{ "id": 799402, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE MURPHY, n/k/a Catherine Madonia, Appellant, and MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage Murphy", "decision_date": "2003-01-24", "docket_number": "No. 93436", "first_page": "212", "last_page": "223", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 212" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208032 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, attorney fees are the primary responsibility of the party for whom the services are rendered\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453249 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477001 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588977 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57-63", "parenthetical": "attorney fees under section 11(h) of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256304 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871936 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 845", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79341 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853-55", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "854-55", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "855", "parenthetical": "Cook, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0845-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 803, "char_count": 19192, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4225339109393472e-07, "percentile": 0.6493112146692722 }, "sha256": "c3dd1f0374d5ddf08780a408b324b6be9d233cc7d9c53d27f94586a4bc18fb14", "simhash": "1:c9f0f98268184697", "word_count": 3141 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:27:35.846684+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE MURPHY, n/k/a Catherine Madonia, Appellant, and MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal concerns a circuit court\u2019s award of attorney fees for a prior appeal in this dissolution of marriage action. After remand from an earlier appeal, Catherine Murphy \u2014 now known as Catherine Madonia (Catherine) \u2014 petitioned the circuit court to award her the attorney fees she had incurred in prosecuting that appeal. The trial court awarded her a portion of the fees she requested. Michael Murphy appealed that award, contending that Catherine had not \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d in the earlier appeal and, alternatively, that the trial court had no evidence to support the award. The appellate court reversed, with one justice dissenting. 327 Ill. App. 3d 845. Catherine has brought the instant appeal from that judgment. We reverse in part and remand.\nBACKGROUND\nCatherine filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in July 1990. The circuit court granted Catherine custody of the parties\u2019 child, subject to Michael\u2019s reasonable visitation, and ordered Michael to pay $600 per month in child support, as well as to maintain medical insurance for the child and pay his tuition and fees for a parochial school education. The court also divided the marital assets, the largest of which was a personal injury settlement resulting from an incident in which Michael was shot and permanently paralyzed from the chest down. The settlement consisted of a one-time lump-sum payment and guaranteed annual future payments. The court awarded Catherine the marital residence and a lump sum of $220,000, but awarded all future payments under the settlement to Michael as marital property. Catherine appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s order of dissolution. In re Marriage of Murphy, 259 Ill. App. 3d 336 (1994).\nIn January 1994 Catherine filed a motion to modify child support, alleging Michael\u2019s salary had increased. In November 1998 the court entered an order increasing Michael\u2019s child support obligation to $850 per month, retroactive to January 1998. Catherine appealed this order, arguing that the trial court had erred (1) by failing to award her attorney fees, and (2) in its modification of the child support obligation. The latter contention actually was comprised of three specific alleged errors in the circuit court\u2019s treatment of the case: (a) the conclusion that the law of the case doctrine precluded the court from considering the annuity payments as part of Michael\u2019s net income for purposes of setting child support; (b) the court\u2019s downward departure from the statutory child support guidelines; and (c) the court\u2019s decision to make the modification retroactive only to January 1998. The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in departing downward from the statutory guidelines and reversed and remanded on this issue, but affirmed the circuit court in all other respects. In re Marriage of Murphy, No. 4 \u2014 99\u20140215 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nIn September 2000, Catherine filed a motion requesting that Michael reimburse her for attorney fees she incurred in prosecuting her appeal of the November 1998 order. In the motion, she contended that: she engaged counsel for purposes of the appeal; she successfully argued that the downward deviation was erroneous; her income was significantly below Michael\u2019s; Michael was unrepresented on appeal; and the amount her counsel charged was reasonable and customary for the preparation and argument of an appeal. The motion also stated that a multipage exhibit attached to the motion showed the \u201ctime expended by counsel and his rate and expenses for the preparation and argument on the appeal.\u201d That attachment consists of an apparently computer-generated time sheet, with an anonymous handwritten notation on the first page which states: \u201cFees & Expenses Incurred $7199.35.\u201d\nMichael argued before the circuit court that Catherine had prevailed \u201conly in minor part\u201d in her appeal, and further argued that Catherine was \u201cwell able\u201d to pay her own fees, in light of her net worth of approximately $500,000. He also noted that in the appeal of the November 1998 order the appellate court had rejected Catherine\u2019s argument that the circuit court had erred in failing to award her attorney fees for the prior circuit court litigation. He contended that Catherine had alleged no change in circumstances since the entry of the appellate court\u2019s order which might impact on the parties\u2019 abilities to pay their own attorney fees.\nIn October 2000, the circuit court held a hearing on this motion as well as Catherine\u2019s motion to \u201cimplement the mandate\u201d of the appellate court. The following is the only testimony adduced regarding the motion for attorney fees:\n\u201cQ. State your name.\nA. Catherine Madonia.\nQ. And now, Miss Madonia, when you prosecuted the appeal, did you incur attorney\u2019s fees?\nA. Yes, I did.\nQ. And have you paid those attorney\u2019s fees?\nA. No. I paid some of them, part of them. Not all of them.\nQ. And you entered into an agreement with me for an hourly rate as set forth in our motion?\nA. Yes, I did.\u201d\nMichael argued again at the hearing and in a post-trial motion that any award of attorney fees to Catherine would be inappropriate because (1) Catherine had only prevailed in minor part in the prior appeal, and (2) she had shown no change in her financial circumstances since the last hearing on attorney fees, when the court declined to award fees to Catherine. At the hearing, counsel for Catherine replied that \u201cThis isn\u2019t a 1983 or 1988 case [sic, presumably referring to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988] where you have to be the prevailing party. Either party may seek to have the other party pay based upon the income, not based upon their assets.\u201d\nThe circuit court took the motion under advisement, and ultimately awarded Catherine $1,750 in attorney fees. No written order appears in the record, but the court\u2019s docket entry states with respect to this issue that \u201cUpon consideration of all relevant statutory factors, the Court awards [counsel for Catherine] the sum of $1,750.00 for fees on appeal.\u201d\nMichael appealed, and the appellate court reversed, with one justice dissenting. 327 Ill. App. 3d 845. The court reached only Michael\u2019s first argument, that Catherine had not \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d in her earlier appeal. The court noted that interpretation of the phrase was a matter of first impression. After looking to other Illinois statutes as well as federal law, the court demurred from issuing a definitive pronouncement as to what it would mean for a party to \u201csubstantially prevail,\u201d but stated that \u201cwhatever it means, Catherine did not substantially prevail on her appeal.\u201d The court stated that the issue on which Catherine obtained relief made only a relatively minor monetary difference, as compared to the relief potentially available if Catherine had prevailed on the other issues she had raised. The court averred that its determination was not based merely on the numerical fact that she had prevailed on only one of the four issues she raised on appeal. However, the court went on to state that to \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d did \u201csuggest ] that one has to obtain at least 50% of the relief she seeks.\u201d\nThe dissent noted that section 508(a)(3.1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act was added in 1997, as part of a \u201ccomplete overhaul of the fee provisions of\u2019 the Act, intended to achieve \u201c \u2018substantial parity in parties\u2019 access to funds for litigation costs.\u2019 \u201d 327 Ill. App. 3d at 853-55 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting 750 ILCS 5/102(5) (West 1998). The dissent criticized the \u201cmajority\u2019s requirement that there be an overwhelming victory before attorney fees can be awarded\u201d as contrary to the spirit of the-1997 amendments, \u201cwhich sought to prevent the situation where an economically disadvantaged spouse is forced to \u2018cave in\u2019 to a truly unfair settlement.\u201d The dissent contended that the \u201cmajority\u2019s new rule, that \u2018one has to obtain at least 50% of the relief she seeks\u2019 before attorney fees may be awarded\u201d was without support in the statute or case law and further was objectionable in that\n\u201cIf a party has a legitimate basis for appeal we should not attempt to discourage that party from raising other issues as well, even though the party thereby risks obtaining less than 50% of the relief sought. The appellate court should attempt to provide guidance on troublesome issues, not penalize parties for raising issues other than sure winners.\u201d 327 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55 (Cook, J., dissenting).\nFinally, the dissent noted that the trial court\u2019s determination regarding fees was entitled to deference and should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The dissent closed with the following observation:\n\u201cThe argument could be made that this court is as well-qualified as the trial court to determine whether a party has \u2018substantially prevailed\u2019 on appeal. However, we have recently ruled that we have no jurisdiction over attorney fees on appeal. In re Marriage of Baylor, 324 Ill. App. 3d 213, 216 (2001).\u201d 327 Ill. App. 3d at 855 (Cook, J., dissenting).\nWe granted Catherine leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nANALYSIS\nBefore this court Catherine contends, relying on the last sentence of the appellate court dissent, that the appellate court was without jurisdiction to reverse the circuit court\u2019s fee award. She also argues that the circuit court\u2019s fee award was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed.\nI. Jurisdiction\nWe find the jurisdictional argument to be without merit. It is important to note that this case does not involve the question whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to make an initial award of fees. That was the question the appellate court addressed in Marriage of Baylor, the case cited by the appellate court dissent. We express no opinion on this question, because it is not germane to this case \u2014 the appellate court did not purport to make a fee award. All the appellate court did in this case was review the circuit court\u2019s final order awarding attorney fees. There is no question that the appellate court has jurisdiction to review an award of attorney fees in the context of an otherwise valid appeal.\nII. Propriety of Award\nThe appellate court determined that the circuit court erred in awarding Catherine attorney fees, because Catherine did not \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d in her prior appeal. Catherine argues that the circuit court\u2019s order is entitled to deference and the appellate court erred in overturning the fee award in this case.\nIn our view, the threshold question in this case is one of statutory construction, determining the meaning of the statute in question, section 508(a)(3.1) of the Act. Cf. Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49, 57-63 (1989) (attorney fees under section 11(h) of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act). Construction of a statute is a purely legal question, appropriately subject to de novo review. See, e.g., Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 86 (2002). Upon review, we disagree with the appellate court\u2019s construction of section 508(a)(3.1).\nThe guiding principles which inform our task of statutory construction are well settled. Our lodestar is the intent of the legislature. We may consider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims. We are also guided by the presumption that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unjust result. However, our inquiry always must begin with the language of the statute, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent. Statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the statute is clear and unambiguous, we have no occasion to resort to aids of construction. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). Where possible, we will adopt that construction which will give effect to every word, clause, and sentence; we strive to read statutes so as not to render any portion inoperative or superfluous. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Nor, under the guise of statutory interpretation, can we \u201ccorrect\u201d an apparent legislative oversight by rewriting a statute in a manner inconsistent with its clear and unambiguous language. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42.\nSection 508(a) of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering the financial resources of the parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable amount for his own or the other party\u2019s costs and attorney\u2019s fees. Interim attorney\u2019s fees and costs may be awarded from the opposing party, in accordance with subsection (c \u2014 1) of Section 501. At the conclusion of the case, contribution to attorney\u2019s fees and costs may be awarded from the opposing party in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503. Fees and costs may be awarded to counsel from a former client in accordance with subsection (c) of this Section. Awards may be made in connection with the following:\n(1) The maintenance or defense of any proceeding under this Act.\n(2) The enforcement or modification of any order or judgment under this Act.\n(3) The defense of an appeal of any order or judgment under this Act, including the defense of appeals of post-judgment orders.\n(3.1) The prosecution of any claim on appeal (if the prosecuting party has substantially prevailed).\n(4) The maintenance or defense of a petition brought under Section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking relief from a final order or judgment under this Act.\n(5) The costs and legal services of an attorney rendered in preparation of the commencement of the proceeding brought under this Act.\n(6) Ancillary litigation incident to, or reasonably connected with, a proceeding under this Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(l) through (a)(6) (West 1998).\nThe appellate court treated section 508(a)(3.1) as if it referred to \u201cthe prosecution of any appeal\u201d in which the appellant substantially prevailed. It does not so read. Rather, section 508(a)(3.1) allows the circuit court to award fees for the \u201cprosecution of any claim on appeal (if the prosecuting party has substantially prevailed).\u201d\n(Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3.1) (West 1998). Inclusion of this claim-specific language can hardly have been inadvertent, as such language is found in no other subsection of the statute. To the contrary, all other subsections speak in general of actions with respect to \u201cproceedings,\u201d \u201corders,\u201d or \u201cjudgments.\u201d See 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(l) through (a)(6) (West 1998). Only with respect to the prosecution of an appeal, does the statute specifically tailor attorney fee awards to individual claims and impose the additional requirement that the appellant \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d in any claim before the circuit court may consider ordering the opposing party to reimburse him for his attorney fees expended thereon.\nWe believe that the appropriate reading of this section is that, in the context of a petition for fees for prosecution of an appeal, the circuit court may only award fees incurred for those individual claims on which the appellant can be said to have \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d on appeal. To interpret the statute as requiring that the appellant prevail on the appeal as a whole would read out the phrase \u201cclaim on,\u201d which is contrary to our settled rules of construction.\nOur interpretation has other virtues in addition to comporting with the plain language of the statute, giving effect to all of the words penned by the legislature. First, it eliminates the difficulty which the appellate court frankly confronted, of determining how much relief the appellant must obtain in a multiissue appeal so as to \u201csubstantially prevail.\u201d This is difficult in any multiissue appeal; it would be far more difficult in an appeal in which one or more of the claims involved nonmonetary concerns \u2014 as is frequently the case in dissolution proceedings. It is a discomforting prospect to require the circuit court to determine whether a party \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d in an appeal in which he succeeded in overturning the child support amount but failed in his appellate claim that he should receive visitation. Although we acknowledge that it still may at times be more of an art than a science for a court to determine whether an appellant has substantially prevailed with respect to an individual issue, the difficulty will be lessened if the court is not required to weigh the relative import of issues raised.\nSecond, our construction neither discourages meritorious appeals nor encourages frivolous ones. The appellate court dissent was concerned that a rule should not discourage a party from raising all possible issues on appeal, for fear of losing possible reimbursement for fees expended on \u201csure winners.\u201d Although we note that the general rule in the United States is that parties pay their own fees (see, e.g., In re Marriage of McGuire, 305 Ill. App. 3d 474, 479 (1999) (\u201cAs a general rule, attorney fees are the primary responsibility of the party for whom the services are rendered\u201d)), we acknowledge the sentiment expressed.\nOur construction of the statute obviates this concern. An appellant may petition for fees incurred in the prosecution of any issue on which he substantially prevailed on a prior appeal, regardless of how many other issues may have been raised. However, awarding appellate fees on a claim-by-claim basis also removes any affirmative incentive for a party to add frivolous issues on appeal along with meritorious issues, in hopes of increasing the fees which his opponent may be required to pay. By our construction of the statute a party may raise any claims he desires on appeal. While the circuit court may award fees for issues deemed meritorious by the appellate court, no recompense will be had for preparation of claims on which the appellate court determined not to grant relief.\nIn this case, the determination whether Catherine \u201csubstantially prevailed\u201d on her individual claims is quite simple. She obtained no relief whatsoever on three of the issues she raised and obtained all of the relief she sought on the remaining issue. Clearly, she substantially prevailed on the \u201cdeparture from the statutory guidelines\u201d claim and only that claim. Thus, the circuit court could only award her the fees incurred for the prosecution of that claim. Therefore, the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that Catherine did not \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d was correct with respect to three issues, but was erroneous with respect to the fourth.\nWe remand to the appellate court for consideration of Michael\u2019s remaining argument.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons above stated, we reverse in part the appellate court\u2019s holding that Catherine did not \u201csubstantially prevail\u201d on her prior appeal and remand to the appellate court.\nAppellate court reversed in part;\ncause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dawn D. Behnke, for appellant, and Catherine Madonia, appellant pro se, both of Springfield.", "Michael R. Murphy, of Springfield, appellee pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 93436.\nIn re MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE MURPHY, n/k/a Catherine Madonia, Appellant, and MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Appellee.\nOpinion filed January 24, 2003.\nDawn D. Behnke, for appellant, and Catherine Madonia, appellant pro se, both of Springfield.\nMichael R. Murphy, of Springfield, appellee pro se." }, "file_name": "0212-01", "first_page_order": 224, "last_page_order": 235 }