{
  "id": 453264,
  "name": "AURELIA PUCINSKI, Petitioner, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK et al., Respondents",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pucinski v. County of Cook",
  "decision_date": "2000-07-06",
  "docket_number": "No. 88441",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "AURELIA PUCINSKI, Petitioner, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK et al., Respondents."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAurelia Pucinski, clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, brings this original action for mandamus (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(a)) to compel Cook County and its treasurer to pay Real Applications, Ltd., for a mainframe computer and related software purchased by Pucinski for the circuit clerk\u2019s office. Real Applications, Ltd., initially named as a respondent, has been redesignated as a petitioner on the court\u2019s own motion and seeks the same relief as Pucinski. For the reasons that follow, the writ is denied.\nThe verified mandamus petition filed by Pucinski indicates that she accepted a proposal from Real Applications, Ltd., to purchase a new computer and related software for approximately $501,000. Pucinski accepted the proposal in her capacity as clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, and acquired the computer and software for the sole purpose of enabling her to perform her official duties as clerk.\nPucinski believed that payment for the computer and software should be made using money retained by Cook County in its \u201cCourt Document Storage Fund.\u201d The Court Document Storage Fund was established by the county treasurer pursuant to section 27.3c of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/27.3c (West 1998)). It was funded by court document fees charged and collected by the clerk of the circuit court to defray the expense of establishing and maintaining a document storage system in the circuit clerk\u2019s office.\nAccording to section 27.3c of the statute, \u201cany costs relative to the storage of court records, including hardware, software, research and development costs, and related personnel\u201d were payable from the Court Document Storage Fund. 705 ILCS 105/27.3c (West 1998). There is no dispute that the items purchased by Pucinski fell within these categories. There is also no dispute that the county\u2019s Court Document Storage Fund contained sufficient funds to cover the purchase. According to the verified petition, more than $7 million remained in the fund unencumbered at the time Pucinski bought the computer and software from Real Applications, Ltd.\nThe problem with Pucinski\u2019s purchase is that it was not made in accordance with the provisions of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1001 et seq. (West 1998)) and Cook County Ordinances, chapter 10, sections 17 and 18. Specifically, the contract signed by Pucinski with Real Applications, Ltd., did not have the prior approval of the Cook County board of commissioners and was not signed by the president of the board, the county purchasing agent and the comptroller (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 36001 (West 1998); Cook County Ordinances, ch. 10, \u00a7 17) and it was not the subject of competitive bidding (55 ILCS 5/5\u2014 36006 (West 1998); Cook County Ordinances, ch. 10, \u00a718).\nAccording to the mandamus petition, Pucinski requested board approval, but the president of the board declined to put her request on the board\u2019s agenda. Exhibits attached to the petition indicate that the county opposed Pucinski\u2019s plan because it was inconsistent with the county\u2019s efforts to upgrade its own computing facilities and to consolidate county users on a single system.\nWhen the board failed to consider Pucinski\u2019s request, she executed the purchase contract herself in her official capacity. She did so on the grounds that the purchase was necessary in order for her office to perform its statutory and constitutional obligations. Pucinski believed that her solution to her office\u2019s computing problems was superior to the county\u2019s and that she had ultimate authority for determining how her office should be run.\nPucinski accepted a proposal from Real Applications, Ltd., on September 13, 1999. She then sent a letter to the president of the Cook County board advising him of her actions. One week later, on September 20, 1999, Pucinski signed the actual purchase contract. At the direction of the board president, the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney promptly notified Pucinski and Real Applications, Ltd., that the contract was not authorized and that no invoices issued under that contract would be paid. The same day, the new equipment was delivered and installed in Pucinski\u2019s office. When Real Applications, Ltd., failed to receive payment in accordance with the contract, its attorneys sent a demand letter to Pucinski asking for the contract price plus late fees. This litigation followed.\nThe standards governing Pucinski\u2019s petition are well established. The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of public right, \u201cthe performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.\u201d Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). It will not be granted unless the petitioner can show a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the respondent to act, and clear authority in the respondent to comply with the writ. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999).\nThese requirements were not met here. Although clerks of the circuit courts are nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch of state government and not employees of the counties (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 18(b); County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186, 200 (1987)), responsibility for maintaining the clerks\u2019 offices belongs to the counties, not the state. The county boards provide the necessary rooms and office furniture for the clerks, and the cost is paid from the county treasuries. 705 ILCS 105/20 (West 1998). The county boards provide the clerks\u2019 compensation and the \u201camount necessary for clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other expenses.\u201d 705 ILCS 105/27.3 (West 1998). The county boards bear the expense of establishing and maintaining automated record keeping systems and document storage systems in the clerks\u2019 offices (705 ILCS 105/27.3a, 27.3c (West 1998)), and the clerks\u2019 offices are subject to annual audits by the county boards (705 ILCS 105/27.8 (West 1998)).\nBecause operations of the circuit clerks\u2019 offices are paid for by the counties, any payments made from the county treasuries on behalf of the clerks\u2019 offices must comport with the requirements of the Counties Code. In Cook County, the clerk must also meet the requirements of the applicable Cook County ordinances. As previously indicated, the Counties Code and Cook County ordinances expressly require competitive bidding and prior approval by the board for contracts of the magnitude of the one at issue in this case. In addition, section 3 \u2014 10014 of the Counties Code explicitly states that \u201c[n]o money or funds shall be paid out of any county treasury, except in accordance with an order of the county board, or when payment is specially authorized by law to be made.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 10014 (West 1998).\nPucinski contends that subjecting her computer purchase to the requirements of the Counties Code and Cook County ordinances would unduly infringe on her right to run her own office. She likens the situation to one where a county attempts to interfere with the hiring and classification of a circuit clerk\u2019s employees. In such a case, our appellate court has held that the Clerks of Court Act does not empower county boards to control the hiring, firing, promotion, or compensation of deputy clerks hired by the circuit court pursuant to statute. See Kotche v. County Board, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1127, 1131 (1980).\nThe situation here is distinguishable. Personnel matters are not at issue. This dispute involves the Court Document Storage Fund, and a circuit clerk\u2019s authority with respect to that fund is defined by section 27.3c(c) of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/27.3c(c) (West 1998)). Section 27.3c(c) does not confer on circuit court clerks the right to direct how monies in the Court Document Storage Fund should be expended. Appropriate expenditures from the fund for the storage of court records, including expenditures for computer hardware and software, are to be determined by the county in the first instance. Under the express terms of the law, the circuit clerks\u2019 authority is limited to approving such expenditures.\nThere is likewise no merit to Pucinski\u2019s argument that placing her contracts for computer-related purchases under the control of the county contravenes article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides that the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are separate and that \u201cno branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1. The separation of powers provision does not create rigid boundaries prohibiting every exercise of functions by one branch of government which ordinarily are exercised by another. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 367 (1996). It does prohibit the other branches of government from taking action which unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of judges. See Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 411 (1997). That, however, is not an issue here.\nThe right to impose and expend court document storage fees does not derive from the inherent power of the court. It is purely statutory. Absent statutory authorization, the fees could not be collected. Under the terms of the Clerks of Courts Act, which governs the fees, the fees can only be collected if the county board requires them to be. 705 ILCS 105/27.3c(a), (b) (West 1998). Judges have nothing to do with establishment or expenditure of the fees. All judges can do is waive the fee in a particular case. 705 ILCS 105/27.3c(c) (West 1998). After a fee is assessed, it must be remitted to the county treasurer, and the power to make expenditures is vested in the county board, not the judiciary. 705 ILCS 105/27.3c(c) (West 1998). Under these circumstances, requiring expenditure of the funds to comply with the Counties Code and Cook County ordinances does not implicate separation of powers concerns.\nIn reaching this conclusion, we are aware that the freedom of circuit clerks to spend public money for their offices is more circumscribed than some holders of that office would prefer. That, however, is a matter for the legislature. The legislature has determined that counties should fund the operations of the circuit clerks and that expenditures for the circuit clerks\u2019 offices should meet the same requirements as other expenditures from the county treasury. Under the Illinois Constitution, that is the legislature\u2019s prerogative. As long as spending decisions by the counties do not imperil the operation of the courts, separation of powers principles do not warrant intervention by the court.\nFor the foregoing reasons, Pucinski has no basis for compelling Cook County and its treasurer to pay Real Applications, Ltd., for the mainframe computer and related software she purchased for her office. Because the purchases were not made in accordance with the Counties Code and the pertinent Cook County ordinances, any such payments would be contrary to law. The writ is therefore denied.\nA motion by Cook County and the county treasurer to strike part of Pucinski\u2019s brief, which we took with the case, is denied as moot.\nWrit denied.\nJUSTICE FREEMAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Lee J. Schwartz, of Chicago, for petitioner Aurelia Pucinski.",
      "Fern C. Bomchill, Britt M. Miller and James C. Schroeder, of Mayer, Brown & Platt, of Chicago, for petitioner Real Applications, Ltd.",
      "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Thomas M. Burnham and Paul A. Castiglione, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for respondents County of Cook and Maria Pappas.",
      "Thomas F. McGuire, of Long Grove, for amicus curiae Illinois Sheriffs Association."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 88441.\nAURELIA PUCINSKI, Petitioner, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK et al., Respondents.\nOpinion filed July 6, 2000.\nRehearing denied October 2, 2000.\nFREEMAN, J., took no part.\nLee J. Schwartz, of Chicago, for petitioner Aurelia Pucinski.\nFern C. Bomchill, Britt M. Miller and James C. Schroeder, of Mayer, Brown & Platt, of Chicago, for petitioner Real Applications, Ltd.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Thomas M. Burnham and Paul A. Castiglione, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for respondents County of Cook and Maria Pappas.\nThomas F. McGuire, of Long Grove, for amicus curiae Illinois Sheriffs Association."
  },
  "file_name": "0540-01",
  "first_page_order": 550,
  "last_page_order": 558
}
