{ "id": 58906, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD A. DEVINE, Appellant, v. $30,700.00 UNITED STATES CURRENCY et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency", "decision_date": "2002-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 90470", "first_page": "142", "last_page": "178", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 142" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "987 F.2d 10", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10507801 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/987/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "852 F.2d 646", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10544533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/852/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 F. Supp. 930", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7408312 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/802/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 F.3d 732", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11354456 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/51/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 208", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450388 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "the appellant's name and address were known from both deed records and tax rolls" }, { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "the appellant's name and address were known from both deed records and tax rolls" }, { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "the appellant's name and address were known from both deed records and tax rolls" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 844", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906731 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" }, { "page": "850-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 F.3d 791", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10529338 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794-95", "parenthetical": "notice mailed to the defendant at home and jail was insufficient because the government knew the defendant was released on bond to a different temporary residence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/12/0791-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 F. Supp. 993", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5815911 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999", "parenthetical": "the seizing agency had plaintiffs name and address; therefore, notice by publication was insufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/304/0993-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 F. Supp. 14", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3239856 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/510/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 F. Supp. 1563", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3728965 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/767/1563-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 38", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170862 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390993 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "weight": 4, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 U.S. 306", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 362818 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "657", "parenthetical": "the method of service must be one the party receiving service \"might reasonably adopt to accomplish\" service" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/339/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187594 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449-50" }, { "page": "254-55" }, { "page": "1877-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 161", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9108094 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "606-07" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260268 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "432-33" }, { "page": "432-33" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75278 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "944-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351274 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725349 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "\"[w]e construe a statute so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless, when the statute is examined as a whole\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455469 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222569 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554869 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "the inclusion of specific language in one provision and the omission in another provision evinces legislative intent to refrain from imposing the requirement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820884 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55979 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 U.S. 267", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1730053 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/518/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295788 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096662 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "474-75" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "895 S.W.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10007521 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/895/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 F.3d 287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11168401 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/235/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 So. 2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7464039 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/650/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Kan. App. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1109795 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/kan-app-2d/25/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 F.3d 378", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1793531 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/84/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 F.3d 301", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11911683 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/111/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 F.3d 1312", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11878464 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/135/1312-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 F.3d 478", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1757395, 3673491 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/201/0478-01", "/us-app-dc/340/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 F.3d 664", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 917949 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/202/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 F.3d 147", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11510452 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "where the DEA administratively forfeited certain property, the court held that \"the circumstances surrounding the federal government's incarceration of a prisoner require greater efforts at ensuring notice than would be expected for individuals at liberty in society\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/213/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 F.3d 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11227654 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "since property owner was in federal custody, the DEA notices mailed to his home address and to the Forsyth County jail, where he had been held for a brief period following his arrest, were ineffective" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/228/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 F.3d 474", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11142178 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/238/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281423 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the State maintained that a prisoner's address is easy to ascertain" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 F.3d 509", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7413851 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/45/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 F.3d 709", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 105896 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" }, { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/137/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "987 F.2d 10", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10507801 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/987/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 F. Supp. 930", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7408312 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/802/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 F.3d 732", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11354456 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/51/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 844", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906731 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 38", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170862 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "31-32" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "31-32" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "weight": 9, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" }, { "page": "873-74" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "875" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "865" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "874" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "339 U.S. 306", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 362818 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "314-15" }, { "page": "657-58" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "658" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "659" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "306" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/339/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 161", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9108094 ], "weight": 24, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "605" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "168-69" }, { "page": "605-06" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "705", "parenthetical": "Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter and Breyer, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096662 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0464-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1886, "char_count": 68392, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8427189165129197e-07, "percentile": 0.8400607525766947 }, "sha256": "3e47892bf5460ebf75e11d032d4bf1536acd0c0937ccd562a364ec6b7c9f3df7", "simhash": "1:d971f37c6923465a", "word_count": 11315 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:46:57.269661+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD A. DEVINE, Appellant, v. $30,700.00 UNITED STATES CURRENCY et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the State initiated civil forfeiture proceedings against currency totaling $30,700 and $20,811. The State served notice of the forfeiture proceedings upon claimants Rashawn and Ida Carter (Rashawn and Ida) by certified mail, with return receipts requested (725 ILCS 150/4(A)(1) (West 2000)), to their last known addresses and made additional service by publication (725 ILCS 150/4(A)(3) (West 2000)). The circuit court of Cook County entered a default order forfeiting the claimants\u2019 interest in the currency. The appellate court reversed the order of the circuit court. 316 Ill. App. 3d 464, 469. We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court. In this appeal, we examine whether claimants received proper notice of civil forfeiture proceedings under the Act and whether such notice satisfied procedural due process.\nBACKGROUND\nOn May 23, 1998, the Chicago police received a tip that a man wearing a white jersey had entered the Drexel National Bank, in Chicago, holding a gun. Responding to the tip, police entered the bank and observed a man wearing a white jacket holding a white cylindrical object under his arm. The police officers approached the man, whom they later identified as Rashawn, and performed a protective pat-down. This pat-down revealed a sock filled with United States currency and additional bundles of currency. The combined amount of currency recovered from Rashawn totaled $30,700.\nFollowing the pat-down, the officers questioned Rashawn and learned that he did not have an existing account at the bank, but that he planned to rent a safety-deposit box. Rashawn provided conflicting answers when asked where he obtained the money and was unable to provide an accurate figure of the amount of money he was carrying. The officers subsequently took Rashawn to the police station for further questioning. At the police station, Rashawn admitted that he was a member of the Gangster Disciples street gang, that he was unemployed and did not own the money, and that he \u201cmessed up\u201d trying to deposit the money. Rashawn also informed officers that he had been previously arrested for cannabis possession and that he was out on bond pending a hearing in that case. A background check confirmed a prior arrest and revealed an extensive criminal history, including six adult arrests by the Chicago police, a 1992 narcotics possession conviction, the use of multiple aliases, an arrest in Sangamon County, Illinois, for possession of a controlled substance, and the use of separate invalid driver\u2019s licenses with addresses in both Chicago and Springfield, Illinois.\nThe officers performed a \u201cmoney lineup\u201d with the currency. The money was \u201chidden\u201d and subsequently \u201cdiscovered\u201d by a narcotic-sniffing police dog. The police dog positively identified the money as having a residue odor of narcotics.\nOfficers also discovered in Rashawn\u2019s possession three separate safety-deposit box keys. Although Rashawn initially denied any knowledge about the keys, he ultimately informed the officers that the keys belonged to \u201ctwo separate banks in Peoria, Illinois.\u201d The officers, however, ascertained that one of the keys belonged to a safety-deposit box held at the Drexel National Bank in Chicago. The State asserts that the box was registered to Ida, Rashawn\u2019s grandmother, and that the key to the box granted Rashawn access to its contents. On May 26,1998, the officers obtained and executed a search warrant and recovered $20,811 from the safety-deposit box. The officers then performed a separate \u201cmoney lineup\u201d with a second narcotic-sniffing police dog on the currency totaling $20,811. This second dog also gave a positive indication for the odor of narcotics on the currency.\nFive days after the Chicago police executed the warrant, Ida telephoned the police to inquire about the contents of the safety-deposit box. When the officer questioned Ida about the safety-deposit box, Ida was unable to identify its contents. Ida did not indicate to the police that she possessed any interest in the contents of the safety-deposit box. Notwithstanding, officers scheduled two separate appointments with Ida so that she could establish a claim to its contents. Ida failed to keep either appointment with the police.\nOn August 4, 1998, the State filed a consolidated in rem complaint for forfeiture of the $30,700 and $20,811 pursuant to section 505 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/505 (West 2000)). The complaint named Rashawn as a party with interest in the currency. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Gangster Disciples street gang is an active criminal organization that participates in the illegal distribution of prohibited substances through its members, who will often use safety-deposit boxes to conceal and store proceeds from ongoing drug operations. The complaint further alleged that in obtaining safety-deposit boxes these drug dealers often use false names or the identities of relatives and third parties to conceal the true identity of the owner and to hide the location of the proceeds. Finally, the complaint alleged that the gang often uses individuals as couriers to transport currency to safe storage locations.\nOn the same day, the State mailed notice of the forfeiture proceedings and a copy of the in rem complaint via certified mail, with a return receipt requested, to Rashawn at his last known address on Chicago\u2019s south side. The notice was accompanied by an affidavit of an assistant State\u2019s Attorney who verified the method of service, identified the party having an interest in the money, and asserted that no claim to the money had been filed. The State concedes that it did not receive a return receipt from the August 4 mailing. The State also made additional service by publication of the forfeiture proceedings on August 7, August 14, and August 21 in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. Rashawn did not respond to the notice of forfeiture or appear before the court at the forfeiture proceeding.\nFollowing the mailing to Rashawn and notice by publication, the State made additional efforts to serve notice of the proceedings to additional potential parties of interest. The record shows that on September 2, 1998, the State sent notice of forfeiture by certified mail to Ida at her address, on Chicago\u2019s south side, also Rashawn\u2019s last known address. As with the previous mailing, the State concedes, it did not receive a return receipt from the September 2 mailing. Ida did not appear before the court at the forfeiture proceeding.\nOn October 13, 1998, the circuit court entered a default order forfeiting Rashawn\u2019s interest and that of all other parties claiming right, title, or interest in the currency. On January 13, 1999, Rashawn and Ida filed a joint motion to vacate the forfeiture, alleging that they never received notice of the forfeiture proceeding. Rashawn provided an affidavit stating that he was incarcerated for unrelated charges in the Vandalia Correction Center beginning July 7, 1998, until his release November 10, 1998. In her affidavit, Ida claimed that she was the owner of the safety-deposit box at the Drexel National Bank and never received notice of forfeiture at her residence. The circuit court denied the motion to vacate the forfeiture order.\nThe appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Rashawn and Ida because they were not properly served in accord with the Act. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 474-75. According to the appellate court, complete service under the Act is accomplished when the State receives a return receipt signed by the addressee. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 469. Moreover, the appellate court held that the State failed to give Rashawn notice required by due process. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 471. This appeal by the State followed.\nANALYSIS\nI. Effective Notice Under the Act\nAs an initial matter, we review whether service is perfected under the Act upon mailing of the notice or, conversely, upon receipt of the certified mail return receipt signed by the addressee. The parties agree that absent proper notice of the forfeiture proceedings, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and the power to order forfeiture of the currency. The parties also agree that the State never received certified mail return receipts of the notice mailings sent to both claimants. However, the State argues that failure to receive these return receipts does not render the notice defective. Rather, the State argues that service is effective under the Act upon the mere mailing of notice by certified mail, as long as the notifying party had no reason to suspect that the notice would not reach the intended recipient. This matter involves an issue of statutory interpretation, and our review is de novo. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000).\nThe Act is a remedial civil sanction enacted for the express purpose of deterring the rising incidence of the abuse and trafficking of substances prohibited by the Illinois Controlled Substance Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2000)) and the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 2000)). See 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2000). Forfeiture under the Act \u201cencourages owners \u2018to take care in managing their property and ensures that they will not permit that property to be used for illegal purposes.\u2019 \u201d In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 87 (1997), quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Thus, the Act is designed to serve a remedial purpose and, therefore, is liberally construed to achieve that purpose. 725 ILCS 150/13 (West 2000). Moreover, it is the intent of the legislature that the Act be interpreted in light of \u201cthe federal forfeiture provisions contained in 21 U.S.C. 881 as interpreted by the federal courts, except to the extent\u201d the provisions expressly conflict. 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2000).\nThe Act contains uniform procedures to accomplish the forfeiture of drug-related assets. 725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000). Non-real property is seized by two different methods depending on the value of the property. Non-real property valuing less than $20,000 is forfeited in a nonjudicial forfeiture action. 725 ILCS 150/6 (West 2000). Where the value of non-real property exceeds $20,000, the State shall \u201cinstitute judicial in rem forfeiture proceedings\u201d in accordance with section 9 of the Act. 725 ILCS 150/6 (West 2000).\nThe Act outlines the method of notice required to apprise individuals of pending forfeiture proceedings. 725 ILCS 150/4 (West 2000). The method of service depends upon the State\u2019s knowledge of the identity and location of the claimant at the time of service. Section 4 of the Act, entitled \u201cNotice to Owner or Interest Holder,\u201d provides that, \u201c[i]f the owner\u2019s or interest holder\u2019s name and current address are known, then [notice or service shall be given] by either personal service or mailing a copy of the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to that address.\u201d 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(1) (West 2000). The Act requires notice by publication in the event the address or name of the owner or interest holder is unknown. 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(3) (West 2000). Owners or interest holders are obligated to advise the seizing agency of address changes that occur prior to the mailing of notice. 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(1) (West 2000) (\u201cif an owner or interest holder\u2019s address changes prior to the effective date of the notice of pending forfeiture, the owner or interest holder shall promptly notify *** of the change in address\u201d). Individuals claiming an interest in the property subject to forfeiture may file a claim to the property within \u201c45 days after the effective date of notice.\u201d 725 ILCS 150/6(0(1) (West 2000). Further, the Act provides when notice is effective: \u201cNotice served under this Act is effective upon personal service, the last date of publication, or the mailing of written notice, whichever is earlier.\u201d 725 ILCS 150/4(B) (West 2000). If parties fail to appear at the forfeiture proceedings, \u201cproperty may be subject to forfeiture even if no one appears to claim it.\u201d In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d at 88.\nIn order to determine when mailed notice is perfected under the Act, we are bound by long-standing principles of statutory construction. We must give effect to legislative intent, which begins with the plain language of the statute. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997); Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996); People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 197 (1992). Where clear and unambiguous, statutory language must be enforced as enacted, and a court may not depart from its plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443. Moreover, where language is express and plain, a court must not search for subtle intentions of the legislature. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443.\nIn light of the express language contained in section 4 of the Act, we hold that service of notice by mailing is perfected when the notice is deposited in the mail, provided the State complies with the mailing procedures set forth in the Act. Section 4(B) expressly states, \u201c[n]otice served under this Act is effective upon *** the mailing of written notice ***.\u201d 725 ILCS 150/4(B) (West 2000). The meaning of this provision is clear and unambiguous. The Act does not condition the effectiveness of notice upon receipt of the return receipt signed by the addressee, and this court will not rewrite the Act to create this requirement.\nClaimants argue that the inclusion of the \u201creturn receipt\u201d language implies that the legislature intended that notice would not be perfected unless and until the State receives the return receipt. This argument fails to consider the structure of section 4, which, when plainly read, supports another conclusion. Section 4(A) directs the State to issue notice of forfeiture proceedings by specific methods \u2014 personal service, publication, or postal delivery. Essentially, section 4(A) directs how notice shall be given, or by what means notice must be served. Where postal delivery is required, section 4(A) requires service by certified mail with a return receipt requested. In contrast, section 4(B) fixes when service is complete. Service is effective \u201cupon personal service, the last date of publication, or the mailing of written notice, whichever is earlier.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 150/4(B) (West 2000). The return receipt requirement is omitted from the \u201cwhen\u201d provision of section 4(B).\nClearly, our legislature is able to expressly condition service upon receipt of the signed return receipt. Other enactments expressly demand a return receipt to complete service. See, e.g., 225 ILCS 115/18 (West 2000) (Veterinary Medicine and Surgery Practice Act of 1994) (notice is given to the owner \u201cby certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall allow a period of 7 days to elapse after the receipt is returned before disposing of such animal\u201d); 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 30(l)(a) through (l)(c) (West 2000) (Juvenile Court Act of 1987) (\u201c[t]he return receipt, when returned to the clerk, shall be attached to the original notice, and shall constitute proof of service\u201d); 750 ILCS 25/10(a)(l) (West 1998) (Expedited Child Support Act of 1990) (\u201c[i]f service is made by certified mail, the return receipt shall constitute proof of service\u201d); 765 ILCS 1033/15(b) (West 1998) (Museum Disposition of Property Act) (\u201c[njotice is deemed given if the museum receives, within 60 days of mailing the notice, a return receipt\u201d). Therefore, based upon our principles of statutory construction and the clear difference in wording between sections 4(A) and 4(B), we must construe the omission of the return receipt requirement from section 4(B) as intentional. See People v. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d 519, 525 (1988) (the inclusion of specific language in one provision and the omission in another provision evinces legislative intent to refrain from imposing the requirement); see also People v. Keene, 296 Ill. App. 3d 183, 189-90 (1998).\nCiting Avdich v. Kleinert, 69 Ill. 2d 1 (1977), the appellate court reasoned that the mere inclusion of a return receipt requirement in any portion of section 4 implies that the return of the receipt is required for notice to be effective. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 469. Specifically, the appellate court stated, \u201c[t]hat the party giving notice must receive a return receipt signed by the addressee in order to accomplish service is a well-established requirement in Illinois law.\u201d 316 Ill. App. 3d at 469. Avdich is not authority for the proposition that all enactments which contain the \u201creturn receipt\u201d requirement demand return of the receipt to perfect service. In fact, Avdich, like the enactments previously referred to, illustrates our legislature\u2019s ability to expressly condition service upon receipt of the signed receipt. In Avdich, we considered the notice requirement under the forcible entry and detainer statute. See 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 211 (West 2000). As in the instant matter, the parties in Avdich disputed whether the mere mailing of notice by certified mail constituted service or whether the statute required receipt of the return receipt in order to complete service. The forcible entry and detainer statute states that \u201c[a]ny demand may be made or notice served *** by sending a copy of said notice to the tenant by certified or registered mail, with a returned receipt from the addressee.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 211 (West 2000). Based upon this language, we held that the \u201cstatute clearly indicates a legislative intent that service of a notice by certified mail is not to be considered complete until it is received by the addressee.\u201d Avdich, 69 Ill. 2d at 9. However, the forcible entry and detainer statute conditions effectiveness of notice upon \u201ca returned receipt from the addressee.\u201d By contrast, the Act only requires \u201cwith a return receipt requested.\u201d If we afford the language in each provision its plain and ordinary meaning, one demands the return of the receipt while the other merely demands a request.\nClaimants argue that the only advantage of certified mail with a return receipt requested is to provide proof of delivery. Proof of delivery is not the only discernable advantage. Rather, the inclusion of a return receipt request requirement in the statute serves more than one purpose. According to the certified mailing receipt contained in the record, each piece of certified mail is assigned a tracking number, and a record of all deliveries is kept by the postal service for a period of two years. This information grants the sender actual proof of mailing. This proof of mailing is objective evidence for the State during forfeiture proceedings. This proof of mailing, therefore, facilitates overall enforcement of the Act. This mailing method also serves a claimant\u2019s interest. Parties who receive certified mail with a return receipt requested are alerted to the importance of its contents and are less likely to discard the mail upon receipt without reading its contents.\nFinally, we must also consider that the Act is remedial in nature; therefore, the Act warrants liberal construction to achieve the overall\" purpose of the statute. 725 ILCS 150/2, 13 (West 2000). The appellate court\u2019s holding, that the State must receive a return receipt signed by the addressee, fails to recognize the circumstances which often accompany forfeiture. It is frequently the case that currency is seized from individuals who provide false address information to the officers upon seizure. In this case, we observe that at the time of seizure, Rashawn held licenses with two alias addresses in the State of Illinois. Moreover, as noted by the State during oral arguments and in its complaint, it is also common that individuals in possession of the currency at the time of seizure are merely couriers used to transport the currency. These individuals have no interest in receiving the certified mail and, therefore, refuse to sign for the mail upon its arrival. Conditioning the completion of notice upon receipt of the return receipt is a condition not expressed by the legislature, and given the realities of what often occurs in these cases, an obstacle to the enforcement of the Act. The statute provides for mailing of notice to the last known address of the owner or interest holder. It does not condition this mailing upon the State\u2019s investigation into the accuracy of this information. In fact, it expresses the contrary: the owner or interest holder is obligated to notify the seizing agency of his or her change in address occurring prior to the mailing of notice. 735 ILCS 150/4(A)(1) (West 2000). The appellate court\u2019s holding renders this obligation superfluous. See Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 106 (2001) (\u201c[w]e construe a statute so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless, when the statute is examined as a whole\u201d).\nThe record shows that on August 4, 1998, pursuant to section 4(A)(1) of the Act the State mailed notice to Rashawn via certified mail with a return receipt requested. The State mailed this notice pursuant to information supplied by Rashawn on the date of seizure, May 23, 1998. The record does not show that Rashawn notified the State of a change in his address. Pursuant to our holding, we find that service of this notice was complete upon its mailing, August 4, 1998. The record also shows that pursuant to section 4(A)(1), on September 4, 1998, the State mailed notice to Ida at the address believed to be her residence. Consistent with our holding, service was complete upon its mailing, September 4, 1998.\nII. Due Process\nWe now turn to whether notice in this instance satisfied procedural due process. According to the appellate court, notice mailed to Rashawn\u2019s home address was \u201cnot reasonably calculated to apprise Rashawn of the pending forfeiture proceeding.\u201d 316 Ill. App. 3d at 471. The appellate court concluded that because Rashawn\u2019s address at the Vandalia Correctional Center was \u201creadily ascertainable,\u201d failure to send notice of forfeiture to this address denied Rashawn due process of law. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 471. We disagree. The State provided constitutionally adequate notice.\nWhether claimants were afforded due process in the instant matter is an issue of law, and any review is de novo. People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 162 (2001); see also People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 944-45 (1996).\n\u201cDue process entails an orderly proceeding wherein a person is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has an opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights.\u201d Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No. 1, 133 Ill. 2d 413, 432 (1990). The \u201cfundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.\u201d Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 432; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449-50, 72 L. Ed. 2d 249, 254-55, 102 S. Ct. 1874, 1877-78 (1982); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950). Due process is satisfied if the \u201cmanner of effecting service of summons gives reasonable assurance that notice will actually be given.\u201d People ex rel. Loeser v. Loeser, 51 Ill. 2d 567, 572 (1972); see also Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 432-33; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 94 L. Ed. at 874, 70 S. Ct. at 657 (the method of service must be one the party receiving service \u201cmight reasonably adopt to accomplish\u201d service). Put another way, notice cannot be a \u201cmere gesture,\u201d but rather must be a reasonable attempt to inform those affected by the proceeding. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 94 L. Ed. at 874, 70 S. Ct. at 657; see Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 432-33. It is important to note, however, that in examining the sufficiency of notice with regard to due process a court may consider the character of the proceedings and the practicalities and peculiarities of the case. See Stratton, 133 Ill. 2d at 433; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 94 L. Ed. at 875, 70 S. Ct. at 659.\nFurther, as recently stated by the United States Supreme Court, due process does not require that \u201cthe State must provide actual notice, but that it must attempt to provide actual notice.\u201d (Emphases in original.) Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 606, 122 S. Ct. at 701. In Dusenbery, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional sufficiency of forfeiture when notice was sent by certified mail to a petitioner where he was incarcerated but, according to the petitioner, he never actually received the notice from the prison mailroom. The petitioner argued that the government had the burden of securing actual delivery of the notice because the government had the ability to ensure the petitioner\u2019s receipt. For example, the defendant argued that due process required that a prison official watch the inmate open the notice and cosign a receipt. The Court disagreed.\n\u201cPetitioner argues that because he was housed in a federal prison at the time of the forfeiture, the FBI could have made arrangements with the BOP [Bureau of Prisons] to assure the delivery of the notice in question to him. [Citation.] But it is hard to see why such a principle would not also apply, for example, to members of the Armed Forces both in this country and overseas. Undoubtedly the Government could make a special effort in any case (just as it did in the movie \u2018Saving Private Ryan\u2019) to assure that a particular piece of mail reaches a particular individual who is in one way or another in the custody of the Government. *** But the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government; it requires only that the Government\u2019s effort be \u2018reasonably calculated\u2019 to apprise a party of the pendency of the action ***.\u201d Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 606-07, 122 S. Ct. at 701.\nDespite the dissent\u2019s contention, the Court did not hold that \u201c[i]n the event the property owner is incarcerated, the government must send the notice to the owner at his place of incarceration.\u201d 199 Ill. 2d at 168 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). This issue was not considered by the Court. Instead, the Court considered the constitutional sufficiency of the mail delivery and distribution system once mail arrived to the prison. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694.\nTurning to the instant matter, the appellate court determined that the sending of notice to a claimant at his home address while the claimant is incarcerated fails to reasonably apprise the claimant of the pending forfeiture proceedings. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 469. The appellate court based its decision upon both Illinois appellate and federal decisions. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 34 L. Ed. 2d 47, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972); Ramirez v. United States, 767 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Winters v. Working, 510 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Jaekel v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1993); People v. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d 844 (1995). These cases do not convince this court that claimants were denied due process.\nFor example, in Smith the defendant was arrested for the possession of cocaine and cannabis. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 846. At the time of his arrest, officers seized the sum of $106 from the defendant. Notice of pending forfeiture was sent to the defendant\u2019s home address. Defendant failed to reply or appear, and the court ordered forfeiture of the currency. The appellate court held that the State failed to give notice required by due process because notice of the forfeiture proceedings was mailed to defendant\u2019s residential address despite the State\u2019s knowledge that the defendant was confined to jail for charges brought at the time of seizure. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 850-51. Similarly, in Robinson the defendant was arrested and charged with armed robbery. Robinson, 409 U.S. at 38, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 48, 93 S. Ct. at 30. The defendant was held in custody awaiting trial when the State initiated forfeiture proceedings against the automobile used by the defendant at the time of his arrest. The State issued notice of forfeiture proceedings to the address listed with the Secretary of State. In an ex parte hearing, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the automobile. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court reversed forfeiture because the State knew that the defendant \u201ccould not get to [the address to which notice was mailed] since he was at that very time confined\u201d in the jail. Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 49, 93 S. Ct. at 31.\nIn the above-mentioned cases, and other cases relied upon by the appellate court and claimants, we find one critical factor present which is absent in the instant matter: the notifying party knew the claimant\u2019s name and address and failed to serve notice to that address. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210, 9 L. Ed. 2d 255, 258, 83 S. Ct. 279, 281 (1962) (the appellant\u2019s name and address were known from both deed records and tax rolls); Woodall, 12 F.3d at 794-95 (notice mailed to the defendant at home and jail was insufficient because the government knew the defendant was released on bond to a different temporary residence); Williams v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 51 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 1995) (notice mailed to the claimant\u2019s residential address was insufficient because although he was incarcerated on unrelated charges, the seizing agency was \u201cwell aware of his incarceration\u201d and had weekly conversations with him at the jail at the time it mailed notice to his residence); Jaekel, 304 F. Supp. at 999 (the seizing agency had plaintiffs name and address; therefore, notice by publication was insufficient); Montgomery v. Scott, 802 F. Supp. 930, 936 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (at the time of his arrest for the possession and sale of a controlled substance, officers seized $32,000 in currency, holding that \u201c \u2018where the state knows that an interested party does not reside at the mailing address *** due process may require more than sending a letter to the address on file\u2019 \u201d (emphasis in original)), quoting Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 650 n.4 (2d Cir. 1988). Often in forfeiture cases, the party claiming interest in the subject property was incarcerated or confined to jail for conduct related to the seizure of property. As a result, the arrest and seizure were interrelated, such that the seizing agency knew the claimant\u2019s actual location. Therefore, in instances where the seizing agency has knowledge the individual is incarcerated, notice mailed to the individual\u2019s listed last known address is a mere gesture and not reasonably calculated to apprise the individual of the pending proceedings.\nA federal court case is helpful in the instant matter. In Sarit v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 987 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1993), the court of appeals addressed whether notice mailed to the claimant\u2019s last known address, which was returned \u201cunclaimed,\u201d and was supplemented by publication satisfied due process. In Sarit, the claimants argued that the DEA knew that they were represented by counsel and planned to contest forfeiture. Therefore, they argued that when the notice was returned \u201cunclaimed,\u201d the DEA\u2019s failure to contact counsel and acquire their current address denied them due process. The court of appeals disagreed:\n\u201cWe note at the onset that while Mullane clearly contemplates inquiry into the \u2018peculiarities\u2019 and the \u2018practicalities\u2019 of a given case, it has not generally been interpreted to require a party to make additional attempts beyond notice that is legally satisfactory at the time it is sent. [Citation.] The Court has read an implicit bad faith standard into the notice inquiry, overturning notice even where formal procedures were followed if the notifying party knew or had reason to know that notice would be ineffective. [Citations.] ***\nVirtually all of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs share the feature \u2014 missing from this case \u2014 that the government knew at the time the notice was sent that the notice was likely to be ineffective. [Citations.]\n*** Only exceptional circumstances would compel us to so extend the DEA\u2019s duty, absent indication that it knew or should have known that the notice would be ineffective.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Sarit, 987 F.2d at 14-15.\nLikewise, we have considered the \u201cpeculiarities\u201d and circumstances of the instant matter. Here, there is no evidence in the record that the seizing agency knew or should have known Rashawn was incarcerated in the Vandalia Correctional Center. Rather, Rashawn\u2019s subsequent arrest and incarceration were unrelated to the seizure of the currency at issue here. In fact, Rashawn was incarcerated in a separate county for a separate crime approximately six weeks after officers seized the currency. The record shows that on May 23, 1998, at the time of seizure, Rashawn gave his address to the officers and freely left the station. This was Rashawn\u2019s final contact with the seizing agency; he did not notify the seizing agency of his change of address. 725 ILCS 150/ 4(A)(1) (West 2000). We note that Rashawn does not allege that the State had actual notice of his whereabouts at the time notice was mailed. Importantly, the parties do not dispute that the information Rashawn provided on May 23, 1998, was, according to the seizing agency, his last known address. Moreover, based upon the record in this case \u2014 which is sparse on the issue of Ida\u2019s involvement \u2014 there is nothing to suggest the State had contradictory information regarding Ida\u2019s address. Rather, the record shows that after her June 5, 1998, telephone conversation with an officer following the seizure of the currency, she never contacted the police again or appeared personally to establish a claim. (In oral argument counsel for claimants referenced two phone conversations between Ida and the police; however, the record belies this assertion.) Notwithstanding this discrepancy, importantly, Ida does not argue that the State mailed the notice to an incorrect address. Rather, Ida simply claims that she never received the mailing. The claimants argue that the State must investigate and verify each address prior to service of notice. However, such \u201cheroic efforts\u201d are not required. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694. Moreover, the circumstances of this case do not demand that we extend the State\u2019s duty in this manner.\nRegardless, we observe that the State did make additional attempts to afford notice in the instant case. This is evident by the State\u2019s attempt to supplement the notice mailing with notice by publication. Pursuant to the Act, the State published notice of the forfeiture proceedings on three separate occasions. According to the Act, publication is only acceptable where the claimant\u2019s address is unknown. 725 ILCS 150/4(A)(3) (West 2000). However, the peculiar circumstances and facts known by the State, namely, Rashawn\u2019s history of alias addresses throughout the state, led it to take further action. Although we do not find that this additional effort was required, either by the statute or by due process, this effort to supplement the notice mailing made the risk of nonreceipt more acceptable. See Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1988) (\u201cThe Supreme Court has repeatedly held that notice by first-class mail is sufficient, notwithstanding the Court\u2019s obvious awareness that not every first-class letter is received by the addressee *** [particularly where mailing is supplemented by other forms of notice such as posting or publication, the risk of non-receipt is constitutionally acceptable\u201d).\nCONCLUSION\nAccordingly, we hold that under the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, where notice of forfeiture is mailed by certified mail with a return receipt requested, service is complete upon the mere mailing of the written notice. Additionally, we conclude that notice in this case was reasonably calculated to apprise all interested parties of the pending proceedings and, therefore, satisfied due process of law.\nThe judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FITZGERALD" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\ndissenting:\nThe majority holds that claimant, Rashawn Carter, received appropriate notice of the forfeiture proceedings at issue. I disagree. Due process requires the government to provide notice that is reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the forfeiture proceedings and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard. In the present case, the notice the State gave Rashawn fell far short of the requirements of due process.\nBACKGROUND\nOn May 23, 1998, police officers responded to a tip that a man with a gun had entered the Drexel National Bank. Upon their arrival at the bank, the officers observed Rashawn holding a white cylinder-shaped object under his arm. The officers performed a protective pat-down of Rashawn and found several bundles of currency. The white cylinder-shaped object was actually a sock filled with additional currency. In all, the officers recovered $30,700 from Rashawn.\nThe officers questioned Rashawn and learned that he did not have an existing account at the bank, but that he planned to rent a safety-deposit box. Rashawn gave conflicting answers when asked where he had obtained the money and was unable to tell the officers how much money he was carrying. The officers took Rashawn to the police station for further questioning. At the station, Rashawn admitted that he was a member of a gang, that he was unemployed and that he did not own the money. Rashawn also told the officers that he had been arrested for possession of cannabis and was out on bond pending a hearing. A background check confirmed this arrest and also revealed that Rashawn had been arrested several times in Sangamon County, the last arrest on September 30, 1997.\nThe officers performed a \u201cmoney lineup,\u201d at which a police dog positively identified the currency as having a residue odor of narcotics. A further search of Rashawn revealed three separate safety-deposit box keys. One of the keys was for a safety-deposit box at the Drexel National Bank registered to Ida Carter, Rashawn\u2019s grandmother. The officers obtained a search warrant for the safety-deposit box. During a subsequent search of the box, the police recovered $20,811. A police dog positively identified the currency as having a residue odor of narcotics. The State did not prosecute Rashawn for any narcotics violation in connection with the currency.\nOn August 4, 1998, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture of the $30,700 and $20,811. The complaint named Rashawn as a party with interest in the currency. On the same day, the State mailed notice of the forfeiture proceedings and a copy of the complaint via certified mail, with a return receipt requested, to Rashawn at 4844 S. State Street, Chicago, Illinois. The State did not receive a return receipt from the mailing. The State then published notice of the forfeiture proceedings on August 7, August 14 and August 21 in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. And on September 2, 1998, the State sent a notice of forfeiture by certified mail to Ida at 4844 S. State Street. The State did not receive a return receipt from the September 2 mailing. Neither Rashawn nor Ida appeared at the forfeiture proceedings.\nOn October 13, 1998, the circuit court entered a default order forfeiting Rashawn\u2019s interest and that of all other parties claiming right, title, or interest in the currency. On January 13, 1999, Rashawn and Ida filed a joint motion to vacate the forfeiture, alleging that they did not receive notice of the forfeiture proceedings. In support of the motion, Rashawn averred that he was incarcerated for unrelated charges in the Vandalia Correction Center beginning July 7, 1998, until his release November 10, 1998. Ida also filed an affidavit in which she averred that she was the owner of the safety-deposit box and she did not receive the notice of the forfeiture proceedings mailed to her home. The circuit court denied the motion to vacate the forfeiture order.\nThe appellate court reversed* finding that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Rashawn and Ida because they were not properly served. 316 Ill. App. 3d 464, 471. The court noted further that numerous federal courts have questioned the probative value of positive dog alerts due to reports that reveal the high level of contamination of the nation\u2019s money supply with narcotics residue. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 472. The court adopted the view of these federal courts that the mere fact of prior contamination fails to establish that the currency was actually exchanged for or intended to be exchanged for drugs by the person currently in possession of the currency. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 473. Accordingly, the court concluded that the \u201csniff test\u201d was not enough to establish probable cause that the currency seized from Rashawn was connected to narcotics. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 473.\nANALYSIS\nThe due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States require, at, a minimum, that \u201cdeprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.\u201d Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57 (1950). See also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694 (2002). In Mullane, the Supreme Court explained the principles involved,\n\u201cAn elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [Citations.] The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, [citation], and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance, [citation]. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. \u2018The- criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute deals.\u2019 [Citations.]\nBut when notice is a person\u2019s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, [citation], or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.\u201d Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15, 94 L. Ed. at 873-74, 70 S. Ct. at 657-58.\nNotice by publication is not a favored mode of process. As the Supreme Court explained in Mullane,\n\u201c[i]t would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts. *** Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper\u2019s normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed.\u201d Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 94 L. Ed. at 874, 70 S. Ct. at 658.\nWhere the names and addresses of interested parties are not known, notice by publication must be accepted out of necessity. However,\n\u201c[e]xceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.\u201d Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318, 94 L. Ed. at 875, 70 S. Ct. at 659.\nThe incarceration of a party with an interest in property being forfeited shapes the notice by due process. In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 34 L. Ed. 2d 47, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972), the appellant was arrested on a charge of armed robbery on June 16, 1970. The State instituted forfeiture proceedings against the appellant\u2019s car, alleging that the appellant had used the car in the armed robbery. The appellant was held in custody in the Cook County jail from June 16, 1970, to October 7, 1970, awaiting trial. Nevertheless, the State mailed notice of the forfeiture proceedings to appellant\u2019s home address as listed in the records of the Secretary of State, and not to the jail facility. In finding the notice ineffective, the Supreme Court explained,\n\u201cIn the instant case, the State knew that appellant was not at the address to which the notice was mailed and, moreover, knew also that appellant could not get to that address since he was at that very time confined in the Cook County jail. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the State made any effort to provide notice which was \u2018reasonably calculated\u2019 to apprise appellant of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings.\u201d Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 49, 93 S. Ct. at 31-32.\nIn Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 605, 122 S. Ct. at 700, quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the government must give a property owner notice that is \u201c \u2018reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances\u2019 \u201d to apprise the owner of the pendency of the forfeiture. In the event the property owner is incarcerated, the government must send the notice to the owner at his place of incarceration. Although the government need not show that the property owner received the notice, the method chosen by the government in attempting notice, that is, the procedures used by the government in mailing the notice and in processing the mail at the correctional facility, must be defend-able \u201c \u2018on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.\u2019 \u201d Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 606, 122 S. Ct. at 701, quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 94 L. Ed. at 874, 70 S. Ct. at 657.\nApplying these principles to the facts at issue, the Supreme Court found that the notice the government gave the property owner satisfied the requirements of due process. The Supreme Court explained,\n\u201cThe Government here carried its burden of showing the following procedures had been used to give notice. The FBI sent certified mail addressed to petitioner at the correctional facility where he was incarcerated. At that facility, prison mailroom staff traveled to the city post office every day to obtain all the mail for the institution, including inmate mail. *** The staff signed for all certified mail before leaving the post office. Once the mail was transported back to the facility, certified mail was entered in a logbook maintained in the mailroom. *** A member of the inmate\u2019s Unit Team then signed for the certified mail to acknowledge its receipt before removing it from the mail-room, and either a Unit Team member or another staff member distributed the mail to the inmate during the institution\u2019s \u2018mail call.\u2019 \u201d Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 168-69, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 605-06, 122 S. Ct. at 700.\nThe method chosen by the government in attempting notice was reasonable in light of the procedures followed by the FBI and the correctional institution.\nDusenbery, 534 U.S. 161, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694, is based squarely upon Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306, 94 L. Ed. at 865, 70 S. Ct. at 652, and Robinson, 409 U.S. 38, 93 S. Ct. 30, 34 L. Ed. 2d 47. It holds that the government must mail notice to the property owner at the place of incarceration. However, the government need not show that the property owner received the notice, in order to comply with due process.\nThe majority rejoins,\n\u201cDespite the dissent\u2019s contention, the Court did not hold that \u2018[i]n the event the property owner is incarcerated, the government must send the notice to the owner at his place of incarceration.\u2019 199 Ill. 2d at 168 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). This issue was not considered by the Court. Instead, the Court considered the constitutional sufficiency of the mail delivery and distribution system once mail arrived to the prison. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694.\u201d 199 Ill. 2d at 157-58.\nThe majority\u2019s construction of Dusenbery is simplistic, if not surprising. If due process did not require that mail be sent to the property owner at the place of incarceration, the Court would not have considered the \u201cconstitutional sufficiency of the mail delivery and distribution system once mail arrived to the prison.\u201d Rather, the Court would have considered either the notice sent to the property owner at the house trailer where he was arrested or the notice sent to the property owner in Randolph, Ohio, the town where his mother lived, sufficient to comply with due process. Of course, such a holding would be contrary to Robinson, where, as noted above, the Court held that notice mailed to the property owner\u2019s home address as listed in the records of the Secretary of State, but not to the jail facility, was ineffective.\nPerhaps the majority is intimating that Robinson is not good law, or that Dusenbery has limited Robinson in some fashion. Given the fact that Dusenbery did not criticize or, in any way, diminute the holding in Robinson, I, for one, believe that Robinson remains good law. Turning to the facts of this case, Rashawn was incarcerated at Vandalia Correctional Center at the time the State mailed the notice of forfeiture to his home. The State did not receive a return receipt from the mailing and was thus alerted to the fact that the notice was ineffective. The State, however, made no attempt to send notice of the forfeiture to Rashawn at Vandalia. Instead, the State was satisfied with publication of notice in the Daily Law Bulletin. Such notice fell woefully short of due process. The State knew, or should have known, that Rashawn was incarcerated at Vandalia. Consequently, the State was required to send notice to Rashawn at Vandalia.\nIn a forfeiture proceeding, the interest of the property owner is potentially great. See 725 ILCS 150/6 (West 1998) (providing for administrative forfeiture of nonreal property valued at less than $20,000, and judicial in rent forfeiture proceedings for nonreal property that exceeds $20,000). As noted in Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1998),\n\u201cA person who violates the narcotics laws might well possess valuable property that is unrelated to narcotics. The forfeiture of such property may be a matter of great importance to him. And without the owner even being made aware of, or having a practical opportunity to challenge the forfeiture, its lawfulness is difficult to justify. In these circumstances, furthermore, no one but the owner can be relied on to protect the owner\u2019s interest.\u201d\nAlthough the potential loss to the property owner may be great, forfeiture statutes generally allow notice by mail or publication. See 725 ILCS 150/4 (West 1998). When the property owner is incarcerated, however, he has little influence as to whether the notice given is actually received. \u201c[A]s a prisoner, the owner is unable to insure that he will receive the notice once the post office has delivered it to the institution. The owner is entirely dependant on the institution to deliver his mail to him.\u201d Weng, 137 F.3d at 715. By contrast, the hardship to the government in implementing procedures \u201creasonably certain to inform\u201d the property owner of the forfeiture is small. As noted by the dissent in Dusenbery, \u201c[t]he agency responsible for giving notice of the forfeiture, here, the FBI, is part of the same Government as the prisoner\u2019s custodian, the Bureau of Prisons.\u201d Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 178, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 612, 122 S. Ct. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter and Breyer, JJ.). \u201cWhere a claimant is \u2018residing at a place of the government\u2019s choosing,\u2019 the seizing agency must take steps to locate the claimant in order to satisfy due process.\u201d United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 1995). See also In re Forfeiture of $2,354.00 United States Currency, 326 Ill. App. 3d 9 (2001) (where the State maintained that a prisoner\u2019s address is easy to ascertain).\nThe majority disagrees. The majority maintains there is no evidence in the record that the seizing agency knew or should have known Rashawn was incarcerated in Vandalia. Rashawn was incarcerated in a separate county for a separate crime approximately six weeks after officers seized the currency. 199 Ill. 2d at 161. Citing Sarit v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 987 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1993), a case it finds \u201chelpful in the instant matter,\u201d the majority concludes that the notice to Rashawn\u2019s home was effective.\nThe majority fails to consider that when the officers interviewed Rashawn, he informed them he was out on bond for a prior arrest. A background check confirmed this arrest and also revealed that Rashawn had been arrested several times in Sangamon County, the last arrest on September 30, 1997. As the Third Circuit observed in Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 2001), \u201calthough Foehl was not in jail at the time the notice was returned, he had been released on bail. We can safely assume that the Beaumont police had a very good idea of his whereabouts during that time.\u201d\nMore importantly, however, the majority fails to consider that the State is one entity and not several agencies or departments. The State, in the person of the State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, prosecuted the forfeiture action at issue. At the same time, the State prosecuted Rashawn for possession of cannabis based upon an incident on March 28, 1995, and aggravated battery based upon an incident on May 9, 1996. The State incarcerated Rashawn at Vandalia. A simple telephone call from the State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County to the Illinois Department of Correction would have provided the State\u2019s Attorney with the information needed to effectuate notice upon Rashawn.\nLastly, the majority\u2019s reliance on Sarit is misplaced. In Sarit, DEA agents seized $41,448 from the plaintiffs\u2019 then-residence, located at 114 Alvin Street, on July 28, 1989. The attendant search was conducted without a warrant. On August 21, 1989, the plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) seeking return of the currency. On September 1, the United States Attorney objected to this motion and filed a memorandum of law in which he informed the plaintiffs that the currency was being held for administrative forfeiture. Subsequently, on September 19, 1989, the DEA sent notice of the administrative forfeiture proceeding by certified mail to 114 Alvin Street. The notice was returned unclaimed. The DEA also published notice of the proceeding, with the first notice published on September 27, 1989. On October 13, 1989, the district court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 41(e) motion on equitable grounds, deferring to the administrative forfeiture proceedings. The plaintiffs\u2019 right to file a claim with the DEA expired on October 17, 1989. On November 2,1989, the administrative forfeiture was decreed and entered.\nIn upholding the validity of the notice given by the DEA, the circuit court observed,\n\u201cGiven plaintiffs\u2019 vigorous (although tardy) pursuit of their claim, the fact that the government had been involved in ongoing court action on the very issue of the seizure of plaintiffs\u2019 currency, the government\u2019s awareness of plaintiffs\u2019 representation by counsel, and the frowned upon treatment of forfeitures, the call is a close one. [Citation.] Nevertheless, Mullane counsels us to consider all of the circumstances, and we find in this case other pertinent factors, including the government\u2019s memorandum and the conduct of plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, which compel us to uphold the finding of the district court.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Sarit, 987 F.2d at 14.\nThe court of appeals found decisive that the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel had sufficient general notice of the risk that the property would be forfeited within the coming months if action were not taken; the statute covering forfeitures and the regulations interpreting it were available to counsel; and, once the plaintiffs and their counsel were aware that notice of the forfeiture would be sent in the ensuing two months, they could have notified the DEA of their own change of address. The court concluded that \u201cthe damage done by the ineffective notice could and ought to have been stemmed by plaintiffs\u2019 counsel.\u201d Sarit, 987 F.2d at 15.\nSarit is distinguishable from the present case. First, the plaintiffs in Sarit were not incarcerated at the time of the forfeiture proceedings. Second, the plaintiffs in Sarit had instituted an action in the district court for the return of the property and were represented by counsel. Knowledge of the statutes regulating the forfeiture proceedings and the risk that the property would be forfeited within a short time period was attributed to counsel, and thus to the plaintiffs. Third, the plaintiffs in Sarit had received a memorandum informing them that the currency was being held for administrative forfeiture and providing them with a seizure number that had been assigned to the currency. The memorandum further informed the plaintiffs that if they filed a claim and cost bond with the DEA, the DEA would be required to refer the matter to the United States Attorney for the initiation of judicial forfeiture proceedings. In contrast, Rashawn was incarcerated at the time the State mailed the notice of forfeiture. The State did not attempt to notify Rashawn\u2019s criminal counsel of the forfeiture. Indeed, there is no indication in the record that Rashawn\u2019s criminal counsel continued to represent him once the criminal proceedings resulted in the convictions. Thus, the Sarit court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cthe damage done by the ineffective notice could and ought to have been stemmed by plaintiffs\u2019 counsel\u201d (Sarit, 987 F.2d at 15), has no bearing in this case. Further, the State nowhere claims that it gave Rashawn information of the kind given the Sarit plaintiffs in the memorandum. The majority\u2019s assertion that Sarit is \u201chelpful in the instant matter\u201d is simply incorrect.\nThe majority\u2019s holding that the notice given Rashawn was effective is based upon the premise that the State may be compartmentalized, such that information available to the State\u2019s Attorney of one county or to the Illinois Department of Corrections is not attributable to the State\u2019s Attorney of another county. The majority\u2019s sole support for this holding is Sarit. However, this holding is not supported by Sarit and is contrary to case law. See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. 161, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 122 S. Ct. 694 (in determining whether the government\u2019s actions were reasonable, the Supreme Court looked to the procedures followed by the FBI, the forfeiting agency, in mailing the notice, and the procedures followed by the federal correctional institution where the property owner was incarcerated, in processing certified mail addressed to inmates); United States v. Minor, 228 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2000) (since property owner was in federal custody, the DEA notices mailed to his home address and to the Forsyth County jail, where he had been held for a brief period following his arrest, were ineffective); United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 2000) (where the DEA administratively forfeited certain property, the court held that \u201cthe circumstances surrounding the federal government\u2019s incarceration of a prisoner require greater efforts at ensuring notice than would be expected for individuals at liberty in society\u201d); United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 674 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (on review of an administrative forfeiture proceeding conducted by the DEA, the court held: \u201cat a minimum, due process requires that when a person is in the government\u2019s custody and detained at a place of its choosing, notice of a pending administrative forfeiture proceeding must be mailed to the detainee at his or her place of confinement\u201d); Lopez v. United States, 201 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (where notices sent by the DEA to the property owner\u2019s home and to the county jail were returned to the DEA, and where the DEA knew that the property owner was in the custody either of the State of Florida or of the Attorney General of the United States, the DEA should have attempted to locate the property owner within the prison system); United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998) (the requirements of due process were satisfied where the record showed that the government sent notice, by certified mail, to the property owner at the jail facility, and the watch commander at the jail testified that jail personnel sign for certified mail, open it in the presence of the inmate, and then distribute it directly to the inmate); Boero v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 111 F.3d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1997) (\u201cBoero was a prisoner in custody, having been transferred to his place of incarceration directly from a federal facility, and notice could easily have been given to him; the notice was indisputably inadequate and the district court has found *** that the DEA was responsible for the failure of notice\u201d); United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 51 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 1995); State v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $3,743.00, 25 Kan. App. 2d 54, 956 P.2d 1351 (1998) (where the property owner was booked into the Shawnee County jail and later transferred to the Kansas State Correctional Facility, the court found the notice mailed to the property owner\u2019s home ineffective, rejecting the State\u2019s claim that it had no reason to know the property owner remained incarcerated during the criminal proceedings); State v. $17,636.00 in United States Currency, 650 So. 2d 900 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994); State v. Jacobiak, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4747 (1989) (\u201cby virtue of appellant\u2019s conviction and sentencing, appellee knew or should have known appellant was incarcerated at the time the petition was filed. Under the circumstances *** sending a copy of the petition by regular mail to appellant\u2019s trial attorney, was not \u2018an effort\u2019 that would ordinarily provide notice to appellant of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings\u201d); People v. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d 844 (1995). See also Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 2000) (where the notice sent by the Secret Service to the property owners was returned to the government five days later marked undeliverable, and where the property owners were actively seeking the return of their money through an administrative FTCA claim filed with the INS, \u201canother attempt at written notice [by the Secret Service] would have been reasonable, even necessary, under the circumstances and would not have been too burdensome on the government\u201d); Montgomery v. Scott, 802 F. Supp. 930, 936 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (\u201cIt was unreasonable for the DEA to ignore its discovery that plaintiff had not received the original mailed notice. The Government must use the information it possesses to determine whether to rely on a particular method of notice; it may not ignore information that reveals that a method of notice is inadequate to provide an interested party with notice\u201d); Redd v. Tennessee Department of Safety, 895 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tenn. 1995) (where a drug task force of the Tennessee Department of Safety seized money in a raid at a mobile home and the home\u2019s owner told the task force officers that the petitioner had brought the money to her and told her to use it if she needed to, and where police later arrested the petitioner for an unrelated murder he committed two days before the raid, the court held \u201cit is clear that the Department of Safety possessed the requisite knowledge of the petitioner\u2019s possible proprietary interest in the seized property. Such knowledge required the Department to give notice to the petitioner of the seizure and possible forfeiture of the property\u201d).\nCONCLUSION\nThe opportunity to be heard has \u201clittle reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.\u201d Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657. In the present case, the State mailed the notice of the forfeiture to Rashawn\u2019s home. Although the State did not receive a return receipt from the mailing, the State inquired no further. The State failed to notify Rashawn of the forfeiture at the correctional center where he was incarcerated. Rashawn was thus deprived of the opportunity to contest the forfeiture and divested of his property without due process of law. It matters not that Rashawn was incarcerated on charges unrelated to the forfeiture. The State prosecuted and incarcerated Rashawn on those charges. The State was aware of the incarceration and knew, or should have known, that notice mailed to Rashawn at his home address would be ineffective. As held by the Supreme Court, notice sent to a prisoner\u2019s home is inadequate. Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 49, 93 S. Ct. at 31. Such notice is not reasonably calculated to apprise the prisoner of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings. Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 49, 93 S. Ct. at 31-32. \u201c[W]hen notice is a person\u2019s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.\u201d Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 94 L. Ed. at 874, 70 S. Ct. at 657.\nI respectfully dissent.\nJUSTICES McMORROW and KILBRIDE join in this dissent.\nThe State represented to the circuit court and to this court that \u201cthe offense for which Rashawn was incarcerated occurred almost one month after the incident that led to the forfeiture,\u201d that is, in June 1998 rather than the dates shown above.\ninformation about inmates is available to the general public at the Illinois Department of Correction\u2019s internet site.\nAt least one commentator has roundly criticized Sarit,\n\u201cWhile these unique facts make the decision easily distinguishable, it is still disturbing that the court allowed a claimant\u2019s right to contest the forfeiture to be snuffed out so cavalierly by the DEA. The decision is wholly out of sync with the Supreme Court\u2019s efforts to provide additional procedural safeguards in civil forfeiture actions.\u201d 1 D. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases par. 9.03, at 9 \u2014 53 (2001).\nThe commentator lists a number of cases which have distinguished Sarit.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios Burtzos, Anthony M. O\u2019Brien and James Nichols, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.", "David R. McLenachen and Thomas Peters, both of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 90470.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD A. DEVINE, Appellant, v. $30,700.00 UNITED STATES CURRENCY et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed March 21, 2002.\nFREEMAN, J., joined by McMORROW and KILBRIDE, JJ., dissenting.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios Burtzos, Anthony M. O\u2019Brien and James Nichols, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.\nDavid R. McLenachen and Thomas Peters, both of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0142-01", "first_page_order": 154, "last_page_order": 190 }