{ "id": 351244, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. TERRELL W. BELL, JR., Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bell", "decision_date": "2001-05-24", "docket_number": "No. 89520", "first_page": "343", "last_page": "356", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 343" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186494 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "283" }, { "page": "283" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "284-85" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285-86" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "284-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198915 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" }, { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182693 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5245901 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5274185 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3203397 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2610972 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222569 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557241 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 S. Ill. U. L.J. 217", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "S. Ill. U. L.J.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "560-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589174 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "\"Although the statute we are discussing authorizes the imposition of consecutive sentences, rather than extended terms of imprisonment, it too concerns a sentence of 'imprisonment' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0178-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 632, "char_count": 20917, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5512113681266556e-07, "percentile": 0.6746665539187806 }, "sha256": "4f3f60ea1cde7bb9121aae02261153e00f4fc590aa6fc77cab90ca4f19cccfa9", "simhash": "1:b93626eac3fec8f7", "word_count": 3450 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:53.942400+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. TERRELL W. BELL, JR., Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this appeal, we determine the proper test for ascertaining whether offenses arise from an unrelated course of conduct for purposes of imposing extended-term sentences under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) (West 1998).\nBACKGROUND\nEvidence produced at trial established the following facts. On August 20, 1996, defendant and two friends, Ronald Smith and Andre Anderson, visited Chuck and Charlie\u2019s Tavern in Quincy, Illinois. Terry Powell, an acquaintance of defendant, was also present at the tavern. When Powell left the tavern, defendant, Smith, and Anderson followed him into an alley and attacked him. The men hit and kicked Powell, and defendant struck him several times with a pool cue stick or a mop handle. At some point during the beating, defendant took money from Powell\u2019s trousers. The men then continued to hit and kick Powell. The entire beating lasted approximately 15 minutes.\nDefendant was subsequently apprehended and charged with armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 1998)), robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 1(a) (West 1998)) and two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(a), (b)(1) (West 1998)). On January 14, 1998, a jury in the circuit court of Adams County convicted defendant of one count of armed robbery, one count of robbery and two counts of aggravated battery. At defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing on February 20, 1998, the State sought a total sentence of 30 to 50 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant requested leniency, due to his age of 24 years and his rehabilitative potential. The circuit court sentenced defendant to a term of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. The circuit court also imposed an extended-term sentence of 10 years\u2019 imprisonment pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) (West 1998)) for the aggravated battery conviction. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1998)) because the court found that the armed robbery and aggravated battery were the result of a \u201csingle course of conduct.\u201d\nDefendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the trial court\u2019s sentences were an abuse of discretion in light of defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing an extended-term sentence for defendant\u2019s aggravated battery conviction. With respect to his second argument, defendant contended that, because his convictions arose from a o single course of conduct, he was eligible to receive an extended-term sentence only on the more serious class offense of armed robbery.\nThe appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing defendant. 313 Ill. App. 3d 280, 283. The appellate court also rejected defendant\u2019s argument that he was ineligible to receive an extended-term sentence for the aggravated battery conviction. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 286. The appellate court stated that, according to this court\u2019s decision in People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192 (1984), a defendant convicted of multiple offenses may be sentenced to an extended-term sentence, pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a), only on those offenses within the most serious class. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 283. The appellate court further noted, however, that under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a), extended-term sentences may be imposed on differing class offenses that arise from \u201cunrelated courses of conduct.\u201d 313 Ill. App. 3d at 283, citing People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1995). In this case, the appellate court determined that defendant\u2019s armed robbery and aggravated battery convictions arose from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct,\u201d and, therefore, he was eligible to receive an extended-term sentence for the aggravated battery conviction pursuant to section 5\u20148\u20142(a). 313 Ill. App. 3d at 286.\nIn holding that defendant was eligible to receive an extended-term sentence, the appellate court reasoned that there were two possible tests for determining if a defendant\u2019s offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d 313 Ill. App. 3d at 285. One test is derived from section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a) (West 1998)), which controls the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple convictions. Section 5\u20148\u20144(a) states:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 \u2014 13,12\u201414, or 12 \u2014 14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 ***.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20144(a) (West 1998).\nTherefore, generally, under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) consecutive sentences will not be imposed where a defendant commits offenses that were part of a \u201csingle course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a) (West 1998). This test is frequently referred to as the \u201cindependent motivation\u201d test. See, e.g., People v. Kagan, 283 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220 (1996); People v. Fritz, 225 Ill. App. 3d 624, 629 (1992); People v. Harris, 220 Ill. App. 3d 31, 32 (1991); People v. Ingram, 84 Ill. App. 3d 495, 498 (1980); People v. Siglar, 18 Ill. App. 3d 381, 383 (1974).\nThe second test considered by the appellate court was the \u201cmultiple acts test\u201d (313 Ill. App. 3d at 285), which was originally discussed in the context of extended-term sentences in a special concurrence by Justice Cook in People v. Keene, 296 Ill. App. 3d 183, 191 (1998) (Cook, J., specially concurring). Under the \u201cmultiple acts test,\u201d offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d when the offenses are supported by more than one physical act, unless one offense is an included offense. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 284-85.\nExamining the two tests, the appellate court concluded that the section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) test \u2014 whether there was a \u201csubstantial change in the nature of [a defendant\u2019s] \"criminal objective\u201d \u2014 \u201chas potential for confusion and gives less guidance to trial courts.\u201d 313 Ill. App. 3d at 285. The court rejected that test and, instead, adopted the multiple acts test for the purpose of determining whether multiple offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d under section 5\u20148\u20142(a).\nApplying the multiple acts test to the case at bar, the appellate court held that defendant\u2019s offenses of armed robbery and aggravated battery were supported by more than one physical act and, therefore, were part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d 313 Ill. App. 3d at 285. The court noted that the evidence showed defendant struck and kicked Powell before reaching into his trousers and taking money. Defendant then struck and kicked Powell again. Based on these facts, the court found that \u201c[d]efendant\u2019s act of armed robbery, taking money from Powell\u2019s pants while armed with a dangerous weapon, was a separate and distinct act from defendant\u2019s act of striking and kicking [the victim]. The act of reaching into Powell\u2019s pants and taking his money was a separate act from the act of striking and kicking [the victim].\u201d 313 Ill. App. 3d at 285-86. The court held that, although the \u201cacts had some connection to each other, *** [defendant] committed two separate acts and two separate crimes.\u201d 313 Ill. App. 3d at 286. The appellate court concluded that defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence for aggravated battery and, therefore, was properly sentenced. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 286.\nWe granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R 315(a).\nANALYSIS\nBefore this court, defendant contends that he was not eligible for an extended-term sentence under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) (West 1998)) because his offenses of armed robbery and aggravated battery were not part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections governs the imposition of an extended-term sentence and provides:\n\u201cA judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by Section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 for the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 were found to be present.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 2(a) (West 1998).\nIn Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, we interpreted section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 2(a) to mean that a defendant who is convicted of multiple offenses may be sentenced to an extended-term sentence only on those offenses that are within the most serious class. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d at 205-06. However, extended-term sentences may be imposed \u201con separately charged, differing class offenses that arise from unrelated courses of conduct\u201d (Emphasis added.) Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d at 257.\nThis court has not yet adopted a test to determine whether multiple offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d for purposes of extended-term sentencing under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a). Defendant argues that we should adopt the section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) test, used to determine whether offenses arise from a \u201csingle course of conduct,\u201d for purposes of consecutive sentencing, to determine the similar question of whether multiple offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d for purposes of extended-term sentencing under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a). Generally, under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a), consecutive sentences will not be imposed \u201cfor offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d Thus, defendant contends that the section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) test \u2014 whether there was a \u201csubstantial change in the nature of [defendant\u2019s] criminal objective\u201d \u2014 should be used to determine whether multiple offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a). According to defendant, the adoption of a different test to interpret \u201cunrelated courses of conduct\u201d and \u201csingle courses of conduct\u201d will lead to confusion in the trial courts. Defendant thus contends that the appellate court erred in adopting the multiple acts test to determine whether offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d\nThe State, in response, argues that the appellate court correctly adopted the multiple acts test to determine whether multiple offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d Under the multiple acts test, when two or more offenses are supported by more than one physical act, the offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct,\u201d unless one offense is an included offense. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 284-85. The State argues that the multiple acts test provides courts with more guidance and less confusion than the section 5\u20148\u20144(a) test by giving courts a \u201cclear standard\u201d to determine whether multiple offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d In addition, the State contends that whether offenses arise from a \u201csingle\u201d or separate course of conduct for purposes of consecutive sentencing under section 5\u20148\u20144(a) is a separate issue from whether the offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d for purposes of extended-term sentencing under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a). According to the State, the legislature\u2019s decision to draft two separate provisions for a consecutive sentencing determination and an extended-term sentencing determination indicates that the two sentencing determinations require different standards. We disagree with the State\u2019s contentions.\nWe hold that the section 5\u20148\u20144(a) test \u2014 whether there was a \u201csubstantial change in the nature of [defendant\u2019s] criminal objective\u201d \u2014 is the proper test for determining whether multiple offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d pursuant to section 5\u20148\u2014 2(a). We do so for two reasons.\nFirst, in adopting the section 5\u20148\u20144(a) test to determine whether offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct,\u201d we minimize any confusion that may result in the trial courts if two different tests were required to determine whether offenses are part of a \u201csingle\u201d or separate course of conduct under section 5\u20148\u20144(a) and whether they are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d under section 5\u20148\u20142(a). As we discuss below, if we were to adopt the multiple acts test, a court could find that a defendant\u2019s offenses were part of a \u201csingle course of conduct\u201d and impose consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5\u20148\u20144(a), and then find that those same offenses were part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d and impose an extended-term sentence on a lesser class offense pursuant to section 5\u20148\u2014 2(a).\nThe case at bar provides an example of the confusion that could result. Here, the trial court specifically found that defendant\u2019s offenses were part of a \u201csingle course of conduct\u201d and, accordingly, sentenced him to concurrent sentences under section 5\u20148\u20144(a). The trial court then sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence for the lesser class offense of aggravated battery. Although neither defendant nor the State contested the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s offenses were part of a \u201csingle course of conduct\u201d under section 5\u20148\u20144(a), defendant did appeal the trial court\u2019s imposition of an extended-term sentence. On appeal, the appellate court applied the multiple acts test to determine whether defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence and found that defendant\u2019s offenses were part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d Thus, under the appellate court\u2019s reasoning, defendant\u2019s offenses were, at the same time, part of a \u201csingle\u201d yet \u201cunrelated\u201d course of conduct. In adopting the same test to determine whether offenses were part of a \u201csingle course of conduct\u201d and whether the same offenses were part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct,\u201d we avoid the possibility of such an absurd result.\nSecond, under the multiple acts test, virtually all offenses will be \u201cunrelated,\u201d because different offenses generally require proof of different physical acts. Indeed, the State conceded at oral argument that, under the multiple acts test, it is \u201ca possibility\u201d that any two crimes would be considered unrelated, such that an extended-term sentence would be appropriate in nearly every situation. The only example the State could offer as to when a court would be prohibited from imposing an extended-term sentence on a lesser class offense would be a case in which a defendant shoots a bullet into one person, and the bullet exits the body of that person and enters another person, thereby killing both persons.\nWe do not believe that section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) should or was intended to address such limited situations, especially because, even under the State\u2019s \u201csingle bullet\u201d scenario, an extended-term sentence would not be possible. In People v. Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70 (1988), we held that \u201c \u2018if exactly the same physical act does form the basis for more than one offense, a defendant may still be prosecuted for each offense, but only one conviction and sentence may be imposed.\u2019 \u201d Segara, 126 Ill. 2d at 77, quoting H. Eisenberg, Multiple Punishments for the \u201cSame Offense\u201d in Illinois, 11 S. Ill. U. L.J. 217, 237 (1987). Thus, where two offenses result from the same physical act, there would be no need to determine whether those offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct,\u201d because only one conviction and sentence will be imposed. It appears then that an extended-term sentence would be permissible in essentially every situation under the multiple acts test. However, as we have held, imposition of an extended-term sentence on a lesser class offense is not appropriate in every situation but, rather, is appropriate only where offenses arise from an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d\nThe State relies upon People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977), in which this court found problematic the use of the section 5\u20148\u20144(a) test to determine whether a defendant convicted of multiple offenses may have concurrent sentences imposed. King, 66 Ill. 2d at 564. In King, we adopted the multiple acts test for determining whether concurrent sentences are appropriate. King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. However, we observed a \u201cdistinction\u201d between the imposition of consecutive and concurrent sentences and held that a defendant is prejudiced if he receives \u201cconsecutive sentences for crimes arising from multiple acts motivated by essentially the same criminal objective.\u201d King, 66 Ill. 2d at 565. We noted that a defendant\u2019s criminal objective is relevant in determining whether consecutive sentences may be imposed. King, 66 Ill. 2d at 565. The issue in the case at bar, whether a defendant is eligible for an extended-term sentence, is more akin to a determination of whether a defendant can receive consecutive sentences than it is to a determination of whether multiple convictions and concurrent sentences may be imposed. Indeed, we have previously relied on section 5\u20148\u20142(a), which governs extended-term sentencing, in construing section 5\u20148\u20144(a), which governs consecutive sentencing. See People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 229 (1989) (\u201cAlthough the statute we are discussing authorizes the imposition of consecutive sentences, rather than extended terms of imprisonment, it too concerns a sentence of \u2018imprisonment\u2019 \u201d). Therefore, the State\u2019s reliance on King is misplaced.\nWe hold that, in determining whether a defendant\u2019s multiple offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d for the purpose of his eligibility for an extended-term sentence under section 5\u20148\u20142(a), courts must consider whether there was a substantial change in the nature of the defendant\u2019s criminal objective. If there was a substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, the defendant\u2019s offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d and an extended-term sentence may be imposed on differing class offenses. If, however, there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, the defendant\u2019s offenses are not part of an unrelated course of conduct, and an extended-term sentence may be imposed only on those offenses within the most serious class.\nHaving adopted the section 5\u2014=8\u20144(a) test for determining whether multiple offenses are part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct\u201d pursuant to section 5\u20148\u20142(a), we apply that test to the case at bar. Here, the trial court found that defendant\u2019s offenses of armed robbery and aggravated battery were the result of a \u201csingle course of conduct\u201d under section 5\u20148\u20144(a). Because this finding was not contested by either party, we accept it for the purpose of this appeal. Based on the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s offenses were part of a \u201csingle course of conduct,\u201d those offenses cannot be part of an \u201cunrelated course of conduct.\u201d Consequently, defendant is eligible for an extended-term sentence only on the most serious class offense. Aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony and is a less serious class of offense than armed robbery, a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(e), 18\u2014 2(b) (West 1998). Therefore, the trial court erred in imposing an extended-term sentence on defendant\u2019s aggravated battery conviction.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. We vacate the circuit court\u2019s imposition of an extended-term sentence for defendant\u2019s aggravated battery conviction. We remand the matter to the circuit court with directions to resentence defendant for the aggravated battery conviction pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(6) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(a)(6) (West 1998)).\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.\nJUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nDefendant was also charged with one count of failure to register a change of address as a child sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 1998). However, this charge was later severed upon defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe multiple acts test originally was formulated by this court to determine whether multiple convictions and concurrent sentences may be imposed. See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 560-66 (1977).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Robert N. Markfield, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Barney S. Bier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Michael Hoard, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 89520.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. TERRELL W. BELL, JR., Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 24, 2001.\nGARMAN, J., took no part.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Robert N. Markfield, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Barney S. Bier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Michael Hoard, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0343-01", "first_page_order": 353, "last_page_order": 366 }