{ "id": 1224780, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VICTOR PEREZ, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Perez", "decision_date": "2000-02-17", "docket_number": "No. 86376", "first_page": "254", "last_page": "269", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 254" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796908 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5110312 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in the absence of any evidence that defendant was aware that his companion intended to shoot the victim or direct evidence tying defendant to a common design to shoot the victim, defendant's murder conviction on a theory of accountability was reversed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477041 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5217398 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 U.S. 72", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8896 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" }, { "page": "1097" }, { "page": "1045-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/360/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738071 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234-35" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222749 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821413 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576671 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57344 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243906 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0439-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 946, "char_count": 26353, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.30872894731526e-07, "percentile": 0.9425146022026767 }, "sha256": "def80f49e0339d868b102d7da93a54b2cfac91dbd55afa3dd34fb9f6de3207c5", "simhash": "1:b61e9b08d76b467b", "word_count": 4415 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:47.405500+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VICTOR PEREZ, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Victor Perez, was found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 1994)) stemming from the shooting death of Pedro Gonzalez. The conviction was based on a theory of accountability. 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 1994). Defendant was sentenced to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction in an unpublished order. No. 2 \u2014 96\u20140744 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now reverse defendant\u2019s conviction.\nThe evidence presented at trial showed, in relevant part, that on February 14, 1995, around 9 p.m., the victim, Pedro Gonzalez, was walking home from a gym in Elgin with his brother Angel Gonzalez and his friend Eduardo Corral. As they were walking, a green car pulled up beside them. Several persons exited the car, including Anthony Rivera and Luis Nieves, both admitted members of the Maniac Latin Disciples street gang (Disciples). The Disciples and the Latin Kings (Kings) are rival gangs. There was conflicting testimony as to the events that occurred next.\nAngel Gonzalez, a State witness, testified that as Rivera and Nieves exited the car they asked \u201c[w]ho is a King?\u201d and accused Pedro of displaying King hand signs. Angel stated that defendant drove by in his car, was hailed by Rivera, turned around and parked behind the green car. As defendant exited his car and approached the group, he was asked by Rivera and Nieves if Pedro was a King. According to Angel, defendant pointed at Pedro and said \u201cyes, he\u2019s [Pedro\u2019s] a King\u201d three times. Angel added that defendant \u201cpointed the finger and said my brother and he made a gang sign.\u201d However, when the prosecutor asked Angel to describe exactly what defendant did, Angel responded: \u201cHe pointed his finger.\u201d On cross-examination, Angel stated he did not know whether defendant said Pedro was a King once, twice or three times, \u201cbut for me it was several times I heard.\u201d\nAngel testified that about two minutes after defendant\u2019s statement he heard five or six gunshots. Angel did not know who fired the shots and did not see a weapon. Angel testified that defendant was present at the time of the shooting and that afterwards, he saw defendant run to his car, get in and speed away. Angel stated that defendant left \u201cscreaming.\u201d Angel claimed that neither he nor Pedro was a member of the Kings on the day of the shooting, but that both had been members in the past. Angel believed that defendant used to be a King, but that on February 14, 1995, he was a member of the Disciples.\nAngel further testified that about a week before the shooting, Rivera and Nieves were in the same green car and followed him and Pedro as they walked, flashing gang signs at the brothers. Angel stated that he and Pedro did nothing in response. Then, on the day before the shooting, he and Pedro were again followed by Rivera and Nieves in the green car, displaying Disciple gang signs. Angel thought that Rivera and Nieves were trying to start a fight, and believed that nothing happened that day because he and Pedro were in front of a police station. Angel added that, that same day, Pedro had run home and reported to Angel that he was being chased by the same men in the green car. The defendant was not present on any of these occasions.\nEduardo Corral, also testifying for the State, stated that on the day of the shooting five individuals, including Rivera, got out of a green car and were looking for Pedro. According to Corral, the group told Pedro to stop displaying King signs. Corral further testified that, at some point, defendant pulled up in his car, got out, and joined the group. Corral did not know defendant. Corral stated that someone told Pedro that they had seen him \u201cthrowing the crown up,\u201d which meant he was identifying himself as a King. Corral testified that Pedro denied doing this, but \u201cCoco say yes, I\u2019m sorry man, you just did it.\u201d Corral stated that he did not see Coco in the courtroom, and identified People\u2019s Exhibit 18, a photograph of Luis Nieves, as Coco. When Corral became aware that Coco was defendant\u2019s nickname, he admitted that he was \u201cconfused.\u201d He was then allowed, over defense objection, to repeat his testimony. Corral then stated that Pedro said to defendant, \u201cRight, Coco? I didn\u2019t do it [display King gang signs], you know,\u201d and defendant responded, \u201cI\u2019m sorry, man, but you did, you know.\u201d Someone then yelled \u201ccops\u201d and Pedro began to run. Corral testified that Rivera asked Pedro why he was running and then shot him. Corral also testified that several days before the shooting, he and Pedro were chased by Rivera and another individual, whom Corral did not see at the murder scene.\nWhile Corral stated that about four minutes passed between defendant\u2019s statement and the time someone yelled \u201ccops,\u201d on cross-examination, Corral testified that the period between the two statements was a short time, \u201c[a]lmost right away.\u201d Corral further stated that Rivera pulled his gun very quickly and that there was no time for anyone to say, \u201cdon\u2019t shoot.\u201d Corral also testified on cross-examination that he did not see anyone motion to defendant as his car passed by, nor did he hear anyone whistle at defendant. Corral stated that no one flashed any gang signs after defendant arrived on the scene. Corral admitted that, at the time of the incident, he told a police officer that a man referred to as \u201cCoco\u201d had pointed to Pedro and said \u201che\u2019s the Latin King.\u201d\nDetective James Lullo testified for the State, over defendant\u2019s objection, as a gang expert. Lullo stated that he had been a police officer for 11 years and had worked with street gangs for about eight of those years. Lullo testified that he was a certified gang specialist assigned to the Elgin police department gang unit. He stated that he had a working knowledge of Elgin\u2019s street gangs and was familiar with members of both the Disciples and Kings. According to Lullo, every gang has an \u201cunderlying criminal intent\u201d which is carried out by its members. Generally, members of opposite gangs do not socialize with each other. Lullo explained that, on the day of the shooting, the Disciples and Kings were at war, which meant that rival gang members fought and shot at each other. Lullo admitted that characterizing someone as a full gang member was a \u201csubjective call\u201d involving factors such as the individual\u2019s self-admission to gang membership, the presence of gang tattoos, \u201changing\u201d in gang territory, associating with other gang members, using gang signs and expressions, and being involved in crimes with other gang members.\nDetective Lullo testified that, in his opinion, defendant was an associate member of the Disciples. An associate member is one who sometimes \u201changs\u201d with members of a gang in a specific neighborhood. Associate members are not constantly in the neighborhood, but display hand signs and understand the knowledge and structure of the gang. Detective Lullo believed defendant was an associate member of the Disciples based upon several incidents which had occurred in the six months prior to the shooting. Lullo testified that one incident involved a traffic altercation between defendant and a member of the Kings \u201cwhere they were crashing each other and shooting.\u201d In another instance, defendant was at a street fair with eight members of the Disciples, during which time the Disciples had a physical altercation with the Kings where shots were fired.\nOn cross-examination, Lullo testified that he was not the investigating officer in the traffic incident involving defendant and a Kang. Upon reviewing the report prepared on the incident, Lullo noted that it indicated defendant was driving his car when he was hit by an intoxicated driver who did not stop. Defendant then chased the car that hit him, which was driven by a gang member. Lullo conceded that having an accident with a gang member does not make one a gang member. Lullo also admitted on cross-examination that defendant was seen at the street fair in the company of five known Disciples, not eight, and that those five wore gang colors and represented themselves as Disciples. Defendant was not wearing gang colors and did not represent himself as-a gang member.\nLullo further testified that defendant, on numerous occasions, was observed in the Disciple neighborhood associating with gang members. On cross-examination, Lullo admitted that defendant\u2019s home is located in the Disciple neighborhood. On redirect, Lullo stated that defendant was involved in another incident where he was driving a car with two passengers when shots were fired at them. On re-cross-examination, Lullo admitted defendant\u2019s companions were not associated with a gang and that all three told police they did not know why they had been shot at because they were not gang members. Moreover, Lullo conceded that defendant has never admitted to being a gang member, wears no tattoos, and is not known to have ever attended a gang meeting.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court heard arguments on the motion and denied it. Defendant then presented his defense.\nJuan Carrizales, called as a defense witness, testified that he and defendant were close friends. On February 14, 1995, around 8:15 p.m., defendant picked him up and they went to get something to eat. Defendant was not wearing gang colors. According to Carrizales, as defendant was driving him home around 9 p.m., he made an unexpected left turn, double parked the car and got out. Carrizales stated that he did not leave the car and did not see where defendant went. Carrizales testified that after about a minute, defendant returned to the car and, as defendant was getting in, Carrizales heard about four or five gunshots. Defendant and Carrizales then left. On cross-examination, Carrizales stated that he was a member of the Disciples, but that defendant was not. Carrizales testified that he never told the police that he was at the scene of the shooting because he did not want to get involved. It was not until defendant\u2019s attorney spoke to Carrizales that he disclosed this information.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that on February 14, 1995, he left his house to pick up Carrizales and get something to eat. As he was taking Carrizales home, he saw a group of individuals, one of whom he believed to be Luis Nieves. Defendant testified that he owed Nieves $20 and wanted to repay him. Defendant had known Nieves for about a year and a half and knew Nieves was a member of the Disciples. Defendant stated that he quickly turned the car around, double parked and left the vehicle with the engine running. Carrizales remained in the car.\nDefendant testified that as he approached the group, someone said, \u201chey, Coki [Coco], isn\u2019t it true that I\u2019m not a King?\u201d At first, defendant did not recognize the speaker, but after looking at him closely, defendant realized he was Pedro Gonzalez. Defendant replied, \u201cI know you were, but I don\u2019t know if you are.\u201d Defendant testified that Pedro was one of his first friends when he moved to Elgin from Puerto Rico at age 12. About a year later, Pedro became a member of the Kings, but defendant did not join. Defendant testified that he had not seen Pedro for several years prior to the night of the shooting. After defendant\u2019s brief conversation with Pedro, Angel whispered to Pedro and Pedro began to walk quickly away. Defendant stated that Pedro now looked scared, although he had not when he asked defendant the question. Nieves and defendant also began to walk away. According to defendant, as he was getting into his car he heard shots. He then entered his vehicle and left the scene.\nDefendant testified that he did not see who fired the shots and that he did not know that he would be marking Pedro for trouble when he answered Pedro\u2019s question. Defendant stated that he thought that they were trying to resolve a problem because, when he got there, \u201ceverything was normal.\u201d Defendant testified that he had no idea there was going to be a shooting or that anyone was armed. All he did was answer Pedro\u2019s question truthfully. He did not know Anthony Rivera, nor had he ever spoken to him, although he had seen Rivera around the neighborhood.\nDefendant further testified that he was not a member of the Disciples; had not told anyone that he was a member of the Disciples; had never received any tattoos marking him as a member of the Disciples; and had never attended any meeting of the Disciples. He did testify, however, that he lived in a Disciple neighborhood, and understood that Kings and Disciples are enemies. Defendant added that it is sometimes dangerous to be around gang members and that fights break out between rival gangs. Defendant had friends in both gangs and stated that his friends \u201cknow that I don\u2019t like any trouble.\u201d Defendant admitted that if Pedro was a member of the Kings on February 14, 1995, he was in trouble. However, defendant denied saying Pedro \u201cis a King,\u201d stating: \u201cI said he was a King. That about now I don\u2019t know if he is.\u201d Defendant also denied ever pointing at Pedro or accusing him of \u201cthrowing up the crown.\u201d Defendant did not pay Nieves the $20 and did not report the shooting.\nAt the conclusion of the trial, the court found defendant guilty of first degree murder on a theory of accountability. At sentencing, defendant moved to reopen the case and present newly discovered evidence. The court granted defendant\u2019s motion, vacated the finding of guilty and judgment of conviction, and allowed defendant to present additional witnesses.\nAnthony Rivera, the first additional witness to testify on behalf of defendant, stated that he pleaded guilty to the murder of Pedro Gonzalez and was serving a 35-year sentence. Rivera testified that, the day before the shooting, he had an altercation with Pedro wherein Pedro indicated that he was a King by displaying hand signs. Rivera chased him for several minutes, but did not catch him. On the day of the shooting, Rivera testified, he approached Pedro and asked him why he had displayed King signs. Pedro repeatedly said that he was not a King. Rivera stated that he asked Nieves whether Pedro was a King, and Nieves told him that Pedro was a King. Pedro turned to run and Rivera shot him. Rivera testified that he did not discuss his intention to shoot Pedro with anyone. He did not take the gun from his waistband until Pedro began to run. Rivera did not pay any attention to defendant, who may have been among the group of people at the scene. Rivera stated that while he had seen defendant driving around Elgin, he did not know defendant and had never spoken to him.\nOn cross-examination, Rivera testified that he is a member of the Disciples, but that defendant is not. Rivera stated that he was testifying on defendant\u2019s behalf because, \u201cI\u2019m not going to take an innocent person down with me.\u201d Rivera indicated that he had acted alone in shooting Pedro and that defendant was in no way responsible for Pedro\u2019s death.\nLuis Nieves next testified on behalf of defendant. Nieves stated that he pleaded guilty to the voluntary manslaughter of Pedro Gonzalez and was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. Nieves testified that on February 14, 1995, he, Rivera, and another individual saw three persons whom they recognized as Kings. Nieves said that Rivera began arguing with Pedro about Pedro\u2019s gang affiliation. Nieves told Rivera that Pedro was a King. Nieves stated that defendant arrived on the scene as Pedro began to run. He did not know why defendant was present and did not hear any conversation between Pedro and defendant. According to Nieves, as defendant was approaching, Rivera shot Pedro. Nieves testified that he did not know Rivera had a gun. After the shooting, Nieves did not see defendant. Nieves stated that he was a member of the Disciples in February 1995, but defendant was not a member or an associate of the gang. At the conclusion of his testimony, the trial court questioned Nieves about whether he had ever loaned defendant money. Nieves confirmed that he had loaned defendant ten or twenty dollars and that the debt was outstanding at the time of the shooting.\nFinally, Lieutenant Scott Davis of the Elgin police department testified for the defense. Davis, who had been the assistant to the chief of internal affairs for about six months, testified that Detective Lullo was currently under investigation for two separate incidents of misconduct. One investigation involved inaccuracies in Detective Lullo\u2019s time sheets. The other involved allegations of incorrect statements on a search warrant. Davis indicated that both internal investigations were pending and that no discipline had been issued against Detective Lullo.\nAt the close of the new evidence, the trial court again found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The trial court held that, despite the new evidence, the State had proven the case against defendant beyond a reasonable doubt on an accountability theory.\nOn direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed. No. 2 \u2014 96\u20140744 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court rejected defendant\u2019s arguments that the State did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Detective Lullo to testify concerning defendant\u2019s gang affiliation. Defendant reiterates these arguments in this appeal.\nWe first address defendant\u2019s contention that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to prove him guilty of first degree murder, under an accountability theory, beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed the requisite intent to promote or facilitate a crime. Defendant claims that he did not share the criminal intent of Rivera and that the evidence did not show that he was engaged in a common criminal design. We agree.\n\u201cIn assessing whether the evidence against a defendant was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d People v. Taylor, 186 Ill. 2d 439, 445 (1999); People v. Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1996). A conviction should not be set aside on grounds of insufficient evidence unless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt exists about the defendant\u2019s guilt. Taylor, 186 Ill. 2d at 445; People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 455 (1990).\nIn Illinois, a person is legally accountable for another\u2019s criminal conduct when \u201c[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 1994); People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 96 (1998). To prove that the defendant possessed the intent to promote or facilitate the crime, the State must present evidence which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that either: (1) the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal, or (2) there was a common criminal design. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995); People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218, 234-35 (1992). Intent may be inferred from the character of defendant\u2019s acts as well as the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d at 234.\nIn the instant case, the State attempted to establish that defendant was a member of the Disciples, and thus must have shared Rivera\u2019s motive to harm Pedro, whom Rivera suspected to be a member of a rival gang. However, the appellate court found only that defendant associated with members of the Disciples. Guilt by association is a thoroughly discredited doctrine. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1097, 79 S. Ct. 1040, 1045-46 (1959); see also People v. Bolar, 229 Ill. App. 3d 560, 562 (1992). The fact that defendant lived in a Disciple neighborhood and had friends who were gang members does not establish that he possessed any ill-will toward Pedro. Rather, the evidence presented at trial suggested that defendant did not share Rivera\u2019s motive to harm Pedro, where it was uncontradicted that while Pedro was defendant\u2019s childhood friend, Rivera and defendant had never even spoken to each other. Therefore, we conclude that defendant did not share the criminal intent of the principal, Rivera.\nWe must next determine if the intent requirement of the accountability statute was satisfied by defendant\u2019s participation in a common criminal design. The common design rule provides that where two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts. W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 337. Words of agreement are not necessary to establish a common purpose to commit a crime. People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 141 (1995). Accountability may be established through a person\u2019s knowledge of and participation in the criminal scheme, even though there is no evidence that he directly participated in the criminal act itself. W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 338. Proof that the defendant was present during the perpetration of the offense, that he fled from the scene, that he maintained a close affiliation with his companions after the commission of the crime, and that he failed to report the crime are all factors that the trier of fact may consider in determining the defendant\u2019s legal accountability. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141. Evidence that the defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts, with knowledge of its design, also supports an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his conviction for an offense committed by another. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141.\nHowever, mere presence of a defendant at the scene of a crime does not render him accountable for the offense. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 140. Moreover, and significant here, this court has recently stressed that presence at the commission of the crime, even when joined with flight from the crime or knowledge of its commission, is not sufficient to establish accountability. Taylor, 186 Ill. 2d at 449; People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 323 (1998); Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 108. Accountability focuses on the degree of culpability of the offender and seeks to deter persons from intentionally aiding or encouraging the commission of offenses. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 105. Thus, \u201c[ujnless the accomplice intends to aid the commission of a crime, no guilt will attach.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d at 322.\nApplying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we find that while defendant was present at the scene of the crime, knew of its commission and fled the scene, the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he intentionally aided in or encouraged the crime\u2019s commission. We reject the trial court\u2019s reasoning that, because defendant sometimes associated with members of the Disciples, he must have known that by answering the question about Pedro\u2019s gang status, he was precipitating Pedro\u2019s shooting. While defendant testified, in hindsight, that if Pedro were a King on February 14, 1995, he was in trouble, he also testified that, at the time he answered the question, he did not know Pedro was in trouble. This claim is supported by the uncontested evidence that, when defendant answered the question about Pedro\u2019s gang status, he did not know of the ongoing dispute and prior altercations between Rivera and Pedro, he did not know that Rivera, or anyone at the scene, was armed, and he did not see any signs of impending violence.\nIn order to hold defendant accountable for Pedro\u2019s murder, defendant must have, with the requisite intent, aided or abetted Rivera prior to or during the commission of the offense. See Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 96. Without knowledge of any common criminal design to harm Pedro, defendant could not intentionally aid in the scheme\u2019s commission. See People v. Estrada, 243 Ill. App. 3d 177 (1993) (in the absence of any evidence that defendant was aware that his companion intended to shoot the victim or direct evidence tying defendant to a common design to shoot the victim, defendant\u2019s murder conviction on a theory of accountability was reversed); People v. Taylor, 219 Ill. App. 3d 47 (1991) (State failed to prove that defendant knowingly participated in a common scheme to commit illegal acts where he drove around with friends who, without a plan, dropped concrete from an overpass, killing a motorist; defendant\u2019s involuntary manslaughter conviction based on accountability reversed).\nWe conclude that, despite the deference given to the State on review, no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the intent to promote or facilitate Rivera\u2019s commission of the offense of first degree murder. Accordingly, we hold that the appellate court erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a factfinder could have based defendant\u2019s conviction for first degree murder under the theory of accountability. See Taylor, 186 Ill. 2d at 449. Because we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction, we need not reach the issue he raises concerning the propriety of Detective Lullo\u2019s testimony.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts.\nJudgments reversed.\nJUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Leonard C. Goodman, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Joel Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Rebecca Zavett, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 86376.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VICTOR PEREZ, Appellant.\nOpinion filed February 17, 2000.\nLeonard C. Goodman, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Joel Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Rebecca Zavett, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0254-01", "first_page_order": 266, "last_page_order": 281 }