{ "id": 1224818, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MURRAY BLUE, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Blue", "decision_date": "2000-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 84046", "first_page": "99", "last_page": "142", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139376 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 1028", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 812", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5274450 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818", "parenthetical": "State should not editorialize when stating an objection" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/0812-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5151596 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/9/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2520103 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959427 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386268 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 981", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5219731 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0981-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5785655 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2980842 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394202 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3511619 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "982-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0978-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897570 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984278 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5600044 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861206 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90-92", "parenthetical": "error for prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning victim's children and to argue that victim was as beloved as any celebrity in the country" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123281 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322-23", "parenthetical": "the State's urging to the jury to \" 'tell the [victim's family] what you decided' \" was \"improper, inexcusable and unprofessional\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "605-06", "parenthetical": "argument concerning decedent's wife and small children partially deprived defendant of a fair trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542942 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78" }, { "page": "277" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5069519 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "page": "648-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106373 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188484 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122027 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J." }, { "page": "522-23", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "waiver doctrine is a limitation on the parties, not the court" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131032 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777552 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40-41" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 Ill. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2509352 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/390/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 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MURRAY BLUE, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis matter comes before the court on the direct appeal of the jury conviction of defendant, Murray Blue, of one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1992)); three counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4, 9 \u2014 1 (West 1992)); two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 4.2(a)(1) (West 1992)); and two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1992)). Defendant elected to have the same jury deliberate his subsequent capital sentencing hearing. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(d) (West 1992). The jury determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b), (d) (West 1998). The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and sentenced defendant to death.\nDefendant appealed his convictions and sentence directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. On appeal, defendant contends that errors occurring at the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial entitle defendant to a new trial or, in the alternative, to a new sentencing hearing.\nThis court holds that cumulative errors occurring at trial deprived defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. U.S. Const., amend. XIV \u00a7 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2. We reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment on defendant\u2019s convictions, vacate the sentence entered on the judgment, and remand for a new trial.\nBACKGROUND\nThe trial of defendant Murray Blue encompassed multiple crimes. The State alleged that, on the afternoon of March 8, 1995, defendant was involved in two separate shooting incidents. Testimony of several witnesses and physical evidence admitted at the guilt phase of defendant\u2019s trial revealed the following course of events.\nA. The Victor Young Shooting\nVictor Young testified that, from 1990 until 1991 or 1992, he sold cocaine and heroin for defendant at the corner of Maypole and Kildare Streets in Chicago. Defendant controlled drug sales at Maypole and Kildare. At the beginning of each day, defendant would give Young two guns to carry with him. Defendant would collect the guns at the end of the day. At the time, both Young and defendant were members of the Gangster Disciples street gang. Young identified other individuals that sold drugs for defendant as Clyde Cowley and Jimmy Parker.\nYoung stopped selling drugs for defendant when Young joined the Conservative Vice Lords, a rival street gang. In March 1995, Young was selling drugs for the Conservative Vice Lords at the corner of Karlov and Maypole Streets.\nOn March 8, 1995, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Young and his friends Jermaine White and Lawrence Walker were walking on Maypole Street, between Kildare and Keeler. As they passed 4245 W. Maypole Street, defendant yelled at Young from the first-floor window of an apartment building. Defendant accused Young of talking to the police about defendant. Young denied it and told defendant that defendant was not going to harm Young. Young turned to walk away and defendant called after him. When Young turned back toward defendant, he saw that defendant was holding a \u201cTEC-9\u201d semiautomatic gun. Young started to run away from the apartment building and defendant began shooting at him. Young estimated that defendant fired 12 to 20 shots. Young was hit in the hip or buttocks and fell to the ground.\nLawrence Walker, who was standing next to Young at the time the shooting began, testified that he heard defendant fire at least 15 shots. Walker continued to run from the scene when the shooting started.\nFrom the ground, Young looked behind him and saw defendant run out of the apartment building, accompanied by Clyde Cowley and Jimmy Parker. Parker was also holding a weapon and, at defendant\u2019s direction, shot at Young as well. Young then heard defendant say, \u201cLet\u2019s get out of here. It\u2019s getting too hot.\u201d\nYoung saw defendant, Cowley and Parker run through a vacant lot. A few minutes later, Young observed a black Lincoln Continental automobile drive north on Kildare Street at 40 miles per hour. Young could not see inside the car, but he knew that the car belonged to defendant.\nB. The Shooting of Daniel Doffyn, Milan B\u00fabalo, Murray Blue and Clyde Cowley\nOn the same day that the shooting of Young took place, March 8, 1995, Geneva Walker was living in an apartment in a building located at 754 N. Lorel Avenue in Chicago. The apartment building also contains the address of 750 N. Lorel, and is located approximately 17 blocks from the 4200 block of West Maypole. At 3:15 p.m., Walker heard the sound of glass breaking. Looking outside her window, she saw a man sitting on the window ledge of another first-floor apartment. She observed the man removing broken glass and dropping it on the ground. She called 911 and reported what she saw.\nThe 15th District station of the Chicago police department is directly across the street from 750 N. Lorel. Several police officers responded to the call of a burglary in progress at the apartment building. Officer Elois Jackson testified that she was in the warrant office at the 15th District station when she heard the report over her police radio of a burglary in progress. Jackson told the dispatcher she could respond to the call and walked across the street to 750 N. Lorel.\nAs she approached the building, Jackson saw Officers Milan B\u00fabalo and Daniel Doffyn walking to the front of the building. Jackson entered a gangway at the south side of the building, leading toward its rear. As she reached the far end of the gangway, she was approached by two black males. One carried a TEC-9 gun, with his hands extended in front of him. The other male appeared to be unarmed. Jackson keyed in her radio that she had an emergency, pointed her gun at the men, and yelled at them to get on the ground.\nThe man with no gun, later identified as Parker, raised his hands in the air, but did not immediately go to the ground. The other male turned \u00bfnd started to run away. Eventually, Parker followed Jackson\u2019s command to get to the ground. As he did so, Jackson heard the sound of gunfire. Jackson remained behind the wall of the gangway, with her gun trained on Parker, until other officers arrived.\nOfficers Milan B\u00fabalo and Daniel Doffyn were in the parking lot of the 15th District station when they learned of the suspected burglary at 750 N. Lorel. Doffyn and B\u00fabalo went across the street together to investigate the reported burglary. The officers saw broken glass on the ground from a window next to the entrance to 750 N. Lorel. B\u00fabalo testified that, followed by Doffyn, he went inside the building. B\u00fabalo knocked on the front door of the apartment with the broken window. B\u00fabalo could hear the sound of several feet running to the back of the apartment and the sound of breaking glass.\nDoffyn ran down the steps from the first-floor landing and out the building. B\u00fabalo followed Doffyn as Doffyn ran from the front of the building to the rear, through a gangway at the north side of the building. When B\u00fabalo entered the gangway, Doffyn was already rounding the far corner of the gangway, into the back yard of the building. According to B\u00fabalo, Doffyn never drew his service weapon at any time.\nWhen B\u00fabalo reached the backyard of the building, he saw Doffyn struggling with a black male. Doffyn had the individual, whom B\u00fabalo identified in court as Clyde Cowley, in a \u201cbear hug\u201d and Cowley was trying to break free. Almost immediately, B\u00fabalo heard the sound of several gunshots fired in quick succession. Both Doffyn and Cowley fell to the ground, with Doffyn lying facedown on top of Cowley.\nBubalo\u2019s testimony continued as follows: just as Doffyn and Cowley dropped, B\u00fabalo felt himself get shot in his left hip. As he fell to the ground from his own wound, B\u00fabalo saw defendant running toward him, from \u201caround the corner.\u201d Defendant was firing a gun at B\u00fabalo and B\u00fabalo returned fire. The officer fired until he fell on two knees and one hand. B\u00fabalo fired a total of five shots; one struck defendant in the back of the head as defendant ran past B\u00fabalo. This shot caused defendant to fall face forward to the ground, slightly behind B\u00fabalo.\nAfter defendant fell, B\u00fabalo radioed for help, disarmed defendant, and crawled to the aid of Doffyn and Cowley. As B\u00fabalo was attempting to reach Doffyn, Officer Robert Podkowa ran past B\u00fabalo to help Doffyn.\nAfter telling Podkowa what happened, B\u00fabalo lay back on the ground. The wound in his hip prevented him from walking. B\u00fabalo underwent surgery the next day for a total replacement of his left hip.\nSeveral officers arrived on the scene immediately after the shooting. Officer Podkowa testified that he ran to the rear of the building from the police station after hearing the sound of gunfire. He found B\u00fabalo on one knee, and saw three other bodies on the ground. After learning what had happened from B\u00fabalo, Podkowa went directly to Doffyn because Doffyn appeared to be the \u201cworst hit.\u201d There was a lot of blood near where Doffyn lay.\nDoffyn was lying on top of Cowley. Podkowa pulled Cowley out from beneath Doffyn. Because Cowley was moving, he searched Cowley to make sure Cowley had nothing in his hands. Podkowa found a loaded, .38-caliber revolver in Cowley\u2019s right pants\u2019 pocket.\nA Chicago police department detective searched defendant inside the ambulance that took defendant from 750 N. Lorel to the hospital. The detective found a nine-millimeter pistol in defendant\u2019s right front pants\u2019 pocket and a box of nine-millimeter bullets in his other pocket.\nFrom the crime scene, police recovered a TEC-9 gun, a Taurus model revolver and spent cartridges. They also found a black Lincoln automobile parked \u201ca couple of doors\u201d south of 750 N. Lorel.\nPolice officers searched the first-floor apartment with the broken front window. They discovered that the window of the rear door to the apartment had also been broken. In the living room, officers found several bags of marijuana on a table, and a jacket with .38-caliber bullets in its pocket. In the bedroom, police found plastic bags containing rock cocaine and folded tin packets containing heroin. Also in the bedroom were $5,385 in cash, a scale and a razor blade. An open box of nine-millimeter cartridges lay on the bed.\nChicago fire department ambulance commander Steven Schulz stated at trial that he arrived at 750 N. Lorel at approximately 3:30 p.m. on March 8. At the rear of the building, he found four persons on the ground, including Doffyn. Doffyn was in critical condition, with a bullet wound to the head. Schulz saw \u201ca quantity of blood ... and brain matter\u201d in the snow. Schulz was unable to secure an airway in the unconscious Doffyn, because the officer\u2019s jaw was clenched and Schulz could not get a laryngoscope between his teeth. Schulz established an IV and used an ambu-bag to try to hyperventilate Doffyn with oxygen.\nAdditionally, Schulz cut the straps of Doffyn\u2019s shirts and bulletproof vest. Schulz saw a gunshot wound to Doffyn\u2019s upper right chest near the clavicle. Schulz found out later that the bullet to the chest had traversed one of Doffyn\u2019s major blood vessels. He also learned later that evening that Doffyn had died.\nReviewing a report prepared by other paramedics, Schulz averred that Cowley had been shot in the back.\nThe chief medical examiner of Cook County, Edmund Donoghue, performed an autopsy on Doffyn on March 9, 1995. Donoghue found evidence of a bullet wound to the right side of Doffyn\u2019s head, a few inches above his right ear. As he opened Doffyn\u2019s skull, Donoghue found that the bullet wound coursed through the right parietal and frontal lobes of Doffyn\u2019s brain. Donoghue recovered a bullet and lead fragments from the right frontal lobe of the brain.\nDonoghue further described an injury to Doffyn\u2019s right upper chest. He said the gunshot wound was \u201cvery large,\u201d involving the first rib, the space between the first and second ribs, the second rib, the right upper, middle and lower lobes of the lung, the anterior surface of the liver, the abdominal wall and the left thigh. Donoghue recovered another bullet from Doffyn\u2019s left thigh.\nDoffyn died of multiple gunshot wounds. Either of the wounds described could have killed Doffyn, according to Donoghue.\nThe State called Richard Chenow, formerly of the firearms section of the Chicago police department, to render expert forensic evidence. Chenow opined, inter alla, that the bullet recovered from Doffyn\u2019s thigh was fired from the TEC-9 pistol recovered from defendant. The bullet taken from Doffyn\u2019s head was so mutilated that it contained insufficient individual characteristics to indicate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the bullet had been also fired from the TEC-9. However, Chenow did say that the bullet came from the same class of weapons as a TEC-9.\nChenow stated that the bullet removed from Young also came from the TEC-9 gun, \u201cto the exclusion of all other firearms.\u201d As to the bullet removed from Bubalo\u2019s body, Chenow could not positively identify it as fired by the TEC-9; however, he could not rule out the TEC-9 as the source of the bullet.\nThe State called Etoya Nelson as a witness. She is the mother of two of defendant\u2019s children. Nelson,testified that she and defendant lived together for a period of time, ending in February 1995. Nelson spoke by telephone to defendant on March 4 and March 5, 1995. Defendant refused to tell her where he was; defendant said he was on the run from the police. Defendant called Nelson again on March 7 and came to see her.\nOn the witness stand, Nelson denied the substance of a statement she allegedly made to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney on March 9, 1995. Nelson denied reporting that defendant told her, two days previously, that \u201cpeople were running over him, they had taken everything he had.\u201d However, Nelson admitted having signed the statement taken by the prosecutor on March 9.\nDefendant presented the testimony of two witnesses in defendant\u2019s case in chief. Officer James Lukas of the office of professional standards of the Chicago police department participated in the departmental investigation that followed the shooting of B\u00fabalo and Doffyn on March 8, 1995. Lukas testified that a recording of 911 telephone calls indicated a message was broadcast to all police at \u201c15.28:38 hours\u201d that \u201call had been captured and [sic] offender had been caught.\u201d Lukas stated that a second broadcast, approximately one minute later, indicated that two officers and two others were shot, and an evidence technician was requested.\nThe stipulated testimony of Hernando Torres, M.D., established that on March 8, 1995, defendant received a bullet wound to the left side of his head.\nAdditionally, the theory of defendant\u2019s case evolved during the course of the trial. During opening statements to the jury, counsel for defendant posited that Doffyn was not killed by bullets fired by defendant, but rather by gunfire from Bubalo\u2019s weapon. Defendant\u2019s attorney also implied that members of the Chicago police department discussed the shooting of Doffyn and B\u00fabalo in an attempt to reach a consensus as to what had occurred. By the time defense counsel delivered the closing argument at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, defendant retreated from this theory significantly, and instead argued generally that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof.\nC. Defendant\u2019s Sentencing Hearing\nThe same jury that deliberated the guilt/innocence phase of defendant\u2019s trial also heard the capital sentencing phase. Regarding defendant\u2019s eligibility for the death penalty (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b) (West 1998)), the parties stipulated that all of the evidence and signed verdict forms admitted at the guilt/innocence phase could be admitted for the purpose of determining defendant\u2019s death eligibility.\nEvidence adduced at ,the aggravation/mitigation phase (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(d) (West 1998)) demonstrated the extent and nature of defendant\u2019s criminal history. The State introduced the testimony of Antron Person, whom defendant had employed to sell drugs. Person stated that in 1995, defendant earned $30,000 a week selling drugs.\nPerson further averred that, in February 1995, Louis Moret told Person that defendant had pulled a gun on Moret and told Moret to \u201cget away before defendant could hurt him.\u201d Defendant put a gun to Moret\u2019s head and told him to leave the corner of Kildare and Maypole. Also in February 1995, defendant had complained to Person that police took \u201cstuff\u2019 from defendant, and that \u201cthe last thing he [was] going to do is kill a police [szc] before he let them kill him.\u201d\nA variety of law enforcement officials testified to defendant\u2019s arrests and convictions in the years preceding March 8, 1995. In October 1991, the Chicago police arrested defendant for unlawful use of weapons after defendant attempted to pull a gun from his waistband during a protective, pat-down search by a police officer. The charge was later dismissed.\nIn September 1994, defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of alcohol, marijuana and weapons. Pursuant to this arrest, defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawful use of weapons.\nAuthorities recovered two unregistered semiautomatic weapons from defendant\u2019s residence in July 1992. During the search of his apartment, defendant told the officers where the guns were and that they were registered. The guns were not registered. Officers also found $1,740 in cash in the bedroom of the apartment. Defendant told the police that he was unemployed and could not account for the cash. Defendant was charged with mob action and failure to register handguns. The mob action charge was subsequently dismissed.\nDefendant was arrested in December 1994 on charges of unlawful possession of weapons and controlled substances. As a result of the arrest, police recovered a loaded, .38-caliber handgun, $1,250 in cash, heroin, and 150 bags of rock cocaine.\nA joint project by the Chicago police department and the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), conducted in July 1993, investigated how handguns were coming into the City of Chicago. According to ATF agent John Taylor, the ATF and Chicago police learned that a man named Barry Jones was a \u201cstraw purchaser\u201d of guns for defendant. Taylor testified that Jones was forced to purchase guns for defendant to repay a $1,500 debt Jones owed to defendant. Defendant had also ordered gang members to beat up Jones because of his failure to repay the debt, Taylor said.\nTaylor stated that when defendant wanted Jones to make a purchase, defendant would pick up Jones in defendant\u2019s car and drive to a gun shop. Defendant would give Jones money and a list of guns that defendant wanted Jones to buy. Once purchased, Jones would turn the guns over to defendant. Jones allegedly purchased 28 guns for defendant.\nThe State introduced additional evidence concerning defendant\u2019s purported involvement in a shooting that occurred shortly before March 8, 1995. Terrence Hall testified that on February 26, 1995, he was working as the manager of an Amoco filling station at Washington and Pulaski. At approximately 10 p.m., Hall saw a gray customized van pull into the station and begin to refuel. A car pulled into the other side of the station. The driver of the car, later identified as Louis Moret, approached the driver of the van and spoke to him. Then Moret walked to a line at the cashier station. Two men emerged from the van and approached Moret. One of the men from the van, subsequently identified as defendant, seemed very angry and pulled a gun from his pocket. Moret began to run and defendant fired several shots at Moret, killing him. Hall stated that defendant followed Moret as Moret tried to run from defendant. Both defendant and the second person from the van then walked to the van and drove away.\nDetective Gerhardstein of the Chicago police department investigated Moret\u2019s murder. He counted 14 bullet wounds on Moret\u2019s body, including one wound in the middle of Moret\u2019s forehead, and wounds to Moret\u2019s neck, chest and back. Gerhardstein said that witnesses at the station identified the shooter as defendant. Gerhardstein obtained an arrest warrant for defendant on March 4, 1995; he arrested defendant for Moret\u2019s murder on March 8, 1995.\nIn mitigation, defendant introduced the testimony of acquaintances, family members and medical experts. Jacqueline Wheeler, a teacher at the Austin Community Academy High School between 1979 and 1992, testified that she selected defendant to participate in the \u201cprincipal scholars program.\u201d The program is designed for minority students who show academic promise.\nDefendant\u2019s grade point average in high school was 2.6, which was considered \u201cthe cream of the crop\u201d at the Austin Community Academy. To her knowledge, defendant had no disciplinary problems while in high school.\nFamily members averred that defendant visited his children on a regular basis and participated in their upbringing. Testimony from the mother of two of defendant\u2019s children, and defendant\u2019s eight-year-old daughter indicated that defendant\u2019s children would miss him if he were put to death. Defendant has five children by four different women.\nDefendant\u2019s brothers, Robert Lee Blue and Curtis Blue, testified that defendant came from a family of 13 children. It was a single-parent family. Robert and Curtis described defendant as a very good student in high school and a very good employee, when defendant was working at Church\u2019s Chicken.\nDefendant\u2019s brothers professed not to know about defendant\u2019s alleged history as a drug dealer. In addition, Robert admitted that he did not know what defendant was doing for employment in 1995, because Robert was away at school. He did not know why guns and drugs were found in an apartment where defendant was living in 1995. Defendant encouraged Robert not to get involved with drugs or gangs.\nBoth Robert and Curtis knew defendant was accused of killing Doffyn, but neither had spoken to defendant about the murder of Louis Moret.\nCurtis testified that, as a result of the bullet wound to the head that defendant received on March 8, 1995, defendant is not as \u201cagile\u201d as he used to be and defendant has dizzy spells. Sometimes he passes out as a result of the wound.\nDefendant\u2019s maternal aunt, Gertrude Collier, also testified. According to Collier, when defendant was growing up, he was a lovable and respectable young man. He won trophies and praise from teachers. She loves him very much and if he was taken out of her life, it would \u201cdestroy her very much.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s mother, Carrie Blue, testified that defendant was the eleventh-born of her 13 children. She said that defendant was a \u201cnice son\u201d and that she never had any problems with him. He was an \u201cA\u201d student as a child. She described an incident in which defendant suffered a severe football injury in high school that caused defendant to lose a kidney. Even though this accident necessitated a prolonged absence from school, defendant maintained good grades, his mother said.\nCarrie Blue testified that defendant loves his children and does things for them and with them. He supports his children.\nShe pleaded with the jury not to take her son away from her.\nDefendant\u2019s mother admitted that, before she moved out of an apartment she occupied at 4306 W. Maypole Street in 1991, she was aware that drugs were being sold at the corner of Maypole and Kildare. After she was shown several guns on cross-examination, she asserted that she did not know how the guns got into her home on Maypole Street or how defendant had obtained them. None of her children would allow her to see them with guns because they know that she would not approve. She never saw cocaine or heroin in her son\u2019s home.\nCarrie Blue did not know if defendant had been fired from Church\u2019s Chicken. She said that in 1994 and 1995, defendant was working for her. She has never asked defendant about any murder.\nChaplain Marcus Baird is the chaplain at the Cook County jail. He testified to defendant\u2019s participation in various prayer services and Bible studies. Baird said defendant was one of the \u201cdisciples in counseling.\u201d He has seen defendant develop a desire to help others and to get more involved in the Bible studies program at the jail. Baird agreed that by participating in religious programs, defendant could call Baird as a witness to testify that defendant was active in those programs.\nBaird said that he has talked to defendant about this case and that defendant sometimes struggles to remember things. When he talks to defendant, defendant sometimes understands the questions that Baird asks and is sometimes able to speak about Jesus and God. Defendant has told Baird that he shot a police officer, although he cannot remember the shooting. Defendant has not mentioned shooting another officer or the shooting of Louis Moret.\nJamillah Simms, the mother of defendant\u2019s son, and defendant\u2019s friend Robert McMillan also testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. Their testimony was substantially similar to the mitigation testimony of other family members and acquaintances.\nA board-certified neurologist, Gero Kragh, M.D., testified for the defense. In Kragh\u2019s opinion, defendant has static encephalopathy and sub clinical polysensory neuropathy, etiology to be defined. A review of a CT scan taken of defendant on March 9, 1995, showed that defendant had bone and bullet fragments in his brain and neck. Physical findings in defendant suggest significant and profound diffused difficulties involving the brain, including the left temporal lobe, left cerebellar hemisphere, brain stem, eighth cranial nerve and other ancillary problems in the neck.\nKragh concluded that defendant does not have a normal brain. Defendant has permanent brain damage, although not all of his current difficulties can be attributed to the bullet fired by B\u00fabalo. Defendant\u2019s school records suggest that he suffered from an attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity. Kragh believed that defendant\u2019s disinhibition or potential for explosiveness also predates the gunshot wound to the head. The same applies to other problems exhibited by defendant, including difficulty in organizing his thoughts in a coherent fashion and \u201cdifficulty with the conversation in the brain between the left and right halves at various times.\u201d\nKragh attributed other difficulties to damage caused by the bullet wound. He said defendant could not use complete sentences to describe the shooting at 750 N. Lorel. The best defendant could recall was the agitation, confusion, and explosiveness of the moment. He had no recall of events 30 minutes before the shooting and events one month after the shooting. He also said defendant has difficulty with immediate recall, getting his thoughts together, balance, clumsiness, \u201cthe staggers\u201d and \u201cthings like that.\u201d\nFurther, defendant exhibits abnormal reflexes, which indicate a problem with his left frontal lobe. Due to this physical defect, defendant will behave unpredictably when stressed or will predictably not behave in a manner that is conducive for his survival or the survival of others. Even under the most quiet circumstances, defendant is not, and never will be, normal. While he has made remarkable progress since he was shot in the head, it is doubtful that the progress will continue.\nThe defense also called Michael Gelbort, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist with a specialty in neuropsychology. Gelbort found cognitive dysfunction in defendant correlating to defendant\u2019s brain damage. Some of the difficulties resulting from the damage to the left hemisphere of defendant\u2019s brain are: difficulties in learning new information; intellectual scores in the borderline mentally deficient range; changes in sense of touch; change in motor functioning. Gelbort opined that defendant\u2019s neurocognitive deficits are permanent and irreversible. Gelbort recommended that defendant be placed in a structured, controlled environment where he would have to make few choices and where he could avoid stress.\nIn rebuttal, and over defendant\u2019s objection, the State introduced the victim impact statements of Doffyn\u2019s parents and daughter. Doffyn\u2019s mother read all three statements into the record.\nThe court allowed the State to present the testimony of Mathew Markos, M.D., in rebuttal, again over the objection of defendant. Markos is a forensic psychiatrist. Markos examined defendant in late 1996 and early 1997 in order to determine defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial and defendant\u2019s mental state on March 8, 1995.\nMarkos concluded that, while defendant does have some brain impairment, defendant did not suffer from any impairment significant enough to render defendant unfit to stand trial. Markos found defendant to be calm, cooperative, and alert. Defendant responded to Markos\u2019 questions in a relevant, coherent and rational manner. Markos found no indication of anxiety, agitation or abnormal behavior. He found no evidence of abnormal thought processes, delusional thinking, or abnormal perceptions.\nDefendant has a memory deficit, which includes an absence of memory of the events surrounding his arrest on March 8, 1995. Aside from this \u201cisolated cognitive deficit,\u201d defendant appears to have no other cognitive deficits. Defendant is intact cognitively and mentally, except for the memory deficit.\nDefendant scored 84 on an IQ test. Someone with this score is in the \u201cborderline to normal\u201d range of intelligence. If he scored an 85, defendant would fall in the \u201cnormal\u201d range.\nDefendant has shown good mental and physical improvement since the injury, Markos testified. Markos did not detect any malingering in defendant.\nANALYSIS\nBefore this court, defendant alleges that he is entitled to either a new trial and sentencing hearing, or a new sentencing hearing alone. In particular, defendant maintains that the conduct of the State\u2019s prosecutors throughout the entire proceedings below was so improper and abusive that defendant was denied a fair trial. Next, defendant asserts that, during the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court committed the following errors: refusing to ask potential jurors if they would automatically sentence defendant to death for killing a police officer; permitting the State to display a life-size mannequin clothed with Doffyn\u2019s uniform and allowing the exhibit to go to the jury room during the jury\u2019s deliberations; allowing the State to argue that the Doffyn family and the police \u201cneeded to hear\u201d from the jury; and sustaining hearsay objections by the State during defense counsel\u2019s examination of a witness, where the State had elicited hearsay from the same witness on direct examination.\nDefendant further contends that, during the sentencing phase of his trial, the trial court erred in the following respects: denying defendant\u2019s request that a member of the public defender\u2019s office assist defendant\u2019s counsel; permitting Dr. Markos to testify regarding the extent of brain damage suffered by defendant when he was shot by B\u00fabalo; allowing the State to display a five-foot-square poster illustrating various aspects of defendant\u2019s criminal history; and admitting victim impact testimony that contained improper content and exceeded the permissible amount of such testimony allowed by statute. Lastly, defendant urges the court to find the death penalty statute unconstitutional.\nFollowing a thorough review of the record and controlling case law, we hold that some of the arguments raised by defendant constitute error and, cumulatively, deprived defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. We find that a combination of errors occurring at trial may have coerced the jury into returning a verdict more likely grounded in sympathy than on a dispassionate evaluation of the facts. In light of this possibility, the constitutionality of defendant\u2019s trial is in doubt and we must reverse and remand for a new trial.\nA. Doffyn\u2019s Uniform\nDefendant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the bloodied and brain-splattered uniform of Daniel Doffyn into evidence and permitting the uniform to be taken into the jury room during deliberations. At trial, defendant moved the trial court to bar introduction of Doffyn\u2019s partial uniform into evidence. The uniform, consisting of Doffyn\u2019s shirts, police jacket and bullet-proof vest, contained bloodstains and stains from Doffyn\u2019s brain matter. Also, the clothing was torn as a result of medical treatment rendered to Doffyn. Defendant argued that autopsy reports, photographs taken of Doffyn at the morgue, and the testimony of the medical examiner adequately supplied any facts the State intended to prove by display of the uniform. Defendant asserted that viewing the uniform would have no probative value, and it could only \u201cexcite\u201d the jury\u2019s emotions concerning the shooting of a police officer.\nIn response, the State urged that the uniform showed that defendant knew Doffyn was a police officer when defendant fired his weapon at him and that the officers, Doffyn and B\u00fabalo, were wounded in the line of duty. The clothing display would also corroborate the medical examiner\u2019s testimony concerning the placement and nature of Doffyn\u2019s injuries, according to the State. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion, finding the uniform \u201crelevant.\u201d\nThe State displayed the uniform on a headless torso mannequin during the State\u2019s case in chief. The State introduced the uniform during B\u00fabalo\u2019s testimony, but had the mannequin in the courtroom, in view of the jury, during the examination of another State witness. Defendant objected to the premature display of the uniform and to the fact that the State placed the clothes on a life-size mannequin. The trial court ordered the mannequin removed to the court\u2019s chambers until it was ready to be introduced.\nAfter the completion of Bubalo\u2019s testimony, the mannequin remained in the courtroom. Counsel for defendant again objected, complaining that the mannequin had been present during the testimony of several witnesses. The court again ordered it removed from the courtroom.\nDefendant renewed his objection to the exhibit when the State moved to admit the exhibit into evidence, and when the State proposed sending the exhibit to the jury room during deliberations. The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objections and, prior to jury deliberations, ordered that the jurors be supplied with rubber gloves in case the jurors wanted to handle the uniform.\nThe fundamental principles governing the admission of physical evidence are well established:\n\u201cEvidence having a natural tendency to establish the facts in controversy should be admitted. A party cannot have competent evidence excluded merely because it might arouse feelings of horror and indignation in the jury. Any testimony concerning the details of a murder or other violent crime may have such tendencies, but manifestly this could not suffice to render it incompetent. Of course, where spectacular exhibits having little probative value are offered for the principal purpose of arousing prejudicial emotions they should be promptly excluded. But questions relating to the *** manner and extent of its presentation, are largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with unless there has been an abuse to the prejudice of the defendant.\u201d People v. Jenko, 410 Ill. 478, 482 (1951).\nFurther, if a defendant in a murder trial pleads not guilty, the State must prove every element of the crime charged and every fact relevant to the charges, irrespective of whether defendant offers to stipulate to any of those facts. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 319 (1990); People v. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 447 (1974).\nWhile the State and defendant rely on case law regarding photographic evidence to further their respective arguments, a line of cases already exists concerning the admission of articles of clothing worn by a victim. The common principles guiding these decisions echo the holding in Jenko, namely, that clothes will be admissible provided they tend to prove facts material to the issues to be proved in the case, and the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by potential prejudice. People v. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 447-48 (1974); see also People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d 39, 60 (1973); People v. Jurczak, 147 Ill. App. 3d 206, 215 (1986); People v. Parisie, 5 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1039 (1972). The admission of the articles rests within the trial court\u2019s discretion. See Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d at 447-48; People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d at 60.\nIllinois courts have found bloodstained police uniforms both inadmissable and admissible. In People v. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 133 (1992), the trial court admitted two police officers\u2019 \u201cbullet-marked and bloodstained uniforms\u201d into evidence and allowed the uniforms to go the jury room during deliberations. On appeal, defendants maintained that the uniforms were irrelevant to contested issues at trial, and that, as police uniforms, they were \u201csymbols charged with emotion.\u201d Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 143-44. The State responded that the bullet holes in the uniforms were relevant to the question of defendants\u2019 intent to kill the officers and to show that the defendants meant to inflict great bodily harm.\nThe Burrell court noted that tangible objects admitted into evidence that are probative of any material issue may be taken into the jury room during jury deliberations. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144. Whenever physical evidence is allowed into the jury room, the proximity of the exhibit to the jury and the potential that the exhibit may be in the jury\u2019s possession for an extended period of time give the proponent of the exhibit a distinct advantage over the opposing party. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144. For this reason, the court will closely scrutinize the exhibit to ensure that its prejudicial value does not outweigh its value as evidence. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144.\nThe appellate court ruled that, while the uniforms were probative of defendants\u2019 criminal intent, the prejudicial effect of the uniforms outweighed their probative value. \u201cThe jury saw the shirt, bullet holes, and blood during the trial. [One of the victims] even put his fingers through the bullet holes during his testimony.\u201d Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144. Thus the court determined that the trial court erred in allowing the uniforms into evidence, although the error was subsequently determined to be harmless error. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144.\nIn contrast to Burrell, the appellate court in People v. Stewart, 122 Ill. App. 3d 546, 549 (1984), found no error in the admission of a policeman\u2019s uniform. In Stewart, the trial court admitted the officer\u2019s \u201cbloody clothing\u201d into evidence. The State successfully argued that the uniform was proof of aggravated battery, the crime charged against defendant. Stewart, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 549. The appellate court affirmed because the evidence was relevant to the crime charged. Stewart, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 549.\nNeither appellate decision controls the outcome of this case. Anderson v. Board of Education of School District No. 91, 390 Ill. 412, 420 (1945). However, we find the reasoning of the Burrell court persuasive in the context of the instant appeal. Like the uniform in Burrell, the verbal descriptions and photos of Doffyn\u2019s uniform in the record indicate that the uniform displayed to the jury was \u201cbullet-marked and bloodstained.\u201d Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 143-44. The uniform also bore the tears from where paramedics and other medical personnel attempted to save Doffyn\u2019s life.\nThere was no question left in the jury\u2019s mind, moreover, as to the nature of the stains on the front and collar of the shirt and on the jacket. During his direct examination, B\u00fabalo identified the uniform on the mannequin as Doffyn\u2019s police uniform, and then answered the following question:\n\u201cQ. There\u2019s a great deal of damage to the front of this due to rescue measures.\nIs this the blood and brain matter on the shirt, is this how it appeared to you when you saw him on March 8th of 1995?\nA. Yes, sir.\u201d \u25a0\nThe reasons offered by the State to the trial court for admission of the uniform included corroboration of anticipated medical testimony regarding the path of the bullets that injured Doffyn, as well as reinforcement of allegations that Cowley and defendant knew that they were firing their guns at uniformed officers acting in the line of duty. On appeal, the State argues that the uniform shows defendant intended to kill Doffyn by purposefully firing at Doffyn\u2019s head and above his bulletproof vest.\nNot all of these reasons withstand close scrutiny. According to the indictments returned in this case, the fact that the victims were police-officers was relevant to the charge that defendant attempted to murder B\u00fabalo (but see 720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4, 9 \u2014 1(a) (West 1992)), but none of the first degree murder charges for the death of Doffyn were dependant on the victim\u2019s profession (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1992)). Further, as defendant argues before this court, if the State wanted to illustrate the defendant\u2019s intent to shoot at Doffyn\u2019s head, it makes no sense to employ a model on which the head is absent. Additionally, there was ample testimony, from paramedic Schulz and Dr. Donoghue, to describe the placement and appearance of Doffyn\u2019s wounds. Through Donoghue, moreover, the State introduced and admitted 16 autopsy photographs documenting Doffyn\u2019s injuries. Therefore, although we agree that the uniform could corroborate the medical testimony describing the placement or nature of one of the fatal wounds on Doffyn\u2019s body, the evidentiary value of the uniformed mannequin \u2014 over and above the other proof introduced by the State \u2014 was minimal.\nHaving found the uniform at least nominally probative of a material fact, we now determine whether the potential prejudice of the uniform' outweighed its probative value. We conclude that it did. While we are aware that pictures graphically displaying wounds and autopsy procedures have been previously allowed into evidence (see, e.g., People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 40-41 (1996); People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 246 (1993); Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d at 320), the physical evidence here was not photos of a gruesome scene, but the actual remnants of the scene itself, spattered with the actual blood and brains of the victim.\nWe are further aware that bloodied garments of victims have been admitted into evidence, as the cases cited above demonstrate. In this case, however, we perceive a coalescence of facts that tip the evidentiary scale from items that are merely useful to those that are aimed directly at the sympathies, or outrage, of the jury. These are not just bloody clothes, but the clothes of a police officer, which, as the defendants noted in Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 144, are uniquely \u201ccharged with emotion.\u201d Critically, too, the jury knew that the stains on the uniform were not only from the officer\u2019s blood \u2014 a concept disturbing in and of itself \u2014 but also from the officer\u2019s brains. The latter fact presumably intensified the already inflammatory nature of the garments.\nAdditionally, the jury was allowed an extended period of exposure to the life-size mannequin that wore the uniform. They saw the mannequin in the courtroom during the testimony of several witnesses, and then were allowed an even closer exposure to the exhibit during their deliberations. By furnishing the jurors with gloves, moreover, the trial court appeared to encourage the jury to engage in a tactile interaction with the uniform.\nThe nature and presentation of the uniform rendered the exhibit so disturbing that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. Its admission into evidence was error.\nB. The State\u2019s Rebuttal Closing Argument\nDefendant contends next that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State, in rebuttal closing argument, to make inappropriate references to police and to Doffyn\u2019s family. Rather than arguing the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom, defendant maintains, the State appealed directly to the jurors\u2019 passions and prejudices by urging the jury to use its verdict to send a message to Doffyn\u2019s family and to the police. Defendant maintains that the error inherent in the State\u2019s improper argument deprived defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.\nThe State\u2019s response is twofold. First, the State asserts that defendant waived this argument by neglecting to contemporaneously object to the statements and to raise the alleged error in defendant\u2019s post-trial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Second, the State avers that the argument fell squarely within the broad latitude allowed prosecutors in making arguments, and to trial judges in scrutinizing their propriety. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 244 (1999).\nThe State correctly observes that defendant failed to properly preserve this argument for our review. Defendant contemporaneously objected to the State\u2019s references to police officers, but failed to raise the issue in his post-trial motion. As to the argument concerning Doffyn\u2019s family, defendant neither objected at trial nor included the alleged error in his motion for a new trial. Generally, in the absence of both a timely objection at trial, and repetition of that objection in a post-trial motion, any alleged error is deemed waived. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190. Under the unique circumstances of this case, however, we decline to apply the waiver doctrine so that we may address the merits of defendant\u2019s arguments and protect defendant\u2019s interest in receiving a fair trial. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127 (1998) (waiver doctrine is a limitation on the parties, not the court); see also People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 528 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).\nCourts allow prosecutors great latitude in making closing arguments. People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1987). In closing, the State may comment on the evidence and all inferences reasonably yielded by the evidence. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 184 (1992). However, argument that serves no purpose but to inflame the jury constitutes error. People v. Tiller, 94 Ill. 2d 303, 321 (1982); People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643, 651 (1988). Closing arguments must be viewed in their entirety and the allegedly erroneous argument must be viewed contextually. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d at 176. \u201cThe regulation of the substance and style of the closing argument is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and the trial court\u2019s determination of the propriety of the remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.\u201d People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995); accord Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d at 175; Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 185.\nIn its rebuttal argument, the State argued:\n\u201cMR. McKAY [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: You heard from Roger Doffyn. He needs to hear something from you. He and Mrs. Doffyn need to hear from you that even though they suffered the worst possible nightmare a parent could suffer, that they had to bury their child, they need to hear, from you that they will get justice. Brittany Doffyn needs to hear from you that daddy didn\u2019t die in vain. Mike B\u00fabalo needs to hear it from you, artificial hip and all[,] that his heroics, his courage, his honor, and his duty didn\u2019t go in vain. Every Chicago police officer\u2014\nMS. HILL-McCLAIN [defense counsel]: Objection to that, Your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nMR. McKAY: From the superintendent down to the newest rookie and every police officer in this state needs to hear from you right now.\nMS. CAROTHERS [defense counsel]: Your Honor, that is objectionable.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nMR. McKAY: That while they serve and protect us we will serve and protect them. They need to hear from you that no gun-toting drug dealer is going to get away with shooting one of them.\u201d\nThe State defends these appeals to the jury on behalf of the Doffyn family and the police as supplications to fearlessly administer justice. Generally, arguments urging a fearless administration of justice or commenting unfavorably on the evils of crime do not constitute error. People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 277-78 (1986). However, even a cursory examination of the State\u2019s argument in this case suggests more than a general exhortation to the jury to protect society. Accordingly, we examine separately the remarks made concerning the victim\u2019s family and the police in order to determine the existence, if any, of error.\n1. The Doffyn Family\nIn People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359 (1964), this court ruled that a defendant\u2019s guilt may be proved only by \u201clegal and competent\u201d facts, \u201cuninfluenced by bias or prejudice raised by irrelevant evidence.\u201d Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371. Proof that the victim of a crime is survived by a family is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371. It can only serve to prejudice a defendant in the eyes of the jury. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371. Therefore, the court continued, evidence or argument dwelling on the victim\u2019s family, or relating defendant\u2019s punishment to the existence of a family, is \u201cinflammatory and improper\u201d and constitutes reversible error. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371.\nIn People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265 (1986), the State made several references to and elicited testimony concerning the victim\u2019s family. The victim\u2019s spouse testified that she had three children, 10 years of age and younger, and that two of the children were fathered by decedent. She also identified family photographs of the decedent with her and the children. At closing argument, the State referred to decedent\u2019s family, saying, \u201c \u2018Little did [decedent] know that when he said good-bye to his wife, that would be the last time he saw her alive.\u2019 \u201d Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 277.\nThe Hope court found that the evidence and argument about the victim\u2019s family bore no relation to defendant\u2019s innocence or guilt. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 278. The sole motivation behind these statements was a desire to prejudice the jurors against the defendant, and to inflame their emotions. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 278. In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the court held that \u201c \u2018be he a sinner or a saint, [defendant] has the right to expect that his fate will be fixed with reference only to the circumstances of the crime with which he is charged.\u2019 \u201d Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 278, quoting People v. Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601, 606 (1961). See also People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 322 (1990) (argument that defendant\u2019s acts deprived victim of her \u201crights\u201d held to be improper); People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 322-23 (1983) (the State\u2019s urging to the jury to \u201c \u2018tell the [victim\u2019s family] what you decided\u2019 \u201d was \u201cimproper, inexcusable and unprofessional\u201d); People v. Jordan, 38 Ill. 2d 83, 90-92 (1967) (error for prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning victim\u2019s children and to argue that victim was as beloved as any celebrity in the country); People v. Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601, 605-06 (1961) (argument concerning decedent\u2019s wife and small children partially deprived defendant of a fair trial).\nIn the present appeal, the State\u2019s argument that Doffyn\u2019s father, mother and child needed to \u201chear\u201d from the jury was patently immaterial to the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. Combined with the State\u2019s reminder of the pain endured by the parents in the loss of their only child, the remarks concerning the decedent\u2019s family amounted to an unequivocal, and erroneous, appeal to the jury\u2019s emotions.\nAdditionally, the inflammatory impact of the State\u2019s argument cannot be fully understood without also knowing the evidence that preceded it. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 157; People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355,. 392-93 (1992); People v. Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d 19, 29 (1979); People v. Tate, 45 Ill. 2d 540, 545 (1970); see People v. Parks, 168 Ill. App. 3d 978, 982-83 (1988). The State opened its case in chief with testimony from decedent\u2019s father, Roger Doffyn. Mr. Doffyn\u2019s testimony covers nine pages of transcript. Among other things, he testified as to his age (71), and that he had been married to decedent\u2019s mother for 51 years. Mr. Doffyn related that he and his wife occupied one floor of a two-flat, while his son and his granddaughter lived together on another floor of the same building. According to Mr. Doffyn, his son and granddaughter shared the same birthday.\nMr. Doffyn described the last time he saw his son alive, March 8, 1995. He identified a photograph of his son and described the events of the evening of March 8, after he learned that his son had been shot.\nSome of the testimony admitted through Mr. Doffyn served the proper purpose of identifying the victim as Daniel Doffyn, and proving that he was alive, and subsequently died, on the date of defendant\u2019s crime. People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 335 (1992). Further, we agree that incidental evidence of a victim\u2019s family is not only permissible, but in most trials, unavoidable, since \u201c[c]ommon sense tells us that murder victims do not live in a vacuum and that, in most cases, they leave behind family members.\u201d People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 415 (1983).\nNonetheless, some of the evidence admitted through Mr. Doffyn, such as the age of his granddaughter, the number of years he has been married to decedent\u2019s mother, and the living arrangements of the Doffyn family, was not probative of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. This evidence served only one purpose, namely, to highlight the poignancy of the Doffyn family\u2019s loss and to suggest to the jury that the family\u2019s pain could be alleviated by a guilty verdict. Moreover, the knowledge of these facts surely heightened the impact of the State\u2019s emotional closing argument on the jury.\nWe reject the State\u2019s contention that jury instructians in the present matter cured any error introduced by the State\u2019s argument. The instructions cited by the State were standard instructions that arguments of counsel are not evidence. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.03 (3d ed. 1992). Instructing the jury that arguments are not evidence will not, in every instance, cure the defect caused by introduction of such evidence. Whether the remarks and/or evidence constitute error depends, in each case, on the nature and extent of the statements and whether they are probative of defendant\u2019s guilt. See People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 142 (1990); Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 276.\nIn the case at bar, we find that the generic instructions tendered by the State were not likely to undo the damage to defendant\u2019s case inflicted by the State\u2019s pointed remarks. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to argue that its verdict should be a vehicle to vindicate the Doffyn family. Cf. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 481-82 (1993) (any error resulting from \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cfleeting\u201d remarks concerning the victim\u2019s family, and reference to the defendant as a \u201cpredator\u201d cured by standard instructions concerning arguments of counsel); People v. Chavez, 265 Ill. App. 3d 451, 461-62 (1994).\n2. The Police\nSimilarly, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sustain defendant\u2019s objections to the State\u2019s argument concerning the police. The State\u2019s exhortation that the jury send a message to all police that the jury supported them, from the \u201csuperintendent to the newest rookie,\u201d was little more than a transparent play to the jury\u2019s sympathy and loyalty to law enforcement. Nothing in the portions of the State\u2019s argument quoted above tended to make the fact of defendant\u2019s guilt more or less true.\nThe same reasons that made introduction of the remarks concerning the Doffyn family inappropriate should have compelled the trial court to bar the State\u2019s direction that the jurors use their verdict to reassure the police. Admission of these remarks constituted an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion. Cf. People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 390 (1972); People v. Montgomery, 254 Ill. App. 3d 782, 795 (1993); People v. Rivera, 235 Ill. App. 3d 536, 540-41 (1992); People v. Williams, 228 Ill. App. 3d 981, 1002 (1992); People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643, 648-51 (1988); People v. Flair, 51 Ill. App. 3d 75, 81 (1977); but see People v. Chavez, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 461; People v. Lovelace, 251 Ill. App. 3d 607, 623-24 (1993); People v. Jenkins, 190 Ill. App. 3d 115, 136 (1989).\nOur own review of the record leads us to believe that the State compounded the error of its rebuttal argument by introducing, in the State\u2019s case in chief, testimony from Commander Joseph Delopez of the Chicago police department. Delopez testified that, in November 1994, he was the commander of the training division of the department. He was present for the \u201cstar ceremony\u201d when Doffyn took his police officer\u2019s oath of office.\nOver defendant\u2019s objection, the court permitted Delopez to read aloud the oath of office sworn by Doffyn. The oath states:\n\u201cI, Daniel Doffyn, having been appointed to the office of police officer, do solemnly swear that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of such to the best of my abilities.\u201d\nDelopez was also permitted to testify that Doffyn\u2019s police badge was retired and is now displayed in the \u201chonored star case\u201d at Chicago police department headquarters.\nAt the time Delopez testified, the State argued that his testimony was relevant to show that Doffyn was killed in the line of duty. Defendant did not dispute this fact at trial. Moreover, the fact Doffyn was killed in the line of duty was relevant only at the eligibility phase of defendant\u2019s subsequent capital sentencing hearing (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b)(1) (West 1992)). The fact that Doffyn was a police officer was, at the guilt phase of the trial, irrelevant to the central issue of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 1992).\nIn sum, the trial court allowed the State to argue two emotion-laden themes to the jury, neither of which was probative of defendant\u2019s guilt for the several crimes charged against him. The nakedly prejudicial nature of the arguments was intensified by parallel evidence which, perhaps by design, reinforced the tragedy of the loss suffered in this case by the police force and by the family of Daniel Doffyn. Consequently, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the jury to hear these arguments.\nC. \u201cTestifying\u201d by Prosecutors\nDefendant enumerates several instances of alleged misconduct at trial by attorneys for the State. Defendant contends that the State\u2019s improper examination and treatment of certain witnesses and abusive conduct toward defense counsel deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nThis court finds that counsel for the State engaged in improper conduct at trial. Additionally, the most egregious behavior contributed to the continuum of error that deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nIn the State\u2019s case in chief, the State called Etoya Nelson to establish, inter alla, defendant\u2019s purported hostility toward police and the fact that, in the days immediately preceding March 8, 1995, defendant believed that the police were pursuing him. Before trial, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys McKay and O\u2019Connor interviewed Nelson after a warrant had issued for her arrest. McKay and O\u2019Connor were also the prosecutors that tried the State\u2019s case against defendant.\nThe trial transcripts demonstrate that the exchanges at trial between Nelson and the prosecuting attorneys were palpably hostile. Further, the State\u2019s counsel repeatedly interjected testimony of their own through thinly veiled \u201cobjections.\u201d The following colloquy illustrates the State\u2019s misconduct during cross-examination of Nelson by defendant\u2019s attorney:\n\u201cMS. HILL-McCLAIN [defense counsel]: And what about Mr. O\u2019Connor?\nMS. NELSON: He did have an attitude problem. When I first told him that my daughter was sick, he told me my daughter was not his concern. She was at home very sickly on [sic] asthma.\nMR. O\u2019CONNOR: Judge, objection. That\u2019s a lie.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll sustain the objection.\nMS. HILL-McCLAIN: Can we have Mr. O\u2019Connor\u2019s statement read back?\nMR. O\u2019CONNOR: I said it was a lie.\nMS. HILL-McCLAIN: Object to him saying that\u2019s a lie, Your Honor, unless he\u2019s going to swear under oath and take the stand.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll sustain the objection.\u201d\nDuring redirect examination, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney McKay questioned Nelson concerning their encounter before trial:\n\u201cMR. McKAY: How was that?\nNELSON: And you told me, that\u2019s why you are going to jail now. You told me that.\nMR. McKAY: You keep going. I want you to tell me, what did I say to you\u2014\nMS. NELSON: You told me\u2014\nMR. McKAY: \u2014that you had a problem with?\nMS. NELSON: I felt you had an attitude problem because you said, that\u2019s why you was at home, you was his homebody while he was out [sleeping with] someone else. This is the exact words you said to me.\nMR. McKAY: I didn\u2019t.\nMS. NELSON: Oh my God.\n\u2756 H\u00ed \u2756\nMR. McKAY: Now what else did me or Mr. O\u2019Connor say or do to you that you had a problem with?\nMS. NELSON: No, it wasn\u2019t that it was no problem. I\u2019m just saying I didn\u2019t like the attitude. Who wanted to get locked up?\nMR. McKAY: You being locked up wasn\u2019t our decision. There was a warrant out for you.\nMS. HILL-McCLAIN: He\u2019s testifying. I\u2019ll object.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll sustain the objection.\u201d\nLastly, on recross examination, Nelson elaborated on her allegation that she had been detained in a \u201ccage\u201d at the police station:\n\u201cMS. HILL-McCLAIN: And were you by yourself in a cage?\nMS. NELSON: Yes.\nMS. HILL-McCLAIN: And you had the state\u2019s attorneys and the police?\nTHE COURT: One question at a time. Let her answer the questions.\nMR. O\u2019CONNOR: May I enter an objection to counsel\u2019s continuous misstatement of what occurred? There\u2019s never been any interview in a cage.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\u201d\nBefore this court, the State has conceded the error of the prosecutors\u2019 \u201ctestifying\u201d objections. An objection is intended only to state the fact of the objection and the evidentiary basis therefor. See Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 287 (1956). The objections quoted above constituted an improper attempt by the prosecutors to introduce contrary evidence through themselves while Nelson was still on the witness stand. See also People v. Wielgos, 220 Ill. App. 3d 812, 818 (1991) (State should not editorialize when stating an objection).\nMoreover, the State\u2019s objections violated the \u201cadvocate-witness rule,\u201d which bars attorneys from assuming a dual role as advocate and witness in the same proceedings. See 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 3.3(a)(10), 3.7; United States v. Johnston, 690 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982). The rule is particularly pertinent to prosecutors in criminal cases because of the sensitive role they assume as the government\u2019s representative in the courtroom. In Johnston, 690 F.2d 638, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals repeated four considerations that animate the witness-advocate rule: (1) as an advocate for the government, the prosecutor\u2019s objectivity as a witness could never be assured; (2) the prosecutor\u2019s credibility is automatically (and unfairly) enhanced by the prestige and authority of the prosecutor\u2019s office; (3) the dual role of witness and advocate assumed by a prosecutor might confuse the jury; and (4) the rule reinforces the adage that the appearance of propriety is as vital to the operation of our judicial system as actual propriety. Johnston, 690 F.2d at 643.\nIn the instant case, the prosecutors\u2019 \u201cobjections\u201d to Nelson\u2019s testimony exceeded the accepted evidentiary bases for entering objections. Instead, they offered the jury a simultaneous rebuttal to Nelson\u2019s account of an event where both McKay and O\u2019Connor were present. Since the objections were made by prosecutors, moreover, the State gained an unfair advantage: it is probable that the jury endowed the remarks made by government representatives with greater credibility than is normally accredited to witnesses. See Johnston, 690 F.2d at 643. The advantage gained by the State in this case was reinforced by the fact the trial court sustained some of the State\u2019s objections, so that, in the eyes of the jury, the trial judge might have appeared to endorse those objections. Accordingly, counsel should have refrained from attempting to rebut Nelson\u2019s testimony with their own \u201ctestimony.\u201d Further, the trial court erred whenever it failed to overrule the editorial comments offered by McKay and O\u2019Connor.\nD. Cumulative Error\nIn response to each assertion of error by defendant, the State urges that, regardless of whether error occurred, the evidence against defendant at the guilt and sentencing phases was so overwhelming that the absence of these errors would have made no difference in the outcome of the trial. This court may invoke the harmless error doctrine to dispose of claims of error that have a de minimus impact on the outcome of the case. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 157; People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1996).\nYet prejudice to a defendant\u2019s case is not the sole concern that drives our analysis of defendant\u2019s appeal: \u201cA criminal defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair; orderly, and impartial trial\u201d conducted according to law. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). This due process right is guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 214; U.S. Const., amend. XIV \u00a7 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2; see also Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d at 480.\nAdditionally, when a defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial has been denied, this court must take corrective action so that we may preserve the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 577 (1980). To determine whether defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial has been compromised, we employ the same test that this court uses whenever it applies the second prong of the plain error test. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). We ask whether a substantial right has been affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant\u2019s trial was fundamentally fair. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 522-23 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring).\nAs explained in People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (1979) (Ryan, J., specially concurring), when an error arises at trial that is of such gravity that it threatens the very integrity of the judicial process, the court must act to correct the error, so that the fairness and the reputation of the process may be preserved and protected. Critically, the court will act on plain error regardless of the strength of the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Green, 74 Ill. 2d at 455 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).\nJustice Ryan noted in Green-.\n\u201c \u2018Even those guilty of the most heinous offenses are entitled to a fair trial. Whatever the degree of guilt, those charged with a federal crime are entitled to be tried by the standards of guilt which [the legislature] has prescribed.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d at 455 (Ryan, J., specially concurring), quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 1506, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1945).\nIn this appeal, we hold that a new trial is necessary in order to preserve the trustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process. We do not disagree that the evidence proving defendant\u2019s guilt is overwhelming. Nonetheless, regardless of the weight of the evidence, as guardians of constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system, we must order a new trial when, as here, we conclude that defendant did not receive a fair trial.\nEach of the errors detailed above, in and of itself, casts doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process. Cumulatively, we find that the errors created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant\u2019s case. People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992); People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 83 (1984); People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 341 (1982). The argument by State\u2019s counsel concerning the Doffyn family and the police encouraged the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the facts. Therefore, by allowing the State to suggest improper considerations to the jury, the trial court errantly allowed the jury to consider \u201cevidence\u201d not relevant to defendant\u2019s alleged crimes.\nCombined with the introduction of the dead officer\u2019s bloodied uniform, moreover, the errors assumed a synergistic effect. In particular, if we view together the manner and duration of the uniform\u2019s display, the appeal to the jurors to demonstrate their gratitude to the police force, the introduction of Doffyn\u2019s oath of office and testimony that his star occupies an honored place at police headquarters, we discern an intent by the State to place the jury\u2019s responsibility as citizens on trial, as much as the State placed defendant on trial. See People v. Carter, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1034-35 (1998).\nThe State\u2019s overbearing conduct in pursuit of defendant\u2019s convictions was further demonstrated by the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys\u2019 behavior at trial. The tendency of the prosecutors to interject editorializing objections unfairly negated evidence that may have been favorable to defendant. The fact the objections were made \u2014 and sometimes sustained \u2014 by government representatives suggested that, because knowledgeable authorities found the testimony in question incredible, then the jury should reach the same conclusion.\nUnder these circumstances, defendant did not receive a fair trial. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 214; Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371. In sum, the trial court allowed the guilty verdict to rest on considerations other than the evidence alone. Accordingly, we reverse defendant\u2019s convictions and sentence and remand for a new trial.\nIn light of our decision to reverse the judgment entered by the trial court, we need not decide the remainder of the alleged errors identified by defendant. However, we will address one remaining issue which the court finds troubling and which the court directs the parties and the trial court to remedy in the event of a retrial.\nE. Conduct of Counsel\nThe record in the present matter yields evidence of improper conduct by both counsel for the State and for defendant. In addition to the impermissible objections made at trial by the State\u2019s counsel, we have found the behavior of the attorneys in this case so wanting in professionalism that we believe it necessary to address the most egregious examples of that conduct here.\nAn assistant State\u2019s Attorney engaged in improper conduct in his examination of Dr. Gelbort during the aggravation/mitigation phase. The source of the State\u2019s animosity toward Gelbort was the State\u2019s unsuccessful pretrial attempts to obtain a copy of Gelbort\u2019s report of his examination of defendant. Defendant argues that the State\u2019s cross-examination of Gelbort was \u201cvery prejudicial\u201d because the State insinuated that defendant\u2019s attorneys hid the report from the State. Our review of the record reveals that even after Gelbort informed the prosecutor that he had turned his report over to the court, the State\u2019s Attorney questioned Gelbort\u2019s veracity concerning the State\u2019s attempts to meet with him. The tone and manner of the examination amounted to harassment, which was improper in and of itself. It was doubly improper, however, because if the State had difficulty obtaining discovery concerning anticipated expert testimony, the State\u2019s remedy rested with the trial court or defendant\u2019s attorneys, and not with the witness himself.\nThe remaining complaints against the attorneys for the State include shouting at a defense witness in open court, throwing photographic exhibits onto a table in front of defense counsel, and calling one of defendant\u2019s attorneys an \u201casshole\u201d in the judge\u2019s chambers. We agree that these incidents were improper. Attorneys should, at all times, maintain a sense of decorum and professionalism. Infantile behavior and foul language are signs of disrespect for the court and the justice system, as much as a lack of respect for each other. People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 413-14 (1985).\nIn fairness to the State, however, we note that counsel for defendant engaged in improper behavior as well. According to the State, defense counsel referred to one of the prosecuting attorneys as a \u201cjerk.\u201d One of defendant\u2019s attorneys was argumentative with the court, had to be admonished not to make \u201cspeaking\u201d objections of her own, and was twice reminded not to leave the courtroom while the trial was in session. Too, in the many instances of unnecessary bickering between the attorneys during trial, counsel for defense and the State displayed equal degrees of immaturity and unprofessionalism.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We remand the cause for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 84046.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MURRAY BLUE, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 27, 2000.\nCharles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0099-01", "first_page_order": 111, "last_page_order": 154 }