{ "id": 58955, "name": "PAUL D. CARROLL, as Adm'r of the Estate of Joshua A. Carroll, Deceased, Appellee, v. JERRY PADDOCK et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Carroll v. Paddock", "decision_date": "2002-02-07", "docket_number": "Nos. 90771, 90772, 90778 cons.", "first_page": "16", "last_page": "28", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 16" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864528 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 F. Supp. 1449", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 11649488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1453", "parenthetical": "entity that received over 90% of its financing from state and local sources was organized for the purpose of conducting public business" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/730/1449-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "entity that received 65% of its cash funds from government sources, including local government funding, was not \"almost entirely government funded\" and thus was not organized for the purpose of conducting public business" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511405 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257179 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "regardless of its mission statement or sources of funding, an entity that existed to benefit its members, not the public at large, was not a public entity under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533168 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "entity with no shareholders, funded with public funds that operates its commuter rail line in the public interest was organized for the purpose of conducting public business" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351260 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259110 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777542 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351256 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026001 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995" }, { "page": "995" }, { "page": "994-95" }, { "page": "995" }, { "page": "991" }, { "page": "994-95" }, { "page": "994-95" }, { "page": "994-95" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0985-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 920, "char_count": 20995, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.251565063511266e-07, "percentile": 0.8689566457349444 }, "sha256": "13ad605383433afe339ced0db844e8cfbb24772271b8c6835fa13ce73a15c839", "simhash": "1:89dfdd9a366a005a", "word_count": 3302 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:46:57.269661+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAUL D. CARROLL, as Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Joshua A. Carroll, Deceased, Appellee, v. JERRY PADDOCK et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe primary issue in this appeal is whether a not-for-profit charitable hospital and a not-for-profit mental-health-care organization are \u201clocal public entities\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000)). Plaintiff, Paul D. Carroll, as administrator of his son Joshua\u2019s estate, brought this wrongful-death action against defendants Jerry Paddock, Rod Neeson, Human Resources Center of Edgar and Clark Counties (HRC), Paris Community Hospital (Hospital) and Dr. Mamerto Guinto, alleging that the defendants\u2019 malpractice caused Joshua\u2019s death by suicide. The circuit court of Edgar County held that the action was time barred by the Act\u2019s one-year statute of limitations. 745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 2000).\nThe appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that HRC and the Hospital are not local public entities within the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act and, thus, neither those entities nor their employees are entitled to invoke the protection of the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d 985, 995. We consolidated and granted all of defendants\u2019 petitions for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn April 14, 1997, Paul and Patricia Carroll brought their son, Joshua, to the emergency room of Paris Community Hospital after Joshua attempted to commit suicide. Joshua was seen by Dr. Guinto, an employee of the Hospital, and Jerry Paddock, an employee of HRC. Joshua was discharged without being admitted. On April 15, 1997, Paul and Patricia took Joshua to HRC, where he received psychological assessment, care and treatment from Rod Neeson. Later that morning, Joshua took his own life.\nOn April 15, 1999, plaintiff filed a wrongful-death action against defendants. HRC, Paddock, Neeson, and Guinto filed motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619 (West 2000)), arguing plaintiffs complaint was not timely filed under the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Tort Immunity Act. The Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment on the same ground. In their motions, the defendant entities claimed that they were not-for-profit corporations organized for the purpose of conducting public business and that they and their employees were local public entities entitled to assert immunities and defenses afforded by the Act.\nPlaintiff responded that HRC and the Hospital did not qualify as local public entities under the Act. In the alternative, plaintiff argued that section 1 \u2014 206 of the Act constitutes special legislation in violation of article iy section 13, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. iy \u00a7 13) and that section 1 \u2014 206 of the Act delegates tort immunity to private entities in violation of article I, section 12, and article XIII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 12; art. XIII, \u00a7 4).\nThe complaint, exhibits and discovery depositions filed of record supply a factual basis for assessing the status of defendants under the Act. HRC is a not-for-profit corporation. It is composed of three divisions: developmental disabilities, community services, and clinical services. The clinical services division provides outpatient mental-health services, and its employees administered mental-health screening to Joshua and assessed his condition.\nHRC came into being as a result of the merger of two existing not-for-profit corporations known as the Edgar County Mental Health Center and the Edgar County Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council. Following the merger, the entity assumed its present designation as the Human Resources Center of Edgar and Clark Counties. HRC\u2019s board of directors consists of private citizens, as did its original incorporators.\nAccording to its articles of incorporation, HRC is organized \u201cexclusively for charitable and educational purposes, the purposes being limited to those set forth in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. \u00a7 501(c)(3) (1994).\u201d The articles also provide that \u201cno part of [HRC\u2019s] net income will inure to the benefit of private individuals\u201d and \u201cthe organization will not be operated for the benefit of private individuals or designated individuals, the creators or their families, or persons controlled directly or indirectly by such private interest.\u201d Further, HRC\u2019s mission statement explains that the corporation shall \u201cpromote and conserve the mental health of the people of Edgar and Clark Counties.\u201d\nIn a discovery deposition, the executive director of HRC, John Young, testified about the operations of that entity. He stated that HRC provides clinical services, including outpatient mental-health care and substance-abuse evaluations and classes. According to Young, HRC also furnishes services for developmentally disabled persons, including placement of those individuals with private corporations for work experience and income. Young further stated that HRC renders community services through contracts with area hospitals and healthcare providers and that HRC provides laundry services for many private entities.\nLike HRC, the Hospital is a not-for-profit organiza-, tion. Its purpose, as stated in the articles of incorporation, is:\n\u201cTo conduct and carry on the work of the corporation not for profit but exclusively for scientific, educational, and charitable purposes in such a manner that no part of its income or property shall inure to the private benefit of any donor, member, officer, or individual having a personal or private interest in the activities of the corporation.\n* * *\nTo operate a charitable hospital in Edgar County, Illinois, for the care of the sick of the area without regard to their ability to pay for such services and without regard to their race, color, or creed.\u201d\nThe Hospital\u2019s board of directors does not include members of the county board of Edgar County. It is composed primarily of community business representatives.\nThe interim administrator of the Hospital, Chris Ellington, testified at his discovery deposition that the Hospital is managed by his employer, Allied Management Services, a not-for-profit corporation, owned by another not-for-profit corporation, Norton Health Care, Inc., of Louisville, Kentucky. Allied Management Services charges an annual management fee of $132,000. In addition to this fee, the hospital pays salaries to the chief executive officer and chief financial officer, both of whom are selected by Allied Management Services.\nAccording to Ellington, the hospital\u2019s services are on a fee-for-service basis. It designates services as charity care only if collection efforts have been unavailing. Ellington stated that, to his knowledge, there was no difference in the purpose and operation of the defendant not-for-profit hospital and other for-profit hospitals.\nThe bylaws of the Hospital establish classes of members. Individuals can become members of the Hospital by making donations to the Hospital. Members are entitled to vote at annual and special meetings.\nFollowing two hearings, the trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motions, concluding HRC and the Hospital are \u201clocal public entities\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000)). The trial court also rejected plaintiffs constitutional challenges to section 1 \u2014 206 of the Act. Plaintiff appealed.\nIn reversing, the appellate court held that neither HRC nor the Hospital are \u201clocal public entities\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 995. The court primarily relied on the fact that neither of the entities were almost entirely government funded. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95. Having determined that the Act did not apply, the court declined to consider plaintiffs constitutional challenges to section 1 \u2014 206. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 995. We consolidated and allowed defendants\u2019 petitions for leave to appeal.\nANALYSIS\nThe present matter comes to this court following the circuit court\u2019s decision to grant three motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(5) and one motion for summary judgment. An appeal from a section 2 \u2014 619 dismissal is the same in nature as one following a grant of summary judgment: each matter is given de novo review. Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (2001). In both instances, the reviewing court must ascertain whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993).\nDefendants argue that both HRC and the Hospital are local public entities within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act. Thus, the issue before us is one of statutory construction.\nThe most fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. In re Estate of Andernovics, 197 Ill. 2d 500, 507 (2001). The statute\u2019s language is the best indicator of such intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). When interpreting a statute, we must, however, give effect to the entire statutory scheme rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation from other relevant portions of the statute. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). Put another way, statutes should be construed as a whole with each provision evaluated in connection with every other section. Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 196 Ill. 2d 70, 88 (2001).\nAs provided within the statute, the purpose of the Tort Immunity Act is \u201cto protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101.1 (West 2000). The Act defines the term \u201c[ljocal public entity\u201d as:\n\u201ca county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school board, educational service region, regional board of school trustees, community college district, community college board, forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, museum district, emergency telephone system board, and all other local governmental bodies. \u2018Local public entity\u2019 also includes library systems and any intergovernmental agency or similar entity formed pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Illinois or the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act as well as any not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business. It does not include the State or any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, university or similar agency of the State.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 1998).\nThe appellate court correctly noted that no Illinois court has specifically defined the phrase \u201corganized for the purpose of conducting public business.\u201d 317 Ill. App. 3d at 991. The court then went on to analyze several appellate court cases and one United States district court case that have applied this language in different fact situations. See Smith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 210 Ill. App. 3d 223 (1991); Johnson v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798 (1998); O\u2019Melia v. Lake Forest Symphony Ass\u2019n, 303 Ill. App. 3d 825 (1999); Niehaus v. Rural Peoria County Council on Aging, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 665 (2000); McQueen v. Shelby County, 730 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Ill. 1990). In four of those cases, the court considered to what extent the entity in question relied upon public funding in order to determine whether the entity was \u201corganized for the purpose of conducting public business.\u201d See Smith, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 227 (entity with no shareholders, funded with public funds that operates its commuter rail line in the public interest was organized for the purpose of conducting public business); Johnson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 811 (regardless of its mission statement or sources of funding, an entity that existed to benefit its members, not the public at large, was not a public entity under the Act); Niehaus, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 670 (entity that received 65% of its cash funds from government sources, including local government funding, was not \u201calmost entirely government funded\u201d and thus was not organized for the purpose of conducting public business); McQueen, 730 F. Supp. at 1453 (entity that received over 90% of its financing from state and local sources was organized for the purpose of conducting public business).\nIn light of these cases, the appellate court concluded that public funding is a determinative factor as to whether an entity is a local public entity under the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95. With regard to HRC, the court reasoned:\n\u201cHRC argues that it receives substantial government funding \u2014 66.13% from government grants and membership dues in fiscal year 1998 and 55% from fees and grants from governmental agencies in fiscal year 1997. ***\nWe conclude that HRC is not \u2018organized for the purpose of conducting public business\u2019 and is not a \u2018local public entity\u2019 under the Act. HRC is not almost entirely government funded; the fact that it receives some grants from government sources does not bring it within the scope of the Act.\u201d 317 111. App. 3d at 994.\nIn relation to the Hospital, the appellate court stated:\n\u201cThe Hospital obtained 49.1% of its revenue from private sources, namely, insurance payments and self-pay collections. It receives the remainder of its revenue from federal programs \u2014 Medicaid and Medicare. The only local government funding is provided by Edgar County through a contract for ambulance services. *** We conclude that the Hospital is not government funded, nor is it almost entirely government funded.\u201d 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95. Having concluded that HRC and the Hospital were\nnot government funded, the appellate court held that neither was a local public entity under the Act and, therefore, neither the entities nor their employees were entitled to invoke the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 8 \u2014 101 of the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95.\nAlthough the appellate court reached the correct conclusion, we believe the court placed too much emphasis on government funding. Irrespective of the degree of government funding, a not-for-profit corporation must be \u201corganized for the purpose of conducting public business\u201d in order to satisfy the definition of a \u201c[ljocal public entity.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000). The term \u201cpublic business\u201d is not defined in the Act. As indicated by the appellate court, every undefined word in a statute must be ascribed its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). The appellate court went on to quote the O\u2019Melia court observation that:\n\u201c \u2018 \u201cPublic\u201d is defined as \u201c[p]ertaining to a state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all ***. Belonging to the people at large; *** not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990). *** Thus, to conduct \u201cpublic business\u201d under the Act, a corporation must pursue an activity that benefits the entire community without limitation. In addition, the phrase \u201cpublic business\u201d is also today commonly understood to mean the business of the government.\u2019 \u201d 317 Ill. App. 3d at 992, quoting O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828.\nWe agree with this definition of \u201cpublic business\u201d and we hereby adopt it as our own.\nWhile HRC and the Hospital were organized for charitable purposes, the characteristics making a not-for-profit corporation a charitable organization do not, without more, also qualify the corporation as a \u201clocal public entity\u201d under the Tort Immunity Act. See 317 111. App. 3d at 994-95. Both HRC and the Hospital conduct operations common to many entities in the private sector. Interim administrator Ellington admitted that there was no difference in the purpose and operation of the defendant not-for-profit Hospital and other for-profit hospitals. Moreover, both HRC and the Hospital were privately created and are privately managed.\nFurthermore, the board of directors of each not-for-profit consists solely of private citizens. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the entities are subject to the control of the county board or any other unit or agency of local government. Without evidence of local governmental control, it cannot be said that a not-for-profit corporation conducts \u201cpublic business\u201d for purposes of the Act. Thus, in order to receive the benefits of the Act, the not-for-profit corporation must also be subject to the kinds of organizational regulations and control that are typical of other governmental units.\nAn indicia of the requisite control might be shown by evidence that the governing body of the not-for-profit corporation is subject to regulations such as the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1.01 et seq. (West 2000)) or the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2000)) or is otherwise \u201c \u2018[o]pen to *** the [public] at large\u2019 \u201d (O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828, quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990)). The necessary control might also be evinced by particular local ordinances that dictate the means and methods to be used by the not-for-profit corporation in conducting its business. Other indicia of control might include evidence that members of the county board or other local governing bodies control the governing body of the not-for-profit corporation.\nPrivate endeavors often improve or affect the public interest, but that fact standing alone does not transform those private enterprises into public businesses. Undoubtedly, health care is an endeavor in the public interest. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that a not-for-profit, hospital and a not-for-profit mental-health-care organization are the same as public health-care facilities operated by public employees and controlled by governmental officials or a governmental entity.\nPublic business is the business of government and a local public entity must either be owned by or operated and controlled by a local governmental unit. Immunity under the Act only attaches to liability arising from the operation of government. 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101.1 (West 2000). Therefore, a not-for-profit is involved in the operation of the government\u2019s public business if and only if the not-for-profit is tightly enmeshed with government either through direct governmental ownership or operational control by a unit of local government.\nAs to the Hospital\u2019s contention that its activities fall within the ambit of \u201cconducting public business\u201d because the Act itself sets out detailed provisions regarding \u201chospital activities\u201d (see 745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 101 through 6 \u2014 110 (West 2000)), the appellate court was correct that the Hospital has misread the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994. To receive immunity from injuries resulting from \u201chospital activities,\u201d it must initially be determined that the entity is a \u201clocal public entity\u201d under the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994. Simply because an entity engages in \u201chospital activities\u201d does not necessarily mean that the entity conducts \u201cpublic business\u201d under section 1 \u2014 206 of the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994.\nGiven that the Act does not apply to HRC or the Hospital, we, like the appellate court, decline to address the constitutional issues raised by the plaintiff.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the above-stated reasons, we hold that neither the Human Resources Center of Edgar and Clark Counties nor Paris Community Hospital were organized for the purpose of conducting public business. Accordingly, neither of those not-for-profit corporations or their employees are entitled to assert the immunities and defenses contained within the Tort Immunity Act. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Evan H. Johnson and Robert C. Bollinger, of Erickson, Davis, Murphy, Johnson, Griffith & Walsh, Ltd., of Decatur, for appellants Jerry Paddock, Rod Neeson and the Human Resources Center of Edgar and Clark Counties.", "Richard F. Record, Jr., and John F. Watson, of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellant Hospital & Medical Foundation of Paris, Inc.", "Stephen J. Hough, of Croegaert, Clark & Hough, Ltd., of Olney, for appellant Mamerto Guinto.", "Brent D. Holmes and Jason M. Crowder, of Heller, Holmes & Associates, PC., of Mattoon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 90771, 90772, 90778 cons.\nPAUL D. CARROLL, as Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Joshua A. Carroll, Deceased, Appellee, v. JERRY PADDOCK et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed February 7, 2002.\nCARMAN, J., took no part.\nEvan H. Johnson and Robert C. Bollinger, of Erickson, Davis, Murphy, Johnson, Griffith & Walsh, Ltd., of Decatur, for appellants Jerry Paddock, Rod Neeson and the Human Resources Center of Edgar and Clark Counties.\nRichard F. Record, Jr., and John F. Watson, of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellant Hospital & Medical Foundation of Paris, Inc.\nStephen J. Hough, of Croegaert, Clark & Hough, Ltd., of Olney, for appellant Mamerto Guinto.\nBrent D. Holmes and Jason M. Crowder, of Heller, Holmes & Associates, PC., of Mattoon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0016-01", "first_page_order": 28, "last_page_order": 40 }