{ "id": 725334, "name": "ILLINOIS PRESS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees, v. GEORGE H. RYAN, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Press Ass'n v. Ryan", "decision_date": "2001-01-19", "docket_number": "No. 88597", "first_page": "63", "last_page": "70", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 63" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "53 F.R.D. 98", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 3735191 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/53/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. Ct. 1410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 L. Ed. 2d 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 950", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11985923, 11986169, 11985807, 11985746, 11986009, 11986108 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0950-03", "/us/410/0950-06", "/us/410/0950-02", "/us/410/0950-01", "/us/410/0950-04", "/us/410/0950-05" ] }, { "cite": "321 F. Supp. 1385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3190108 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/321/1385-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464225 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "\"We note, however, that in none of these decisions was the question of standing raised. Those decisions, therefore, are not authority for the position urged by the plaintiff'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778585 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147642 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 Ill. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460428 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/399/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549613 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0462-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 582, "char_count": 13163, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8333834214757407e-08, "percentile": 0.3625844595572947 }, "sha256": "0ebb766807eec6a1ef3c57da299e1e85c940820a956a74e8a29a325feabb937c", "simhash": "1:84e4be3f332bfe53", "word_count": 2108 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:27:15.890678+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS PRESS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees, v. GEORGE H. RYAN, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, the Illinois Press Association and many of its member newspapers, brought this action for a declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Sangamon County against the Governor of the State of Illinois, George H. Ryan. The plaintiffs sought a determination that a provision of the Illinois Constitution requires that ethics commissions created under the State Gift Ban Act (5 ILCS 425/1 et seq. (West 1998)) conduct their proceedings in public. The circuit court held that proceedings of one of the commissions established by the Act, that serving the legislative branch, must be public, to comply with the constitution. The Governor brings this appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1).\nThe State Gift Ban Act prohibits various officers and employees of the three branches of state government from soliciting or receiving gifts from certain sources. To enforce the provisions of the legislation, the Act establishes separate ethics commissions, applicable to employees and officers of the executive branch generally, of four other constitutional offices \u2014 Attorney General, Secretary of State, Comptroller, and Treasurer \u2014 and of the legislative and judicial branches. 5 ILCS 425/45 (West 1998). The Act also prescribes procedures that the commissions must follow when considering ethics complaints filed against persons subject to the Act\u2019s requirements. The Act directs the commissions to meet in closed session at various stages of these proceedings. 5 ILCS 425/60(c), (d) (West 1998).\nIn May 1999, the Illinois Press Association and a number of its members filed the instant action in the circuit court of Sangamon County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ethics commissions created by the Act must conduct their proceedings in public. The plaintiffs argued that public proceedings were required by article IV\u00a1 section 5(c), of the Illinois Constitution, which provides:\n\u201cSessions of each house of the General Assembly and meetings of committees, joint committees and legislative commissions shall be open to the public. Sessions and committee meetings of a house may be closed to the public if two-thirds of the members elected to that house determine that the public interest so requires; and meetings of joint committees and legislative commissions may be so closed if two-thirds of the members elected to each house so determine.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I\\( \u00a7 5(c).\nThe Governor moved to dismiss the action. The Governor argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because there did not then exist any actual controversy regarding the proceedings of any of the ethics commissions. The Governor also contended that he was not a proper party defendant in the case because he had no authority or control over the various commissions, beyond his power to appoint the members of one of the commissions, that for the Governor. See 5 ILCS 425/45(a)(l) (West 1998). With respect to the merits of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, the Governor argued that the commissions established by the Act were not \u201clegislative commissions\u201d and therefore did not fall within the purview of article I\\( section 5(c), of the Illinois Constitution.\nThe circuit judge rejected the Governor\u2019s argument that no controversy existed. The judge believed that the plaintiffs could seek declaratory relief in advance of commission proceedings. The judge also concluded that the Governor was a proper party defendant in a case like this, involving a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. The circuit judge determined, however, that the only ethics commission to come within the scope of the provision in article iy section 5(c), of the Illinois Constitution was the one created for the legislative branch, because only its members were appointed by the legislature. The judge therefore allowed the plaintiffs\u2019 action to proceed only with respect to that commission.\nThe circuit judge later heard arguments on the application of article iy section 5(c), to the legislative branch\u2019s ethics commission. In a written order, the court ruled that the constitutional provision applied to the commission and that the proceedings of the commission must therefore be public. The court noted that the General Assembly, in enacting the Gift Ban Act, did not exempt the ethics commission serving the legislature from the requirements of article iy section 5(c), as the legislature is authorized to do under that provision. Because the effect of the court\u2019s ruling was to invalidate, on constitutional grounds, the provisions of section 60 of the Gift Ban Act directing the General Assembly\u2019s ethics commission to meet in closed session, the Governor brings the present appeal directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1).\nThe Governor renews here his contention that he is not a proper party defendant in this action. The Governor observes that he has no authority or control over the operations of the legislative branch\u2019s ethics commission, which is the sole focus of the present appeal, and he maintains that any ruling or remedy entered in the case cannot be binding on the commission or its members. The Governor concludes that the instant appeal must be dismissed because he is the only defendant in the matter. We agree.\nDeclaratory relief may be obtained only when there is \u201can actual controversy between adverse parties.\u201d Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 493 (1988). A court should \u201crefuse to enter a declaratory judgment or order, if it appears that the judgment or order, would not terminate the controversy or some part thereof, giving rise to the proceeding.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701(a) (West 1998).\nWe do not believe that the Governor is a proper party to this action. The only ethics commission at issue here is the one that serves the legislative branch. The Governor represents a different branch of government, however. He has no authority over the legislative branch\u2019s commission; he does not select its members or exercise any control over the manner in which it conducts its proceedings. The plaintiffs and the Governor are not adverse parties to any dispute involving the ethics commission for the legislative branch of government. Accordingly, we do not believe that the present case involves an actual controversy between the plaintiffs and the Governor, a prerequisite for declaratory relief. See Saline Branch Drainage District v. Urbana-Champaign Sanitary District, 399 Ill. 189, 195-96 (1948). The plaintiffs\u2019 claim here centers on the statutory provision that directs the legislative branch ethics commission to meet in closed session at certain stages in the proceedings. In granting the plaintiffs relief, the circuit court directed the commission to make its meetings \u201copen to the public to the extent mandated by the Illinois Constitution.\u201d The plaintiffs\u2019 argument thus challenges the manner in which the commission conducts its business and the way in which it would apply the statute, as enacted. But as the federal court of appeals has noted:\n\u201cA person aggrieved by the application of a legal rule does not sue the rule maker \u2014 Congress, the President, the United States, a state, the state\u2019s legislature, the judge who announced the principle of common law. He sues the person whose acts hurt him.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Quinones v. City of Evanston, 58 E3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 1995).\nIn the present case, the plaintiffs have brought this action against the Governor in his capacity as chief executive. But the absence of any connection between the Governor and the subject of the suit \u2014 the actions of the legislative branch\u2019s ethics commission \u2014 demonstrates to us that the Governor is not a proper party to defend the challenged legislation. When the circuit court limited the scope of the plaintiffs\u2019 action to the legislative branch ethics commission, the court also effectively severed any possible connection between the only named defendant and the case. For these reasons, too, any order entered in this case directing the commission to meet publicly rather than in closed session would not bind the commission or its members, for they are not parties to this action. See Zurich Insurance Co. v. Baxter International, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 235, 246 (1996). Thus, an adjudication of the merits of this appeal, involving only these parties, would constitute merely an advisory opinion.\nOpposing this result, the plaintiffs argue that this court allowed a similar action to go forward against Governor Edgar in Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162 (1993). The plaintiff in that case brought suit against the Governor and the Attorney General, seeking a declaration that a provision in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act was unconstitutional, and the case was resolved on its merits, even though the Governor was named a party to the action and had no direct relationship to or control over the legislation challenged there. The plaintiffs in the present case thus argue that, just as the statute in Messenger could be challenged in a declaratory judgment action against the Governor and the Attorney General, so too should we allow the present suit to proceed against the Governor.\nThis court\u2019s opinion in Messenger discussed the plaintiffs standing to bring the suit, but the opinion did not also examine whether either the Governor or the Attorney General was a proper party to the action, for the defendants\u2019 status as proper parties was not questioned there. Accordingly, we do not believe that Messenger stands for the proposition the plaintiff would derive from it. See Underground Contractors Ass\u2019n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 376 (1977) (\u201cWe note, however, that in none of these decisions was the question of standing raised. Those decisions, therefore, are not authority for the position urged by the plaintiff\u2019).\nTwo other cases cited by the plaintiffs do not compel a different result. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950, 35 L. Ed. 2d 682, 93 S. Ct. 1410 (1973), involved a challenge in federal court to an Illinois abortion statute. The district court concluded that the Attorney General was a proper defendant in that case. The court found that the Attorney General, as the chief legal representative of the state, had an interest in the enforcement and validity of the challenged legislation, given his responsibility to prosecute violations of the statute. The present action, in contrast, has been brought against the Governor alone, who has no connection with or authority over the subject of the action \u2014 the legislative branch ethics commission.\nKoehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1971), also cited by the plaintiffs, involved a challenge in federal court to the application and facial validity of certain Illinois divorce laws. Regarding the plaintiffs\u2019 challenge to the application of the statutes, the court concluded that the Governor and other defendants were not proper parties to the proceeding, because they had no role in the adjudication of divorce cases. With respect to the challenge to the facial validity of the statutes, the court declined to address the defendants\u2019 argument that they were not proper parties to the action because of their immunity as public officials. Noting that the defendants must possess some connection to the challenged laws to be proper parties, the court found the record incomplete concerning their relationship to the enforcement of decrees rendered under the statutes. The court ultimately declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the case, however, deferring to the state courts under the abstention doctrine.\nUnlike Koehler, the case at bar presents no uncertainty regarding the absence of any connection between the Governor and the legislation challenged here. As noted above, the Governor has no role in the selection of the members of the legislative branch ethics commission, and no authority over the proceedings conducted by that commission. Moreover, support for the present holding may be found in the federal court\u2019s first determination in Koehler, noted above, that the Governor and other named defendants were not proper parties to the portion of the action challenging the applications of the laws. Just as the defendants in that case had no role in the allegedly improper application of the statutes, the Governor in the present case possesses no control over the legislative branch ethics commission\u2019s compliance or noncompliance with the constitutional provision forming the basis for the plaintiffs\u2019 challenge here.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County is vacated, and the appeal is dismissed.\nVacated and dismissed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Michael E Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Donald M. Craven, of Craven & Thornton, PC., of Springfield, and Dale Cohen, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 88597.\nILLINOIS PRESS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees, v. GEORGE H. RYAN, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 19, 2001.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Michael E Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nDonald M. Craven, of Craven & Thornton, PC., of Springfield, and Dale Cohen, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0063-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 84 }