{
  "id": 2737919,
  "name": "Wallace E. Sugden, Appellant, vs. The Department of Public Welfare, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Sugden v. Department of Public Welfare",
  "decision_date": "1960-09-29",
  "docket_number": "No. 35683",
  "first_page": "119",
  "last_page": "122",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 119"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "215 Ill. 285",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        5618509
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "17 Ill.2d 303",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5333350
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/17/0303-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:17.161655+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Wallace E. Sugden, Appellant, vs. The Department of Public Welfare, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice House\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal is from a judgment of the superior court of Cook County confirming the order and decision of the Department of Public Welfare that the plaintiff is liable for the statutory maintenance charge of his former wife at the Elgin State Hospital. The case relates to revenue.\nEllen Sugden has been a patient in the Elgin State Hospital since 1948. After her commitment, plaintiff began making payments to the hospital for her clothing and incidental expenses. The cost of these expenses, not constituting any part of the maintenance or treatment charges, was all that plaintiff was liable for at the time under section 9 \u2014 1 of the Revised Mental Health Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 91\u00bd, par. 9 \u2014 1.\nIn June of 1952 the plaintiff was granted a divorce from Ellen Sugden on grounds existing prior to her insanity. The divorce decree provided in part: \u201cThat the plaintiff Wallace E. Sugden, shall continue to pay for all ordinary expenses in relation to the defendant\u2019s confinement at the Elgin State Hospital or at any other similar institution.\u201d\nOn January 1, 1952, section 9 \u2014 19 of the Mental Health Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 91\u00bd, par. 9 \u2014 19) became effective. Under this section, the spouse of a patient is liable under certain circumstances for the cost of monthly maintenance charges. The plaintiff received his first monthly statement of sums due for the care and maintenance of Ellen Sugden in July 1952. He paid all charges, then and thereafter assessed by the Department, until January, 1958, when he petitioned the Department under section 9 \u2014 22 (chap. 91^, par. 9 \u2014 22) for a release from the statement of sums due as maintenance charges.\nAt the hearing the plaintiff argued that he is not liable for any maintenance charges under section 9 \u2014 19 because he is no longer the spouse of Ellen Sugden. The Department took the position that plaintiff was not liable as the spouse of Ellen Sugden but was liable for the maintenance charges under the divorce decree. It insisted that since the plaintiff is liable for \u201call ordinary expenses\u201d in relation to her confinement and since the maintenance charges are ordinary expenses, the plaintiff is liable for the cost of her maintenance at the State hospital.\nThe plaintiff admits that the divorce decree imposed a financial obligation on him, but he contends that an administrative agency is without authority to construe a court decree. The legislature has delegated to administrative agencies the duty of making decisions and determinations. In making such determinations these agencies have the authority to construe statutory provisions. (People ex rel. United Motor Coach Co. v. Carpentier, 17 Ill.2d 303; Nye v. Foreman, 215 Ill. 285.) On occasion such a determination may require the application of a court\u2019s decision, the meaning and effect of which is disputed. If an administrative agency had to have every questioned meaning of a court\u2019s decision interpreted by a court before it could proceed, it would be deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite action. We are of the opinion that an administrative agency has the authority to construe a court\u2019s decision to the extent that it is necessary for the initial determination of the issues which the legislature has given it the authority to determine.\nThe question then is whether it was necessary for the Department to interpret the obligation imposed by the divorce decree in order to make its determination of plaintiff\u2019s liability. After imposing the liability for maintenance charges in section 9 \u2014 19, the legislature in sections 9 \u2014 20 and 9 \u2014 21, (pars. 9 \u2014 20 and 9 \u2014 21,) has prescribed how this liability is to be calculated and fixed. In section 9 \u2014 22 it has given a party aggrieved by the administration of the act the right to petition the Department for a hearing. In section 9 \u2014 23 it has provided for enforcement of this liability in the county court. An examination of these provisions reveals that they relate only to the liability created in section 9 \u2014 19. Thus, the Department only has the authority to initially determine whether a person is liable under the act and the extent of his liability under the act.\nMeaning and effect must of course be given to the decree in determining whether Sugden was still the spouse of Ellen Sugden. Since the decree severed the marriage relationship, the plaintiff was no longer liable as a spouse under section 9 \u2014 19 and the Department should have so found. A construction of the obligation imposed by the divorce decree was in no manner necessary for a determination by the Department of the plaintiff\u2019s liability under the Mental Health Code. The determination of plaintiff\u2019s financial liability under the divorce decree was outside the scope of the Department\u2019s authority and could not be enforced in this proceeding.\nThe judgment of the superior court of Cook County confirming the decision of the Department of Public Welfare is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice House"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Norman, Engelhardt & Zimmerman, of Chicago, (Harold W. Norman, Allyn J. Franks, and George H. Redding, Jr., of counsel,) for appellant.",
      "Grenville Beardsley, Attorney General, of Springfield, (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel,) for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 35683.\nWallace E. Sugden, Appellant, vs. The Department of Public Welfare, Appellee.\nOpinion filed September 29, 1960.\nNorman, Engelhardt & Zimmerman, of Chicago, (Harold W. Norman, Allyn J. Franks, and George H. Redding, Jr., of counsel,) for appellant.\nGrenville Beardsley, Attorney General, of Springfield, (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel,) for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0119-01",
  "first_page_order": 119,
  "last_page_order": 122
}