{ "id": 29948, "name": "In re D.S., a Minor (D.S. et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. R.S. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross-Appellee))", "name_abbreviation": "D.S. v. R.S.", "decision_date": "2001-06-21", "docket_number": "No. 88460", "first_page": "309", "last_page": "333", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 309" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "455 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307633 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "1397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160788 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186538 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2999464 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "there is no separation of powers violation when a circuit court ordered a State's Attorney to prosecute a neglect petition under the Juvenile Court Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5386026 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the circuit court possessed the authority to order the State to prosecute a dependency action under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3096773 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151", "parenthetical": "ordering the State to file a petition in respect to a minor under the Juvenile Court Act is not an impermissible exercise by the judicial branch of powers belonging exclusively to the executive branch and therefore does not violate the separation of powers doctrine" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623-24" }, { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229710 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278173 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821419 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426854 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984190 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192395 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801349 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2409603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/275/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236934 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "6" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "6-7" }, { "page": "8-9" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9-10" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173528 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0249-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1187, "char_count": 44979, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.339010577223277e-07, "percentile": 0.8740411120493897 }, "sha256": "af8c4863c35d93b670162bfcd554587eb8cedc324f64112d6ff2755322b02414", "simhash": "1:df7d74dac4d3c670", "word_count": 7590 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:20.838332+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re D.S., a Minor (D.S. et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. R.S. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross-Appellee))." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe principal issue presented in this appeal is whether the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, contained in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1), is violated when a circuit court issues an order directing the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute a petition for the termination of parental rights, after the court has set a permanency goal for the minor consisting of substitute care pending a court determination on the termination petition. The circuit court of Kane County, after selecting its permanency goal for D.S., ordered the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office to prosecute a pending petition to terminate parental rights after the State had previously indicated that it would not undertake such prosecution. The State\u2019s Attorney appealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 307 Ill. App. 3d 249. This court allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn September 9, 1993, D.S. and her three older sisters, R.S., R.S., and E.H., were removed from the home of their parents and taken into protective custody by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) based upon evidence that they were neglected and abused minors. Specifically, the State alleged in its \u201cSecond Amended Petition for Adjudication of Wardship\u201d that the minors were subject to environmental neglect because the family home had been declared unfit for human habitation by the City of Aurora. The petition further alleged that the minors had been abused because their father presented a substantial risk of physical harm to them. On November 9, 1993, the children\u2019s parents waived an adjudicatory hearing and stipulated that the. minors were environmentally neglected and abused. The circuit court adjudicated the minors to be wards of the court and ordered that they remain in the custody and guardianship of DCFS until further order. On November 10, 1993, the circuit court appointed CASA Kane County, Inc., a social service agency, as guardian ad litem (hereinafter GAL) to represent the minors.\nOn July 8, 1997, the GAL filed a verified petition in the circuit court to terminate the parental rights of the minors\u2019 parents. Count I of the termination petition was brought by the GAL on behalf of D.S. Count I of this petition was also brought by D.S., individually. Count II of the petition was brought by the GAL on behalf of R.S. and her sister R.S. Both minor sisters objected to the termination petition filed on their behalf, stating that they did not wish their parents\u2019 rights to be terminated as to them. Accordingly, the attorney for the GAL withdrew his appearance on their behalf and they were appointed new counsel.\nThe petition to terminate parental rights proceeded solely as to D.S. The petition alleged that the parental rights of both of D.S.\u2019s natural parents should be terminated because the parents were unfit in four respects. Specifically, the termination petition alleged that D.S.\u2019s parents were unfit because they had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility with respect to D.S.\u2019s welfare; had continuously and repeatedly neglected D.S. since her removal; had failed to protect D.S. from an injurious environment; and had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of D.S. as well as reasonable progress toward the return of D.S. within 12 months after she was adjudicated neglected and abused. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(d), (D)(g), (D)(m) (West 1998).\nThe petition to terminate parental rights stated that D.S. had resided with her foster parents continuously since the shelter care hearing in September, 1993, and alleged that the foster parents were \u201cready, willing and able to adopt [D.S.]\u201d after the rights of the natural parents were terminated. The petition further alleged that \u201c[t]he Kane County State\u2019s Attorney *** has in the exercise of its discretion decided not to seek termination of parental rights in this proceeding,\u201d and requested that the circuit court \u201cguarantee[ ] [D.S. and the GAL] the right to prosecute this petition.\u201d\nIn response, the State filed with the circuit court a motion to dismiss the termination petition filed by the GAL and D.S. The dismissal motion alleged that the State\u2019s Attorney is the only party authorized to prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act. Because the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, in the exercise of its discretion, had declined to seek termination of parental rights in this matter, the motion concluded that the petition must be dismissed.\nOn August 26, 1997, the circuit court held that the GAL had standing to file (as opposed to prosecute) the petition to terminate parental rights on behalf of D.S. under section 2 \u2014 13(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(1) (West 1998)), which provides in relevant part that \u201cany adult person *** may file *** a petition with respect of a minor under this Act.\u201d The circuit court further ruled that D.S., as a minor, lacked both the standing and capacity to proceed individually to file a petition to terminate her parents\u2019 rights. Therefore, the circuit court granted the State\u2019s oral motion to dismiss D.S., individually, as a petitioner. The circuit court, however, reserved ruling on the question of whether the GAL had the authority to prosecute the termination petition.\nOn September 9, 1997, the circuit court denied the GAL\u2019s request to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights. The court ruled that \u201cthere is no support in current Illinois law to allow for a termination petition to be prosecuted by any party other than the State,\u201d and that \u201cthe case law and the statute is very clear that it is within the sole discretion of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office to prosecute all proceedings.\u201d The circuit court further observed that it would be \u201ccontrary to public policy\u201d as expressed in the Juvenile Court Act to allow any party other than the State to prosecute a termination petition.\nThe circuit court, however, did not dismiss the termination petition. The court ruled that the State had until September 23, 1997, to decide whether it would prosecute the petition filed by the GAL. On September 17, 1997, the State renewed its motion to dismiss the GAL\u2019s petition to terminate parental rights. The State alleged in its motion that \u201c[a]fter consideration of the facts and circumstances which exist in the instant case at this time, and after considering the best interests of [D.S.], the People do not believe it is appropriate to proceed with a prosecution of the [termination petition] at this time.\u201d\nOn September 23, 1997, the circuit court denied the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the termination petition, pending a permanency review hearing with respect to the future status of D.S. In the course of his ruling, the circuit court judge observed that \u201cwith the addition to the Juvenile Court Act of the permanency review statute *** the court has increased authority to direct the permanency goal. *** If the court sets a permanency goal of adoption, then I believe that the court can direct *** the State to prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights.\u201d\nOn October 28, 1997, the circuit court conducted the permanency review hearing. The court entered an order finding that DCFS\u2019s recently determined permanency goal for D.S. of foster home placement, with guardianship to remain in DCFS, was \u201cnot an appropriate goal.\u201d The court also noted in its order that the State still did \u201cnot wish to proceed\u201d with respect to the petition to terminate parental rights filed on D.S.\u2019s behalf.\nAnother permanency review hearing was conducted by the circuit court with respect to D.S. on January 16, 1998. In its order, the circuit court ruled that the appropriate permanency goal for D.S. was to place her permanent guardianship in her foster parents. The court found that this goal was in the best interests of D.S. \u201cdue to the length of current placement\u201d (D.S. had been in the protective custody of her foster parents since 1993), D.S.\u2019s \u201cemotional and physical status,\u201d and \u201cthe lack of success at past attempts at reunification.\u201d The circuit court further ordered that \u201c[a] 11 parties shall work toward completion of and success of the permanency goal entered herein.\u201d The court, however, specifically stated in its order that it was not ruling out the permanency goal of substitute care pending a court determination on the termination of parental rights.\nOn March 24, 1998, the State again renewed its motion to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights filed by the GAL, stating that it would, \u201conce again, decline to prosecute said petition.\u201d On March 31, 1998, in accordance with effectuating the court\u2019s permanency goal of placing permanent guardianship of D.S. in her foster parents, DCFS filed with the circuit court a motion to vacate DCFS\u2019s guardianship of D.S., terminate DCFS\u2019s wardship as to D.S., and to close D.S.\u2019s case. DCFS also filed a motion to appoint D.S.\u2019s foster parents as guardians of D.S.\nOn May 26, 1998, the circuit court conducted a hearing regarding the entry of an agreed order with respect to the guardianship of D.S. The record reveals that the mother of D.S. signed a letter of consent to the guardianship, and that the GAL, D.S.\u2019s foster parents and D.S.\u2019s mother agreed to the terms of the agreed guardianship order. Although the father of D.S. had previously indicated that he would also agree to the order, during the hearing he declined to sign a letter of consent because he had reservations with respect to restrictions upon his visitation with D.S. Based upon the best interests of D.S., the circuit court then ordered that the permanency goal for D.S. be changed to substitute care with D.S.\u2019s foster parents (with the guardianship of D.S. to remain in DCFS) pending the outcome of the proceedings to terminate parental rights. The circuit court directed the State to prosecute the termination petition which had been filed by the GAL on behalf of D.S. The circuit court judge then recused himself from hearing the termination proceedings in this matter.\nThe State filed a motion requesting the circuit court to reconsider its ruling directing the State to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights. The circuit court held a hearing on the State\u2019s motion to reconsider on July 7, 1998. During the hearing, the circuit court noted that, pursuant to provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, it has the \u201cresponsibility to determine what permanency goal is in the minor child\u2019s best interests.\u201d The circuit court explained that after determining that the appropriate permanency goal for D.S. was substitute care pending a legal determination on the termination of parental rights petition, the court then had the responsibility \u201cto set forth or consider what tasks and what orders need to be made in order to accomplish the permanency goal.\u201d Because D.S. had been in foster care placement from 1993 to 1998, and to achieve the permanency goal set in this case, the court ordered the office of the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the termination of parental rights petition. The circuit court then entered an order denying the State\u2019s reconsideration motion on the basis that the court\u2019s direction to the State to prosecute the termination petition was \u201cappropriate\u201d and \u201cin furtherance of the court-ordered goal of substitute care pending termination.\u201d\nOn appeal, the State alleged that the circuit court erred in two respects: allowing the GAL to file the petition to terminate parental rights, and ordering the State to prosecute the termination petition. The GAL filed a cross-appeal, contending that the circuit court erred in holding that the State\u2019s Attorney has the sole authority to prosecute a petition for the termination of parental rights.\nThe appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 307 Ill. App. 3d 249. The appellate court rejected the argument advanced by the State that the GAL was not entitled to file a petition to terminate parental rights on behalf of D.S. The court observed that, under the plain language of section 2\u201413(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u201413(1) (West 1998)), \u201c[a]ny adult person *** may file *** a petition in respect of a minor under this Act.\u201d The appellate court determined that, in light of this broad statutory provision, the circuit court did not commit error in allowing the GAL to file the termination petition. 307 Ill. App. 3d at 253.\nAlthough the appellate court determined that the circuit court properly allowed the GAL to file the termination petition, the court agreed with the State that the office of the State\u2019s Attorney is vested with the sole authority to prosecute petitions to terminate parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act. Relying upon this court\u2019s prior decisions in In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), and People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453 (1916), the appellate court concluded that it is well settled that upon the filing of a petition under the Juvenile Court Act, the State becomes the real party in interest and has the responsibility of prosecuting the proceedings. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the circuit court did not err in denying the request by the GAL to prosecute the termination petition.\nHaving held that the State\u2019s Attorney is vested with the sole right to prosecute termination petitions under the Juvenile Court Act, the appellate court then addressed the question of the circuit court\u2019s authority to order the State to prosecute a termination petition. Placing principal reliance upon our decision in In re J.J., the appellate court concluded that \u201cthe juvenile court may order the State to prosecute [a termination petition] when consistent with the overriding purposes of the [Juvenile Court] Act.\u201d 307 Ill. App. 3d at 255. The appellate court reasoned that \u201cIn re J.J. makes it clear that it is the juvenile court as well as the State\u2019s Attorney that is responsible to ensure that the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family, and the community are served, which are the overriding purposes of the Act.\u201d 307 Ill. App. 3d at 255. Applying this reasoning to the matter before it, the appellate court panel concluded that \u201cwe find no error in the [circuit] court\u2019s decision to order the State to prosecute the petition given the length of time D.S. has been in foster care placement and the fact that there was some indication in the record that the parents failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child or to correct the conditions that led to her removal.\u201d 307 Ill. App. 3d at 255-56.\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We also allowed amicus curiae briefs to be filed by the State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, the Cook County public guardian, and the Children and Family Justice Center of the Northwestern University School of Law.\nIn its brief to this court, the State asserts that it \u201cdo[es] not take issue\u201d with the appellate court\u2019s ruling that, pursuant to section 2\u201413(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u201413(1) (West 1998)), the GAL had statutory authority to file the termination petition. The State confines its appeal to the sole question of whether the circuit court\u2019s direction to the office of the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights brought on behalf of D.S. violates the doctrine of separation of powers found in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1).\nOur grant of the State\u2019s petition also brings before us the GAL\u2019s request for cross-relief. 155 Ill. 2d R. 318(a). The GAL contends that the lower courts erred in two respects. First, the GAL asserts that the courts below improperly barred D.S. from individually filing the termination petition. Second, the GAL maintains that the lower courts erred in holding that the State possesses the sole authority to prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act.\nANALYSIS\nThe purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to secure for each minor subject to it the care and guidance that will serve \u201cthe safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1\u20142(1) (West 1998). The goals of the Act include preserving and strengthening family ties \u201cwhenever possible,\u201d but if reunification is delayed or fails, then the best available placement is to be made to provide permanency for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1\u20142(1) (West 1998). To effectuate the intended purposes of the Act, the Illinois General Assembly has instructed that this legislation is to be \u201cliberally construed\u201d (705 ILCS 405/1\u20142(4) (West 1998)) and that \u201c[i]n all proceedings under this Act the court may direct the course thereof so as promptly to ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully to gather information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to this Act.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2(2) (West 1998).\nProceedings under the Juvenile Court Act are initiated by the filing of a petition pursuant to section 2\u201413(1) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2\u201413(1) (West 1998)), which provides, in relevant part:\n\u201cAny adult person, any agency or association by its representative may file, or the court on its own motion, consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor may direct the filing through the State\u2019s Attorney of a petition in respect of a minor under this Act.\u201d\nAs stated, in its submissions to this court the State has abandoned the contention advanced below that the GAL lacked statutory authority to file a petition to terminate parental rights on behalf of D.S. The State now correctly acknowledges in its pleadings that section 2\u201413 of the Act \u201cclearly provides for the filing of the [termination] petition by the GAL.\u201d\nHowever, in the petition for cross-relief filed by the GAL with this court, the GAL makes a brief argument that D.S., individually, has a right to a file a petition under the Juvenile Court Act, including a petition to terminate her parents\u2019 rights. We disagree. The plain language of section 2\u201413(1), which provides that a petition may be filed by \u201c[a]ny adult person,\u201d establishes that the General Assembly did not contemplate the filing of petitions under the Act by minors. This conclusion is supported by the provisions contained in section 2\u201417 of the Act, wherein the legislature has provided that minors who are the subject of proceedings under the Act must be appointed a GAL whose duty it is to \u201crepresent the best interests of the minor and *** present recommendations to the court consistent with that duty.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u201417(1) (West 1998). Therefore, minors, such as D.S., are assured representation by a GAL who is obliged to advocate for their best interests and file the appropriate pleadings to protect their rights. Accordingly, we conclude that a minor, individually, may not file a petition under the Juvenile Court Act.\nWe now turn to the principal issue raised in this appeal: whether the circuit court\u2019s order, directing the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights after the court had set the permanency goal for D.S. as substitute care pending a determination on the termination petition filed by the GAL, was unconstitutional because it violated the doctrine of separation of powers set forth in article II, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1). Because this issue presents a question of law, our review is de novo. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998).\nThe Illinois Constitution provides that the legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate, and that \u201c[n]o branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1. In \u201c \u2018both theory and practice, the purpose of the [separation of powers] provision is to ensure that the whole power of two or more branches of government shall not reside in the same hands.\u2019 \u201d Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 410 (1997), quoting People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 473 (1988). However, the doctrine of separation of powers \u201cwas not designed to achieve a complete divorce among the three branches of government\u201d (In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 7; Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 58 (1979)) and does not require \u201cgovernmental powers to be divided into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments\u201d (In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 7; In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill. 2d 113, 119 (1976)). Because the \u201cseparation of the three branches of government is not absolute and unyielding\u201d (Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 411), the doctrine of separation of powers \u201cis not contravened merely because separate spheres of governmental authority may overlap\u201d (Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 411; see also People ex rel. Devine v. Murphy, 181 Ill. 2d 522, 530 (1998); McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill. 2d 84, 94 (1992); In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 7).\nIt has long been established that, upon the filing of a petition under the Juvenile Court Act, the \u201cpeople become the real party complainant and must prosecute the proceeding.\u201d People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453, 455 (1916); see also In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 6. Section 1\u20146 of the Juvenile Court Act provides that the people of the State of Illinois shall be represented by the State\u2019s Attorney in proceedings under the Act. 705 ILCS 405/1\u20146 (West 1998). The State contends that because prosecutorial discretion is a purely executive function of the office of the State\u2019s Attorney, the circuit court violated the principle of the separation of powers when it ordered the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the termination petition filed by the GAL on behalf of D.S., even though the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office had declined to prosecute the petition at that time.\nThe State acknowledges that the overriding purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to secure the best interests of the minor and the community, and, if possible, to preserve and strengthen the minor\u2019s family ties. The State contends, however, that the goals of the Act \u201cmust be accomplished within the framework of the constitutional provisions requiring the separation of powers.\u201d The State proffers the general argument that \u201c[n]o section of the Juvenile Court Act can operate to grant a court the authority to exercise powers properly belonging to the executive branch,\u201d but does not make citation to any specific section of the Act which may allegedly violate the separation of powers principle. Rather, the primary focus of the argument advanced by the State is that the appellate court erred in holding that this court\u2019s decision in In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), provided the circuit court with the duty and authority to order the State to prosecute the termination petition. The State contends that the reasoning in our decision in In re J.J. is inapposite because that case is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar. We disagree with the State\u2019s contentions.\nIn In re J.J., petitions for adjudication of wardship were filed by DCFS with respect to three minor children who had allegedly been abused. The State\u2019s Attorney moved to dismiss these petitions, and the GAL objected. The circuit court dismissed the petitions for adjudication of wardship without considering the merits because the court concluded that, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it was \u201c \u2018without legal authority or precedent to require the State to proceed with the prosecution of this case.\u2019 \u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 4. The circuit court accepted the argument proffered by the State that the office of the State\u2019s Attorney had the exclusive right to request dismissal of a petition for adjudication of wardship because of its role in the executive branch of government, and that any judicial interference with this executive discretion violated the separation of powers.\nOn appeal, this court rejected the State\u2019s attempt to narrowly and rigidly compartmentalize the exercise of executive and judicial powers with respect to abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. We agreed with the State\u2019s assertion that it had been well settled that \u201cthe office of the State\u2019s Attorney enjoys wide discretion in both the initiation and management of criminal litigation.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 6-7. However, we held that the \u201cevil of a court\u2019s attempting to invade the exclusive executive discretion of the constitutional office of the State\u2019s Attorney in controlling the initiation and management of criminal litigation is absent in dependency and neglect proceedings, where both the State\u2019s Attorney and the court are charged with the duty of ensuring that *** the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family and the community are served.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8-9.\nWe found that under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, the circuit court had \u201cnot only the authority but the duty to determine whether the best interests of the minor will be served by dismissing a petition alleging abuse of a minor.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9. For example, we noted that the legislature determined that in all proceedings brought under the Act, the court is vested with the authority to \u201c \u2018direct the course thereof so as promptly to ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully to gather information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to [the] Act.\u2019 \u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801\u20142(2) (now 705 ILCS 405/1\u20142(2) (West 1998)). We further observed that, in section 2\u201421 of the Act, the legislature specifically instructed that \u201c \u2018[a]fter hearing the evidence\u2019 \u201d presented during an adjudicatory hearing, \u201c \u2018the court shall make *** a finding of whether or not the minor is abused, neglected or dependent,\u2019 \u201d and if the court \u201c \u2018finds that the minor is not such a person, the court shall order the petition dismissed and the minor discharged.\u2019 \u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 802\u201421(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/2\u201421(1) (West 1998)).\nThis court reasoned that, under the framework of the Juvenile Court Act, although the prosecution of a petition \u201cis the responsibility of the State\u2019s Attorney,\u201d the determination of \u201cwhether the best interests of the minor will be served by dismissal of a petition *** is the responsibility of the juvenile court.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 11. Therefore, \u201cwhen the State moves to dismiss a petition alleging abuse of a minor, the circuit court shall consider the merits of the motion and determine, on the record, whether dismissal is in the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family, and the community.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9. We found that \u201c[ojnly in this way will the circuit court be able to fulfill its duty [under the Act] to ensure the best interests of the minor and \u2018gather information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to [the] Act.\u2019 \u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9-10, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801\u20142(2). We further concluded that the circuit court may order the office of the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute a petition under the Act against its wishes if the court determines that such prosecution is in the best interests of the minor. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 11.\nIn sum, we held in In re J.J. that the statutory duties imposed upon the circuit court by the Juvenile Court Act did not conflict with the role of the State\u2019s Attorney under the Act because both the court and the State\u2019s Attorney are jointly charged with acting in the best interests of the minor. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 11. Accordingly, the principle of the separation of powers was not violated.\nIn the matter at bar, the State attempts to factually distinguish our decision in In re J.J. on the basis that \u201cthe interest of the protection of the minor [present in In re J.J.] *** is absent here.\u201d The State asserts that, unlike in In re J.J., where the dismissal of the minors\u2019 petitions for adjudication of wardship would have denied them the right of access to the protective services of the juvenile court, in the instant cause the best interests of D.S. remain secure despite the State\u2019s refusal to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights. According to the State, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s \u201cfailure to prosecute a termination petition does not frustrate the purposes of the Act *** [as] D.S. is still subject to the court\u2019s jurisdiction so the court can fulfill its obligation to see that her best interests are addressed.\u201d We find the arguments of the State unpersuasive.\nIn the present cause, the circuit court, like the court in In re J.J., was charged with carrying out statutory duties imposed by the Juvenile Court Act with the purpose of ensuring the best interests of the minor, D.S. Section 2\u201428 of the Act requires the circuit court to conduct a permanency hearing within 12 months of the entry of a temporary custody order and at least every six months thereafter. 705 ILCS 405/2\u201428(2) (West 1998). The statute provides that \u201c[a]t the permanency hearing, the court shall determine the future status of the child.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u201428(2) (West 1998). The circuit court complies with this directive by selecting a permanency goal, from among several listed in section 2\u201428, which the court finds to be \u201cin the best interest of the child.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u201428(2) (West 1998). Section 2\u201428 of the Act further provides that, upon completion of the permanency hearing, the court shall enter an order which sets forth the \u201cfuture status of the minor, including the permanency goal, and any order necessary to conform the minor\u2019s legal custody and status to such determination.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u201428(3)(a) (West 1998).\nIn the matter before us, the circuit court determined that it was in the best interests of D.S. to set a permanency goal of substitute care pending court determination on the termination of parental rights. The parties to this appeal neither dispute the court\u2019s authority to set this permanency goal nor challenge the goal itself. We conclude that, under the facts presented, once the circuit court found that this particular permanency goal was in the best interests of D.S., the court had the duty and the authority, pursuant to section 2\u201428(3) (a) of the Act, to enter any order \u201cnecessary to conform the minor\u2019s legal custody and status to the goal the court selected.\u201d Therefore, under these circumstances, the circuit court appropriately ordered the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the termination petition as a means of accomplishing the permanency goal found to be in D.S.\u2019s best interests.\nIn its submission to this court, the State also raises the contention that our decision today places the office of the State\u2019s Attorney in an \u201cethical dilemma\u201d with respect to Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (134 Ill. 2d R. 3.1). We find the State\u2019s argument to be without merit. Rule 3.1 provides, in relevant part, that a lawyer \u201cshall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.\u201d The plain language of Rule 3.1 prohibits a lawyer from bringing a proceeding that is \u201cfrivolous.\u201d Actions on the part of the State in compliance with an order of the circuit court would not be deemed \u201cfrivolous.\u201d\nIn instances where, as here, reunification between a minor and her family is delayed or fails, section 1\u20142(1) of the Act directs the circuit court to select \u201cthe best available placement to provide permanency for the child.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1\u20142(1) (West 1998). Indeed, the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act would be rendered meaningless and the functions of the juvenile court would be nullified if the court were powerless to effectuate the permanency goal it found to be in a minor\u2019s best interests. A clear example is provided by the matter at bar: if the circuit court does not have the statutory duty and authority to effectuate the permanency goal found to be in the best interests of D.S., it is conceivable that the future status of D.S. could remain in limbo until the time, if ever, the State decides to prosecute the termination petition. As we have recently observed in In re D.L., because \u201cit is not in [a minor\u2019s] best interests for his status to remain in limbo for an extended period of time,\u201d the circuit court should \u201cconsider, in an expedited manner, cases involving [such children], so that the minors whose futures are at stake in [juvenile] proceedings can obtain a prompt, just, and final resolution of their status.\u201d In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000).\nOur decision today is not without precedent. We have previously held that \u201ceach branch of government has concurrent powers and responsibilities that are in the nature of parens patriae.\u201d In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 488 (1997). The doctrine of parens patriae \u201crepresents an expression of the general power and obligation of the government as a whole to protect minors and the infirrp.\u201d In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 488; People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 623-24 (1952). The parens patriae power is codified in the Juvenile Court Act, which specifically charges the circuit court with the duty to act in the best interests of the minor and for the minor\u2019s own protection. Labrenz, 411 Ill. at 624. In addition to our decision in In re J.J., the duty and authority of the circuit court to guard the interests of minors in proceedings conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act and to direct the State\u2019s Attorney to take actions in accordance with that duty have been repeatedly upheld. See People ex rel. Davis v. Vasquez, 92 Ill. 2d 132, 151 (1982) (ordering the State to file a petition in respect to a minor under the Juvenile Court Act is not an impermissible exercise by the judicial branch of powers belonging exclusively to the executive branch and therefore does not violate the separation of powers doctrine); In re J.M., 245 Ill. App. 3d 909 (1993) (the circuit court possessed the authority to order the State to prosecute a dependency action under the Act); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 110 Ill. App. 3d 714 (1982) (there is no separation of powers violation when a circuit court ordered a State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute a neglect petition under the Juvenile Court Act).\nThe State contends, incorrectly, that our decision today contravenes the \u201cdeep and broad[ ] societal policies\u201d which recognize the serious and final nature of termination proceedings.\nIn the matter before us, the circuit court, pursuant to the permanency review provisions of section 2 \u2014 28 of the Act, determined that the permanency goal in the best interests of D.S. is substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. We stress that \u201c[t]he selection of a permanency goal is not a final determination on the merits with regard to termination of parental rights but, rather, an intermediate procedural step taken for the protection of and best interests of the child.\u201d In re K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 675, 682 (2000). It is well settled that \u201c[p]arental rights and responsibilities are of deep human importance and will not be lightly terminated.\u201d In re Paul, 101 Ill. 2d 345, 351-52 (1984). Indeed, it is precisely because \u201cthe private interest affected [in termination proceedings] is commanding\u201d (Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 609, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982)), that parental rights may be terminated only upon a finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is an \u201cunfit\u201d person as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (West 1998)). 705 ILCS 405/2\u201429(2) (West 1998). Our decision today expresses no opinion with respect to the ultimate disposition of the termination of parental rights proceeding in the case at bar.\nIn sum, the doctrine of separation of powers does not seek to achieve a complete divorce between the branches of government. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 7. Inevitably, there are areas in which separate spheres of governmental authority overlap and certain functions are thereby shared. Such an overlap of governmental authority does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine. E.g., Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 411. As we explained in In re J.J., due to the unique nature of abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, both the State\u2019s Attorney and the circuit court have concurrent obligations to protect the best interests of the minor. Just as the circuit court in In re J.J. had a statutory duty to determine whether the State\u2019s motion to dismiss was in the best interests of the minor, the circuit court in the matter at bar had a duty under the statute to set a permanency goal and enter orders to effectuate that goal. The duty and authority vested in the circuit court by the Juvenile Court Act does not offend the separation of powers doctrine. Accordingly, the appellate court did not err in affirming the judgment of the circuit court.\nWe now turn to the remaining argument raised in the petition for cross-relief (155 Ill. 2d R 318(a)) filed by the GAL. The GAL contends that it should be allowed to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights on behalf of D.S. The GAL asserts that denying D.S. the opportunity to prosecute the termination petition through her GAL violates rights guaranteed her under the Juvenile Court Act, as well as under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The GAL further contends that ordering the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the termination petition, while not allowing the GAL to do so, would compromise D.S.\u2019s case. In the alternative, the GAL asserts that the circuit court appropriately ordered the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the termination petition. We conclude that the arguments raised in support of the GAL\u2019s petition for cross-relief lack merit.\nThe GAL cites three provisions of the Juvenile Court Act in support of its argument that the GAL should be allowed to prosecute the termination petition. First, relying upon section 1\u20142(1) of the Act (750 ILCS 405/1\u20142(1) (West 1998)), the GAL contends that D.S. has a \u201cright to be made available for adoption within a reasonable amount of time after removal from her natural parents, if her natural parents are unfit.\u201d Second, pursuant to section 1\u20142(3)(a) of the Act, the GAL observes that, in all proceedings under the Act, D.S. has the procedural rights of adults unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the minor\u2019s protection. (705 ILCS 405/1\u20142(3)(a) (West 1998)). Third, the GAL asserts that pursuant to section 1\u20145 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1\u20145(1) (West 1998)), D.S. has the right to counsel, the right to be heard, and the right to present evidence material to these proceedings.\nIn addition, the GAL asserts that several constitutional rights held by D.S. require that the GAL be allowed to prosecute the termination petition. Specifically, the GAL contends that, pursuant to article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 12), D.S. has the right to freely and promptly obtain a remedy for the grievances alleged in the termination petition. The GAL also makes the general argument that D.S. has the right to due process and equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2).\nApart from providing citation to the above provisions, the GAL has failed to adequately explain, and we cannot discern, how the statutory and constitutional rights cited by the GAL in the petition for cross-relief would be violated if the office of the State\u2019s Attorney, rather than the GAL, prosecutes the termination petition. The GAL has not shown how allowing it to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights would appreciably add to the ability of the circuit court to guard the welfare of a minor. Indeed, the record in this matter belies the GAL\u2019s arguments. Contrary to the position of the GAL that D.S. has been, and will continue to be, without adequate rights during these proceedings, D.S. has been represented by a GAL and counsel whose duty it is to protect the rights of D.S. and advocate for her best interests. In accordance with section 1\u20145 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/ 1\u20145 (West 1998)), D.S.\u2019s GAL has protected her right to be heard and to present evidence material to these proceedings. Further, the circuit court has assured the protection of D.S.\u2019s statutory and constitutional rights throughout the course of this matter.\nThe Juvenile Court Act contains no provision affording private parties the right to prosecute petitions filed pursuant to the Act. As we noted above, it is well settled that the office of the State\u2019s Attorney is charged with prosecuting petitions under the Act, and the State\u2019s Attorney and the circuit court share the concurrent duty to ensure the best interests of the child, the child\u2019s family, and the community. Our decision today recognizing the statutory duty and authority of the circuit court to guard the interests of minors in proceedings conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act and to compel the State to take action in accordance with that duty will assure that the shared duty will be exercised in the minor\u2019s best interests.\nIn addition, we note that, under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, D.S. and the GAL have the right to be actively involved in the termination proceedings. Section 1\u20145 of the Act provides that D.S. has the right to be represented by counsel, to be present, and to be heard. 705 ILCS 405/1\u20145(1) (West 1998). Further, as a party to the termination action, the GAL, on behalf of D.S., may question witnesses, present evidence, examine pertinent court files and records, and make arguments to the court. 705 ILCS 405/1\u20145(1) (West 1998). We therefore conclude that there is no merit to the argument raised by the GAL that the statutory or constitutional rights of D.S. would be compromised by ordering the State to prosecute her petition.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the order of the circuit court directing the State to prosecute a pending termination petition after setting a permanency goal of substitute care pending court determination on the termination of parental rights did not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers contained in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1). We further hold that the GAL does not have authority to prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAffirmed.\nJUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAt the time the minors were removed from the family home, D.S. was 4 years old, R.S. was 8, R.S. was 11, and E.H. was 14.\nE.H. was not named in the termination petition because she had already reached the age of emancipation.\nA motion to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights was also filed by DCFS. In its motion, DCFS echoed the arguments advanced by the State.\nThe Act defines the term \u201cpetition\u201d to include any supplemental petitions filed in a case. 705 ILCS 405/1\u20143(12) (West 1998).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield-, and David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Lisa Ann Smith and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "James D. Skaar, of Smith, Landmeier, Skaar & Elders, EC., of Geneva, for appellees and cross-appellants.", "Bruce A. Boyer and Christina Gabriel Kanelos, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Children & Family Justice Center.", "Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry and Nancy G. Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Richard A. Devine, Cook County State\u2019s Attorney.", "Thomas Grippando and Lee Ann Lowder, of the Office of the Public Guardian, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Patrick T. Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 88460.\nIn re D.S., a Minor (D.S. et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. R.S. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross-Appellee)).\nOpinion filed June 21, 2001.\nModified on denial of rehearing February 4, 2002.\nTHOMAS, J., took no part.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield-, and David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Lisa Ann Smith and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nJames D. Skaar, of Smith, Landmeier, Skaar & Elders, EC., of Geneva, for appellees and cross-appellants.\nBruce A. Boyer and Christina Gabriel Kanelos, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Children & Family Justice Center.\nRenee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry and Nancy G. Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Richard A. Devine, Cook County State\u2019s Attorney.\nThomas Grippando and Lee Ann Lowder, of the Office of the Public Guardian, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Patrick T. Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian." }, "file_name": "0309-01", "first_page_order": 321, "last_page_order": 345 }