{ "id": 725339, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. MICHAEL J. WALLER, State's Attorney of Lake County, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND J. McKOSKI, Circuit Judge of the 19th Judicial Circuit, et al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski", "decision_date": "2001-04-19", "docket_number": "No. 89300", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "408", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 393" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2827026 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180-81", "parenthetical": "writ of mandamus issued directing circuit court to vacate order denying dismissal motion and \"to rule upon that motion in the light of the applicable legal standards\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5813305 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "writ of mandamus issued to correct clear errors in the circuit court's application of mandatory venue requirements" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "writ of mandamus appropriate in a homicide case to compel the trial court to comply with mandatory sentencing guidelines imposed by statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535990 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336119 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810501 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" }, { "page": "198-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193671 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801361 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" }, { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542386 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243955 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810501 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542386 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243955 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0198-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 805, "char_count": 25618, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8071792032781765e-07, "percentile": 0.7172694238158287 }, "sha256": "33841c8d2c4173a81073c5b305e4fddef3cf239070c934d7296aa09278b5acdf", "simhash": "1:bb35360dc8c6bd76", "word_count": 4174 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:27:15.890678+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. MICHAEL J. WALLER, State\u2019s Attorney of Lake County, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND J. McKOSKI, Circuit Judge of the 19th Judicial Circuit, et al., Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney of Lake County, brings this original action for mandamus (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(a)) to compel the circuit court, pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998)), to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences upon defendant, Roberto Flores. For the reasons that follow, the writ of mandamus is granted.\nBACKGROUND\nOn August 17, 1999, defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West 1998). These convictions related to three separate incidents, involving three different minors, which occurred in Lake County between December 1, 1997, and August 1, 1998. Defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing was held on October 22, 1999. During this hearing, the prosecutor argued that \u201cpursuant to statute,\u201d specifically, section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998)), the sentences imposed upon defendant with respect to each count must be imposed consecutively. The relevant portion of subsection (a) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 provides:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless *** the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section *** 12\u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1998).\nSubsequently to the prosecutor\u2019s request for the imposition of consecutive sentences, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and the court:\n\u201cTHE COURT: What do you mean pursuant to statute? This isn\u2019t the single transaction on three different victims? [Prosecutor]: It is in the same course of conduct.\nTHE COURT: Three different victims, three different days isn\u2019t the same course of conduct. He can\u2019t interpret the same course of conduct as being an overall reason to sexually assault children any more than rob a gas station.\n* * *\nMaybe the law has changed, but I looked this up a few years ago. You can\u2019t tell from the statute. Your interpretation would be plausible by the words of the statutes themselves.\u201d\nIn the alternative, the prosecutor argued before the circuit court that, even if the offenses forming the basis of defendant\u2019s convictions were found to have not been committed in the \u201csame course of conduct\u201d within the meaning of subsection (a) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144, the imposition of consecutive sentences was nevertheless required pursuant to subsection (b) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144. The relevant portion of subsection (b) provides:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose a consecutive sentence except as provided for in subsection (a) unless *** multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for offenses that were not committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, and one of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted was *** a violation of Section *** 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the Court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998).\nThe prosecutor contended that, under the facts presented in this case, subsection (b) mandated that the circuit court impose consecutive sentences upon defendant. First, the prosecutor noted, defendant had been convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under section 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West 1998)), a triggering offense mandating the imposition of consecutive sentences. Second, the prosecutor argued that the nature of defendant\u2019s criminal objective, specifically, his sexual gratification, had not substantially changed during the course of committing the offenses.\nAfter a brief recess, the circuit court rejected the State\u2019s argument that either subsection (a) or (b) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences. The circuit court stated:\n\u201cThe problem is not only the time span, but the single course, the nature of the criminal objective. In my opinion, we have three victims, the nature of the criminal objective changes. We can\u2019t classify this as the criminal objective being sexually assaulting children. That is my opinion on the cases.\u201d\nThe circuit court sentenced defendant to a 25-year term of imprisonment on each of the three counts, and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.\nThereafter, the State filed with the circuit court a \u201cmotion to conform the sentences to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144,\u201d arguing in the alternative that either subsection (a) or (b) applied, and concluding that either section mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences. No response was filed to the State\u2019s motion. The circuit court denied the motion. We allowed the State\u2019s motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus. 155 Ill. 2d R. 381. No response has been filed in this court to the State\u2019s petition.\nANALYSIS\nMandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to enforce, as a matter of right, a public officer\u2019s performance of his or her public duties where no exercise of discretion on the officer\u2019s part is involved. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999); Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). A writ of mandamus \u201cprovides affirmative rather than prohibitory relief [citation] and can be used to compel the undoing of an act.\u201d Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997). A writ of mandamus will be granted only if a plaintiff can establish a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the public officer to act, and clear authority in the public officer to comply with the writ. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 229; Noyola, 179 Ill. 2d at 133. Mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. Kellerman v. Crowe, 119 Ill. 2d 111, 118 (1987).\nBefore this court, the State has abandoned as its primary argument the contention advanced in the circuit court that subsection (a) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 mandates that consecutive sentences be imposed upon defendant. Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal, we accept the finding of the circuit court that defendant did not commit the offenses as part of a \u201csingle course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective,\u201d within the meaning of subsection (a). The State presently focuses its argument on subsection (b) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144, and maintains that defendant is subject to mandatory consecutive sentences under this provision. We agree.\nSubsection (b) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 was amended by Public Act 90 \u2014 128, effective July 22, 1997. Prior to the 1997 amendment, subsection (b) left within the circuit court\u2019s discretion the question of whether to impose consecutive sentences upon a defendant convicted of committing multiple offenses in separate courses of conduct. The provision allowed the court to impose consecutive sentences if, based upon the \u201cnature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant,\u201d the court was \u201cof the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1996).\nThis court, in People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188 (1993), observed that the interplay between subsection (a) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 and the preamended version of subsection (b) created \u201csomething of an anomaly, [in that it mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences for offenses committed in a single course of conduct, while] leaving the question of consecutive sentences within the discretion of the trial judge in what must be deemed the more serious situation of multiple offenses committed in separate courses of conduct.\u201d Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 198. We opined that although this result \u201cmight simply have been an oversight by the legislature,\u201d it was \u201cnot one that we are able to correct under the guise of statutory interpretation.\u201d Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 198-99.\nIn response to Bole, the Illinois General Assembly passed the 1997 amendment to subsection (b), which mandated that the circuit court \u201cshall enter sentences to run consecutively\u201d when two factors are present. First, \u201cmultiple sentences of imprisonment\u201d must be \u201cimposed on a defendant for offenses that were not committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998). Second, a defendant must be convicted of one of several triggering offenses enumerated in subsection (b). 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(b) (West 1998). A review of the 1997 amendment to subsection (b) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 establishes that these changes \u201celiminat[ed] the trial court\u2019s discretion to impose concurrent sentences when the enumerated offenses are committed in separate courses of conduct.\u201d People v. Conley, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11 n.1 (1999).\nThe offenses in this case were committed by defendant between December 1997 and August 1998, after the July 1, 1997, effective date of the amendment to subsection (b). Therefore, the amended version of this statutory subsection governs the matter at bar. Applying the provisions of subsection (b) to the instant cause, we find that the two factors requiring imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences on defendant were present here. First, multiple sentences of imprisonment were imposed upon defendant for \u201coffenses that were not committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998). Second, defendant was found guilty of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under section 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West 1998)), one of the enumerated offenses which trigger the application of mandatory consecutive sentences under subsection (b).\nAs stated, a writ of mandamus will not be granted unless a plaintiff can show a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty on the part of the public officer to act, and clear authority in the public officer to comply with the writ. We find that the necessary factors for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are present in this case.\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections imposes specific requirements upon the circuit court with respect to the imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences, and the circuit court is responsible under the statute for enforcement of these sentencing requirements and imposing the appropriate sentence. The record reveals that, in the matter at bar, the circuit court did not apply the law as specified in section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b). Once the circuit court determined that defendant was not subject to mandatory consecutive sentences pursuant to subsection (a) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 because defendant had not committed the offenses \u201cas part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective,\u201d the circuit court\u2019s exercise of discretion was completed. Subsection (b) of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 unequivocally mandates imposition of consecutive sentences when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for the enumerated offenses when the offenses are committed in separate courses of conduct. See Conley, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 11 n.l. Because the circuit court had previously determined that defendant had not committed the offenses as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of his criminal objective, and had imposed multiple sentences of imprisonment for an enumerated triggering offense, the circuit judge had no further discretion to exercise when sentencing defendant. It is well established that a sentencing judge \u201ccannot impose a penalty not otherwise allowed by the sentencing statute in question.\u201d People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 506 n.l (1999); People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1988). Because the concurrent sentences imposed upon defendant by the circuit court were not authorized by section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b), those sentences are void. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). Under the circumstances presented, the issuance of a writ of mandamus is appropriate to compel the circuit court to comply with mandatory legal standards. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d at 336 (writ of mandamus appropriate in a homicide case to compel the trial court to comply with mandatory sentencing guidelines imposed by statute); see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d 321, 334 (1977) (writ of mandamus issued to correct clear errors in the circuit court\u2019s application of mandatory venue requirements); People ex rel. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Donovan, 30 Ill. 2d 178, 180-81 (1964) (writ of mandamus issued directing circuit court to vacate order denying dismissal motion and \u201cto rule upon that motion in the light of the applicable legal standards\u201d).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is vacated. The writ of mandamus is issued. The matter is remanded to the circuit court, which is directed to resentence defendant in conformity with section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Uniform Code of Corrections, which requires that the sentences imposed upon defendant for each conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child be served consecutively. It remains within the discretion of the circuit court to determine, within the permissible statutory sentencing range (see 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West 1998); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (West 1998)), the length of each sentence to be imposed.\nJudgment vacated;\nwrit issued;\ncause remanded with directions.\nJUSTICE CARMAN\ntook no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nThe triggering offenses listed in the 1997 amendment to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) mandating imposition of consecutive sentences are \u201ca Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or when the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 \u2014 13,12\u201414, or 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW JUSTICE CARMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\nconcurring in part and dis- . senting in part:\nI agree that this cause should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. I do not agree that the remedy of mandamus is proper in this cause.\nWe should refrain from granting mandamus relief for two reasons. First, the remedy of mandamus does not lie to question the discretionary fact-finding authority of a trial judge. Second, the remedy of mandamus is only available when the right to relief is clear as a matter of law. The sentencing statute at issue is open to multiple interpretations and the State is not clearly entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, based upon the following brief analysis, I do not concur with the majority\u2019s remedy of mandamus and I recommend that we remand this matter through the exercise of our supervisory authority.\nInitially, the general sentencing statute at issue in section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 gives a trial judge discretion to impose \u201cas determined by the court\u201d either concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1998). The balance of the statute then limits the exercise of discretion in certain circumstances. In subparagraph (a), the discretion to impose consecutive sentences is removed when multiple offenses are committed as part of a single course of conduct and there is no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. The second part of subsection (a) removes that consecutive sentencing limitation and then requires consecutive sentences when, in a single course of conduct and with no substantial change in the criminal objective, the defendant commits a Class X or Class 1 felony involving severe bodily injury or the defendant commits certain enumerated sex offenses in sections 12 \u2014 13, 12 \u2014 14, or 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1998).\nIn subsection (a) the key factors are whether the offenses are part of a single course of conduct with no substantial change in the criminal objective and whether the sentencing is for the commission of certain crimes.. Here, the majority notes that the trial judge found that the offenses were not part of a single course of conduct and that subsection (a) is not applicable in this case. 195 Ill. 2d at 398. The majority also acknowledges that the State\u2019s argument is focused on the subsection (b) sentencing provisions. 195 Ill. 2d at 398. Therefore, our inquiry in this case is limited to the subsection (b) sentencing provisions and whether the trial court found \u201cno substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998).\nIn subsection (b) the trial judge\u2019s discretion is limited and consecutive sentences can only be imposed if the trial court makes certain factual findings. 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(b) (West 1998). Under the first part of subsection (b), a trial court may make the requisite factual findings \u201cto protect the public from further criminal conduct\u201d as one justification for the imposition of a consecutive sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 1998). The record in this proceeding is abundantly clear that the trial judge made no public safety findings under that first part of subsection (b).\nAlternatively, consecutive sentences are authorized when a trial judge makes the requisite factual findings that the offenses were not part of a single course of conduct and that \u201cthere was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(b) (West 1998). Again, the trial judge did not make those requisite factual findings to trigger consecutive sentences. In fact, the trial judge unequivocally stated that \u201c \u2018the nature of the criminal objective changes.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) 195 Ill. 2d at 397. Accordingly, if the nature of the criminal objective changes, then subsection (b) does not mandate the imposition of consecutive sentences.\nThe trial judge also found as a matter of fact that the offenses were not part of a single course of conduct. That factual finding is conceded by the majority. 195 Ill. 2d at 398. The trial judge further found a change in the criminal objective involving three separate offenses. The trial judge made no public safety findings under subparagraph (a). Therefore, none of the limitations in either paragraph (a) or (b) applied to the sentence and the trial judge relied upon the general statutory grant of discretionary authority and imposed concurrent sentences.\nDespite the trial judge\u2019s findings in the record, the majority opinion seems to overlook the trial court\u2019s clear, discretionary factual finding that there had indeed been a change in the criminal objective. Unfortunately, the majority\u2019s result is premised upon the unsupported conclusion that there was no substantial change in the criminal objective when the trial judge articulated a contrary finding. The majority\u2019s approach amounts to a virtual de novo reversal of the trial judge\u2019s discretionary fact-finding decision. See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). Since the trial judge exercised his discretionary authority and in effect made a finding of fact regarding the nature of the criminal objective, the trial judge\u2019s ruling is not subject to challenge by the remedy of mandamus. Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). Therefore, even though the majority disagrees with the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion in finding that the criminal objective changed in this case, we simply have no legal authority to allow the challenge of that discretion through a mandamus action.\nThe record also strongly suggests that the trial judge struggled with the uncertainty of the statute. At best, the operative language of the sentencing statute is muddy. The trial judge may have justifiably interpreted the statute in one of at least three different ways. The specific statutory sentencing provisions refer to offenses committed or not committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a), (b) (West 1998).\nIn People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 193 (1993), we questioned whether the phrase \u201cno substantial change\u201d might possibly (1) define, (2) describe, or (3) limit the \u201csingle course of conduct\u201d phrase in a similar sentencing provision. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 193. Hence, this court previously pondered but never determined the meaning of the operative sentencing phrase now at issue in this case. Since Bole, this court has not resolved the questions posed in that case.\nFurthermore, mandamus relief is only appropriate when the application involves a clear right to relief. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). In light of Bole, it seems premature to ascribe a level of certainty to the statute when the interpretation of the statute remains not so certain. The Bole questions prevent us from holding that the State is clearly entitled to the statutory right of a mandatory consecutive sentence. Additionally, the questions raised in Bole were neither briefed nor argued in this case and we Eire now hindered in attempting to resolve those questions at this time. Thus, the State cannot satisfy the burden of entitlement to a clear, legal right to relief.\nOn a final point, the trial judge may have innocently confused the change of the criminal objective standard with the change of victims. For exEimple, the trial judge stated: \u201c \u2018The problem is not only the time span, but the single course, the nature of the criminal objective. In my opinion, we have three victims, the nature of the criminal objective changes.\u2019\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) 195 Ill. 2d at 397. Without a doubt, the trial judge attempted to address the necessary sentencing standards involving the single course of conduct and criminal objective standards. On the other hand it is unclear whether the trial judge properly interpreted the criminal objective standard in the sentencing statute.\nThe trial judge\u2019s above-referenced statement suggests that he may have equated the statutory reference to \u201cvictim\u201d with the statutory phrase \u201ccriminal objective.\u201d The trial judge may have concluded that the criminal objective changed because the defendant sexually offended three different victims. The mere involvement of one or more victims does not, however, exclusively describe or define a change or lack of change in the criminal objective.\nFor instance, an individual may commit the offense of a robbery at three different stores. The robberies may not occur within a single course of conduct, thus bringing the offenses arguably within subsection (b) of the sentencing statute. The criminal objective is to obtain money from each of the three stores. Thus, the criminal objective does not change merely because the robberies were committed at three different stores. The criminal objective remains the same, namely, the illegal taking of property.\nIn the present case, it appears that the criminal objective probably remained constant, namely, the defendant\u2019s sexual gratification involving three separate victims. The victim is the conduit for the defendant\u2019s pursuit of a common criminal objective of sexual gratification. The victim is not the criminal objective. The defendant\u2019s attacks upon three different victims do not change the common criminal objective of sexual gratification. It seems that the trial judge\u2019s ruling is based in part upon a misapprehension of the criminal objective standard. Despite any apparent misapprehension, the determination of any change in the criminal objective rests within the trial court\u2019s sole discretionary, fact-finding authority.\nTherefore, acknowledging our unresolved questions in Bole and the trial judge\u2019s apparent misapprehension of the criminal objective standard, we should not subject the trial judge in this case to an order of mandamus. Instead this court should exercise its supervisory authority and provide guidance to the trial court in interpreting and applying a confusing sentencing statute. We should also note that this case does not involve a judge who blatantly disregarded the clear mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute. At worst this case involves a judge who might have slightly missed the mark in attempting to untangle a confusing statute.\nIn conclusion, I readily agree with the majority that upon remand the trial court may exercise discretion to determine the appropriate sentence within the permissible statutory sentencing range. In short, the remand should be cloaked in a supervisory order and not in mandamus. Therefore, I specially concur in the remand and I respectfully dissent from granting the remedy of mandamus.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Daniel B. Shanes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for petitioner.", "No appearance for respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 89300.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. MICHAEL J. WALLER, State\u2019s Attorney of Lake County, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND J. McKOSKI, Circuit Judge of the 19th Judicial Circuit, et al., Respondents.\nOpinion filed April 19, 2001.\nGARMAN, J., took no part.\nKILBRIDE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Daniel B. Shanes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for petitioner.\nNo appearance for respondents." }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 407, "last_page_order": 422 }