{ "id": 259110, "name": "In re ESTATE OF BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS (Peggy L. Parrish, Appellant, v. Rolf Hackman, Ex'r of the Estate of Budris Andernovics, Deceased, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Parrish v. Hackman", "decision_date": "2001-09-20", "docket_number": "No. 89386", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "513", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 500" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596976 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758-59", "parenthetical": "finding that time records, while important, are not conclusive" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3217866 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810354 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314", "parenthetical": "holding that the decision to impose a particular sanction under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion of the trial court and, thus, only a clear abuse of discretion justifies reversal" }, { "page": "314", "parenthetical": "holding that a sanction award will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2434566 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2901486 ], "year": 1887, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/119/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5598222 ], "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/287/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ill. App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4978657 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/320/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5007759 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "abstract of op." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/339/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2572928 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "abstract of op." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/77/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ill. App. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3413153 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/330/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592820 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864532 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780263 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307266 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2673200, 2674628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" }, { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0563-02", "/ill-app-3d/7/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5237132 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "allegations in an estate claim not answered are deemed admitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/34/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2713143 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 N.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415429 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" }, { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0741-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 924, "char_count": 22697, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8866692222086579e-07, "percentile": 0.7284194947272987 }, "sha256": "064843a1991f840ca44313d4fe4546c7fdc6fc303992194b1109b4e5278da500", "simhash": "1:cba8fe3e76481cf5", "word_count": 3767 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:03:05.716758+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS (Peggy L. Parrish, Appellant, v. Rolf Hackman, Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Budris Andernovics, Deceased, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe primary question presented in this appeal.is whether section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Act) (755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 7(a) (West 1998)) or section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 610 (West 1998)) applies when an estate files a nonspecific response to a probate complainant\u2019s claim, demanding strict proof of that claim. In February 1989, plaintiff, Peggy L. Parrish, filed a 10-count complaint against the estate of Budris Andernovics, alleging that Andernovics breached an oral contract to make a will. Subsequently, plaintiff argued that she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the estate\u2019s failure to deny explicitly her claim constituted an admission under section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The estate argued that section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Probate Act allowed it to demand strict proof rather than directly admit or deny plaintiffs claim.\nThe trial court rejected plaintiffs argument, denied her claim on the merits, and ordered her to pay attorney fees as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order. The appellate court affirmed. 311 Ill. App. 3d 741. Plaintiff now appeals. We affirm and hold that a trial court has discretion under section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Probate Act to demand plaintiff prove her claim when an estate files a response neither admitting nor denying the claim, but demanding strict proof of it.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiffs complaint sought monetary damages and specific performance of an oral contract to make a will. Plaintiff alleged that she and Andernovics reached an agreement, allowing plaintiff to deed certain parcels of encumbered real estate to him. Plaintiff further alleged that Andernovics agreed to pay the mortgages on the parcels and deed the property back to plaintiff in his will, along with fee title to another parcel of property and a life estate in a third parcel.\nPlaintiff filed her complaint in probate. Rather than admitting or denying plaintiffs claim, the estate\u2019s executor filed a nonspecific response that stated, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cNOW COMES ROLF HACKMAN, duly appointed Executor of the Estate of BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS, deceased, by Holland and Holland, his attorneys, to defend against the claim of PEGGY L. PARRISH against said Estate, and hereby demands strict proof of said claim.\u201d\nPlaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the estate\u2019s answer constituted an admission pursuant to section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code. Following a hearing, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion. The estate then filed several interrogatories and a request to produce, and plaintiff effectively failed to respond to discovery.\nPlaintiff sought interlocutory review in the appellate court under Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308), arguing that she should have been granted judgment on the pleadings. The appellate court denied plaintiff\u2019s request for appeal. Meanwhile, the trial court entered an order compelling plaintiffs discovery responses. Nevertheless, plaintiff persisted in disregarding the interrogatories and requests to produce. Several months later, the estate filed a motion for sanctions. Plaintiff then renewed her motion for judgment on the pleadings.\nAs a sanction for plaintiff\u2019s failure to comply with the discovery order, the trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint with prejudice. On review, the appellate court reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to issue a more lenient sanction. In re Estate of Andernovics, No. 3 \u2014 93\u20140510 (1993) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn remand, the trial court granted the estate attorney fees totaling $4,035. The trial court further directed that plaintiff and her attorney were jointly and severally liable for payment of the sanction. The trial court also conducted a hearing on the merits of plaintiffs claim. At the hearing, plaintiff submitted evidence only as to the value of the real estate and other items subject to the alleged oral contract to make a will. Further, plaintiff held steadfast to her position that the estate\u2019s answer constituted an admission. The trial court rejected plaintiffs claim, finding in part as follows:\n\u201cThere is authority that in a suit for specific performance of a contract to make a will the evidence and the existence of the contract and its terms must be clear and explicit and so convincing that it will leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. Greenwood v. Commercial National Bank of Peoria, 130 N.E.2d 753, 7 Ill. 2d 436 (1955).\nThe Claimant elected to file a claim in this estate matter rather than a separate lawsuit. When the claimant files a claim in an estate [proceeding,] the Probate Act [citation] applies. It has been suggested that the representatives of an estate must be allowed a great deal of latitude in filing answers to claims. The Probate Act specifically sets forth that a claim which is presented by the claimant or his attorney or to which no pleading has been filed within the time provided by the Act may be taken as proved or the Court may require the claimant to prove his claim. Here the Executor in his Answer demanded that the claim be proven. When the claimant filed the claim under the Probate Act the claimant must comply with that Act. Therefore, if a claim is filed in probate, the Probate Act applies. The Probate Act and the Code of Civil Procedure recommend that sections be liberally construed to the end that controversies and rights of the parties may be speedily and fairly determined.\nArguably, the Answer filed by the Estate is an admission under [section 2 \u2014 610(b) of the] Code ***. However, this Court finds that the admission is as to facts well pleaded and not as [to] conclusions of law. This Court further *** exercise[s] its discretion *** to require that the Claimant prove her claim notwithstanding any admission made by the Estate. 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 7(a). ***\nThe claim in this case is anything but routine. As a result the Claimant should have submitted her cause and proved her claim. She has not done so. The Plaintiffs *** Claim is denied.\u201d\nThe appellate court affirmed under reasoning similar to that of the trial court. We granted leave to appeal to consider primarily whether section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Act preempts section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Act Versus Section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code\nPlaintiff contends that the estate\u2019s answer constituted an admission and therefore she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings. In support of this claim, plaintiff relies upon section 1 \u2014 6 of the Act. Section 1 \u2014 6 provides that the Code shall apply to all probate proceedings except as otherwise provided in the Act. 755 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 6 (West 1998). Plaintiff further points to section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code, requiring that pleadings be specific. Section 2 \u2014 610 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) Every answer and subsequent pleading shall contain an explicit admission or denial of each allegation of the pleading to which it relates.\n(b) Every allegation *** not explicitly denied is admitted, unless the party states in his or her pleading that he or she has no knowledge thereof sufficient to form a belief, and attaches an affidavit of the truth of the statement of want of knowledge, or unless the party has had no opportunity to deny.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 610 (West 1998).\nPlaintiff invokes section 2\u2014610 and In re Estate of Jensik, 34 Ill. App. 2d 130, 133 (1962) (allegations in an estate claim not answered are deemed admitted), arguing that, because the estate failed to deny explicitly the allegations contained in her complaint, the allegations must be deemed admitted.\nRelying upon section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Act, the estate disagrees with plaintiff. Section 18 \u2014 7(a) provides in pertinent part that \u201c[a] claim which is consented to by the representative *** or to which no pleading has been filed *** may be taken as proved or the court may require the claimant to prove his claim.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 7(a) (West 1998). The estate contends that section 18 \u2014 7(a) satisfies the \u201cexcept otherwise provided\u201d language in section 1 \u2014 6, thereby taking the issue outside the scope of section 2 \u2014 610.\nCiting In re Estate of Grimsley, 7 Ill. App. 3d 563, 566 (1972), plaintiff urges us to reject the estate\u2019s contention. In Grimsley, the Department of Mental Health filed a claim against the decedent\u2019s estate for unpaid hospitalization expenses. In an unverified answer, the estate alleged that it had not received any statements of unpaid expenses but did not deny that the charges were owed and did not request proof of the claim. The trial court denied the claim for failure to prove details surrounding the decedent\u2019s hospitalization. The appellate court reversed, finding that the Civil Practice Act (now the Code of Civil Procedure) required that the undenied allegations be deemed admitted without the necessity of requiring proof.\nThe court in Grimsley found that the subject provision of the Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 3, par. 199, now 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 7 (West 1998)) was \u201cdirected to instances where no answer has been filed.\u201d Grimsley, 7 Ill. App. 3d at 566. Under Grimsley, plaintiff argues that section 18 \u2014 7(a) does not apply because the estate filed an answer.\nThe issue before us is one of statutory construction. Statutory construction presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). To determine the legislature\u2019s intent, courts first look to the statute\u2019s language. Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368-69 (1998). We accord a statute\u2019s language its plain and commonly understood meaning. In re Petition to Annex Certain Territory, 144 Ill. 2d 353, 362 (1991).\nThe plain language of section 18 \u2014 7(a) allows the trial court wide latitude in allowing claims or requiring proof of claims. If \u201c[a] claim *** is consented to by the representative,\u201d the trial court may accept the claim as plead or may require proof of the claim. (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 7(a) (West 1998). Likewise, if \u201cno pleading has been filed,\u201d the trial court may accept the claim as plead or may require proof of the claim. 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 7(a) (West 1998). Thus, Grimsley cannot be read as holding that section 18 \u2014 7(a) is directed solely to instances when no answer has been filed. Section 18\u2014 7(a) also plainly applies when the estate consents to a claim. Accordingly, assuming the estate\u2019s response should be construed as an admission of her claim, this determination does not take the case at hand outside the purview of section 18 \u2014 7(a). Construing section 18 \u2014 7(a) in conjunction with section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code, we believe no reasonable distinction may be drawn between a claim that is \u201cconsented to\u201d by an estate and a claim that is \u201cadmitted\u201d by an estate. Given this conclusion, the trial court was within its discretionary authority to demand that plaintiff prove her claim.\nNonetheless, in opposition to this determination, plaintiff cites In re Estate of Brauns, 330 Ill. App. 322 (1947), maintaining that Brauns stands for the broad proposition that the sufficiency of an answer to a probate claim must be determined under the Code. In Brauns, the plaintiff filed a claim based upon judgment notes allegedly executed by the decedent. As a consequence, Brauns was decided under the specific provision of the Civil Practice Act that addressed allegations concerning the execution of a written instrument. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 10, par. 159. Accordingly, Brauns has no relevance to the instant case because plaintiff does not allege the execution of a written instrument.\nIn sum, we hold that a trial court may, in accord with section 18\u20147(a) of the Act and section 2\u2014610 of the Code, require a complainant to prove a claim when an estate files a nonspecific response, neither admitting nor denying the claim but demanding strict proof.\nOur decision on this issue is consistent with the longstanding principle that claims against an estate should be scrutinized with care and should not be allowed except on clear proof. See In re Estate of Winan, 77 Ill. App. 2d 462 (1966) (abstract of op.); Bonamer v. Mahanna, 339 Ill. App. 277 (1950) (abstract of op.); Floyd v. Estate of Smith, 320 Ill. App. 171 (1943); In re Estate of Teehan, 287 Ill. App. 58 (1936). The careful scrutiny of claims can only be accomplished through the discretionary authority of the trial court. The allowance of a disputed claim based on a purely technical application of section 2 \u2014 610 of the Code is at odds with the unequivocal language in section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Act and its purpose.\nPrior to the adoption of our current probate act, this court held that our county and circuit probate courts possessed legal and equitable powers to justify all claims against the estate \u201cto ascertain the true facts, and charge the executor with the amount justly chargeable against [the estate], and no more.\u201d Millard v. Harris, 119 Ill. 185, 199 (1887). We view the discretionary authority afforded to the trial court by section 18\u20147(a) of the Act as an expression of the intrinsic supervisory role assumed by the court in probate matters. Unlike most civil litigation involving a dispute between two parties, a probate proceeding implicates any number of creditors and any number of beneficiaries. A review of the Probate Act of 1975 as a whole reaffirms the trial court\u2019s function as an overseer to the payment of claims against the estate and the distribution of the remaining assets to the beneficiaries and creditors. One task of the court in that role, as announced in Millard, is to ensure only just claims are charged against the estate. To achieve this end, the trial court must be free to require proof of claims.\nSection 18 \u2014 11 of the Act provides additional support for our interpretation that the trial court possesses discretion in allowing all claims. In pertinent part, section 18 \u2014 11(a) provides:\n\u201c(a) The representative may at any time pay or consent in writing to all or any part of any claim *** to the extent the claim has not been disallowed by the court ***. *** At the request of any interested person the representative must establish the propriety of his allowance of any claim.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 11(a) (West 1998).\nThus, even the affirmative allowance of a claim by an estate\u2019s representative remains subject to the review of the trial court. Moreover, the propriety of the estate\u2019s allowance of a claim may be raised by any interested third party, requiring the estate to bear the burden of establishing \u201cthe propriety of [the] allowance of any claim.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 11(a) (West 1998). Hence, it is ultimately the trial court\u2019s province to allow or disallow any claim, even those consented to or admitted by the estate.\nB. Sanctions\nPlaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly ordered that she pay attorney fees as a sanction for her failure to comply with discovery. We reject plaintiffs contentions on this point.\nIt is well settled that a trial court may order sanctions against a party refusing to comply with discovery. 134 Ill. 2d R. 219(c). A party disputing a sanction order for failure to comply with discovery must establish that noncompliance was reasonable or justified under the circumstances. Hartnett v. Stack, 241 Ill. App. 3d 157, 172 (1993).\nThe record indicates that the estate filed its initial interrogatories and request to produce in December 1989. Plaintiff filed answers to interrogatories and a response to request to produce, consisting in large part of objections. In June 1990, the estate filed a motion to compel discovery. Plaintiff argued that she need not comply because she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings. In August 1990, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings.\nThe trial court entered an order compelling discovery in April 1992, requiring plaintiff to comply within 28 days. Rather than abiding by the court\u2019s order, plaintiff sought leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308. The appellate court denied plaintiffs motion. Notwithstanding the denial, plaintiff maintained her refusal to comply with discovery and disregarded the order to compel. In May 1993, the estate filed a motion for sanctions. As a sanction for plaintiffs misconduct, the trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.\nThe appellate court reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to issue a more lenient sanction. No. 3 \u2014 93\u20140510 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court stated, however, that plaintiff was incorrect in her position and she was obligated to proceed with discovery after the application for leave to appeal under Rule 308 had been denied. Nevertheless, after the remand plaintiff maintained her position that she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.\nTherefore, we agree with the appellate court\u2019s observation:\n\u201c[Plaintiff] exhibited a stubborn refusal to comply with discovery rules from early on in this case. Despite the fact that her reliance on Grimsley might have justified her initial noncompliance with discovery, once [the appellate court] denied her leave to appeal under Rule 308 all subsequent refusals to comply on her part were patently unreasonable.\u201d 311 Ill. App. 3d at 746.\nConsidering plaintiff\u2019s disregard for the trial court\u2019s authority subsequent to the appellate court\u2019s denial of leave to appeal, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s award of attorney fees was not improper. Boatmen\u2019s National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305, 314 (1993) (holding that the decision to impose a particular sanction under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion of the trial court and, thus, only a clear abuse of discretion justifies reversal). While we might have arrived at a different conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority, 124 Ill. 2d 226, 241 (1988).\nWe also reject plaintiff\u2019s argument that she should not be sanctioned due to the estate\u2019s failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (166 Ill. 2d R. 201(k)). Rule 201(k) provides:\n\u201cEvery motion with respect to discovery shall incorporate a statement that counsel responsible for trial of the case after personal consultation and reasonable attempts to resolve differences have been unable to reach an accord ***.\u201d 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(k).\nStrict compliance with Rule 201(k) is generally required and litigants are not entitled to seek sanctions without first exercising reasonable attempts to resolve discovery differences. Here, technical compliance with the rule was no longer an issue at the point the appellate court denied plaintiff leave to appeal. In other words, as the appellate court stated, plaintiff was obligated to comply with the trial court\u2019s order compelling discovery and could no longer refuse discovery based op her theory of the case when the appellate court denied her interlocutory review under Supreme Court Rule 308.\nIn a related argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court\u2019s calculation of fees was improper because the court failed to consider whether the estate\u2019s attorneys billed at an hourly rate comparable to other firms in the community. We reject plaintiffs claim on this point as well.\nWe agree that, pursuant to Rule 1.5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, the community\u2019s usual and customary charges are a relevant factor to consider in formulating an award for attorney fees. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a)(3). Other factors include the skill and standing of the attorney employed; the novelty and difficulty of the questions; the degree of responsibility in the management of the cause; the time and labor required; and the amounts involved and the benefits resulting to the client. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a). No exact formula exists in determining a proper award. While each factor is relevant, no single factor is conclusive or dispositive. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d 743, 758-59 (1997) (finding that time records, while important, are not conclusive).\nAs the appellate court observed, \u201c[t]he trial court undertook a nine-hour, 21/2-day hearing on this issue, during which the estate sought over $18,000 in fees. Testimony concerning the hours worked and service rendered by the attorneys was heard.\u201d 311 Ill. App. 3d at 746. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court adequately considered the relevant factors in this case, and plaintiff fails to present a persuasive argument that the trial court abused its discretion. See Boatmen\u2019s, 155 Ill. 2d at 314 (holding that a sanction award will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion). Thus, we affirm the appellate court\u2019s ruling on the amount of attorney fees.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe hold that, under section 18 \u2014 7(a) of the Probate Act, a trial court has discretion to demand a probate complainant prove her claim in cases when an estate files a nonspecific response, neither denying nor admitting the claim, but demanding strict proof. In addition, we hold that the trial court properly imposed sanctions upon plaintiff for failure to comply with discovery.\nThe judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWe note that section 2 \u2014 1301(d) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1301(d) (West 1998)) similarly provides that \u201c[judgment by default may be entered for want of an appearance, or for failure to plead, but the court may in either case, require proof of the allegations of the pleadings upon which relief is sought.\u201d While the estate could arguably rely upon section 2 \u2014 1301(d) of the Code to support its claim, we find that section 18 \u2014 7(a)\u2019s substantially analogous language preempts section 2 \u2014 1301(d) under these circumstances. See 755 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 6 (West 1998).\nWhile plaintiffs complaint was verified, the allegations of a verified complaint do not constitute evidence, except by way of admission, and, therefore, could be of no assistance to plaintiff in proving her claim. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 605(a) (West 1998).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "C. Don Weston, of Macomb, for appellant.", "Brian E Holland, of Holland & Holland, of Bushnell, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 89386.\nIn re ESTATE OF BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS (Peggy L. Parrish, Appellant, v. Rolf Hackman, Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Budris Andernovics, Deceased, Appellee).\nOpinion filed September 20, 2001.\nRehearing denied December 3, 2001.\nC. Don Weston, of Macomb, for appellant.\nBrian E Holland, of Holland & Holland, of Bushnell, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 512, "last_page_order": 525 }