduct (In re Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d 178, 197 (1993); In re Weinberg, 119 Ill. 2d 309, 314 (1988)); nonetheless, we also recognize that each case is unique and must be resolved in light of its own facts and circumstances (Timpone, 157 Ill. 2d at 197).\nAs recognized by the Review Board, research fails to uncover a case directly analogous to this one. However, it is well established that culpable neglect of a client\u2019s affairs is grounds for discipline (see, e.g., In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509, 531 (1989); Fox, 122 Ill. 2d 402), and, in situations of repeated neglect, a lengthy suspension, even without a finding of moral turpitude (Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269 (17 months\u2019 suspension with 12 months stayed); Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d 509 (one-year suspension for chronic neglect, misrepresentations and prejudice to clients); In re Johnson, 93 Ill. 2d 441 (1982) (one year); In re Levinson, 71 Ill. 2d 486 (1978) (six months); In re Taylor, 66 Ill. 2d 567 (1977) (one year)). Further, neglect of criminal cases warrants a more severe sanction because in such matters a client\u2019s very liberty is at stake. Bell, 147 Ill. 2d at 39; Fox, 122 Ill. 2d at 409-10.\nIn the Shabani case, respondent filed an appeal and then essentially abandoned the matter by failing to file a brief, nearly costing Shabani his right to appeal. We are unmoved by respondent\u2019s assertions that the appeal was subsequently completed by a new attorney; this is not a mitigating factor. See Smith, 168 Ill. 2d at 284-85. Further, we note that respondent\u2019s prior discipline by the Seventh Circuit, the Review Board, and this court involved a similar brand of behavior: as indicated previously, this court disciplined respondent for failing to communicate with clients; failing to refund unearned fees; converting funds; and neglecting two criminal matters. Since 1984, respondent has been found to have neglected at least seven matters entrusted to him, which amounts to a serious pattern of neglect. This conduct, combined with respondent\u2019s practice of law in the face of suspension, displays an utter lack of regard for the disciplinary system and the rule of this court, as well as a tenuous concern for the welfare of each of his clients.\nNonetheless, we find disbarment unwarranted under the circumstances of this case. See Yamaguchi, 118 Ill. 2d at 428-29 (disbarment destroys professional life, character and livelihood and must be imposed sparingly). We have repeatedly stated that where corrupt motives and moral turpitude are not clearly shown, the proper punishment is suspension rather than disbarment. In re Chapman, 69 Ill. 2d 494 (1978); In re Veach, 1 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74 (1953); see also In re Hogan, 112 Ill. 2d 20, 25 (1986). Further, we find it significant that the neglectful acts underlying respondent\u2019s prior discipline by this court all transpired between the period of 1990 and 1993, the same time as the mishandling of Shabani\u2019s 1991 appeal. Despite a busy criminal practice, respondent has provided years of dedicated service to the community, to his church, and to a segment of the population that is often overlooked. He cooperated with the disciplinary process and expressed remorse. In re Uhler, 126 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1989).\nHowever, as respondent\u2019s prior suspension amounted to only five months, we reject the three months\u2019 suspension suggested by the Review Board here. His present sanction should be sufficiently meaningful to \u201cimpress upon [him] the shortcomings in the manner he has conducted his practice, and to allow him to take additional steps to insure that such events will not occur again.\u201d In re Levin, 101 Ill. 2d 535, 542 (1984). For the reasons stated, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years.\nRespondent suspended.\nUnless otherwise indicated, all further references to \u201cRules\u201d refer to the Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d R.1.1 et seq.).\nRule 764(b) requires a disciplined attorney to cease to maintain a presence in his law office and \u201ccause the removal of any indicia of the disciplined attorney as lawyer, counsellor at law, legal assistant, legal clerk, or similar title.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 764(b). By its express language, however, the rule applies to attorneys suspended for more than six months\u2019 duration.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER,\ndissenting:\nI do not agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that a two-year suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case. In my view, the respondent should be disbarred.\nRegarding the misconduct involved in this proceeding, the record reveals that the respondent, during a prior suspension imposed by this court, met with clients, accepted money from them, and offered them legal advice. Separately, the respondent made a false statement on a petition seeking admission pro hac vice in a criminal matter before a federal court in Alaska, later neglected the defendant\u2019s appeal in that case, and refused to return the defendant\u2019s fee.\nThe respondent\u2019s history of misconduct includes the suspension previously imposed by this court, which arose from the respondent\u2019s neglect of two clients\u2019 claims, his failure to promptly refund client fees, and his conversion of client funds. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suspended the respondent from practicing before that court for his neglect of criminal appeals. The respondent also received a reprimand from the Review Board based on the federal court suspension and his neglect of another criminal case.\nThe respondent\u2019s record of misconduct in this case and in prior matters warrants a more severe sanction than the two-year suspension imposed by the majority. Because of the respondent\u2019s history of sanctions and misconduct, I believe that disbarment is appropriate here.\nJUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER," }, { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON,\nalso dissenting:\nMr. Howard\u2019s prior conduct has shown what a suspension will mean to him. Nothing. The last time we told him to stop practicing law he did it anyway. He was unable to comply with our mandate for even five months. In direct contravention of our orders, he met with clients in his office and in jail, took money from them and dispensed legal advice.\nWe had hoped that a suspension would teach Mr. Howard that he should promptly return unearned fees. It did not. We had hoped that a suspension would impress upon him the importance of not neglecting criminal matters. It did not. Mr. Howard has persisted in the very sorts of behavior that resulted in his discipline before. How, then, can we have any expectation that he will comport himself properly now?\nAlthough I am mindful of the positive aspects of Mr. Howard\u2019s contributions to the profession, it is apparent to me that another suspension will do no good. Mr. Howard is what he is, and he has made very clear through his actions that he is not receptive to our efforts to help him reform. For the foregoing reasons, I would accept the Administrator\u2019s recommendation and vote to have Mr. Howard disbarred.\nJUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven R. Splitt, of Chicago, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.", "George B. Collins and Theresa M. Gronkiewicz, of Collins & Bargione, of Chicago, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 86982.\nIn re GEORGE C. HOWARD, JR., Attorney, Respondent.\nOpinion filed December 2, 1999.\nMILLER and HARRISON, JJ., joined by HEIPLE, J., dissenting.\nSteven R. Splitt, of Chicago, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.\nGeorge B. Collins and Theresa M. Gronkiewicz, of Collins & Bargione, of Chicago, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0423-01", "first_page_order": 557, "last_page_order": 578 }