{ "id": 58947, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHAD HILL, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hill", "decision_date": "2002-05-23", "docket_number": "No. 91329", "first_page": "440", "last_page": "459", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 440" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141517 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738127 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130415 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317115 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "502-03" }, { "page": "502-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 891", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604708 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "Pincham, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926975 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965815 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 Ill. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2554113 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voiding statute authorizing correctional facility personnel to treat a sentence as a mere recommendation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/380/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2665388 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voiding statute restricting circuit court's ability to render judgment of dismissal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317112 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voiding statute mandating instances where the circuit court must utilize its judicial contempt power" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3103110 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding that statute requiring a sentencing judge to explain the reasons for imposing a particular sentence was not mandatory" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146148 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voiding statute limiting a circuit court's ability to proceed with a trial in absentia" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5539451 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voiding statute restricting circuit court's ability to render judgment of dismissal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 361", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1494660 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" }, { "page": "725-26" }, { "page": "650-51" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "365-67" }, { "page": "726-27" }, { "page": "651-52" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "725-26" }, { "page": "650-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 586", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769215 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604-05", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "page": "990", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "page": "2964-65", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 453", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6226195 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" }, { "page": "539" }, { "page": "1928" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152113 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483556 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489531 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5200800 ], "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/329/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5352446 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464699 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156128 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "similarly-distinguishing Davis" }, { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "finding that the legislature may exercise its power to fix punishments in such a way that it necessarily limits the judiciary's discretion in imposing sentence" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224793 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5393061 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963706 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5472805 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222776 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144-45" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0140-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1127, "char_count": 34549, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.700043565753027e-07, "percentile": 0.8928758008671548 }, "sha256": "d7020657f19191780176bde73ac3ff48030314d6238d7f10be40c167fa808ad9", "simhash": "1:fb92ce74e5ded438", "word_count": 5598 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:46:57.269661+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHAD HILL, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this case, we review the circuit court\u2019s finding that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999)), as amended by Public Act 91 \u2014 404 (Pub. Act 91 \u2014 404, \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 2000), violates the separation of powers clause and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Section 12 \u2014 11 of the Code contains one of the so-called \u201c15/20/25-life\u201d mandatory add-on sentences implemented by our legislature.\nIn March 2000, the State filed an information alleging that defendant, Chad Hill, committed the offense of home invasion while armed with a firearm in violation of section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3). In October 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information, primarily arguing that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) violates the Illinois Constitution\u2019s separation of powers clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1) and the proportionate penalties clause (111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11).\nIn March 2001, the circuit court heard defendant\u2019s motion and verbally indicated that it would find the amended statute unconstitutional on both bases and that a written order would follow. In April 2001, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion and issued written findings. We reverse and remand.\nI. ANALYSIS\nThis court has a duty to affirm a statute\u2019s constitutionality and validity if reasonably possible. People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 144 (1995). Legislative enactments, including those that impose criminal penalties, are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. See People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981). A party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its invalidity. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 144. A circuit court\u2019s finding that a statute is unconstitutional is reviewed de novo. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).\nThe applicable version of section 12 \u2014 11 of the Code, as amended by Public Act 91 \u2014 404, establishes the crime of home invasion in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201c(a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present and\n(1) While armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or\n(2) Intentionally causes any injury, except as provided in subsection (a)(5), to any person or persons within such dwelling place, or\n(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or\n(4) Uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs and during the commission of the offense personally discharges a firearm, or\n(5) Personally discharges a firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person within such dwelling place.\n(c) Sentence. Home invasion in violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) is a Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(4) is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(5) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West Supp. 1999).\nDefendant attacks section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3)\u2019s validity on two general bases. First, defendant points to article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution, commonly referred to as the separation of powers clause. This clause states that \u201c[t]he legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1. Defendant asserts that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3), by imposing mandatory add-on sentences, violates the separation of powers clause because it divests the circuit court of its discretionary power to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances.\nSecond, defendant relies on article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution, commonly referred to as the proportionate penalties clause. This clause states in pertinent part that \u201c[a] 11 penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11. Defendant contends that section 12 \u2014 ll\u2019s add-on sentencing scheme violates the proportionate penalties clause because it imposes a penalty that is cruel, degrading, and shocking to the moral conscience. Defendant further contends that section 12 \u2014 11 is unconstitutional because it mandates a penalty more severe than that imposed for more serious crimes.\nAs a threshold matter, we note that defendant asks us to review section 12 \u2014 ll\u2019s add-on sentencing scheme in its entirety. Citing People v. Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d 472 (1972), defendant argues that section 12 \u2014 ll\u2019s unconstitutional infirmities are so pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid. We reject defendant\u2019s request. A defendant does not ordinarily have standing to challenge a statute as it might be applied to others in different circumstances. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 644 (2000). Defendant was charged under section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) (carrying a 15-year add-on sentence) and therefore defendant has no standing to challenge section 12 \u2014 11(a)(4) (carrying a 20-year add-on sentence) and section 12\u2014 11(a)(5) (carrying a 25-year-to-life add-on sentence). As we shall discuss, we find no infirmities present in section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) and we decline defendant\u2019s request that we search for a constitutional violation elsewhere. Thus, we only consider the constitutionality of section 12\u2014 11(a)(3).\nA. Separation of Powers\nDefendant first argues that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) violates the separation of powers clause. Specifically, defendant argues that section 12 \u2014 ll(a)(3)\u2019s mandatory add-on sentence of 15 years usurps the judiciary\u2019s sentencing power by removing its ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors and to fashion a sentence that is tailored to the circumstances of the offense. We disagree.\nIn reaching its conclusion, the circuit court found as follows:\n\u201cThe additional sentence required by the statute is an impermissible exercise of the judicial power and is in violation of the Illinois Constitution. The statute directs this [c]ourt to increase [defendant\u2019s sentence after the [c]ourt imposes a sentence. The sentencing scheme in 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 gives sentencing power to the legislature that is not appropriate for the legislature to possess.\nThe legislature is imposing a restriction on this [c]ourt of its inherent power [sic] to sentence a defendant because it mandates this [c]ourt to perform a specific result [szc]. There is no consideration given in aggravation or mitigation which this [c]ourt is required to consider. The statute compels this [c]ourt to increase the sentence after this [c]ourt has made its determination; thus, this [c]ourt has no discretion in considering the evidence from the case and independently arriving at a sentence mandated by the legislature with the minimum and maximum guidelines previously set. [Citations.]\u201d\nWe disagree with the circuit court\u2019s conclusion for two reasons. First, we disagree with the circuit court\u2019s conclusion that section 12 \u2014 ll(a)(3)\u2019s 15-year add-on sentence removes the discretionary component from the judiciary\u2019s sentencing power. Prior to the amendment, a defendant convicted of home invasion while armed with a firearm faced a Class X felony sentence of 6 to 30 years. Section 12 \u2014 ll\u2019s 15-year mandatory add-on sentence essentially raises the original sentencing range of 6 to 30 years to a range of 21 to 45 years. Thus, the circuit court retains the ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Unquestionably, the legislature could have simply chosen to increase directly the original sentencing range to 21 to 45 years instead of implementing the add-on scheme. We find no substantive difference between that scenario and the legislature\u2019s decision to impose the mandatory add-on sentence.\nSecond, we find that mandatory sentencing schemes do not inherently usurp the judiciary\u2019s power to impose a sentence. This court has repeatedly recognized that the legislature has the power to define criminal conduct and to determine the nature and extent of criminal sentences required to protect society. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 144-45; People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1984); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981); People v. Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 179, 186 (1977); People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962); People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 457 (1927).\nWe have previously held that the legislature acts within its power when it imposes mandatory sentences. For example, in People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984), this court examined the constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence. We rejected defendant\u2019s separation of powers argument, finding that the legislature\u2019s power necessarily includes the authority to establish mandatory minimum sentences, even though such sentences, by definition, restrict the inquiry and function of the judiciary in imposing sentence. We stated that \u201cwhen legislatures exercise their acknowledged power to fix punishments for crimes they necessarily limit the discretion of courts when imposing sentence.\u201d Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 208. In reaching this conclusion, we noted one of our previous cases, People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531, 549 (1979). In that case, we observed:\n\u201c \u2018The legislature may authorize the court to exercise broad discretion in the imposition of sentences by providing for the fixing of sentences within prescribed minimum and maximum years. Or the legislature may restrict the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing, such as by providing for mandatory sentences.\u2019 \u201d Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 208, quoting Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 549.\nWe also noted in Taylor that mandatory sentencing is not a novel concept and that such sentencing schemes exist in a majority of states. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 208.\nSimilarly, in People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235 (1995), defetodant argued that his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, mandated by the Habitual Criminal Act (currently 720 ILCS 5/33B \u2014 1 (West 2000)), improperly divested the judiciary of its sentencing power. We rejected defendant\u2019s separation of powers argument in that case. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d at 248-50. Accord People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345-46 (1984).\nThe United States Supreme Court has also rejected the constitutional necessity for discretionary sentencing ranges. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 114 L. Ed. 2d 524, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991). In Chapman, the Court stated as follows:\n\u201cSuch a sentencing scheme \u2014 not considering individual degrees of culpability \u2014 would clearly be constitutional. Congress has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion. [Citation.] Determinate sentences were found in this country\u2019s penal codes from its inception [citation] and some have remained until the present. [Citations.] A sentencing scheme providing for \u2018individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes\u2019 \u201d (Emphases added.) Chapman, 500 U.S. at 467, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 539, 111 S. Ct. at 1928, quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 990, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2964-65 (1978) (plurality opinion).\nIndeed, discretionary sentencing power did not always lie squarely within the judiciary. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-65, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 725-26, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650-51 (1989), the United States Supreme Court examined the roots of discretionary sentencing in federal law and noted that, historically, the scope of judicial discretion with respect to sentencing has been subject to legislative control. At one time, Congress embraced a fixed-sentencing scheme. Congress eventually abandoned the rigidity of fixed-sentencing and implemented a system of punishment ranges. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 109 S. Ct. at 651. In more recent days, significant reforms in the criminal justice system have reintroduced mandatory sentencing schemes. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-67, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 726-27, 109 S. Ct. at 651-52.\nDefendant correctly notes that this court has previously rejected legislative encroachments on the judicial power. Defendant cites O\u2019Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, 112 Ill. 2d 273 (1986) (voiding statute restricting circuit court\u2019s ability to render judgment of dismissal); People v. Flores, 104 Ill. 2d 40 (1984) (voiding statute limiting a circuit court\u2019s ability to proceed with a trial in absentia); People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155 (1982) (finding that statute requiring a sentencing judge to explain the reasons for imposing a particular sentence was not mandatory); Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287 (1977) (voiding statute mandating instances where the circuit court must utilize its judicial contempt power); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145 (1952) (voiding statute restricting circuit court\u2019s ability to render judgment of dismissal); People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596 (1942) (voiding statute authorizing correctional facility personnel to treat a sentence as a mere recommendation). Defendant argues that those cases support his argument that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3)\u2019s mandatory add-on sentencing scheme unconstitutionally usurps the judiciary\u2019s power.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s reliance on O\u2019Connell, Flores, Murneigh, Agran, Davis, and Montana. Unlike the legislative encroachments we examined in those cases, the intrusion in this case does not rise to an unconstitutional level. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 207 (similarly-distinguishing Davis). The legislature possesses the limited power to impose a limitation on the judiciary\u2019s sentencing power in this context. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 208 (finding that the legislature may exercise its power to fix punishments in such a way that it necessarily limits the judiciary\u2019s discretion in imposing sentence).\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977), citing People v. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d 583, 589 (1975), where we stated that a proper sentence must be \u201cbased upon the particular circumstances of each individual case.\u201d We deem Perruquet distinguishable. First, Perruquet did not involve a separation of powers issue. Second, the statute we examined in Perruquet was punishable with a broad sentencing range. Clearly, if the legislature provides a broad sentencing range, it provides the judiciary with similarly broad sentencing discretion. See Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 549. That discretion necessarily entails not only the ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, but also the duty to consider such factors. See Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154. When the legislature implements a mandatory sentencing scheme, however, it necessarily restricts the judiciary\u2019s discretion and its ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 208; Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d at 549.\nWe conclude that defendant has failed to show that the legislature exceeded its authority in implementing section 12 \u2014 ll(a)(3)\u2019s mandatory add-on sentencing scheme. Generally, aggravating and mitigating factors need not necessarily be a part of the sentencing equation if the legislature deems such factors inappropriate. The legislature has the power to fix the sentence for a crime and, in turn, limit the scope of judicial discretion with respect to imposing the sentence. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 208; accord Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 725-26, 109 S. Ct. at 650-51. The add-on sentencing scheme falls within that power. Section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3), as amended, does not place an unconstitutional Emit on the judiciary\u2019s power to adjudicate, pronounce judgment, impose sentence, interpret the law, or carry it into effect.\nFor these reasons, we find that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) does not violate the separation of powers clause.\nB. Proportionate Penalties Clause\nWe next consider whether section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3), as amended by Public Act 91 \u2014 404, violates the proportionate penalties clause. We conclude that it does not.\nWith respect to defendant\u2019s disproportionate penalties clause argument, the circuit court found as follows:\n\u201cThis add-on sentence violates the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution. The Proportionate Penalties Clause requires that all penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\nCurrently the Home Invasion statute carries a [15/20/ 25-life] enhancement penalty when [the] offender possesses a firearm, discharges a firearm and/or injures an occupant of the dwelling. Presently the Home Invasion statute provides a lesser penalty for an offender who intentionally causes any injury, with the exception as provided in subsection (a)(5) to any person in the dwelling. Said offender is subject to a sentence of imprisonment for six (6) to thirty (30) years. An offender who enters a dwelling while armed with a firearm and threatens the imminent use of force is subject to a minimum sentence of imprisonment of twenty-one (21) years. The statute creates greater penalties for offenses which cause less harm. [Citation.] The statute, when compared with other related statutes, is clearly disproportionate.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nAgain, we disagree with the circuit court\u2019s conclusion. In People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998), we noted three separate tests used to identify a proportionate penalties clause violation. First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. Second, a penalty is invalid under the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared, and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. Third, there is a violation of the proportionate penalties clause when identical offenses are given different sentences. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 474.\nDefendant argues that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) violates the proportionate penalties clause under the first and second tests. We examine these arguments in turn.\nWe first consider whether section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) mandates a penalty that is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. We find that it does not.\nDefendant correctly states that the sentence mandated by section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) is severe. Following imposition of the mandatory add-on, a person convicted under this subsection is subject to a prison term of 21 to 45 years. We find, however, that the sentencing range is not so severe as to render the amended statute unconstitutional.\nFirst, contrary to the assertion made in defendant\u2019s brief, home invasion is not a property crime. Section 12 \u2014 11 contains no elements relating to theft, vandalism, or the like. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 2000). Home invasion is a crime that protects persons from intruders. That is why our statutory scheme specifically categorizes home invasion as an offense directed against the person.\nSecond, as previously stated, the legislature has the power to determine the nature and extent of criminal sentences required to protect society. Its decisions are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d at 542. Against this backdrop, we cannot conclude that the legislature\u2019s decision to impose a 21-to-45-year sentence for the crime of home invasion violates the proportionality clause. A home should be one\u2019s sanctuary, a place where he or she should feel safe. See People v. Harris, 147 Ill. App. 3d 891, 896 (1986) (Pincham, J., dissenting). We are reluctant to second-guess the legislature\u2019s determination that an offender who enters another person\u2019s home while carrying a firearm should be subject to a severe penalty. This is particularly true when one considers the extreme danger arising from the presence of a firearm during the commission of a crime. In sum, we are not persuaded that section 12\u2014 11(a)(3) mandates a penalty that is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.\nWe next consider whether section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) violates the proportionate penalties clause because it mandates a penalty that is more severe than that imposed for similar yet more serious crimes. Specifically, defendant argues that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(1) (home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm) and section 12 \u2014 11(a)(2) (home invasion and causing injury) mandate a Class X felony sentence of 6 to 30 years when force is used or injury occurs. In contrast, section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) (home invasion while armed with a firearm) mandates a Class X felony sentence of 6 to 30 years plus an additional 15 years even if the offender merely threatens the use of force. Thus, defendant argues, section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) imposes a more serious penalty for merely threatening the use of force (a less serious crime), while sections 12 \u2014 11(a)(1) and 12\u2014 11(a)(2) impose a less serious penalty when force or injury actually occurs (more serious crimes). We reject defendant\u2019s argument on this point.\nWhen considering a proportionality clause challenge based on the second test, we conduct a two-step, cross-comparison analysis. First, we consider whether the purposes of the compared offenses are distinct such that comparative proportionality review is not appropriate. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 484; People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 506 (1997). Second, if the purposes are deemed related, we consider whether the offense with the harsher penalty is more serious than the offense with the less severe penalty. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 484-85.\nThe determination of whether a particular offense is more serious than another is not limited to an examination of the degree of harm inflicted. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 146. While that is a relevant consideration, the legislature may consider other factors such as the frequency of the crime and the high risk of bodily harm associated with it. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 146, citing People v. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d 182, 196 (1985). Also, the legislature may perceive a need to enact a more stringent penalty provision in order to halt an increase in the commission of a particular crime. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 146, citing People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436, 449 (1992), quoting People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 320 (1985). As an institution, the legislature is better equipped than the judiciary to identify and remedy the evils confronting our society and is more capable of gauging the seriousness of an offense. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d at 319; Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 145; Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 502-03. Thus, courts will generally defer to the legislature\u2019s judgment that a particular offense is more serious than another. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 502-03. As with any challenge to a statute\u2019s validity, defendant bears the burden of establishing each prong of this test. See Lee, 167 Ill. 2d at 144.\nInitially, the State argues that \u201ca cross-comparison analysis of different versions of an offense found in the same statute cannot be done.\u201d We disagree. That our courts have focused on the comparison of different offenses does not necessarily foreclose a cross-comparison of different subsections with a single statute. In fact, the State has not offered a single persuasive reason for us to reject the cross-comparison analysis in this case except to note that we have never previously applied it in this context. We disagree with the State\u2019s argument on this point. We have never applied the cross-comparison analysis in this context because we have never been faced with the issue. In any case, we can discern no reason to abandon our previous approach merely because the two provisions at issue are found within the same statute.\nThat is not to say, however, that we need not adapt the cross-comparison analysis to a same-statute inquiry. While we would ordinarily compare the purposes of two separate statutes, we must narrow our focus in this case and compare the purposes of the specific provisions contained in the same statute and determine whether they are sufficiently distinct such that proportionality review is inappropriate.\nThis court has previously held that the purpose of the home invasion statute is to protect the safety of persons in their homes. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 484. However, we made that determination based on an earlier and substantially different version of section 12 \u2014 11, existing prior to the amendment implemented in Public Act 91 \u2014 404. That version of section 12 \u2014 11 provided in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201ca) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present and\n1) While armed with a dangerous weapon uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or\n2) Intentionally causes any injury to any person or persons within such dwelling place.\nc) Sentence. Home invasion is a Class X felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 1996).\nThus, the 1996 version of section 12 \u2014 11 did not provide for mandatory add-on sentences nor did it distinguish between home invasions committed with a firearm and those committed without a firearm.\nAs we shall explain, the applicable version of section 12 \u2014 11 is substantially different from the 1996 statute we examined in Lombardi. Therefore, our present inquiry must focus on the amended version of section 12 \u2014 11 and whatever change of purpose the legislature contemplated, if any. The language of a statute is the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent and the statute\u2019s purpose. See Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 477. The current version of section 12 \u2014 11 essentially retains the two subsections contained in the 1996 statute. The first, section 12 \u2014 11(a)(1), applies where a defendant armed with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, uses force or threatens the imminent use of force, whether or not injury occurs. Section 12 \u2014 11(a)(2) generally applies where a defendant causes injury. Both of these sections carry a 6-to-30-year sentence. The only substantive change in these subsections is that the 1996 version of section 12 \u2014 11(a)(1) did not contain the \u201cother than a firearm\u201d language. See 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 1996).\nIn passing Public Act 91 \u2014 404, the legislature essentially added three additional classifications to section 12 \u2014 11. All three of these new classifications relate to firearms. Section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) applies where a defendant, while armed with a firearm, uses or threatens force regardless of whether injury occurs. That section carries a 6-to-30-year sentence plus a mandatory add-on of 15 years. Section 12 \u2014 11(a)(4) applies where a defendant actually uses or threatens imminent force, whether or not injury occurs, and defendant personally discharges a firearm. That section carries a 6-to-30-year sentence plus a mandatory add-on of 20 years. Finally, section 12\u2014 11(a)(5) applies where a defendant personally discharges a firearm and causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person. That section carries a 6-to-30-year sentence plus a mandatory add-on of 25 years to life.\nBy comparing section 12 \u2014 ll\u2019s current and previous forms, it becomes clear that the legislature, while not labeling it as such, essentially intended to break the offense of home invasion into two distinct categories: offenses committed without a firearm and offenses committed with a firearm. With respect to the former, we conclude that the purpose of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) is still to protect the safety of persons in their homes. This is obvious when one notes the similarities between the earlier version of section 12 \u2014 11 and the language found in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). With respect to the latter, there is no question that subsection (a)(3) is still intended to protect people in their homes. Subsection (a)(3), however, has a second, more specific purpose. The legislature clearly added subsection (a)(3) in an effort to deter the use of firearms in conjunction with home invasions. Thus, subsection (a)(3) is intended to protect the safety of people in their homes from intruders carrying firearms and to deter such offenders by imposing a particularly severe penalty.\nOur conclusion is supported by the legislative history of Public Act 91 \u2014 404. Public Act 91 \u2014 404 was unanimously passed by our legislature and mandates stricter sentences for enumerated crimes when they are committed with a firearm. The amendments impose the 15/20/ 25-life add-on sentencing scheme on the offenses of aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2 (West 2000)); aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.3 (West 2000)); home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 2000)); aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14 (West 2000)); predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West 2000)); armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2 (West 2000)); and aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 4 (West 2000)). Thus, Public Act 91 \u2014 404 included a package of amendments implementing sweeping changes to criminal sentences for the purpose of deterring and penalizing the illegal use of firearms.\nOne of the bill\u2019s sponsors, Senator Dillard, stated during the legislative debates that the add-on sentencing scheme contained in the package of amendments would \u201csend a very strong message that we will not tolerate the use or possession of a firearm when committing a crime in Illinois and that anybody that has one is going to do significant, significant time.\u201d 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 25, 1999, at 286 (statement of Senator Dillard). Senator Dillard added:\n\u201cThe purpose behind the sentence enhancement *** for the use of a firearm in the commission of specified serious felonies is to deter the use of firearms in the commission of those violent and serious crimes. *** It\u2019s the intent of this bill that additional firearm enhancements are necessary and appropriate for deterring use of a firearm in the commission of our most serious offenses.\u201d 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 25, 1999, at 286-87 (statements of Senator Dillard).\nWhile one might properly conclude that the general purpose of the statute as a whole has not changed, we nevertheless find that the new firearms provisions serve a second, more specific purpose and target a unique type of danger. Given the pervasive and enhanced danger arising from an intruder\u2019s possession of a firearm, the legislature\u2019s superior position to identify and address the evils of gun-related violence, and the presumptive constitutionality of a legislative enactment, we conclude that the purpose of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are sufficiently distinct from that of subsection (a)(3) to make proportionality review inappropriate.\nWe therefore conclude that defendant has failed to carry his burden of proving that section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.\nII. CONCLUSION\nDefendant has failed to show that section 12\u2014 ll(a)(3)\u2019s add-on sentence of 15 years\u2019 imprisonment violates the separation of powers clause. We find that section 12 \u2014 ll(a)(3)\u2019s add-on sentencing scheme does not completely divest the circuit court of its ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Further, a mandatory sentence is not per se unconstitutional.\nDefendant has also failed to show that section 12\u2014 11(a)(3) violates the proportionate penalties clause. We find that a 21-to-45-year sentence for violating section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) is not cruel or degrading, nor does it shock the moral conscience. We further find that the firearms provision contained in section 12 \u2014 11(a)(3) has a distinct purpose from sections 12 \u2014 11(a)(1) and 12 \u2014 11(a)(2) such that proportionality review is inappropriate.\nFor these reasons, we reverse the circuit court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nWe note that, subsequent to the amendment at issue here, the legislature amended the home invasion statute again in Public Act 91 \u2014 928 (Pub. Act 91 \u2014 928, \u00a7 5, eff. June 1, 2001). That amendment occurred after defendant\u2019s alleged conduct occurred and, in any event, does not impact the issues in this case.\nWe are mindful that section 12 \u2014 11(c) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(c) (West 2000)) actually contains section 12 \u2014 ll\u2019s sentencing provision. For purposes of clarity, however, we refer instead to the individual subsections that trigger subsection (c)\u2019s mandatory add-on sentences.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, and John Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, both of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Susan M. Wilham and Robert N. Markfield, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 91329.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHAD HILL, Appellee.\nOpinion filed May 23, 2002.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, and John Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, both of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Susan M. Wilham and Robert N. Markfield, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0440-01", "first_page_order": 452, "last_page_order": 471 }