{ "id": 725333, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY CRANE, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Crane", "decision_date": "2001-01-19", "docket_number": "No. 88454", "first_page": "42", "last_page": "62", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 42" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2896557 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3210532 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "31-month delay between indictment and arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 1003", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5121619 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "12 years between indictment and trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S. Ct. 647", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5367285 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Md. App. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 4439578 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/69/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204451 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5469638 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3187846 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221489 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" }, { "parenthetical": "six-year delay between indictment and arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609108 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887178 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2656354 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205-06" }, { "parenthetical": "29 months between indictment and arrest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156912 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 647", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1480837 ], "weight": 20, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "2693" }, { "page": "651-52" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "2690-91" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "528-29" }, { "page": "2691" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "531-32" }, { "page": "2693" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "2693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228677 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "\"trial court's determination as to who is responsible for a delay of the trial is entitled to much deference, and should be sustained absent a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "1663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229707 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.D. L. Rev. 469", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "S.D. L. Rev.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384-85" }, { "page": "387" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388-89" }, { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2878954 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926227 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781318 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809206 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "182-83" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2902885 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 U.S. 77", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1499425 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "954" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "954" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/198/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170322 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 514", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9139028 ], "weight": 85, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "109" }, { "page": "2185" }, { "page": "519" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "2186" }, { "page": "519" }, { "page": "110-11" }, { "page": "2186" }, { "page": "520" }, { "page": "2187" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "2187" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "2187" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "2187" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "2188" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "2188" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "116-17" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "116-17" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "116-17" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "530-33" }, { "page": "116-19" }, { "page": "2192-93" }, { "page": "530-31" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "530-31" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "2192" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "2190" }, { "page": "525-30" }, { "page": "114-16" }, { "page": "2189-92" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "2193" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "2193" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "2193" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "2193" }, { "page": "533" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "2193" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "2192", "parenthetical": "\"To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge\"" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "2188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173515 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5099105 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0721-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1277, "char_count": 37475, "ocr_confidence": 0.799, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6278914092836053e-07, "percentile": 0.9266963054602797 }, "sha256": "26f7b42d13067c3eb9cd419bda479b3af5f45f01889750364d64de20759a6f0f", "simhash": "1:fa6cf980fb6a5497", "word_count": 6214 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:27:15.890678+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY CRANE, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe are asked to decide whether defendant Anthony Crane\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy retrial was violated when 26 months elapsed between the time the appellate court reversed defendant\u2019s conviction for murder and defendant filed his motion for dismissal on speedy-retrial grounds. After balancing the opposing interests in light of the circumstances of this case, we conclude defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy retrial was not violated.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was arrested on October 31, 1989, for possession of drugs. While in custody, he was questioned about a robbery and arson murder which occurred at McHugh\u2019s tavern earlier that month. On the following day, defendant gave an assistant State\u2019s Attorney a signed, handwritten statement admitting to the arson murder. Defendant was tried in the circuit court of Cook County and convicted of aggravated arson and first degree murder and sentenced to natural life imprisonment.\nOn May 28, 1993, the appellate court reversed the convictions (People v. Crane, 244 Ill. App. 3d 721 (1993)), finding that the testimony presented at the suppression hearing failed to establish probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest and, consequently, that the trial court erred when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his confession. Defendant\u2019s convictions were overturned and the matter was remanded for a new trial.\nThe State petitioned this court for leave to appeal. We denied the petition on October 6, 1993. People v. Crane, 152 Ill. 2d 566 (1993). The State then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The appellate court\u2019s mandate was recalled pending resolution of the State\u2019s petition. 155 Ill. 2d R. 368.\nOn February 28, 1994, the Unites States Supreme Court denied the State\u2019s application. Upon receiving notification of the denial, the appellate court\u2019s mandate should have been reissued. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 368. However, in this case the mandate was not transmitted to the circuit court until February 2, 1995.\nAfter the mandate was received, the case was placed on the circuit court docket. On March 15, 1995, defendant made his first appearance before the trial court. On that date, defendant\u2019s attorney was unavailable and a continuance was granted to March 21, 1995. On March 21, 1995, defendant agreed to a May 31, 1995, trial date. On May 31, 1995, defendant answered ready and demanded trial. The case was continued on the State\u2019s motion until July 31, 1995. On July 31, 1995, defendant moved for dismissal of the charges against him, alleging the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy retrial because \u201cmore than a reasonable length of time has elapsed since cert was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.\u201d Defendant also alleged his statutory right to a speedy retrial was violated because \u201cmore them 120 days has elapsed since [his] case was remanded.\u201d On September 7, 1995, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal, giving no explanation for its decision.\nAfter other pretrial issues were resolved, defendant\u2019s second trial commenced on October 15, 1996. Defendant again was found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated arson. He later was sentenced to a term of 75 years\u2019 imprisonment on the murder conviction and a concurrent term of 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for the aggravated arson.\nOn appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant\u2019s convictions. 307 Ill. App. 3d 816. Applying the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), the appellate court ruled that defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy retrial had been violated. In assessing defendant\u2019s claim, the appellate court held: the delay in bringing defendant to trial after his convictions were reversed \u2014 a period of 26 months until defendant moved for dismissal \u2014 was presumptively prejudicial; that defendant did not waive his right to a speedy trial by his inaction; and that defendant was severely prejudiced because he remained incarcerated during the entire 26-month period. In addition, the appellate court held the unexplained delay of 11 months, though not a deliberate attempt to circumvent defendant\u2019s speedy-trial rights, was unjustified. Based on this unexcused \u201clengthy delay,\u201d the appellate court concluded that defendant had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and dismissed the indictment.\nWe granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nANALYSIS\nBoth the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Illinois guarantee to anyone accused of a crime the right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const., amend. VI (\u201c[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial\u201d); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8 (\u201cIn criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right *** to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury\u201d). The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is fundamental and, like other sixth amendment rights, is made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).\nAlthough it had long been held that determining whether an accused had been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial depended on \u201ccircumstances\u201d (Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 49 L. Ed. 950, 954, 25 S. Ct. 573, 576 (1905)), in Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court recognized that there was a need to set out \u201ccriteria by which [a constitutional]. speedy trial right is to be judged.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 516, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 109, 92 S. Ct. at 2185. In doing so, the Barker Court analyzed the nature of the speedy-trial right and found it was \u201cgenetically different\u201d from other constitutionally guaranteed protections. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 110, 92 S. Ct. at 2186. One reason is because \u201cthere is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 519, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 110-11, 92 S. Ct. at 2186. Society\u2019s interests are not served, the Barker Court held, when delay in prosecution contributes to court backlog, allows defendants released on bail an opportunity to commit more crimes, prevents defendants from receiving rehabilitation, and lengthens pretrial detention, which causes overcrowding in jails and is costly. Barker, 407 U.S. at 520, 33 L. Ed. 2d at Ill, 92 S. Ct. at 2187.\nThe speedy-trial right also differs from other rights because abridgment of the right to a speedy trial may, at times, work to the advantage of the accused and against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 111, 92 S. Ct. at 2187. Delay is often used as a defense tactic. For this reason, the Barker Court observed, \u201cdeprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused\u2019s ability to defend himself.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112, 92 S. Ct. at 2187.\nFinally, the Barker Court noted that the right to a speedy trial is \u201ca more vague concept than other procedural rules,\u201d which makes it \u201cimpossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112, 92 S. Ct. at 2187. Instead, determining whether an accused\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated \u201cnecessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112, 92 S. Ct. at 2188. Because of the seriousness of the remedy \u2014 \u201ca defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried\u201d \u2014 the right to a speedy trial should always be in balance, and not inconsistent, with the rights of public justice. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112, 92 S. Ct. at 2188.\nThe indistinct quality of the constitutional speedy-trial right has been recognized by this court. In People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 316 (1970), we held the constitutional right to a speedy trial \u201ccannot be defined in terms of an absolute or precise standard of time, within which an accused must be given trial.\u201d In People v. Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d 177, 181 (1977), we announced that whenever a constitutional speedy-trial claim has been raised, \u201c[t]he record in its totality must be examined to ascertain whether the defendant has enjoyed the right guaranteed by the constitution.\u201d\nIn an attempt to provide some structure for a court\u2019s inquiry into whether an individual has been deprived of his constitutional speedy-trial right, the Barker Court identified four factors that may be considered: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and defendant\u2019s assertion of his right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116-17, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. Deciding whether a defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing of these four factors. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116-17, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d at 182-83; Henry, 47 Ill. 2d at 316.\nBecause of the imprecise nature of the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial, our legislature enacted section 103 \u2014 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5 (West 1998)). This statute specifies certain time periods within which a defendant must be brought to trial. The statute implements the constitutional guarantee, but is not equivalent to, or coextensive with, the constitutional right. People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419 (1994); Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d at 181. When a defendant asserts a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the statute \u201c \u2018operates to prevent the constitutional claim from arising except in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues.\u2019 \u201d People v. Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 441 (1973), quoting People v. Stuckey, 34 Ill. 2d 521, 523 (1966).\nIn this appeal, the only issue presented to this court is whether defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy-retrial right has been violated.\nStandard of Review\nAs a preliminary matter, we address the dispute over the proper standard for review. We have held that \u201c[wjhether an accused has been denied a speedy trial within the constitution is a judicial question,\u201d unrestricted by legislative time limitations. Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d at 181. However, the degree of deference to be paid a lower court\u2019s determination on a defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy-trial claim has never been addressed by this court.\nAccording to the State, a trial court faced with a constitutional speedy-trial claim exercises discretion when it balances the four Barker factors. For this reason, the State contends, a reviewing court should be limited to deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion. The State urges us to find that the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court\u2019s ruling because, according to the State, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that defendant\u2019s constitutional right had not been violated.\nDefendant, however, contends a trial court\u2019s ruling on a constitutional speedy-trial claim should be accorded no deference. Defendant asserts that a reviewing court should consider a constitutional speedy-trial claim de novo and engage in its own balancing of the Barker factors to decide whether a constitutional violation has been shown.\nNeither the State, nor the defendant, provides citation to case law in support of their respective positions, and our own independent review of state and federal case law has revealed no definitive answer on this issue. For this reason, in resolving this issue, we look to general principles concerning standards of review.\nIn People V. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998), we were asked to determine the proper standard of review to be applied when a defendant appealed from a trial court\u2019s dismissal of a post-conviction petition when no evidentiary hearing had been held. We reviewed at length the various standards of review and found that \u201c[t]he manifestly erroneous standard represents the typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by a trial judge.\u201d We further found that the abuse of discretion standard was \u201c \u2018the most deferential standard of review available\u2019 \u201d and should be reserved \u201cfor those decisions of the lower court which deserve great deference on review.\u201d Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 387, quoting M. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 469, 480 (1988).\nWe determined that neither standard was proper when reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction proceeding, since at this stage no factual issues had to be decided by the trial court. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388. A court of review would have the same ability as the trial court in the first instance to assess the allegations and, thus, there would be little justification for giving the trial court\u2019s conclusions deference. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388-89. Accordingly, we held \u201cthe appropriate standard for this question is that of plenary review.\u201d Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388-89.\nRecently, in In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37 (2000), we determined the proper standard for reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling that a defendant\u2019s statement was not voluntarily given and should be suppressed. Relying on the Supreme Court\u2019s pronouncement in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), we held:\n\u201c[I]n reviewing whether respondent\u2019s confession was voluntary, we will accord great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, we will review de novo the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary.\u201d In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50.\nWe derive from our decisions in In re G.O. and Coleman a basic principle. When a trial court rules on issues which present a mixed question of law and fact, the reviewing court must afford deference to a trial court\u2019s factual findings. A reviewing court, however, remains free to engage in its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted.\nThis is the appropriate standard to be applied here. When resolving a constitutional speedy-trial claim, any factual determinations made by the trial court, which are contained in the record, shall be upheld on review unless they are. against the manifest weight of the evidence. This standard of review is already applied to factual determinations in statutory speedy-trial cases. See People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 115 (1998) (\u201ctrial court\u2019s determination as to who is responsible for a delay of the trial is entitled to much deference, and should be sustained absent a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion\u201d); People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540 (1989). However, when a trial court performs the Barker balanc.ing test and weighs the interests of the State against the interests of the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case, there is no need to afford deference to a trial court\u2019s determination. The trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to balance the competing concerns. For this reason, we conclude that the ultimate determination of whether a defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy-trial right has been violated is subject to de novo review.\nHaving decided the proper standard of review, we now proceed to a consideration of defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy-trial claim. As noted earlier, this necessitates our balancing the factors set forth in Barker-, the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and defendant\u2019s assertion of his right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116-17, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. All four factors are closely related and no one factor is necessary or sufficient to a finding that the right to a speedy trial has been violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 116-19, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93.\nThe Barker Factors\nWhen assessing a constitutional speedy-trial claim, the first consideration is the length of the delay. Since a certain amount of delay is \u201cinevitable and wholly justifiable\u201d (Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 531, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1992)), a speedy-trial inquiry will not be triggered unless the complained-of delay crosses the threshold from ordinary to \u201c \u2018presumptively prejudicial.\u2019 \u201d Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528, 112 S. Ct. at 2690-91, quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; People v. Singleton, 278 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299 (1996); People v. Belcher, 186 Ill. App. 3d 202, 205-06 (1989).\nIn general, courts have recognized a delay approaching one year to be \u201cpresumptively prejudicial.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; People v. Lock, 266 Ill. App. 3d 185, 191 (1994). A finding of \u201cpresumptive prejudice,\u201d however, does not imply that the delay will be found to have actually prejudiced the defendant. Rather, \u201cit simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.\u201d Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528 n.1, 112 S. Ct. at 2691 n.1.\nIn this case, defendant moved for dismissal on speedy-trial grounds when he had not been retried after 26 months had elapsed since his convictions had been reversed. We find that this length of delay is sufficient to trigger a speedy-trial analysis.\nHaving decided that a speedy-trial inquiry has been triggered, we must next consider the reason for the delay. The State bears the burden of providing justification for any delay which has occurred. People v. Singleton, 278 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299 (1996); People v. Belcher, 186 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1989). Reasons which may be offered to explain a delay are assigned different weight. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. For example, evidence that the State intentionally delayed prosecution to gain some tactical advantage will weigh very heavily against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. Other more neutral reasons, such as a crowded court docket (People v. Wills, 153 Ill. App. 3d 328 (1987)), faulty police procedure, negligence, or incompetence (Singleton, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 300; see Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528-29, 112 S. Ct. at 2691), though still charged against the State, will be weighed less heavily. People v. Williams, 299 Ill. App. 3d 143, 148 (1998). Other reasons for delay, such as the unavailability or inability to locate a competent witness (People v. Sanders, 86 Ill. App. 3d 457 (1980)), or a judge\u2019s illness (People v. Dorsey, 105 Ill. App. 3d 895 (1982)), are generally held to be valid explanations, justifying a reasonable period of delay.\nIn the present case, different reasons were advanced for different portions of the 26-month period of delay. The 26-month delay was broken down into three segments: (1) a nine-month period between May 28, 1993, and February 28, 1994, during which the State sought review of the appellate court\u2019s reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions; (2) an 11-month period between February 28, 1994, and February 2, 1995, when no action was taken on the case because the appellate mandate was not reissued; and (3) a six-month period between February 2, 1995, when the mandate was issued, and July 31, 1995, when defendant moved for dismissal on speedy-trial grounds. We assess the reasons for these smaller periods of delay separately to determine whether they constitute justification for the delay.\n1. May 28, 1993, to February 28, 1994\nFollowing the reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions, the State appealed, first to this court and then to the United States Supreme Court. Nine months were consumed by these appellate proceedings. The appellate court, when ruling on defendant\u2019s speedy-trial claim, found this period of delay \u201cfully justified.\u201d We agree.\nIn United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640, 652, 106 S. Ct. 648, 654 (1986), the United States Supreme Court considered, in a constitutional speedy-trial context, \u201chow to weigh the delay occasioned by an interlocutory appeal when the defendant is subject to indictment or restraint.\u201d The Loud Hawk Court held:\n\u201cGiven the important public interests in appellate review [citation] it hardly need be said that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay. In assessing the purpose and reasonableness of such an appeal, courts may consider several factors. These include the strength of the Government\u2019s position on the appealed issue, the importance of the issue in the posture of the case, and \u2014 in some cases \u2014 the seriousness of the crime.\u201d Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 654, 106 S. Ct. at 656.\nAlthough Loud Hawk discussed interlocutory appeals, the Court observed, generally:\n\u201c[Tjhere are important public interests in the process of appellate review. The assurance that motions to suppress evidence or to dismiss an indictment are correctly decided through orderly appellate review safeguards both the rights of defendants and the \u2018rights of public justice.\u2019 \u201d Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 313, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 106 S. Ct. at 655, quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 49 L. Ed. 950, 954, 25 S. Ct. 573, 576 (1905).\nWe find the reasoning in Loud Hawk applicable here. Applying its rationale, we find the nine-month delay in the matter at bar was justified.\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s murder and arson convictions were reversed after the appellate court, contrary to the trial court, found the State failed to establish probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest and suppressed defendant\u2019s confession. A confession is a vital piece of evidence and its suppression could compromise the State\u2019s prosecution. Consequently, it was reasonable for the State to seek review before proceeding to a new trial on this serious offense. Despite the State\u2019s lack of success, we do not find the appeal to have been frivolous or pursued in bad faith. Further, we do not find the nine-month delay to be unduly long. We conclude, therefore, that this period of delay was justified and should be given no effective weight towards defendant\u2019s speedy-trial claim.\nAs additional support for this determination, we note that, under Illinois law, the State has an absolute right to appeal \u201cfrom an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in *** quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence\u201d and that \u201c[t]he time during which an appeal by the State is pending is not counted for the purpose of determining whether an accused is entitled to discharge under section 103 \u2014 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.\u201d 145 Ill. 2d Rs. 604(a)(1), (a)(4).\nAlthough Rule 604(a) is not directly implicated in cases where, as here, defendant invokes his constitutional speedy-trial rights, the rule provides support for the notion that an appeal by the State is a valid reason which justifies delay. If the State reasonably exercises its right to pursue an appeal, it should not have to risk that the delay will be grounds for dismissal of the charges it seeks to enforce.\n2. February 28, 1994, to February 2, 1995\nWhen the United States Supreme Court denied the State\u2019s petition for certiorari on February 28, 1994, the appeal process was completed. The appellate court\u2019s mandate should have been reissued within a reasonable time. However, for no apparent reason, the mandate was not reissued until February 5, 1995 \u2014 11 months later. The State claims the reason for this 11-month delay was \u201cadministrative error.\u201d Defendant does not dispute this explanation or contend that the delay was intentional.\nThere can be no doubt that the failure of the clerk\u2019s office to fulfill its duty to forward the mandate in a prompt and expeditious manner constitutes negligence, which is neither reasonable nor an acceptable cause for delay. Furthermore, since the State bears the burden of bringing a defendant to trial, this delay cannot be attributed to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 115, 92 S. Ct. at 2190. Consequently, as the Court proclaimed in Doggett, \u201c[although negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused\u2019s defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun.\u201d Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 531-32, 112 S. Ct. at 2693.\nWe do not determine at this juncture, however, what weight should be given this period of unjustified delay. \u201c[Tjoleration of *** negligence varies inversely with its protractedness *** and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused\u2019s trial.\u201d Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 532, 112 S. Ct. at 2693. This period of delay must be viewed in conjunction with the other Barker factors before a determination can be made about its importance to the speedy-trial analysis.\n3. February 2, 1995, to July 31, 1995\nThe last segment of delay consists of the six months between the time the mandate reissued and when defendant moved for dismissal. During this time both the State and the defendant were preparing for trial.\nWhen the appellate court reviewed this period of delay it found, \u201cThe prosecution admits its responsibility for three months of the remaining six-month delay, but the prosecution provided an acceptable explanation for those three months. The defendant shares responsibility for about three months of the *** delay.\u201d 307 Ill. App. 3d at 819.\nIn his brief before this court, defendant accepts responsibility for the delay from March 15, 1995, until May 31, 1995. The defendant does not challenge the appellate court\u2019s ruling that the State adequately explained the remaining period of delay. Consequently, we accept the appellate court\u2019s finding that this period of delay was justified.\nHaving considered the reasons for the delay, we consider the third Barker factor \u2014 defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. In the present case, defendant did not demand trial until May 1995 \u2014 24 months after the reversal of his first conviction. He moved for dismissal of the indictment two months later.\nDefendant has made no attempt to explain his apparent acquiescence to the State\u2019s inaction during the 24 months preceding his demand for trial. Instead, he contends only that his own inaction is not evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his speedy-trial right and that waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record.\nDefendant\u2019s argument is misplaced. Although it is true that, courts may not presume a defendant\u2019s waiver of a fundamental right from his inaction, this does not mean a defendant will be completely absolved from all responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 525-30, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 114-16, 92 S. Ct. at 2189-92. Separate from any consideration of waiver, the Barker Court held that a defendant\u2019s conduct in asserting, or failing to assert, his rights was a factor to be weighed in the balancing test and that \u201cfailure to assert the right [would] make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. Consequently, when assessing defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy-trial claim, his assertion of the right may be factored into the balancing test.\nIn the case at bar, defendant was aware of the charges of murder and arson which were pending against him. He had already been tried and found guilty on these charges and, although his convictions had been reversed, a new trial had been ordered. Furthermore, since defendant remained incarcerated following the reversal of his convictions, he had to be aware that the State intended to retry him on those charges. Yet, defendant never demanded trial until 24 months had passed.\nThe appellate court dismissed defendant\u2019s inaction, speculating that \u201cuntil the trial court regained jurisdiction, with the issuance of the mandate, defendant may not have recognized any obvious forum in which he could assert his right to a speedy trial.\u201d However, defendant\u2019s delay may be attributable to other reasons. It is conceivable that defendant\u2019s strategy was to forgo his right,to a speedy trial in the hope that witnesses necessary to the prosecution would be lost and the State would choose not to retry him. Such was the case in Jackson v. State, 69 Md. App. 645, 519 A.2d 751 (1987).\nWe conclude, then, that defendant\u2019s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial should not be viewed as a completely neutral factor. Had defendant asserted his right during the 11 months his case was lost due to administrative error, the oversight would have been discovered and corrected. Defendant\u2019s failure to make any demand for trial in 24 months subsequent to the reversal of his convictions may be considered together with the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether a constitutional speedy-trial violation has been shown.\nThe fourth and final consideration is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice \u201cshould be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. Those interests are: the prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, the minimization of defendant\u2019s anxiety and concern about the pending charge, and the limitation of the possibility that the defense will be impaired by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 2193; People v. Moore, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1994).\nIn this case, defendant has produced no particularized evidence that his defense was impaired by the delay. Defendant, however, remained incarcerated through the 26-month period. The impairment of defendant\u2019s liberty is an element of prejudice which cannot be ignored. Detention prior to a proper adjudication is exactly the type of prejudice that the speedy-trial clause was intended to protect against. This prejudice weighs heavily against the State.\nApplying the Barker Balancing Test\nThe four Barker factors, which we have reviewed above, \u201chave no talismanic qualities.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 93 S. Ct. at 2193. They are merely the criteria which have been found relevant and useful to an evaluation of a defendant\u2019s constitutional speedy-trial claim. As observed earlier, the factors are interrelated and a constitutional speedy-trial violation will not be conditioned on the presence or absence of any single factor. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. Once the factors have been considered, \u201ccourts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 118, 92 S. Ct. at 2193.\nOur initial observation is that the posture of the case at bar differs from most cases that have come before the courts on constitutional speedy-trial claims. Generally, courts have been concerned with prolonged delays between indictment and trial or indictment and arrest. See Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (5 years between indictment and trial, 10 months of which defendant was incarcerated); Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 112 S. Ct. 647 (81/2-year lag between indictment and arrest); People v. Prince, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1003 (1993) (12 years between indictment and trial); People v. Williams, 299 Ill. App. 3d 143 (1998) (six-year delay between indictment and arrest); People v. Belcher, 186 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1989) (29 months between indictment and arrest); People v. Yaeger, 84 Ill. App. 3d 415 (1980) (31-month delay between indictment and arrest). In several instances, the defendants were not even aware that charges had been brought against them.\nIn this case, however, defendant received a trial and was found guilty of murder and aggravated arson. On appeal from those convictions, the reviewing court found that the evidence of probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest was lacking and, as a result, the fruit of that arrest \u2014 defendant\u2019s confession \u2014 should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. Defendant\u2019s convictions were reversed and a new trial was ordered. While awaiting retrial, defendant remained incarcerated. A period of 24 months passed before defendant demanded retrial and another two months passed before he objected to the delay and sought dismissal of the charges against him, claiming he had been denied his right to speedy retrial.\nWhen the appellate court performed its balancing test, it gave no consideration to the fact that defendant failed to assert his right to a speedy retrial in the 26 months subsequent to the reversal of his convictions. Consequently, once the appellate court found that defendant had been incarcerated for an 11-month period of unjustified delay, it found \u201clittle to balance.\u201d This is where the appellate court erred.\nLike the appellate court, we have analyzed the 26-month delay and found that more than half of this period of time \u2014 15 months \u2014 was justified and should not be used as the basis for finding a denial of defendant\u2019s speedy-trial rights. The remaining 11-month period of delay was not justified, but was due to administrative oversight. Because of the seriousness of the crime involved, we do not find an 11-month delay extraordinary. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (\u201cTo take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge\u201d).\nWe agree with the appellate court that defendant demonstrated prejudice because he remained incarcerated throughout the period of delay. This factor is a significant consideration in the speedy-trial analysis since \u201cthe Speedy Trial Clause\u2019s core concern is impairment of liberty.\u201d Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 652, 106 S. Ct. at 654. Nevertheless, unlike the appellate court, we find the prejudice defendant suffered cannot be properly assessed unless we also consider defendant\u2019s failure to assert his speedy-trial right. Although defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, we merely observe that an earlier assertion of his right could have corrected the error that occurred here and prevented some of the delay.\nThe circumstances of this case are unique. Upon the completion of appellate proceedings, the reviewing court clerk failed to reissue the mandate. Under the particular circumstances of this case, dismissal of the charges is too severe a remedy for the negligence which occurred, especially in light of the defendant\u2019s inaction and the seriousness of the offenses involved.\nThe balancing we are required to perform here is more than an abstract computation of individual factors. It must take into account the rights of the defendant, but does not preclude the rights of public justice. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 112, 92 S. Ct. at 2188. In our view, when balancing the competing concerns in this case, the prejudice suffered by defendant due to his unjustified incarceration for an 11-month period does not warrant a finding that defendant\u2019s speedy-trial right was denied. The indictment against defendant should not have been dismissed.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. However, because that court did not address certain alleged trial errors due to its reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction on speedy-trial grounds, we remand this cause to the appellate court for consideration of defendant\u2019s remaining arguments.\nAppellate court judgment reversed;\ncause remanded.\nRespite this additional 13-month delay, the record does not show that defendant renewed his speedy-trial claim.\nIn the appellate court, defendant also claimed a violation of his statutory speedy-trial right. Although the appellate court made no explicit finding with regard to the statutory claim, the appellate court implicitly found no statutory violation when it ruled that defendant shared responsibility for at least three months of the delay since the mandate was reissued. It is well settled that, when a defendant prevails in an Illinois court of review, a new statutory 120-day term will commence running when the mandate issues and is docketed in the trial court. People v. Worley, 45 Ill. 2d 96, 98 (1970). In this case the mandate issued on February 2, 1995, and defendant moved for dismissal almost six months later, on July 31, 1995. The appellate court\u2019s ruling that defendant shared responsibility for at least three months of this delay extinguished his statutory claim.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Patricia Mysza, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 88454.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY CRANE, Appellee.\nOpinion filed January 19, 2001.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Patricia Mysza, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0042-01", "first_page_order": 56, "last_page_order": 76 }