{ "id": 725338, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JERRY S. IZZO, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Izzo", "decision_date": "2001-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 88887", "first_page": "109", "last_page": "117", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 109" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542959 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317112 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588652 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810318 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798671 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75270 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385568 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224793 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564463 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283106 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209966 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783189 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126430 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130767 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130415 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0182-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 733, "char_count": 13459, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.320876668499282e-07, "percentile": 0.8729989663490033 }, "sha256": "c6e47070f1947325827f6c3b456fc198ae574988d755243bb1c29da179ce7750", "simhash": "1:d2274f424c8f8971", "word_count": 2217 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:27:15.890678+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JERRY S. IZZO, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJerry Izzo, an 18-year-old high school student, was charged by complaint with violating section 21 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 6 (West 1998)), which prohibits the unauthorized possession or storage of weapons on public property. The charge was filed after Izzo was found carrying \u201ca folding silver & black Smith & Wesson S.WA.T. [Special Weapons Assault Team] knife with a blade in excess of 3 inches\u201d while at school. Izzo moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 114 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 1 (West 1998)) on the grounds that section 21 \u2014 6 is unconstitutional. The circuit court of Du Page County granted that motion. The State took a direct appeal to our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nSection 21 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code states:\n\u201c(a) Whoever possesses or stores any weapon enumerated in Section 33A \u2014 1 [of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/33A \u2014 1 (West 1998))] in any building or on land supported in whole or in part with public funds or in any building on such land without prior written permission from the chief security officer for such land or building commits a Class A misdemeanor.\n(b) The chief security officer must grant any reasonable request for permission under paragraph (a).\u201d 720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 6 (West 1998).\nA S.W.A.T. knife of the type found in Izzo\u2019s possession is among the weapons enumerated in section 33A \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/33A \u2014 1 (West 1998)). The public school where Izzo was carrying the knife is a building or land \u201csupported in whole or in part with public funds\u201d as those terms are used in section 21 \u2014 6 (720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 6 (West 1998)). If Izzo wanted to possess or store the knife on school property, he was therefore required by the express terms of the statute to obtain advance written permission to do so.\nIzzo did not seek permission to possess the knife at school, and no such permission was granted to him. Izzo nevertheless contends that he cannot be prosecuted for violation of the law because the law is unconstitutional. Specifically, Izzo asserts that the law is vague and indefinite in violation of the due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2) because it does not adequately define who qualifies as a \u201cchief security officer.\u201d Second, he asserts that the law violates separation of powers principles under article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1) because it allows someone other than the State\u2019s Attorney to bring, modify or nol-pros criminal charges.\nIn addressing Izzo\u2019s due process argument, we begin with the familiar proposition that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional. People v. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d 182, 188 (1985). Although the language challenged in this case is similar to language employed in the Illinois Public Demonstrations Law struck down by our court in People v. Bossie, 108 Ill. 2d 236 (1985), the statute at issue here is different. Unlike the Illinois Public Demonstrations Law, section 21 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code is not alleged to trench on rights protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.\nWhere, as here, a statute does not affect first amendment rights, it will not be declared unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is incapable of any valid application (People v. Wawczak, 109 Ill. 2d 244, 249 (1985)), that is, unless no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid (In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994)). This is not such a case. Situations where one can readily identify a public facility\u2019s \u201cchief security officer\u201d are not difficult to imagine. County jails and this court\u2019s own building are two ready examples.\nBecause section 21 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code does not involve first amendment rights and because there are circumstances in which section 21 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code may be validly applied, the determination as to whether the statute is constitutionally infirm must be made in the factual context of this particular case. Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 442 (1998). If Izzo\u2019s own conduct clearly falls within the statute\u2019s proscriptions, prosecuting him for violating the law does not offend due process protections even though the statute might be vague as to other conduct in other circumstances. People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 28 (1992). Izzo cannot escape the law\u2019s reach by arguing that the statute might be vague as applied to someone else. See People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 385-86 (1989).\nWhere, as here, the challenged statute does not impinge on first amendment rights, due process is satisfied if: (1) the statute\u2019s prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2) the statute provides sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 639-40 (2000).\nThe second of these considerations is not at issue in this case. No claim is made that the absence of a more detailed definition of \u201cchief security officer\u201d has resulted in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and application by police officers, judges or juries. Izzo\u2019s due process challenge is premised solely on the notion that persons of ordinary intelligence cannot be sure in any given situation whom they must contact for authorization if they want to possess weapons on public property.\nIn support of his position, Izzo advances hypotheticals in which application of the law\u2019s requirements might be problematic. Our court has held, however, that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because one can imagine hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms might be called into question. East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 425 (1997). As we have previously indicated, the validity of the law must be judged in light of the particular facts at hand.\nNothing in the record here suggests that the scenarios proposed by defendant are present in the case now before us. Unlike the situation in People v. Bossie, 108 Ill. 2d 236 (1985), this case does not involve multiple jurisdictions or multiple layers of governmental authority. The events giving rise to Izzo\u2019s prosecution occurred at a single place, a school, with a fixed and easily ascertainable chain of authority.\nIt is true that none of the administrators or employees at the school bore the specific title \u201cchief security officer.\u201d Any person of ordinary intelligence would understand, however, that the \u201cchief security officer\u201d was whoever had responsibility for overseeing security issues at the school. The particular title of that person will vary from institution to institution, and enumeration of every different title or position would be impractical. In such circumstances, the legislature may reasonably employ language sufficiently broad to encompass the varying circumstances without offending due process. See People v. Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d 389, 396 (1996). Due process does not mandate absolute standards or mathematical precision. Although it does require that a regulation not be vague, indefinite or uncertain, it does not require that a regulation be more specific than is possible under the circumstances. See Granite City Division of National Steel Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 221 Ill. App. 3d 68, 75 (1991), aff\u2019d, 155 Ill. 2d 149 (1993).\nIf anyone was confused as to who served as \u201cchief security officer\u201d at Izzo\u2019s school, they could simply have gone into the school office and asked. Significantly, however, there is no evidence in the record that anyone was, in fact, confused. There is no indication of any kind that any person had any doubt as to the meaning of section 21 \u2014 6\u2019s provisions in the context of this specific dispute.\nIzzo himself claims no such uncertainty. For him, the law\u2019s supposed vagueness was irrelevant. He was not confused by the statute\u2019s wording. The reason he did not seek advance written authorization before bringing his S.W.A.T. knife to school had nothing to do with not knowing whom, in particular, he was supposed to ask. The reason he did not seek advance written authorization was because, he claims, he did not know that the law required him to do so. Indeed, one of his alternative arguments for dismissal in the circuit court was that the statute was never published at the school and school students were never notified that they were required to seek written permission in order to carry knives of the type he was carrying.\nThat Izzo himself may not have had actual knowledge of section 21 \u2014 6\u2019s authorization requirement does not render the law impermissibly vague or bar its enforcement against him. A principle deeply embedded in our system of jurisprudence is that one\u2019s ignorance of the law does not excuse unlawful conduct. People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113, 127 (1989). Izzo does not cite any provision of the Criminal Code or any case law that would require or even suggest an exception to this principle under the facts of this case.\nThere is likewise no merit to Izzo\u2019s separation of powers claim. As indicated earlier in this opinion, Izzo asserts that section 21 \u2014 6 violates separation of powers principles because it permits someone other than the State\u2019s Attorney to bring, modify or nol-pros criminal charges. There are two problems with this argument. First, it misapprehends the effect of the law. Although the statute gives \u201cchief security officers\u201d power to grant individuals permission to possess or store weapons op public property, it does not give or purport to give such officers the authority to determine if or when individuals should be prosecuted for failing to obtain such permission. That power continues to reside with the local State\u2019s Attorney.\nSimilarly, section 21 \u2014 6 does not confer on chief security officers the power to sanction the possession or storage of weapons which is otherwise illegal. If a chief security officer gives an individual permission to possess or store weapons on public property and it turns out that such possession or storage contravenes some other provision of the law, the offending individual can still be prosecuted for violation of that other provision. The only effect of allowing advance written permission is that the individual cannot also be convicted of violating section 21 \u2014 6. Such a result involves no usurpation of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s authority. The reason a conviction cannot be secured under section 21 \u2014 6 is simply that the conditions of that statute will have been satisfied, i.e., there is no violation.\nA second, and equally fundamental, flaw in Izzo\u2019s separation of powers argument is that it misapprehends the separation of powers doctrine. Under Illinois law, the principle of separation of powers is contained in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides that the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are separate and that \u201c[n]o branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1. The purpose of this doctrine is to insure that each of the three branches of government retains its own sphere of authority, free from undue encroachment by the other branches. Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 302 (1997).\nThe doctrine comes into play when one branch seeks to exert a substantial power belonging to another. People v. O\u2019Donnell, 116 Ill. 2d 517, 527 (1987). No such encroachment is present here. Even if section 21 \u2014 6 could be construed as shifting part of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s prosecutorial power to another set of government officials, which it cannot, such a shift is not inherently improper. The powers and duties of State\u2019s Attorneys are defined by statute (55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 9005 (West 1998)) and can be revised by statute. Although a separation of powers problem would arise if such a revision had the effect of transferring prosecutorial power to the judiciary or to the legislature itself, no possible claim can be made that section 21 \u2014 6 has such an effect.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the circuit court should not have dismissed the. complaint against Izzo on the grounds that section 21 \u2014 6 is unconstitutional. The judgment of the circuit court dismissing the complaint against Izzo is therefore reversed, and this cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nJUSTICE CARMAN\ntook no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON JUSTICE CARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.", "George P Lynch, of Lisle, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 88887.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JERRY S. IZZO, Appellee.\nOpinion filed February 16, 2001.\nGAEMAN, J., took no part.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nGeorge P Lynch, of Lisle, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0109-01", "first_page_order": 123, "last_page_order": 131 }