{ "id": 799373, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CURTIS GIPSON, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gipson", "decision_date": "2003-02-21", "docket_number": "No. 93422", "first_page": "298", "last_page": "312", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 298" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "938 F.2d 785", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10527060 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/938/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 F.3d 1051", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 285143 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1056" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/121/1051-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 633863 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4-5" }, { "page": "6-7" }, { "page": "1635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/495/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435526 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3471333 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811404 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477037 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381802 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2436422 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140335 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "864 F.2d 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10534112 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002-04", "parenthetical": "officer's unrebutted testimony sufficient to establish standard procedure; procedures do not need to be written" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/864/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "912 F.2d 373", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 9045475 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375", "parenthetical": "inventory procedures can be standardized without being written" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/912/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "986 F.2d 57", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 662068 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "evidence was sufficient to establish customary department policy, even though policy was not in writing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/986/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 F.3d 43", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10505538 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "testimony of officers is sufficient to establish department policy; there is no requirement that the prosecution must produce written policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/9/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 F.3d 62", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1840623 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "existence of standard procedures may be proved either by reference to written rules and regulations or testimony regarding standard practices" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/29/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 F.3d 1129", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11639765 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1132", "parenthetical": "lack of written policy not dispositive; evidence of \"well-honed\" police department routine may be sufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/171/1129-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 F.3d 374", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11544978 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "officer's unrebutted testimony that he acted in accordance with standard inventory procedures is sufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/183/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531819 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213-14" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "2257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722898 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "774" }, { "page": "2863" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 640", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192095 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "2610-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216740 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372-74" }, { "page": "746-47" }, { "page": "741-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177992 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "3097" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777547 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351271 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" }, { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0425-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 953, "char_count": 24418, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.199076679949805e-07, "percentile": 0.7749388091738167 }, "sha256": "8dd7f245105137ac6c8579c978100131c8940850e5f68a84be590a158da6d316", "simhash": "1:82b3e1325244ec8a", "word_count": 4069 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:27:35.846684+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CURTIS GIPSON, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt issue are two questions concerning inventory searches: (1) whether a police officer\u2019s unrebutted testimony about police policy on inventory searches can be sufficient evidence of such a policy if the State does not introduce a written policy into evidence; and (2) whether a policy requiring the police to inventory items of value is sufficient to allow the opening of closed containers if the policy does not specifically mention closed containers.\nBACKGROUND\nThe State charged defendant in the circuit court of Cook County with one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1996)). Defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppress the evidence that was found during a search of his car.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant testified as follows. At 12:25 a.m. on January 8, 1998, defendant was driving home from work. When defendant reached the intersection of Jackson and Homan in Chicago, a police car began to follow him. The police car followed him for several minutes. The police car\u2019s lights went on when defendant crossed Kedzie, and defendant pulled over. The police officer approached defendant\u2019s car and told defendant that he was driving on a revoked license. Defendant gave the officer his identification and proof of insurance, following which the officer put defendant into the backseat of his squad car and locked it. The officer put some information into his computer and told defendant that if he did not have any outstanding warrants, he was free to go.\nAccording to defendant, the officer never told him that he was under arrest. The officer then got out of the squad car and looked under the hood of defendant\u2019s car. He searched the passenger compartment of the car and then came back to the squad car. The officer started typing on his computer again and then went back to defendant\u2019s car, took the keys out of the ignition, and opened the trunk. Defendant testified that he had a yellow plastic Ameritech bag tied closed in the trunk. Inside of the Ameritech bag was a black plastic bag, containing rocks of cocaine, that was also tied closed. According to defendant, he never gave the officer permission to search his car, and the officer never told him that the car would be towed or that the officer was conducting an inventory search. The officer never told defendant he was under arrest before he searched the car.\nThe State presented the testimony of Sergeant David Byrd of the Illinois State Police. Byrd testified that he initially began following defendant\u2019s car because it had a cracked windshield. A \u201cregistration response\u201d on defendant\u2019s license plate revealed that the owner\u2019s name was Curtis Gipson and that Gipson\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been revoked. Byrd pulled over defendant and informed him that the reason for the stop was that the car had a defective windshield and that the car\u2019s owner had a revoked license. When defendant confirmed that he was Curtis Gipson, Byrd placed defendant in the back of his squad car.\nOnce defendant was in the car, Byrd called a tow truck and conducted an inventory search of defendant\u2019s vehicle. Byrd explained that the State Police policy is to tow the vehicle when someone is arrested for driving on a revoked license. When a vehicle is towed following an arrest, the police policy is that a tow inventory search should be conducted. When asked to explain the police policy on tow inventory searches, Byrd responded:\n\u201cWe are required to check the passenger compartment, and trunk area for any valuables, or just for our own \u2014 we don\u2019t want anything to leave us that might be of value without checking it first and putting it down on the tow sheet.\u201d\nWhen Byrd opened the trunk, he found a yellow Ameritech bag. He opened the bag and noticed two smaller bags inside. He opened these and observed what appeared to be crack cocaine. Byrd testified that he never told defendant that he would be free to go at some point. Rather, defendant was arrested and taken into custody. Byrd gave defendant a ticket for having a cracked windshield and driving on a revoked license.\nFollowing arguments by the attorneys, the trial judge recalled Sergeant Byrd to the stand. The following colloquy ensued:\n\u201cTHE COURT: You are still under oath, sergeant.\nIs there a printed procedure regarding towing by the Illinois State police?\nTHE WITNESS: Yes, there is, your Honor. It\u2019s in our policy manual.\nTHE COURT: It\u2019s in the policy manual?\nTHE WITNESS: Right, and we teach it to all our cadets when they come out on the road.\nTHE COURT: Is it a manual that you might have handy?\nTHE WITNESS: No, it\u2019s a\u2014\nTHE COURT: Big?\nTHE WITNESS: Six hundred pages.\nTHE COURT: But it is printed in the police procedure?\nTHE WITNESS: It is printed, tow searches and vehicles being towed and if I may, the reason we do that is because even if somebody is revoked and if they just said, okay okay you are going to write the ticket\u2014\nMR. DRAPER [defendant\u2019s attorney]: Objection, judge.\nTHE COURT: Okay all right.\u201d\nFollowing further arguments from counsel, the trial court decided to reserve ruling on the motion until the parties submitted further case law. Two months later, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The trial judge stated that the police had no right to tow the car and that State Police policy could not supercede the law. The State filed a motion to reconsider in which it pointed out that the court had erroneously relied on cases that did not involve inventory searches. At the hearing on the motion, the State argued that a lawful inventory search pursuant to State Police policy had occurred. The trial judge responded that he was not sure what the State Police policy was because he had never seen it and the officer might have just given his own interpretation. The trial judge then stated that the police could not use a minor traffic ticket to create a basis for a search and that defendant had only been stopped for \u201ca little, minor thing like a cracked windshield.\u201d The court questioned why the police had to tow the car. The State responded that defendant had been arrested for driving on a revoked license and that a proper tow inventory search had occurred. The court denied the motion to reconsider.\nThe State appealed, and the Appellate Court, First District, issued an unpublished order reversing the trial court. The appellate court held that the type of tow and impoundment carried out here were authorized by statute. The court then held that Officer Byrd\u2019s uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony provided sufficient evidence of the State Police policy on tow inventory searches and that the State was not required to admit the written policy into evidence. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing, which the court granted. The appellate court issued a second unpublished order, this time affirming the trial court. No. 1 \u2014 99\u20141811 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court continued to hold that the tow and impoundment were lawful. This time, however, the court agreed with the trial court that Sergeant Byrd\u2019s testimony was insufficient and that the State should have introduced the actual written State Police policy. Further, the court noted that Byrd\u2019s testimony was also deficient in that he never stated that there was a specific police policy authorizing him to open closed containers during inventory searches. We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nANALYSIS\nOn review of a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accord great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001). However, we review de novo the ultimate legal question of whether suppression is warranted. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431.\nThe State first argues that the appellate court erred in holding that Officer Byrd\u2019s testimony was insufficient to establish the State Police policy on inventory searches and that there is no constitutional requirement that the State produce the actual written policy. We agree with the State.\nAn inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. People v. Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d 135, 138 (1993). In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097 (1976), the Supreme Court identified three objectives that are served by allowing inventory searches: (1) protection of the owner\u2019s property; (2) protection of the police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of the police from potential danger.\nIn conducting such a search, the police must be acting pursuant to standard police procedures. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-74, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 746-47, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741-42 (1987). \u201c \u2018 \u201c[A] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 72, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610-11 (1983), quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 774, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863 (1981), quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 836, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2257 (1979). However, as Professor LaFave has noted, the courts have generally not read Bertine as requiring that these procedures be in writing. 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure \u00a7 7.4(a), at 550 (3d ed. 1996). Rather, a police officer\u2019s testimony that he was following standard procedure is generally deemed to be sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Lage, 183 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999) (officer\u2019s unrebutted testimony that he acted in accordance with standard inventory procedures is sufficient); United States v. Lozano, 171 F.3d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1999) (lack of written policy not dispositive; evidence of \u201cwell-honed\u201d police department routine may be sufficient); United States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (existence of standard procedures may be proved either by reference to written rules and regulations or testimony regarding standard practices); United States v. Lowe, 9 F.3d 43, 46 (8th Cir. 1993) (testimony of officers is sufficient to establish department policy; there is no requirement that the prosecution must produce written policy); United States v. Ford, 986 F.2d 57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993) (evidence was sufficient to establish customary department policy, even though policy was not in writing); United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1990) (inventory procedures can be standardized without being written); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1002-04 (3d Cir. 1988) (officer\u2019s unrebutted testimony sufficient to establish standard procedure; procedures do not need to be written).\nIn Illinois, a split has developed in the appellate court over whether police inventory procedures have to be in writing. In People v. Evans, 314 Ill. App. 3d 985, 989 (2000), citing 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure \u00a7 7.4(a), at 548-50 (3d ed. 1996), the Second District stated that, \u201c[w]hile written policies on inventory searches are preferred, there is no requirement that such policies be in writing.\u201d The Fourth District, by contrast, does require that the State produce evidence of \u201cwritten directives or policies which outline the procedures to be followed by law enforcement officers.\u201d People v. Williamson, 241 Ill. App. 3d 574, 578 (1993). The Fourth District has held that this requirement is \u201cbinding on all inventory searches.\u201d People v. Krueger, 268 Ill. App. 3d 190, 192 (1994).\nWe agree with the Second District that there is no requirement that the procedures be in writing. The Supreme Court requires only that, in conducting inventory searches, the police act in accordance with standardized department procedures. Although it may be easier for the State to show that it was acting in accordance with standard procedures if it can produce a written policy, the Supreme Court has not required, as a matter of constitutional law, that such policies be reduced to writing.\nThe precise issue we face here is somewhat different. Here, the issue is whether, if the police do have a written policy on inventory searches, the policy itself has to be admitted into evidence, or if an officer\u2019s testimony describing the standard procedure can be sufficient. The State contends that the appellate court\u2019s decision in this case effectively creates a rule that the State must always produce a written policy on inventory searches if one exists. Defendant contends that we do not need to decide the issue as a matter of law. Rather, the question in any case is simply whether the State introduced sufficient evidence of standardized procedures. Defendant argues that Officer Byrd\u2019s testimony was insufficient.\nDefendant is correct that the issue is not one of law. Rather, the issue is simply whether the State introduced sufficient evidence that it was acting in accordance with standardized procedures. However, we disagree with defendant\u2019s assertion that the State did not meet its burden in this case. The defendant bears the burden of proof at a hearing on a motion to suppress. People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994); 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 12(b) (West 2000). A defendant must make a prima facie case that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure. People v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68 (1977). If a defendant makes a prima facie case, the State has the burden of going forward with evidence to counter the defendant\u2019s prima facie case. See People v. Wingren, 167 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319 (1988). However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant. See Wingren, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 319.\nHere, defendant made his prima facie case by showing that Sergeant Byrd searched the trunk of defendant\u2019s car without a warrant. The State, however, met its burden of going forward with the evidence by establishing that Sergeant Byrd searched defendant\u2019s trunk as part of a routine tow inventory search. Sergeant Byrd gave clear, unrebutted testimony of the standard procedures for inventory searches that he was following. Sergeant Byrd testified that it was department policy to tow the vehicle whenever a person is arrested for driving on a revoked license. Before the vehicle is towed, the arresting officer is supposed to do an inventory search of the vehicle and to record anything of value on the tow inventory sheet. The officer is supposed to check the passenger compartment and trunk area for valuables.\nDefendant never attempted to challenge this testimony. His attorney did not ask a single question of Sergeant Byrd about the policy and presented no rebuttal testimony on the issue. The attorney did absolutely nothing to cast doubt on Sergeant Byrd\u2019s testimony. In his arguments to the trial court, the defense attorney\u2019s principal contention was that the police had no right to tow the car. The trial court, not the defense attorney, asked further questions about the policy. But the trial court seemed satisfied with Sergeant Byrd\u2019s answer. The trial court asked Sergeant Byrd if the procedure was written down, and Byrd responded that it was in the policy manual that was taught to all cadets. When the trial court asked Byrd if he had the manual handy, Byrd began to answer the question by saying, \u201cNo, it\u2019s a \u2014 ,\u201d following which the trial court finished Byrd\u2019s sentence for him by saying, \u201cBig?\u201d When Byrd tried to give more information about the policy, the court cut him off.\nThe court later ruled that it did not know what the police policy was because it had not seen the policy. This was error. Sergeant Byrd explained the police policy and defendant did not cross-examine him on the issue or offer any rebuttal to the testimony. The State met its burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the defendant\u2019s prima facie case. Sergeant Byrd\u2019s testimony established that defendant\u2019s trunk was searched as part of a routine tow inventory search. The ultimate burden of proof remained with defendant, and defendant offered nothing to show that the inventory search was improper.\nThe evidence provided by Sergeant Byrd\u2019s testimony was at least as complete as that offered in other cases in which this court has upheld inventory searches. In People v. Clark, 65 Ill. 2d 169, 172 (1976), this court upheld an inventory search based on the following evidence:\n\u201cThe officer testified that it was the policy of the Decatur police department to remove and secure any articles of value contained in any car that was to be towed away, and to prepare an inventory of them. The inventory search, he stated, was to protect the owner of the articles as well as to assist in defense against a future charge of theft.\u201d\nIn Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d 135, the written policy was introduced into evidence and this court upheld the search. However, the written policy merely provided as follows:\n\u201c \u2018An examination and inventory of the contents of all vehicles/boats towed or held by authority of Division personnel shall be made by the officer who completes the Tow-In Recovery Report. This examination and inventory shall be restricted to those areas where an owner or operator would ordinarily place or store property or equipment in the vehicle/boat; and would normally include front and rear seat areas, glove compartment, map case, sun visors, and trunk and engine compartments. \u2019 \u201d Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d at 137.\nSergeant Byrd\u2019s testimony was virtually identical to the evidence offered in these cases, but the trial court rejected it for the sole reason that he could not compare the testimony to the written policy. But, as we previously noted, there is no rule that the procedures even be in writing. Inventory searches can be upheld solely on an officer\u2019s unrebutted testimony that he was following standard procedures. In a case in which the procedures were not in writing, the trial court would not be able to compare the officer\u2019s testimony to anything else.\nOf course, it would be the better practice for the State to produce the written policy. If it does not, the State leaves itself open to the possibility that the defense will be able to cast doubt on the officer\u2019s testimony either through cross-examination or rebuttal testimony. Here, defense counsel did not attempt to do so. Defendant had the burden of proof, and he failed to show that he was subjected to an illegal search.\nThe State next contends that the appellate court erred in holding that Sergeant Byrd was not entitled to open the plastic bags because the State failed to produce any evidence that the inventory search policy allowed the opening of closed containers. In Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990), the United States Supreme Court upheld the suppression of marijuana found in the trunk of a car during an inventory search. The marijuana was in a locked suitcase in the trunk, and the police forced open the suitcase as part of the inventory search. The record contained no evidence of a police policy on the opening of closed containers during inventory searches. The Supreme Court held that it would be permissible for the police policy to mandate the opening of all containers or no containers, or to allow the police the discretion to decide which containers should be opened, based on the nature of the search and the characteristics of the container. However, because there was no evidence of any policy with respect to closed containers in that case, the Supreme Court held that the search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the fourth amendment. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 6-7, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.\nIn Hundley, this court held that the general order of the State Police was sufficient to allow the opening of closed containers during an inventory search. The policy introduced into evidence in Hundley, which was set forth previously in this opinion, did not use the words \u201cclosed containers.\u201d Rather, it required the police to inventory the contents of towed vehicles and to look wherever the owner or operator would ordinarily place or stow property. Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d at 137. The officer testified in Hundley that he opened a cigarette case because, in his experience, women often put their drivers\u2019 licenses and money in such cases. This court held that the general order of the State Police was \u201cadequate to the situation.\u201d Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d at 139.\nThe Seventh Circuit agrees with Hundley that it is not necessary that the policy use the words \u201cclosed containers.\u201d In United States v. Richardson, 121 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997), the court construed the same Illinois State Police policy that we construed in Hundley. The court found that the policy was sufficient to allow the police to open bags in the trunk of the defendant\u2019s car. The purpose of the policy is to inventory valuables, and searching bags in the trunk \u201cprotects against claims of stolen or damaged personal property.\u201d Richardson, 121 F.3d at 1056. In United States v. Wilson, 938 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1991), the court also construed the Illinois State Police policy and held that the police were entitled to open closed bags in the trunk of a car because the policy required the officer to inventory the contents of the vehicle. The court rejected defendant\u2019s argument that the search was illegal because the policy did not specifically mention closed containers:\n\u201cWhile the Illinois policy may not use the buzz words \u2018closed container\u2019 we are convinced that the term \u2018contents\u2019 provides sufficient elucidation to satisfy the requirements of Wells. Here, Trooper Miller inventoried the contents of the entire vehicle, as required under the policy. He continued to follow the established procedure when searching the contents of the trunk.\u201d Wilson, 938 F.2d at 789.\nHundley is controlling on this issue. Although defendant is correct that Sergeant Byrd did not specifically mention a closed container policy, he did testify that the policy required the police to check the passenger compartment and the trunk for valuables and to list any valuables on the tow inventory sheet. Obviously, such a policy requires the police to open any containers that might contain valuables. The policy that Sergeant Byrd testified to was more specific than the one at issue in Hundley. The Hundley policy merely referred to an inventory of the contents of the vehicle. Here, Sergeant Byrd specifically testified that he was supposed to search the trunk and passenger area for \u201cvaluables\u201d and to inventory anything of value on the tow sheet. We believe this policy was sufficient to allow Sergeant Byrd to open the plastic bags in the trunk of defendant\u2019s car. Defendant argues that Hundley is distinguishable because the written policy was introduced in that case and not in this one. That is a distinction without a difference. The point of Hundley is that a policy requiring an inventory of all of the contents of a vehicle is sufficient to allow the opening of closed containers. Here, the policy of inventorying anything of value found in the passenger compartment or trunk was sufficient to allow the opening of containers that may contain valuables.\nCONCLUSION\nDefendant failed to meet his burden of showing that he was subjected to an illegal search. Accordingly, the appellate court erred in upholding the trial court\u2019s suppression order. We reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAppellate court judgment reversed',\ncircuit court judgment reversed',\ncause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios Burtzos and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Sarah Curry, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 93422.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CURTIS GIPSON, Appellee.\nOpinion filed February 21, 2003.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios Burtzos and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Sarah Curry, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0298-01", "first_page_order": 310, "last_page_order": 324 }