{ "id": 229703, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GREGORY A. LUMZY, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lumzy", "decision_date": "2000-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 85313", "first_page": "182", "last_page": "193", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 182" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243897 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "82-83", "parenthetical": "Heiple, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261347 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126521 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208129 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "79-80", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209970 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266-68" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243897 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331-32" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327-28" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333-34" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 723, "char_count": 20762, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.497853216988724e-07, "percentile": 0.8091919644736044 }, "sha256": "bc16017c357a9f3eb6184717ccbdcc23b184e8a16c7fc915abe3232768b0b694", "simhash": "1:5a3ff77744271cff", "word_count": 3397 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:29.923058+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GREGORY A. LUMZY, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from a decision by the appellate court which permitted defendant to appeal the length of his prison sentence without first filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 10, 1997, defendant was charged with the offenses of aggravated battery and robbery. On June 23, 1997, defendant pled guilty to robbery in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissal of the aggravated battery charge. The circuit court of Lee County sentenced defendant to seven years in prison.\nOn August 1, 1997 defendant\u2019s attorney filed a motion to reconsider defendant\u2019s sentence. Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and defendant filed a notice of appeal.\nIn the appellate court, defendant\u2019s attorney filed a motion to remand the cause to the circuit court. The motion alleged that defense counsel had failed to file a certificate of compliance as required by Supreme Court Rule 604(d). Defendant therefore sought a remand for the filing of such a certificate.\nIn response to defendant\u2019s motion, the State urged the court to affirm defendant\u2019s conviction on other grounds. The State argued that defendant\u2019s plea was a \u201cnegotiated plea\u201d because the State had agreed to drop the aggravated battery charge in exchange for defendant\u2019s guilty plea. Accordingly, under the rationale of People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), defendant could not ask the court to reconsider the length of his sentence without having first filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.\nThe appellate court, with one justice dissenting, held that defendant could properly challenge the length of his sentence even though he had not filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The appellate court found Evans distinguishable because the defendant in Evans had pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentencing recommendation. In contrast, the agreement between defendant and the State in the instant case was silent as to the sentence defendant could receive. Accordingly, Evans did not preclude defendant\u2019s appeal under the facts of this case. However, because defendant\u2019s attorney had failed to file in the trial court a certificate of compliance with Rule 604(d), the appellate court ordered a remand to the trial court for the filing of such a certificate. No. 3 \u2014 97\u20140633 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nThis court granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nDISCUSSION\nIn arguing for a reversal of the appellate court\u2019s decision, the State goes to great lengths to characterize defendant\u2019s plea in this case as a \u201cnegotiated plea.\u201d Defendant, for his part, argues with equal force that the failure of the parties to agree upon a sentence precludes his plea from being considered \u201cnegotiated.\u201d Indeed, the parties\u2019 focus on whether the plea constituted a \u201cnegotiated plea\u201d is understandable. In Evans, this court held that:\n\u201c[F]or a defendant to prevail in a challenge to a sentence entered pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant must (1) move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment, and (2) show that the granting of the motion is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.\nWhile that terminology used in Evans was perfectly appropriate and adequate to dispose of the issue before the court in that case, it did not, nor did it purport to, address every conceivable type of plea agreement.\nAs Justice Freeman correctly observed in his special concurrence in People v. Linder, \u201cnot all \u2018negotiated\u2019 pleas are the same.\u201d People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 77 (1999) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Indeed, there are at least four distinct plea scenarios which can occur when a defendant decides to enter a plea of guilty. First, a defendant may simply enter a \u201cblind,\u201d or \u201copen,\u201d plea without any inducement from the State. In such a case, both the defendant and the State may argue for any sentence permitted by law. Likewise, the trial court in such a case exercises its full discretion and selects the defendant\u2019s sentence from the range provided by the relevant statute. Because such a plea involves no agreement between the defendant and the State, a defendant\u2019s ability to appeal his conviction or sentence is limited only by the straightforward terms of Rule 604(d).\nAt the other extreme, a defendant may enter a fully negotiated plea under which he agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a specific sentencing recommendation by the State. This was the fact pattern addressed in Evans. In that case, two defendants had each pled guilty pursuant to plea agreements under which the State agreed to drop other pending charges and to recommend a specific sentence. The trial courts accepted the plea agreements and entered judgment thereon. Subsequently, however, each defendant sought to reduce his respective sentence by filing a motion for sentence reconsideration. After those motions were denied, the defendants filed appeals arguing that their sentences were excessive.\nRelying primarily on contract-law principles, this court in Evans rejected the defendants\u2019 attempts to reduce the sentences to which they had agreed as part of their plea bargains without first moving to withdraw their guilty pleas. This court recognized that a contrary rule would permit defendants to hold the State to its side of the bargain, by eliminating the possibility of convictions on the dropped charges or sentences in excess of the agreed-upon recommendation, while reneging on the agreement by trying to unilaterally reduce the sentences to which they had agreed.\nThis court considered a slightly different type of plea agreement in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999). In that case, we considered the consolidated appeals of two defendants who pled guilty pursuant to agreements under which the State agreed to drop other pending charges and to recommend a sentence not to exceed an agreed-upon cap. Under this third type of plea bargain, the State\u2019s ability to argue for the full range of penalties provided for in the Unified Code of Corrections was constrained by the terms of its agreements with the defendants. After the trial judges in Linder accepted the defendants\u2019 guilty pleas and imposed sentences within the caps, both defendants sought on appeal to challenge the sentences imposed upon them as excessive. Once again relying upon the contract-law principles described in Evans, this court held that such appeals were improper where the defendants had not moved to withdraw their guilty pleas. The majority reasoned: \u201cBy agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, a defendant is, in effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap on the grounds that it is excessive.\u201d Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. Accordingly, this court held that it would be fundamentally unfair to permit defendants to unilaterally modify their sides of the plea bargains while simultaneously holding the State to its side of the bargain.\nThe instant case involves a fourth type of guilty plea which is fundamentally different from the pleas this court considered in Evans and Linder. Here, as in Evans and Linder, the State agreed to drop certain charges against defendant in exchange for defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to another charge. In stark contrast to the facts of Evans and Linder, however, the plea bargain in the instant case was utterly silent as to the sentence which defendant would receive. In this case, therefore, both the State and the defendant were free to argue for any sentence provided for in the Unified Code of Corrections. Likewise, the trial court was able to exercise its full discretion in selecting any sentence permitted by law.\nAccordingly, where the record is clear that absolutely no agreement existed between the parties as to defendant\u2019s sentence, defendant manifestly cannot be breaching such a nonexistent agreement by arguing that the sentence which the court imposed was excessive. Defendant never agreed, impliedly or otherwise, to accept whatever sentence the trial court might have imposed. As a consequence, the contract principles which guided this court\u2019s decisions in Evans and Linder cannot prevent defendant from appealing the length of his sentence under the facts of this case.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the appellate court, remanding the cause to the circuit court for the filing of a certificate of compliance with Rule 604(d) and for further proceedings, is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nBut see Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 82-83 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (arguing that defendant did not impliedly agree to accept any sentence below the agreed-upon cap).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\nspecially concurring:\nThe court today correctly holds that our decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), does not require defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in order to appeal the length of his sentence. I write separately in order to explain more fully why I believe this is so.\nIn Evans, this court held that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions contained in Rule 604(d) are inapplicable to situations where a defendant pleads guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement to (i) dismiss other charges and (ii) recommend a specific sentence, a plea arrangement that we characterized as \u201cnegotiated.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Our concern in such cases was that a defendant who attempts to reduce the agreed-upon sentence seeks \u201cto hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentences\u201d earlier agreed upon. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. Relying on principles of contract law, we noted that the guilty plea and the sentence \u201cgo hand in hand\u201d as material elements of the plea bargain. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.\nAs I noted in my special concurrence in People v. Linder, however, not all negotiated pleas are the same. See People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 77-78 (1999) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring) (explaining different plea bargain scenarios). In this case, defendant and the State agreed only as to charging. In exchange for defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to the robbery charge, the State dropped the charge of aggravated battery. As such, the sentence did not go \u201chand in hand\u201d with the plea. The State did not make any facet of sentencing an element of its bargain with defendant. When the State does not provide any sentencing inducement for a defendant in its plea bargain, such a \u201cnegotiated\u201d plea, at least for purposes of the sentencing hearing, more closely resembles an \u201copen\u201d plea in that the trial court retains all of its discretion at sentencing. See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 79-80 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). As a result, the State can argue for a sentence from th\u00e9 full panoply of penalties contained in the Unified Code of Corrections. Therefore, defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence does not run afoul of the agreement because the parties never made the sentence a part of their bargain. In such cases, all contract principles are honored, and none of the concerns of Evans arise.\nNotwithstanding the above, the State argues that, by reducing the charges, the State did make a sentencing concession because the sentence would have been greater had the aggravated battery charge not been dropped. I disagree. As the appellate court has noted, \u201can agreement by the State to reduce or dismiss charges against a defendant in exchange for the defendant\u2019s plea to the reduced or remaining charges, which has the effect of reducing the sentencing range or the number of sentences a defendant could face, [does not] constitute [ ] an implicit agreement as to sentence.\u201d People v. Mast, 305 Ill. App. 3d 727, 732 (1999). By agreeing to drop a charge, the State has made only the concession of forgoing its right to establish defendant\u2019s guilt of that charge. To imply a sentencing concession on the part of the State in this circumstance would require this court to presume that defendant was, in fact, guilty of the charge. Such a presumption would, of course, fly in the face of the presumption of innocence that exists in our criminal justice system.\nThe rule enunciated in Evans focused on returning the parties to their status quo. When a defendant pleads guilty solely in return for the dismissal of charges, the State and defendant receive just what they bargained for, i.e., a guilty plea in exchange for dismissing charges. The parties have not agreed as to the length of the sentence, which is left to the circuit court\u2019s full discretion. Thus, no part of the bargain would be undermined by allowing defendant to seek reconsideration of the sentence decided by the circuit court alone. In reaching the same conclusion, our appellate court has aptly noted that \u201c \u2018 \u201cplea bargaining, when properly administered, is to be encouraged.\u201d \u2019 Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 325, 673 N.E.2d at 247, quoting People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 416, 488 N.E.2d 264, 271 (1985). Therefore, we should avoid a bright-line rule that places meaningless procedural obstacles in the path of an appeal.\u201d People v. Zarka-Nevling, 308 Ill. App. 3d 516, 526 (1999). For these reasons and those expressed in the court\u2019s opinion, I concur in today\u2019s holding.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," }, { "text": "JUSTICE BILANDIC,\ndissenting:\nThe majority has departed from the principles regarding negotiated guilty pleas that this court has set forth in prior decisions. I therefore respectfully dissent.\nThis court in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), interpreted Supreme Court Rule 604(d), which provides that a defendant may not appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty unless the defendant timely \u201cfiles in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.\u201d 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). This court held that the motion-for-sentence-reconsideration provisions of Rule 604(d) apply only to \u201copen,\u201d as opposed to \u201cnegotiated,\u201d guilty pleas. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 331-32. We defined an open guilty plea as one in which a defendant pleads guilty \u201cwithout receiving any promises from the State in return.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Accordingly, we concluded that, following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea, a defendant must move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment, even if the defendant wants to challenge only his sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.\nEvans explained that allowing a defendant to challenge only his sentence following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea would violate basic contract law principles. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. In such a circumstance, the defendant is attempting to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally reneging on or modifying the terms that the defendant had previously agreed to accept. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327-28. For example, the defendants in Evans agreed to plead guilty and, in exchange, the State promised to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 333. The circuit court accepted the plea agreements in both cases and entered judgments in accordance with the terms of the plea agreements. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 333. Thus, the defendants could not seek to reduce their sentences to which they agreed without first moving to vacate their guilty pleas. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 333-34. Accord People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261, 266-68 (1998) (holding that Evans applied where the defendant pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, yet the parties did not agree on whether that sentence would be served consecutively or concurrently with a sentence imposed by another state, but where the applicable statute mandated consecutive sentences).\nSubsequently, in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 74 (1999) , this court determined that the holding in Evans applies to plea agreements in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s promises to dismiss other charges and to recommend a cap on the length of the defendant\u2019s sentence. We reasoned that, by agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for the sentencing cap, the defendant is effectively agreeing not to challenge a sentence imposed below the cap. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. Although the defendant \u201cmay not like the sentencing court\u2019s ultimate disposition, that is a risk he assumes as part of his bargain. A defendant who is unwilling to accept that risk should not agree to a cap rather than a fixed term.\u201d Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. Therefore, in Linder, this court once again applied basic contract principles to the plea agreement and refused to allow a defendant to renege on his part of the bargain.\nIn this case, defendant was charged with robbery, a Class 2 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1 (West 1998)), and aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4 (West 1998)). At a hearing, the circuit court advised defendant of the charges against him and that he faced possible prison sentences of three to seven years for the robbery, and two to five years for the aggravated battery. The circuit court further advised defendant that he could receive extended prison terms and therefore be sentenced to prison terms of 14 and 10 years, respectively. Defendant and the State ultimately reached a plea agreement. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to robbery in exchange for the State\u2019s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge against defendant. The parties presented the plea agreement to the circuit court. The circuit court again advised defendant that he could be sentenced to a maximum of 14 years\u2019 imprisonment for the robbery. The circuit court accepted the plea agreement and, following defendant\u2019s guilty plea to robbery, sentenced defendant to seven years in prison.\nDefendant\u2019s plea agreement is negotiated within the meaning of Evans. Defendant pled guilty in exchange for the State\u2019s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge against him. Because defendant obtained the State\u2019s promise to dismiss this charge, the prison sentence that defendant could have expected to receive was reduced from 12 years to 7 years if extended sentences were not imposed, and from 24 years to 14 years if extended sentences were imposed. The plea agreement that the parties negotiated, therefore, provided defendant the valuable benefit of a less severe sentence than he could have received had he been convicted of both robbery and aggravated battery.\nMoreover, by pleading guilty to robbery in exchange for the State\u2019s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge, defendant, in effect, agreed that a sentence within the statutory range for robbery was appropriate. Defendant was in fact sentenced to seven years in prison for the robbery \u2014 a sentence within the statutory range. Allowing defendant to challenge the length of his sentence in this circumstance without also requiring him to move to withdraw his guilty plea unfairly binds the State to its part of the plea bargain, i.e., the dismissal of the aggravated battery charge, while allowing defendant the opportunity to renege on or modify the terms to which he had previously agreed. Such a result is not proper under this court\u2019s holding in Evans.\nAllowing defendant to modify unilaterally this plea agreement while holding the State to the terms of the agreement will discourage prosecutors from entering into plea agreements. This result will \u201cnot advance our policy of encouraging properly administered plea bargains.\u201d See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 328.\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant was required to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in order to challenge his sentence. Because he did not do so, defendant\u2019s appeal should be dismissed. I therefore respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE BILANDIC," } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel A. Fish, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon (Joel Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Bridget L. Field and Mary Beth Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Lawrence M. Bauer, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 85313.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GREGORY A. LUMZY, Appellee.\nOpinion filed March 23, 2000.\nRehearing denied May 30, 2000.\nRATHJE, J., took no part.\nFREEMAN, J., specially concurring.\nBILANDIC, J., dissenting.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel A. Fish, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon (Joel Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Bridget L. Field and Mary Beth Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Lawrence M. Bauer, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0182-01", "first_page_order": 194, "last_page_order": 205 }