{ "id": 58897, "name": "GENERAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. GEORGE W. LACEY, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "General Casualty Insurance v. Lacey", "decision_date": "2002-04-18", "docket_number": "No. 90993", "first_page": "281", "last_page": "286", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 281" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 864", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430890 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352875 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1025986 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385509 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0342-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 388, "char_count": 6826, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.238815029946126e-07, "percentile": 0.9411454104080972 }, "sha256": "00d8db9978715bf4e997c452342bd9ff76fd40048048406a2200f1edea6b07f1", "simhash": "1:abef7696780d8978", "word_count": 1068 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:46:57.269661+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GENERAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. GEORGE W. LACEY, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue presented is whether, under the facts of this case, the hability-limit exhaustion clause in General Casualty Insurance Company\u2019s underinsured-motorist policy is valid and enforceable. We hold that it is.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 22, 1991, George W Lacey was operating a car that was involved in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Lacey was covered by an underinsured-motorist policy issued by General Casualty. That policy provided coverage limits of $100,000 per accident and $300,000 per occurrence, and included the following liability-limit exhaustion clause:\n\u201cWe will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgment or settlements, unless we:\n(1) Have been given written notice in advance of a settlement between an \u2018insured\u2019 and the owner or operator of the \u2018underinsured motor vehicle;\u2019 and\n(2) decide to advance payment to the \u2018insured\u2019 in an amount equal to the tentative settlement.\u201d\nThe other driver involved in the accident was insured by Allstate Insurance Company under a policy providing bodily injury liability limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.\nIn the summer of 1997, Lacey settled with Allstate for $42,500. Lacey then filed a claim with General Casualty for underinsured-motorist benefits. General Casualty denied the underinsured-motorist claim, insisting that underinsured-motorist coverage was not triggered because the $42,500 settlement did not exhaust the at-fault driver\u2019s bodily injury liability limits. In addition, General Casualty sought a declaration from the trial court that Lacey was not entitled to underinsuredmotorist benefits. In response, Lacey conceded that the $42,500 settlement with Allstate failed to exhaust the at-fault driver\u2019s bodily injury liability limits. Nevertheless, Lacey argued that he was entitled to underinsuredmotorist benefits because General Casualty\u2019s liability-limit exhaustion clause was void as against public policy. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court entered summary judgment in General Casualty\u2019s favor. With one justice dissenting, the appellate court affirmed. No. 3 \u2014 99\u20140977 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted Lacey\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nANALYSIS\nSummary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2000); Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998). The standard of review for the entry of summary judgment is de novo. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 349.\nBefore this court, Lacey again argues that General Casualty\u2019s liability-limit exhaustion clause is void as against public policy. In support of this argument, Lacey points to the current enactment of section 143a \u2014 2(7) of the Illinois Insurance Code, which provides:\n\u201cA policy which provides underinsured motor vehicle coverage may include a clause which denies payment until the limits of liability or portion thereof under all bodily injury liability insurance policies applicable to the underinsured motor vehicle and its operators have been partially or fully exhausted by payment of judgment or settlement. A judgment or settlement of the bodily injury claim in an amount less than the limits of liability of the bodily injury coverages applicable to the claim shall not preclude the claimant from making an underinsured motorist claim against the underinsured motorist coverage.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(7) (West 2000).\nConceding that this version of section 143a \u2014 2(7) did not become effective until January 1, 1997, Lacey nevertheless argues \u2014 without any citation to authority \u2014 that the validity of General Casualty\u2019s liability-limit exhaustion clause \u201cshould be governed by the law in effect at the time of settlement.\u201d\nWe must reject Lacey\u2019s argument. While we agree with Lacey that statutes represent an expression of pub-lie policy (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 372 (2001)), it is equally well settled that \u201c[statutes in force at the time an insurance policy was issued are controlling.\u201d (Emphasis added.) State Farm, 197 Ill. 2d at 372; Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474, 482 (1997). This principle is rooted, of course, in both the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of contracts (U.S. Const., art. I, \u00a7 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 16) and the maxim that all applicable statutes in effect at the time a policy is issued are deemed a part of the policy. See, e.g., Kapinus v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 317 Ill. App. 3d 185, 187 (2000); Brandt v. Time Insurance Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d 159, 170 (1998); Weisberg v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 124 Ill. App. 3d 864, 868 (1984). Consequently, in assessing whether General Casualty\u2019s Hability-limit exhaustion clause violates public policy, we look not to the law that was in effect at the time of settlement but at the law that was in effect at the time the policy was issued.\nPrior to the 1997 amendment, section 143a \u2014 2(7) specifically authorized General Casualty to include a liability-limit exhaustion clause in its underinsuredmotorist policy. Indeed, the statutory language and the policy language are virtually identical:\n\u201cA policy which provides underinsured motor vehicle coverage may include a clause which denies payment until the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance policies applicable to the underinsured motor vehicle and its operators have been exhausted by payment of judgment or settlement.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(7) (West 1992).\nGiven that the liability-limit exhaustion clause in Generad Casualty\u2019s underinsured-motorist policy was expressly authorized by section 143a \u2014 2(7) at the time Lacey\u2019s policy was issued, that clause by definition conforms to public policy and is fully enforceable.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nAlthough the exact date of the policy\u2019s issuance is unknown, the parties agree that the policy was issued prior to the effective date of the 1997 amendment to section 143a \u2014 2(7).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "John A. Slevin and John R. Pusey, of Vonachen, Lawless, Trager & Slevin, of Peoria, for appellant.", "Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria (Karen L. Kendall, Craig L. Unrath and Rex K. Linder, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 90993.\nGENERAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. GEORGE W. LACEY, Appellant.\nOpinion filed April 18, 2002.\nJohn A. Slevin and John R. Pusey, of Vonachen, Lawless, Trager & Slevin, of Peoria, for appellant.\nHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria (Karen L. Kendall, Craig L. Unrath and Rex K. Linder, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0281-01", "first_page_order": 293, "last_page_order": 298 }