{ "id": 609696, "name": "BILL KROHE, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Krohe v. City of Bloomington", "decision_date": "2003-03-20", "docket_number": "No. 94112", "first_page": "392", "last_page": "400", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 392" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544909 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351263 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 1157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570216 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/1157-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477545 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229713 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307261 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243860 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781334 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472373 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1141", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/1133-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 665, "char_count": 13268, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.9742915741665243e-07, "percentile": 0.9047707028479266 }, "sha256": "2737a84e0001e1db5eba8ccea52b0be23e8e44e2f2946b66d00ff3b475f283c6", "simhash": "1:389fce6e40a27833", "word_count": 2072 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:06.940389+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BILL KROHE, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe sole issue in this appeal is whether, under section 10(a) of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2000)), the phrase \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4 \u2014 110 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 110 (West 2000)). We hold that it is.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiff, Bill Krohe, was a firefighter employed by defendant, the City of Bloomington. In June 2000, and pursuant to section 4 \u2014 110 of the Code, the City\u2019s pension board awarded plaintiff a line-of-duty disability pension for injuries sustained in the line of duty. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff asked the City to continue paying his and his family\u2019s health insurance premiums, as required by section 10(a). Insisting that section 10(a) did not mandate such payment, the City declined plaintiff\u2019s request. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for declaratory relief. The circuit court of McLean County ruled in plaintiffs favor and ordered the City to continue paying plaintiffs health insurance premiums. The City appealed, and, with one justice dissenting, the appellate court affirmed. 329 Ill. App. 3d 1133. We granted the City\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nANALYSIS\nThe fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Michi gan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). If the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we may look to other sources to ascertain the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (1995). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000). Section 10(a) provides:\n\u201c(a) An employer who employs a full-time *** firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer\u2019s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee\u2019s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority ***.\u201d 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2000).\nThe problem in this case arises from the fact that, although the legislature made section 10(a)\u2019s application contingent upon the existence of a \u201ccatastrophic injury,\u201d the Act nowhere defines \u201ccatastrophic injury.\u201d The City maintains that the absence of a definition is of no consequence, however, as the phrase \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d unambiguously encompasses only those injuries that \u201cseverely limit the earning power of the affected employee.\u201d Plaintiff counters that the phrase is \u201cambiguous, uncertain, and subjective\u201d and that its meaning is ascertainable only by examining the Act\u2019s legislative history.\nWe agree with plaintiff. As used in section 10(a), the phrase \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). In this case, \u201creasonably well-informed persons\u201d have tendered no less than six distinct definitions of \u201ccatastrophic injury,\u201d all of which purport to vindicate the legislature\u2019s intent.\nAs mentioned above, the City initially argues that the phrase \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d encompasses only those injuries that \u201cseverely limit the earning power of the affected employee.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Elsewhere in its brief, the City contends that \u201ca reasonable interpretation of [section 10(a)] is that the catastrophic injury be of such a nature that the firefighter is precluded, as a result of a line-of-duty injury, from obtaining gainful employment elsewhere which provides a salary comparable to that of a firefighter.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The City then endorses yet a third construction of \u201ccatastrophic injury,\u201d that articulated by the appellate court in Villarreal v. Village of Schaumburg, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1157 (2001). In Villarreal, the court held that a \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is one that is \u201cfinancially ruinous,\u201d rendering a firefighter \u201cincapable of engaging in any gainful employment.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1163. In his dissent below, Justice Steigmann posits that \u201cwhatever it means, it means something more than a duty-related injury which qualifies a firefighter for a line-of-duty disability pension.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1141 (Steigmann, J., dissenting). The Villages of Schaumburg and Skokie, as amicus in this appeal, maintain that catastrophic injuries are those \u201cthat approach a life-threatening status and/or that interfere with an individual\u2019s earning capacity.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Finally, both plaintiff and the Associated Firefighters of Illinois, as amicus, insist that any injury that renders a person permanently unable to engage in his or her chosen profession is, by definition, \u201ccatastrophic.\u201d\nSignificantly, not one of the six definitions set forth above relies exclusively upon section 10(a)\u2019s plain language. On the contrary, the definitions advanced by or in support of the City derive from four distinct dictionary definitions of \u201ccatastrophe,\u201d as well as from statutory definitions borrowed from other jurisdictions. Similarly, the definitions advanced by or in support of plaintiff come not from section 10(a) itself but from section 10(a)\u2019s legislative history. And while all of these definitions are to some degree \u201creasonable,\u201d none of them are either compelled or foreclosed by the statute\u2019s plain language. We therefore hold that the phrase \u201ccatastrophic injury,\u201d as used in section 10(a), is ambiguous.\nIn reaching this result, we note that even the definitions proffered by the City do nothing to resolve section 10\u2019s ambiguity, as they fail to identify with any degree of certainty or predictability what types of injuries qualify as \u201ccatastrophic.\u201d Indeed, one point on which plaintiff and the City agree is that blindness and loss of limb are textbook examples of \u201ccatastrophic\u201d injuries under section 10(a). Yet neither blindness nor loss of limb renders a firefighter \u201cincapable of engaging in any gainful employment,\u201d which the City at one point insists is the sine qua non of a \u201ccatastrophic injury.\u201d Nor do these injuries necessarily preclude a firefighter from \u201cobtaining gainful employment elsewhere which provides a salary comparable to that of a firefighter,\u201d the City\u2019s alternative standard for evaluating whether an injury is \u201ccatastrophic.\u201d At the same time, however, both blindness and loss of limb instantly terminate a firefighter\u2019s ability to pursue his chosen profession, a definition of \u201ccatastrophic\u201d that plaintiff endorses but the City categorically rejects. Thus, even as defined by the City, \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d remains steadfastly ambiguous.\nBecause the phrase \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is ambiguous, we may look beyond the Act\u2019s language to ascertain its meaning. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 419 (2001). To this end, a statute\u2019s legislative history and debates are \u201c[vjaluable construction aids in interpreting an ambiguous statute.\u201d Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996).\nHere, the legislative history and debates could not be clearer. On November 14, 1997, the Illinois Senate debated whether to override Governor Edgar\u2019s veto of House Bill 1347, which sought to enact the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act. Immediately prior to the vote, the bill\u2019s sponsor, Senator Laura Kent Donahue, delivered the following remarks:\n\u201cI\u2019d like to say for the sake of the record what we mean by catastrophically injured. What it means is that it is our intent to define \u2018catastrophically injured\u2019 as a police officer or firefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line of duty disability.\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue).\nAt the conclusion of Senator Donahue\u2019s remarks, the Senate overrode the Governor\u2019s veto of House Bill 1347 by a vote of 58 to 1.\nIn light of Senator Donahue\u2019s remarks, which were delivered for the sole purpose of defining for the record \u201ccatastrophic injury,\u201d plaintiff urges us to likewise construe \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d as any injury that results in a line-of-duty disability under section 4 \u2014 110 of the Code. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. While Senator Donahue\u2019s statement of legislative intent could not be clearer, it alone cannot control the outcome of this case. As the City correctly points out, Senator Donahue\u2019s statement was made only after the Governor vetoed House Bill 1347 and therefore played no role in the General Assembly\u2019s initial decision to enact section 10(a). By itself, then, Senator Donahue\u2019s statement is of only limited value in ascertaining the legislature\u2019s intent.\nThat said, the legislative history of House Bill 1347, both prior to and following the Governor\u2019s veto, is replete with statements of legislative intent that fully comport with Senator Donahue\u2019s November 14, 1997, remarks. Immediately prior to the House of Representatives\u2019 initial vote on House Bill 1347, the Bill\u2019s sponsor, Representative Art Tenhouse, advised his colleagues as follows:\n\u201c1347 is a simple Bill. It simply provides that full-time law enforcement officers and firefighters that are killed or disabled in the line of duty, we\u2019re going to continue the health benefits for the officer\u2019s children and spouse.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 14, 1997, at 180 (statements of Representative Tenhouse).\nFollowing the conclusion of these remarks, House Bill 1347 passed by a vote of 113 to 4. Similarly, immediately prior to the Senate\u2019s initial vote on House Bill 1347, Senator Donahue advised her colleagues:\n\u201cAnd what this does is that it provides that for full-time law enforcement officers and firefighters that are killed or disabled in the line of duty shall continue the health benefits for the officer or the firefighter, their spouses and their children.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 16, 1997, at 192 (statements of Senator Donahue).\nFollowing these remarks, the Senate passed House Bill 1347 by a vote of 53 to 1. Finally, immediately prior to the House\u2019s vote to override Governor Edgar\u2019s veto of House Bill 1347, Representative Tenhouse reminded the chamber:\n\u201cHouse Bill 1347 *** [plrovides that employers of full-time law enforcement and firefighters who are killed or disabled in the line of duty, shall continue health benefits for the officer or firefighter and the spouse and children thereof.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, October 28, 1997, at 16 (statements of Representative Tenhouse).\nFollowing these remarks, House Bill 1347 once again was passed, this time by a vote of 115 to 1.\nThus, contrary to the City\u2019s position, Senator Donahue\u2019s announcement that a \u201ccatastrophically injured\u201d firefighter is synonymous with a \u201cfirefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line of duty disability\u201d is not an isolated \u201celeventh hour\u201d statement. Rather, as the foregoing account demonstrates, both of the Bill\u2019s sponsors were concerned from the outset with line-of-duty disabilities, explicitly informing their colleagues of the Bill\u2019s focus immediately prior to every vote. In light of this unambiguous legislative history, and in light of section 10(a)\u2019s facial ambiguity, we will defer to the legislature\u2019s judgment. Accordingly, like the appellate and circuit courts below, we construe the phrase \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d as synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4 \u2014 110 of the Code.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLine of duty disability pensions are paid to firefighters who \u201cas the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty, [are] found *** to be physically or mentally permanently disabled for service in the fire department.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 110 (West 2000).\nAs discussed further below, this is but one of several definitions tendered by the City.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Todd Greenburg, Corporation Counsel, of Bloomington, for appellant.", "William J. Connor, of Berg, Robeson & Connor, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee.", "Roger Huebner, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.", "James Baird, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association.", "Thomas W. Duda, of Arlington Heights, for amicus curiae Associated Firefighters of Illinois.", "Joel A. D\u2019Alba, of Asher, Gittler, Greenfield & D\u2019Alba, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois AFL-CIO." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 94112.\nBILL KROHE, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed March 20, 2003.\nRehearing denied June 2, 2003.\nJ. Todd Greenburg, Corporation Counsel, of Bloomington, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Connor, of Berg, Robeson & Connor, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee.\nRoger Huebner, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.\nJames Baird, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association.\nThomas W. Duda, of Arlington Heights, for amicus curiae Associated Firefighters of Illinois.\nJoel A. D\u2019Alba, of Asher, Gittler, Greenfield & D\u2019Alba, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois AFL-CIO." }, "file_name": "0392-01", "first_page_order": 404, "last_page_order": 412 }