{ "id": 29929, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PHILIP MORRIS, INC. (Hagen & Berman et al., Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Philip Morris, Inc.", "decision_date": "2001-10-18", "docket_number": "Nos. 90185, 90186 cons.", "first_page": "87", "last_page": "103", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 87" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "15 A.L.R.3d 568", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2795012 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.W.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11645561 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/603/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Md. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1267464 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "1240-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/349/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994891 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469064 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" }, { "page": "491-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111376 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547-48" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592447 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442657 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2696308 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864537 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926972 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4723885 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/258/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 885", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" }, { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0885-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4723821 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/258/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283190 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126153 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102806 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" }, { "page": "401-02" }, { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 Ill. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2551971 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/379/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5790175 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/30/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4742174 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/261/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4689310 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/254/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073586 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777542 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2656746 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778589 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0484-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1128, "char_count": 26905, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9061067865897194e-07, "percentile": 0.845438286170352 }, "sha256": "8f742eea105da4c2eca031959ee0f0efc19d7e2436877970b1973bdc7a1ab0be", "simhash": "1:6d355e5afeead279", "word_count": 4429 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:20.838332+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PHILIP MORRIS, INC. (Hagen & Berman et al., Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe questions presented for review are: (1) does a circuit court have jurisdiction to adjudicate an attorney\u2019s lien against the proceeds of a settlement where the State of Illinois was the plaintiff in the underlying action and where the settlement funds have never come into the possession or control of the state; and (2) did the circuit court of Cook County abuse its discretion in this case by establishing an escrow account to hold disputed attorney fees pending adjudication of an attorney\u2019s lien? We answer the first question in the affirmative. We do not answer the second question because it is premature.\nBACKGROUND\nThis cause is before us following a motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2\u2014619(a)(1) and (a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(1), (a)(9) (West 1998)). In ruling on a section 2\u2014619 motion to dismiss, the trial court may consider pleadings, affidavits, and other proof presented by the parties. Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 486 (1993); Bloomingdale State Bank v. Woodland Sales Co., 186 Ill. App. 3d 227, 232 (1989); see generally 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice \u00a7 41.8 (1989). The record contains the following facts.\nIn April 1996, the Attorney General of Illinois began to consider filing a civil lawsuit on behalf of the state against tobacco companies. Throughout the summer and fall of 1996, the Attorney General interviewed a number of law firms to represent Illinois in its suit against the tobacco industry.\nThe Attorney General chose the following law firms for the position of \u201cnational counsel,\u201d who would supervise tobacco lawsuits in multiple states: Hagens & Berman, the law offices of Steven C. Mitchell, Barrett Law Offices, and Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein. The Attorney General also chose the firm of Freeborn & Peters for the position of \u201clocal counsel\u201d in Illinois\u2019 suit against the tobacco industry (firms hereafter referred to collectively as \u201cIllinois Special Counsel\u201d or \u201cISC\u201d). The ISC were hired based on their expertise, professional reputations, and their willingness to represent the state for a contingent fee.\nOn September 17, 1996, the Attorney General announced that Illinois would join other states in suing tobacco companies. The lawsuit sought to recover Illinois\u2019 share of billions of dollars spent to treat smoking-related illnesses. The Attorney General predicted a long fight in Illinois courts and conceded that the suit was \u201cnot a dead-bang winner.\u201d He wanted to ensure that Illinois would be included in any possible settlements with tobacco companies. He explained that his office would attempt to cover the expenses of the costly suit by, inter alia, \u201casking private law firms to work on the case free.\u201d\nOn September 27, 1996, the Attorney General declared that Illinois taxpayers would not pay the legal bill for his decision to sue tobacco companies. He said that the state was looking for private law firms willing to \u201cabsorb the cost of the suit and eat the cost if they don\u2019t prevail. The taxpayers aren\u2019t going to pay for it.\u201d He explained that the other states suing the tobacco industry \u201cused outside counsel because it\u2019s an enormous undertaking. We don\u2019t have the resources within the office to do this alone.\u201d\nOn October 9, 1996, the Attorney. General entered into a \u201cContract Agreement for Legal Services\u201d with national counsel and, on November 12, entered into a similar contract with local counsel (both contracts hereafter collectively referred to as \u201ccontract\u201d). Under the contract, which the Attorney General drafted, Illinois Special Counsel were charged with the responsibility of representing the state in litigation against the tobacco industry. The Attorney General retained \u201cfinal authority over all aspects of the litigation\u201d that affected the state\u2019s claims. Illinois Special Counsel were obligated to \u201cconsult and obtain the prior approval\u201d of a member of the Attorney General\u2019s staff \u201cconcerning all policy and other major, substantive issues affecting the litigation.\u201d\nRegarding compensation, the contract provided in pertinent part that neither the state nor the office of the Attorney General was \u201cliable for payment of compensation otherwise than from amounts collected for the State of Illinois\u201d and that compensation would be contingent upon recovery of monies, whether by settlement or agreement, from those liable for damages. The contingent fee would be: \u201cTen percent (10%) of the total recovery to the State of Illinois.\u201d Also, Illinois Special Counsel would absorb the costs of the litigation; ISC would be reimbursed only in the event of a recovery.\nAccording to Richard Stock, the Attorney General\u2019s chief of staff: \u201cThis fee arrangement allowed the State of Illinois to pursue the tobacco industry without having to risk any taxpayer dollars on attorneys\u2019 fees or costs.\u201d At the time of the contract, the 10% contingent fee \u201cwas the lowest agreement of its kind amongst the states which had brought actions against the industry.\u201d Stock averred: \u201cAt the time it was negotiated, I and all who worked on this issue in my office believed that the ten percent was fair and reasonable based upon the risk involved.\u201d\nOn November 12, 1996, Illinois Special Counsel filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against members of the tobacco industry. In announcing the suit, the Attorney General repeated his explanation for employing private law firms based on a contingent fee. He added: \u201cIf they lose they\u2019re paid nothing.\u201d\nOn November 13, 1998, the proposed settlement of the tobacco litigation was announced. On November 20, the Attorney General announced that Illinois would join in the settlement. On November 23, 1998, Illinois entered into the \u201cMaster Settlement Agreement\u201d (MSA). Under the MSA, Illinois is to receive from the tobacco defendants approximately $9 billion, or $360 million annually for 25 years. Thereafter, the tobacco industry will continue to make payments in perpetuity based on factors such as the volume of tobacco products sold and the fiscal health of the settling private tobacco companies.\nSection 17 of the MSA, with its implementing document (\u201cIllinois Fee Payment Agreement\u201d), provided that the tobacco defendants pay a liquidated or arbitrated fee to Illinois Special Counsel to reduce the amount of fees owed. An arbitration panel awarded ISC $121 million, which would be paid over approximately 25 years and deducted from their contingent fee.\nOn December 8, 1998, the circuit court approved the MSA and entered a \u201cConsent Decree and Final Judgment\u201d incorporating the MSA. Under the consent decree, the circuit court retained jurisdiction over the case, including the settlement funds to be distributed by the tobacco company defendants. With limited exceptions not applicable here, section VII of the consent decree recognized that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction to implement and enforce the decree.\nOn September 28, 1999, Illinois Special Counsel served notice of their attorney\u2019s lien pursuant to the Attorneys Lien Act (770 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998)). Based on their contingent fee agreement with the Attorney General, they claimed a lien of 10% of any amount recovered from the tobacco defendants.\nOn December 22, 1999, Illinois Special Counsel petitioned the circuit court to adjudicate its attorney\u2019s lien. The State moved to dismiss the petition; the court denied the motion. Illinois Special Counsel moved to establish an escrow account. The court ordered the State and the tobacco defendants to direct that 10% of all settlement payments be deposited into the account pending a decision on the merits of the lien petition. In opposing the attorney\u2019s lien petition and the escrow account, the State argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the entire lien proceeding.\nThe State appealed from the circuit court\u2019s escrow order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307 (188 Ill. 2d R. 307); the appellate court dismissed the appeal. While that appeal was pending, the circuit court certified the following question for permissive interlocutory appeal (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 308):\n\u201cDoes the Circuit Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a petition under the Attorney\u2019s Lien Act brought by counsel for the State of Illinois, against the proceeds of a settlement, where the State of Illinois was the plaintiff in the underlying action and where the settlement funds have never come into the possession or control of the State?\u201d\nThe appellate court denied the State\u2019s application for leave to appeal.\nWe allowed and consolidated the State\u2019s separate petitions for leave to appeal from the appellate court\u2019s: (1) dismissal of the State\u2019s Rule 307 appeal; and (2) denial of the State\u2019s Rule 308 appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). The Coalition for Consumer Rights and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association each sought leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of Illinois Special Counsel, which we now grant (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 345).\nDISCUSSION\nThe purpose of a motion to dismiss under section 2\u2014619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619 (West 1998)) is to afford litigants a means to dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of a case, reserving disputed questions of fact for a trial. Section 2\u2014619(a)(1) allows dismissal when \u201cthe court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action,\u201d and subsection (a)(9) allows dismissal when \u201cthe claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(1), (a)(9) (West 1998). Specifically, a section 2\u2014619(a)(9) motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs action much in the same way as a section 2\u2014615 motion to dismiss admits a complaint\u2019s well-pleaded facts. Review is de novo. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115-17 (1993).\nI. Attorney\u2019s Lien\nIllinois circuit courts have original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 9.\nThe Attorneys Lien Act provides in pertinent part: \u201cAttorneys at law shall have a lien upon all claims *** which may be placed in their hands by their clients for suit or collection *** for the amount of any fee which may have been agreed upon by and between such attorneys and their clients ***. To enforce such lien, such attorneys shall serve notice in writing *** upon the party against whom their clients may have such suits *** claiming such lien and stating therein the interest they have ***. Such lien shall attach to any verdict, judgment or order entered and to any money or property which may be recovered *** from and after the time of service of the notice. On petition filed by such attorneys or their clients any court of competent jurisdiction shall, on not less than 5 days\u2019 notice to the adverse party, adjudicate the rights of the parties and enforce the lien.\u201d 770 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998).\nThe Act sets forth the requirements for effective liens. The attorney must have been hired by a client to assert a claim. The attorney must then perfect the lien by serving notice, in writing, upon the party against whom the client has the claim. The lien attaches from and after the time of the service of the statutory notice. Rhoades v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 227 (1979).\nThe Act \u201ccreates new rights which have heretofore not been recognized in this State.\u201d Standidge v. Chicago Rys. Co., 254 Ill. 524, 533 (1912). Since the attorney\u2019s lien is a creature of statute, the Act must be strictly construed, both as to establishing the lien and as to the right of action for its enforcement. Attorneys who do not strictly comply with the Act have no lien rights. Haj v. American Bottle Co., 261 Ill. 362, 366 (1913); DeKing, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 597; Unger v. Checker Taxi Co., 30 Ill. App. 2d 238, 241-42 (1961).\nOnce the attorney\u2019s lien is perfected, upon petition \u201cany court of competent jurisdiction\u201d may adjudicate the lien. 770 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998). This includes the circuit court that heard the underlying matter (Standidge, 254 Ill. at 533), or the circuit court that has jurisdiction over the money recovered (McCallum v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 379 Ill. 60, 68 (1942)).\nIn this case, the State chose to sue the tobacco defendants in the circuit court. The State hired private attorneys and sent those attorneys into the circuit court to litigate its cause. After two years of litigation in the circuit court, the State agreed to settle its dispute with the tobacco defendants. The State then requested the circuit court to approve the settlement. The court approved the settlement that created the proceeds upon which the lien was perfected. Illinois Special Counsel complied with the Attorneys Lien Act. They perfected the lien and petitioned the circuit court to adjudicate it. The circuit court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the lien, either because it heard the underlying matter, or because it has jurisdiction over the settlement proceeds.\nHowever, the State invokes the principle of sovereign immunity. \u201cIn the United States, sovereign immunity has been justified as a rule which embodies a policy that protects the State from interference in its performance of the functions of government and preserves its control over State coffers.\u201d S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State of Illinois, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 401 (1982).\nThe 1970 Illinois Constitution abolished the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity \u201c[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, \u00a7 4. The legislature has provided that \u201cthe State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court,\u201d except as provided in the Court of Claims Act. 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998). Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act provides in pertinent part that the Court of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine \u201c[a]ll claims against the State.\u201d 705 ILCS 505/8(a), (b) (West 1998).\nThe State contends that jurisdiction to adjudicate the attorney\u2019s lien of Illinois Special Counsel lies not with the circuit court, but rather with the Illinois Court of Claims. That body \u201cwas, and continues to be, a part of the legislative branch of State Government.\u201d Pub. Act 83\u2014865, \u00a7 1, eff. September 26, 1983. The Court of Claims is not a court within the meaning of the judicial article of our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI); its function is not to adjudicate cases. Rather, the General Assembly established the Court of Claims to receive and resolve claims against the state. Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill. 2d 72, 78 (1985); see generally S.J. Groves & Sons, 93 Ill. 2d at 401-02. \u201cIt is in essence the legislature \u2014 the body called upon to fund any awards \u2014 that is deciding through the Court of Claims the merits of the claims before it.\u201d S.J. Groves & Sons, 93 Ill. 2d at 405.\nThe State contends that, for several reasons, the lien petition of Illinois Special Counsel constitutes \u201ca claim against the State.\u201d Therefore, according to the State, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction thereof. \u201cThe determination of whether an action is in fact a suit against the State turns upon an analysis of the issues involved and the relief sought, rather than the formal designation of the parties.\u201d Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992).\nWe cannot accept the State\u2019s contention that ISC\u2019s lien petition constitutes a claim against the State of Illinois. In its arguments, the State misapprehends the nature of an attorney\u2019s lien under the Attorneys Lien Act.\nThe State first argues that the attorney\u2019s lien petition of Illinois Special Counsel \u201cis, in substance, a breach of contract action against the State.\u201d However, it is quite settled that an attorney\u2019s lien under the Act \u201cis a lien upon the proceeds, only, of the litigation or settlement of the claim.\u201d Baker v. Baker, 258 Ill. 418, 421 (1913). The attorney\u2019s only interest is in the proceeds of the litigation or its settlement. Process Color Plate Co. v. Chicago Urban Transportation District, 125 Ill. App. 3d 885, 891 (1984). This court explained long ago:\n\u201cBy serving the notice claiming a lien the attorney in effect becomes a joint claimant with his client *** in the proceeds of any settlement that may be made by the client, and to the extent of the amount of his fee has the same interest in such proceeds *** as his client and is entitled to his pro rata share thereof.\u201d Baker, 258 Ill. at 421.\nIndeed, it is settled that, outside of the Act, attorneys can still sue their clients to recover for their services. Baker, 258 Ill. at 421; DeKing, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 597.\nFurther, once an attorney serves proper notice of the lien on the client\u2019s adversary, that party bears responsibility for respecting the lien. If the underlying defendant does not respect the lien, then the defendant becomes liable for the attorney fees. Sutton v. Chicago Rys. Co., 258 Ill. 551, 553 (1913); Process Color Plate, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 890. A petition under the Attorneys Lien Act is not a contract action against the attorney\u2019s client. This distinguishes the present case from cases such as People ex rel. Manning v. Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d 245 (1998), which involved claims \u201cagainst the State.\u201d\nThe State contends that the attorney\u2019s lien petition of Illinois Special Counsel constitutes \u201ca claim against the State\u201d for several additional reasons. The State argues that adjudication of the attorney\u2019s lien would threaten to subject the state to liability and would control the actions of the state. A suit will' be considered a claim against the state if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the state or subject it to liability. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 158.\nThe State argues that the circuit court\u2019s adjudication of Illinois Special Counsel\u2019s lien subjects the state to liability. However, our discussion of the Attorneys Lien Act shows that it does not infringe on the state\u2019s statutory sovereign immunity. The defendants in the underlying litigation are charged with honoring the lien, not the state. Under no circumstances can the general funds of the state be reached to satisfy this obligation of the tobacco defendants. See Graham v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 182 Ill. 2d 287, 297 (1998), quoting People v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm\u2019n, 3 Ill. 2d 218, 227 (1954).\nAlso, the State argues that the circuit court\u2019s adjudication of the attorney\u2019s lien would control the actions of the state. According to the State, a circuit court adjudication of the lien \u201cwould force the State to pay those settlement funds to [ISC] without any legislative appropriation.\u201d Again, however, the state is not appropriating any money whatsoever. The tobacco defendants, and not the state, will pay the attorney fees. This was understood and repeatedly acknowledged from the inception of the litigation.\nIndeed, the whole point of contingent fee agreements is to remove from the client\u2019s shoulders the risk of being out-of-pocket for attorney fees upon a zero recovery. Instead, the lawyer assumes that risk and is compensated for it by charging what is in effect an insurance premium. See 1 G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering \u00a7 8.6, at 8\u201415, 8\u201416 (3d ed. 2001); T. Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers\u2019 Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 De Paul L. Rev. 371, 374-78 (1998):\nThe State next argues: \u201cResolution of this dispute necessarily requires a determination of the State\u2019s interest in the disputed settlement funds, an inquiry that implicates the State\u2019s sovereign immunity.\u201d When property of the state is involved, the state becomes directly and adversely affected by the suit and the action must be held to be one against the state. Sass v. Kramer, 72 Ill. 2d 485, 491 (1978); Hollander & Hollander v. Kamenjarin, 201 Ill. App. 3d 799, 801 (1990).\nWe cannot at this juncture consider the tobacco settlement to be state funds. First, whether the payment of ISC\u2019s attorney fees would be a money judgment against the state can be determined by examining the source from which the attorney fees would be paid. See Shell Oil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 95 Ill. 2d 541, 547-48 (1983). In this case, the source of the attorney fees is not the state\u2019s general revenue fund, but rather is \u201cthe bank or other entity with which the fund was invested.\u201d See Shell Oil Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 548.\nSecond, the withholding of funds from the state treasury does not automatically render a case a suit against the state. Saltiel v. Olsen, 85 Ill. 2d 484, 492 (1981), quoting City of Springfield v. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (1978). In this case, the tobacco settlement funds, which have never been in the state\u2019s hands, are not \u201cstate funds\u201d until after ISC\u2019s attorney fees are paid and the funds go into the state treasury. See Saltiel, 85 Ill. 2d at 491-93. The courts of other states that participated in the tobacco settlement have reached this conclusion. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 681, 709 A.2d 1230, 1240-41 (1998); accord Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, 603 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn. App. 1999).\nWe note the State\u2019s attempt to show that the State of Illinois, and not the tobacco defendants, is \u201cthe true target\u201d of Illinois Special Counsel\u2019s attorney\u2019s lien. The State points to sections 3 and 4 of the Illinois Fee Payment Agreement, which provide essentially that ISC waive all future claims against the tobacco defendants in exchange for the attorney fees received pursuant to the agreement. The State reasons: \u201cIf [ISC] are correct, however, and their claim for attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to their attorney\u2019s lien is truly a claim against the Tobacco Defendants, then that lien must be dismissed with prejudice because [ISC] irrevocably waived that claim under IFPA \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) ISC counters that, pursuant to section 5 of the agreement, their arbitrated fee has no effect on their contingent fee contract with the State.\nThis is an issue for the circuit court at the adjudication of ISC\u2019s attorney\u2019s lien, not for this court in the present appeal. We conclude that the circuit court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the attorney\u2019s lien of Illinois Special Counsel. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.\nII. Escrow Order\nThe circuit court established an escrow account and ordered that 10% of all settlement payments be deposited there until further order. The State appealed from the circuit court\u2019s order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1), which allows interlocutory review of an order \u201cgranting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1). The appellate court dismissed the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal.\nBefore this court, the State initially contends that since the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Illinois Special Counsel\u2019s attorney\u2019s lien, then the court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to enter the escrow order. However, our above-stated answer to the certified question disposes of this contention.\nThe State next characterizes the escrow order as injunctive in nature. Based on that characterization, the State contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in entering the escrow order because Illinois Special Counsel did not satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction.\n\u201cTo determine what constitutes an appealable injunctive order under Rule 307(a)(1) we look to the substance of the action, not its form. *** Actions of the circuit court having the force and effect of injunctions are still appeal-able even if called something else.\u201d In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 260 (1989). \u201cMinisterial\u201d or \u201cadministrative\u201d orders of the circuit court, i.e., orders that regulate only the procedural details of litigation before the court, cannot be the subject of an interlocutory appeal. Such orders do not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation and, therefore, are distinguishable from traditional forms of injunctive relief. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 262.\nA majority of the cases ruling on the question have held that an order directing the payment of money into court is not appealable. The most common reason for denying an appeal from such orders is that they are merely interim orders, designed to preserve a fund until rights to it can be established; they are not orders establishing such rights. In re Estate of Basile, 32 Ill. App. 3d 618, 620 (1975), citing Annotation, Appealability of Order Directing Payment of Money Into Court, 15 A.L.R.3d 568, 570 (1967).\nIn the present case, the record shows that this was the circuit court\u2019s view of the escrow order. The court reasoned: \u201cI think an escrow should be established because it would simplify the process here.\u201d The court further noted: \u201cNobody won here today, nobody lost here today, it\u2019s just a simple matter of bookkeeping and accounting, as far as I\u2019m concerned.\u201d We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing the State\u2019s interlocutory appeal of the circuit court\u2019s escrow order.\nCONCLUSION\nIn sum, Illinois Special Counsel\u2019s lien proceeding is not a claim against the State of Illinois. Rather, it is a statutory claim against a fund of monies to be paid by private defendants. The circuit court may adjudicate the claim against the fund. Further, because the source of the fund at issue is not the state treasury sovereign immunity is not implicated. Accordingly the circuit court, and not the Court of Claims, is the proper forum to adjudicate the attorney\u2019s lien.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the question certified by the circuit court of Cook County is answered in the affirmative. We do not address the propriety of the trial court\u2019s escrow, order, as it is premature. The cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nCertified question answered; cause remanded.\nJUSTICE McMORROW took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Don R. Sampen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), and Jerold S. Solovy, Anton R. Valukas and Barry Levenstam, of Jenner & Block, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, for the People.", "Clifford Law Offices (Robert A. Clifford and Robert E Sheridan, of counsel), Ungaretti & Harris (J. Timothy Eaton, of counsel), and Hedlund, Hanley & Trafelet (Reuben L. Hedlund and Dean M. Trafelet, of counsel), all of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 90185, 90186 cons.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PHILIP MORRIS, INC. (Hagen & Berman et al., Appellees).\nOpinion filed October 18, 2001.\nRehearing denied December 3, 2001.\nMcMORROW J., took no part.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Don R. Sampen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), and Jerold S. Solovy, Anton R. Valukas and Barry Levenstam, of Jenner & Block, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, for the People.\nClifford Law Offices (Robert A. Clifford and Robert E Sheridan, of counsel), Ungaretti & Harris (J. Timothy Eaton, of counsel), and Hedlund, Hanley & Trafelet (Reuben L. Hedlund and Dean M. Trafelet, of counsel), all of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0087-01", "first_page_order": 99, "last_page_order": 115 }