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"ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7150930542584253e-07, "percentile": 0.7029709067980411 }, "sha256": "9b311ceea73363b61ef76c8c422626aeaf7af8692b8f6c17f8ca7f0b9effb219", "simhash": "1:9c5ac19732acb6d1", "word_count": 10216 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:31.634154+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LAWRENCE JACKSON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Lawrence Jackson, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing his amended petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Because defendant was sentenced to death for his underlying convictions, his appeal lies directly with this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition.\nBACKGROUND\nAt a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, eight-year-old Urica Winder testified that defendant and codefendant Bobbie Driskel came to her family\u2019s apartment at 1850 West Washington late in the evening on September 24, 1986. The two men stabbed to death her mother, Vernita Winder, her four-year-old sister, Dana, her mother\u2019s boyfriend, Mark Brown, and her mother\u2019s friend, Shirley Martin, and then stole a television set and VCR. Urica, too, was brutally stabbed, but survived the attack by pretending to be dead.\nBased on Urica\u2019s testimony and other evidence, including defendant\u2019s own inculpatory statements to police, defendant was convicted on June 23, 1988, on four counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted murder, one count of aggravated battery of a child, five counts of home invasion, five counts of armed robbery, and one count of residential burglary. Following the convictions, a death penalty sentencing hearing was held. The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty and, after hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, found that the mitigation evidence did not preclude imposition of the death penalty. On September 7, 1988, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death, and imposed terms of imprisonment for the nonmurder convictions. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43 (1991).\nAfter our decision issued, defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. In response, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to this court for further consideration in light of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). See Jackson v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 802, 121 L. Ed. 2d 5, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992). Thereafter, on September 26, 1991, this court issued a judgment affirming defendant\u2019s convictions and nondeath sentences. In accord with Morgan, however, defendant\u2019s death sentence was vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a new death penalty sentencing hearing.\nA new sentencing hearing was held and defendant again was found eligible for the death penalty based on three aggravating factors: multiple murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(3)); felony murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(6)), and murder of a child under the age of 12 when \u201cthe death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(7)). The resentencing jury also determined that the mitigating evidence was insufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(g). Therefore, on April 24, 1995, defendant was resentenced to death. On May 23, 1995, defendant filed a notice of appeal directly to this court.\nOn August 29, 1996, while the direct appeal was still pending, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition, challenging the effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel and the fairness of his death penalty sentencing hearing. Upon receipt of the petition, the circuit court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant. Nothing further was filed, however, until this court issued an opinion on defendant\u2019s direct appeal, affirming the imposition of the death penalty upon resentencing. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998). Thereafter, on March 12, 1999, with the assistance of counsel, defendant filed an amended post-conviction petition, raising 14 claims. A fifteenth claim was added later.\nUpon the State\u2019s motion, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s petition without an evidentiary hearing. Because this is a capital case, defendant seeks review of the dismissal of his post-conviction petition by this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). Before this court, defendant asks that an evidentiary hearing be held on the following nine claims: (1) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at resentencing because his attorney failed to investigate and present evidence of a family history of mental illness; (2) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his appellate attorney failed to argue on direct appeal that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to the introduction of victim impact evidence concerning unrelated offenses; (3) whether his constitutional rights were violated when the State used peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty; (4) whether he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to (a) judicial bias, (b) the presentation of hypnotically enhanced testimony, and (c) erroneous rulings; (5) whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentence in this case; (6) whether the court questioned prospective jurors in a manner which suggested that the jury would have to find unanimously that mitigation evidence outweighed aggravation evidence; (7) whether a new sentencing hearing is required because of the cumulative effect of all of the constitutional violations alleged above; (8) whether the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it has no burden of persuasion; and (9) whether the death penalty statute is unconstitutionally discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious because it precludes the imposition of death in cases where an individual requires \u201cspecial forms of communicative assistance\u201d at trial.\nThe evidence presented at defendant\u2019s second death penalty hearing is presented in detail in our opinion on defendant\u2019s direct appeal and will not be recounted here. We will discuss only those facts necessary to the disposition of this appeal.\nANALYSIS\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)) is a statutory vehicle which provides criminal defendants with an opportunity to obtain relief from substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional rights that occurred at trial or sentencing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). A petition filed under the Act is not an appeal, but a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction or sentence. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142 (2001); People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). Consequently, the purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is not to determine guilt or innocence, but to inquire into constitutional issues which have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 72-73 (1997); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501 (1991). Matters that were raised and decided on direct appeal are res judicata, and matters that could have been raised on appeal, but were not, will ordinarily be deemed waived. People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135 (2000); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).\nIn a capital case, once a post-conviction petition is filed, the circuit court has 90 days in which to examine the petition and, if the petitioner is without counsel or the means to procure counsel, appoint counsel for him. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(1) (West 2000). The petition is then docketed for further consideration and the State must \u201canswer or move to dismiss.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 2000). If the State seeks dismissal of the petition, the circuit court must rule on the sufficiency of the allegations, without engaging in any fact-finding and taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998). Unless the circuit court finds that the allegations in the post-conviction petition, supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights have been violated, the petition may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381; People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 304 (1997). A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of right. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d at 73.\nA circuit court\u2019s ruling on the sufficiency of the allegations contained in a post-conviction petition is a legal determination. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388. We review de novo a post-conviction petition that has been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142 (2001); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 389.\nWith these principles in mind, we address defendant\u2019s claims in the order that they were raised.\nI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nIn his first two claims, defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, first at his resentencing hearing and then when his death sentence was appealed directly to this court. The right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by our federal and state constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8), applies to appellate and sentencing proceedings, as well as trial proceedings, and violations of this right are cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 361 (2000).\nClaims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the familiar Strickland standard, which is composed of two prongs: deficiency and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). To establish the deficiency prong, defendant must show that his counsel\u2019s performance, objectively measured against prevailing professional norms, was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as the \u201ccounsel\u201d guaranteed by the sixth amendment. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 317 (2000); People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 108-09 (1992). Defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction might have been the product of sound trial strategy. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 73-74 (1997).\nTo establish the prejudice prong, defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d at 74. However, the prejudice prong of Strickland is not simply an \u201coutcome-determinative\u201d test but, rather, may be satisfied if defendant can show that counsel\u2019s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at 362.\nIn the case at bar, defendant first claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his capital resentencing hearing. Defendant contends that his attorneys conducted a \u201csuperficial\u201d investigation and, as a result, failed to discover and present to the sentencing jury evidence that defendant\u2019s family has an extensive history of mental illness. In support of this claim, defendant attached to his amended post-conviction petition a 39-page amended mitigation report by forensic social worker Alice Washington. Washington\u2019s report, supported by the affidavits of several of defendant\u2019s family members, reveals that mental illness has affected several generations on both sides of defendant\u2019s family. At least 13 members of defendant\u2019s family, including one sibling, aunts and uncles, and several cousins, have been diagnosed as suffering from mental illness, predominantly paranoid schizophrenia, which has in some instances been accompanied by episodes of extreme violence. In further support of his claim, defendant also attached to his petition a five-page neuropsychological assessment prepared by developmental psychologist Dr. James Garbarino and a one-page letter from psychiatrist Dr. Henry Conroe. It is defendant\u2019s position that the allegations in his claim, supported by the documents which he attached to his petition, make a substantial showing that his resentencing counsel\u2019s failure to present evidence of his family history of mental illness constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether his constitutional rights were violated. We disagree.\nIn the context of a second-stage capital sentencing hearing, the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to show \u201c(1) that his attorney\u2019s performance at the sentencing hearing did not constitute reasonably effective assistance, judged by prevailing professional norms (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065), and (2) there is reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant death (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2069).\u201d People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 195-96 (1998); see also People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000). Counsel has an obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation into potential sources of mitigating evidence to present at the capital sentencing hearing, or must have a legitimate reason for failing to make a particular investigation. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 510 (1998); Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d at 86. However, if an adequate investigation was conducted, counsel will not be deemed ineffective merely because a particular item of evidence was not introduced. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 510; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d at 86.\nIn the present case, defendant cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland test. As to the first prong\u2014 deficiency \u2014 the record does not support defendant\u2019s claim that the investigation into potential sources of mitigating evidence was inadequate, nor does it show that counsel was deficient for having failed to uncover evidence of a family history of mental illness. Defendant\u2019s attempts to draw a comparison between this case and People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491 (1998), are unavailing.\nIn Towns, the record showed that counsel conducted no investigation into mitigating evidence and, instead, relied solely on a pretrial sanity report. In the present case, however, a review of the record reveals that the resentencing defense attorneys employed the services of mitigation specialist Alvin Hill. Although Hill did not testify at the resentencing hearing, he prepared a lengthy mitigation report after interviewing the defendant and at least 10 other persons. Due in part to Hill\u2019s extensive investigations, the defense team was able to present mitigation evidence at the second sentencing hearing which had been unavailable at the first sentencing hearing. For instance, family members who earlier had been unwilling to testify or whose testimony at the first sentencing hearing failed to include family background came forward at the resentencing hearing and revealed, for the first time, the nature of defendant\u2019s life during his formative years. Through the testimony of witnesses such as Alicia Jackson, Donald Jackson, and George Rowe, Jr., the resentencing jury learned that defendant led an impoverished childhood which was chaotic, turbulent, and punctuated by frequent episodes of extreme abuse and neglect. These witnesses explained that defendant\u2019s natural father abandoned the family when defendant was young, leaving him and his siblings to be raised by an alcoholic mother and her abusive boyfriends. As a child, defendant also witnessed several disturbing incidents of violence, including his brother being struck and killed by a car.\nIn addition to this newly discovered family background evidence, defendant\u2019s attorneys introduced new evidence that defendant exhibited abnormal brain functioning, which was likely a result of head injuries defendant had suffered. Dr. Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist with a specialty in neuropsychology, testified that he examined defendant and performed numerous tests, including intelligence tests, which allowed him to assess various aspects of defendant\u2019s brain functioning. From these tests, Dr. Gelbort concluded that defendant suffered from organic brain dysfunction with cognitive abnormalities. The abnormalities seemed to be most severe in the frontal lobes of the brain, which control problem-solving and reasoning ability. According to Dr. Gelbort, the frontal lobes operate as the \u201cgas pedal\u201d and \u201cbrake pedal\u201d of behavior \u2014 allowing a person to initiate appropriate behavior and preventing a person from acting inappropriately. The abnormalities to defendant\u2019s frontal lobes suggested that defendant\u2019s judgment as to appropriate behavior would be impaired.\nBy comparing the evidence presented at defendant\u2019s first sentencing hearing with the evidence presented at resentencing, it is clear that the attorneys who assisted defendant at his resentencing conducted a reasonable investigation into potential sources of mitigating evidence. Neither the investigation, nor the presentation of mitigation evidence at defendant\u2019s resentencing, was superficial.\nMoreover, there is good reason why defense counsel failed to uncover and present evidence of defendant\u2019s family history of mental illness. In an affidavit dated March 10, 1999, and submitted by the defense in support of defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition, mitigation specialist Alice Washington stated, \u201cThat at the time of the initial sentencing hearing, and those subsequent thereof, [sic] no one had knowledge of the family history of mental illness because it was the family\u2019s dark secret.\u201d According to Washington, defendant\u2019s family, apparently due to embarrassment, had been disinclined to reveal information regarding the family\u2019s widespread affliction with mental illness. In a previous affidavit dated January 21, 1999, Washington stated, \u201cIt has been a very difficult task trying to convince [defendant\u2019s] family that the family history of mental illness needs to be explored and presented to the court.\u201d\nWe conclude that the failure to discover the family history of mental illness cannot be attributed to any deficiency of counsel. Defendant\u2019s family withheld this information due to a desire to keep this \u201cfamily secret\u201d private. Consequently, defendant has failed to satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland test. In light of the record in this case, defendant has not made a substantial showing that his counsel was deficient because evidence of a family history of mental illness was not discovered or presented at his resentencing hearing.\nHaving made this determination, it is not necessary to consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Nevertheless, it is clear to this court that defendant cannot make a substantial showing of prejudice and, consequently, the lack of prejudice is an additional reason for finding that defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.\nTo show prejudice, defendant must be able to show a reasonable probability that, had evidence of his family history of mental illness been presented, the sentencing jury would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would not warrant death. Defendant cannot meet this standard, however, because no correlation has been shown between the history of mental illness in defendant\u2019s family and his own mental condition.\nExperts who examined defendant in 1987 and 1988, prior to defendant\u2019s first trial and sentencing, found that defendant did not suffer from a mental illness. Dr. Ziporyn, a psychiatrist called by the defense, diagnosed defendant as having a passive-aggressive personality disorder and testified that \u201cat the time I examined [defendant] there were no marked or major mental issues.\u201d Dr. Ziporyn\u2019s findings were confirmed by Dr. Reifman, the director of the Psychiatric Institute of the circuit court of Cook County, who was called by the State at trial. Based on the results of psychological testing and his own observations of defendant, Dr. Reifman diagnosed defendant as having a mixed personality disorder with antisocial passive-aggressive tendencies, influenced by drug abuse. Dr. Reifman found defendant to be \u201coriented, relevant, coherent, logical\u201d and concluded that defendant was not suffering from a mental disease, defect, or mental condition.\nThese experts have not been contradicted by anything in defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition or the documents attached to the petition. The report prepared by mitigation specialist Alice Washington suggests that the high incidence of paranoid schizophrenia in defendant\u2019s family raises \u201ca reasonable question as to whether or not [defendant] suffers from the same mental illness which has afflicted his relatives.\u201d But Washington is only speculating and her speculation is not evidence which can defeat the earlier expert testimony that defendant does not suffer from mental illness or defect.\nFurthermore, this court is unable to discern from any of the documents attached to defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition how defendant\u2019s family history of mental illness mitigates his criminal behavior in this case. Dr. James Garbarino states in his five-page report: \u201cThe mental illness evident in [defendant\u2019s] family and the cognitive limitations noted in the various reports would tend to contribute to the problems [defendant] would face in drawing appropriate conclusions from social realities.\u201d Thus, according to Dr. Garbarino, defendant\u2019s family history of mental illness may have some tangential relevance to defendant\u2019s ability to draw \u201cappropriate conclusions from social realities.\u201d To the extent that this is true, however, it is cumulative of the evidence already heard by the resentencing jury from Dr. Gelbort, who testified that defendant\u2019s organic brain dysfunction impaired his ability to make appropriate behavior choices. We are unpersuaded that there is a reasonable probability that defendant\u2019s sentencing jury, after considering Dr. Garbarino\u2019s report and other evidence of defendant\u2019s family history of mental illness, would conclude the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would not warrant a death sentence.\nNor is this conclusion altered by the letter from Dr. Henry Conroe. Dr. Conroe, it appears, examined defendant on February 17, 1988, prior to defendant\u2019s initial trial and sentencing. In a letter, dated May 15, 1999, and attached to the post-conviction petition, Dr. Conroe writes:\n\u201cAt the time that I examined [defendant] on 2/17/88, I did not have access to information about his family, his growing up, the history of physical and mental abuse, his history of head injuries, and neuropsychological testing. After being provided this information, I conclude that if this evidence were made available to me initially, my assessment of him would have been different. Beyond the diagnoses of Substance Abuse and a Mixed Personality Disorder with Anti-social and Passive Aggressive features, I would have focused on the effects of his family history, his early environment and the \u2018diffuse neurocognitive dysfunction\u2019 described in Dr. Michael Gelbort\u2019s report on the defendant\u2019s behavior at the time of the crime.\u201d\nSignificantly, Dr. Conroe does not modify his opinion that defendant suffers from a personality disorder rather than a mental illness. Moreover, Dr. Conroe does not focus on the mental illness of defendant\u2019s family as the basis for changing his assessment of defendant. Rather, he states that his opinion of defendant would have been influenced by the spectrum of \u201cinformation about his family, his growing up, the history of physical and mental abuse, his history of head injuries, and neuropsychological testing.\u201d Of particular interest to Dr. Conroe was the evidence of defendant\u2019s \u201cdiffuse neurocognitive dysfunction\u201d described by Dr. Gelhort. All of the evidence which Dr. Conroe found meaningful had been presented to and considered by the resentencing jury.\nFinally, defendant cannot show prejudice because defendant\u2019s family history of mental illness is not inherently mitigating and could be interpreted as aggravating. See People v. Montgomery, 192 Ill. 2d 642, 673 (2000); People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 101 (1999). Washington\u2019s 39-page report indicates that some of defendant\u2019s family members who suffer from paranoid schizophrenia have committed serious criminal acts. Two relatives were in mental institutions after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, one for first degree murder and the other for armed robbery. Another family member was reputed to have killed a child and thrown the body into Lake Michigan. Thus, the family history evidence could suggest defendant\u2019s future dangerousness \u2014 a factor which may be considered in aggravation. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 101; People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1996); People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467 (1995); People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 335-37 (1992).\nIn sum, we conclude that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that his resentencing counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any perceived deficiencies of counsel. Consequently, the claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.\nDefendant next claims he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when he appealed to this court after his resentencing hearing. When determining whether defendant has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights have been violated by appellate counsel\u2019s incompetence, we again employ the Strickland test. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, defendant must show that the failure to raise a particular issue was objectively unreasonable and that the decision prejudiced the defendant. People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179 (2000). \u201cAppellate counsel is not obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel\u2019s appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. Accordingly, unless the underlying issues are meritorious, defendant has suffered no prejudice from counsel\u2019s failure to raise them on appeal.\u201d People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 328-29 (2000).\nIn the case at bar, defendant contends that his appellate counsel was incompetent because he failed to raise on appeal the improper admission of victim impact evidence for unrelated offenses, which was found to be error in People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39 (1998).\nIn Hope, the defendant was convicted for the February 5, 1982, murder of a police officer on a CTA bus. During the eligibility phase of the defendant\u2019s capital sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence that the defendant also had been convicted for the January 11, 1982, murder of a security guard at a McDonald\u2019s restaurant. Later, at the aggravation/mitigation stage of the sentencing proceedings, the State introduced victim impact statements from victims of the McDonald\u2019s shooting. This court held:\n\u201c[The Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1994))] does not contemplate, and we will not condone, an expansion of victim impact statements to include evidence from victims other than the victims of the offense on trial.\u201d Hope, 184 Ill. 2d at 49. Later, this court went on to hold:\n\u201cWhile the details of prior crimes are considered relevant aggravation because they illuminate the character and record of a capital defendant (see People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201, 235-37 (1993)), the unforeseen effects of those prior crimes on their victims are of no such assistance. *** [V]ictim impact statements regarding [an unrelated] offense are simply too attenuated to be relevant.\u201d Hope, 184 Ill. 2d at 52.\nThus, Hope stands for the proposition that victim impact statements, submitted pursuant to the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act and which detail the effects that an unrelated, collateral offense has had on a victim or victim\u2019s family, are inadmissible at a second-stage capital sentencing hearing.\nIn the case at bar, defendant identifies two witnesses as the sources of improper victim impact evidence \u2014 Officer Kelly Byrne and Dr. Demetra Soter. However, neither Officer Byrne nor Dr. Soter gave a \u201cvictim impact statement,\u201d as that term is defined in the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2000). The Act states:\n\u201cIn any case where a defendant has been convicted of a violent crime or a juvenile has been adjudicated a delinquent for a violent crime except those in which both parties have agreed to the imposition of a specific sentence, and a victim of the violent crime is present in the courtroom at the time of the sentencing or the disposition hearing, the victim upon his or her request shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant\u2019s criminal conduct or the juvenile\u2019s delinquent conduct has had upon the victim. If the victim chooses to exercise this right, the impact statement must have been prepared in writing in conjunction with the Office of the State\u2019s Attorney prior to the initial hearing or sentencing, before it can be presented orally or in writing at the sentencing hearing. In conjunction with the Office of the State\u2019s Attorney, a victim impact statement that is presented orally may be done so by the victim or his or her representative.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 120/6(a) (West 2000).\nIn the present case, Officer Byrne, a correctional officer with the Cook County sheriffs department, was called to testify by the State in aggravation. She testified that, between 1985 and 1986, she worked the midnight shift at Division 2 of the county jail, where defendant was incarcerated after being convicted on a burglary charge. On January 21, 1986, Officer Byrne filed a disciplinary report against defendant and, as a result, defendant was confined to segregation for two to three days. When defendant returned to Division 2, he began a campaign of intimidation against Officer Byrne and, as his release date approached, began making verbal threats to her. On one occasion, defendant told Officer Byrne, \u201cI will get you. I will find you, and I will get you.\u201d On another occasion, defendant came up behind Officer Byrne in the hallway and asked, in a threatening tone, how her little girl was doing. At the time Officer Byrne had an 18-month-old daughter, but she did not know how defendant had obtained this information.\nDefendant admits that Byrne\u2019s testimony, up to this point, was properly admitted. The offending \u201cvictim impact\u201d testimony of which he complains consists of a single answer to a question posed by the State, which the court allowed over defendant\u2019s objection:\n\u201cQ. [prosecutor] Ms. Byrne, tell the Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury how you changed your conduct upon the release of [defendant] from Cook County Jail?\nA. [Officer Byrne] Prior to my incident with [defendant], I very seldom carried an off-duty weapon. After his release, I carried one consistently. I also changed my route home from work every day. When I get [szc] off in the morning, I took a different route home.\nAs I said I was working midnight, and I had a retired woman that would stay at my house during the night to babysit, and I instructed her to know where my off-duty weapon was and make sure she knew how to use it if it would be necessary.\u201d\nAs stated, Officer Byrne\u2019s testimony was not a formal victim impact statement presented pursuant to the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act. Nor do we construe Officer Byrne\u2019s testimony as victim impact evidence. The remarks made by Officer Byrne contain none of the typical elements of victim impact evidence. She does not describe any physical, psychological, or financial difficulties experienced by her or her family as a result of a crime perpetrated on her by the defendant. Rather, Officer Byrne\u2019s testimony regarding her altered conduct simply informed the jury that she had taken defendant\u2019s threats seriously.\nWe also find no merit to defendant\u2019s argument that Dr. Soter presented victim impact evidence in violation of Hope. Dr. Soter was Urica Winder\u2019s treating physician. He was called by the State to testify regarding Urica\u2019s wounds, the subsequent surgical procedures she endured, and the possible long-term effects of the injuries on Urica\u2019s physical and emotional well-being. In a vain attempt to characterize the attack on Urica as an \u201cunrelated offense,\u201d defendant points out that the evidence indicated that codefendant Bobbie Driskel, and not defendant, inflicted Urica\u2019s wounds.\nThe fact that defendant did not wield the knife which caused Urica\u2019s injuries does not make her attack an unrelated offense. The attack on Urica was part of the entire incident which resulted in the murders for which defendant was being sentenced. Thus, not only is defendant legally accountable for Urica\u2019s injuries, her injuries reflect on defendant\u2019s moral character. While defendant may not have inflicted Urica\u2019s injuries, neither did he take steps to prevent the attack. Rather, his behavior at the time of the incident suggests that he tacitly approved of the attack on her. Thus, the concern in Hope, that the victim impact evidence would be too attenuated to be relevant to the sentencing jurors\u2019 inquiry into the defendant\u2019s character and record, is not present here.\nBecause defendant has been unsuccessful in his attempt to show that the testimony of Officer Byrne and Dr. Soter was unrelated victim impact evidence admitted in violation of Hope, it follows that appellate counsel could not have been deficient for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Furthermore, because defendant has not made a substantial showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.\nII. Witherspoon Violation\nDefendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury and his \u201cdue process right to a jury from which no jurors have been systematically removed.\u201d The basis for this claim is the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges to remove from the venire individuals who expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty. In particular, defendant claims that the State excused Dale Larsen, Albert Efkman, and James Lofgren based on a perception that they were \u201cweak as far as the death penalty\u201d and, thus, the State \u201cseated a hanging jury\u201d by removing these men who were \u201cotherwise well qualified\u201d to sit on the jury.\nUnder Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968), and its progeny, it is unconstitutional to remove for cause a prospective juror who expresses a general objection to the death penalty on moral or religious grounds. This court has repeatedly held, however, that Witherspoon does not limit the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 549 (1995); People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1994); People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 136-38 (1991). While defendant acknowledges these decisions, he urges us to reconsider them. Yet, he has provided this court with no persuasive reasons for departing from our earlier holdings.\nBut even if this court were inclined to revisit this issue, it would be unnecessary in this case. Defendant contends the State unconstitutionally exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude Dale Larsen, Albert Efkman, and James Lofgren. However, these men were members of the venire at defendant\u2019s first sentencing hearing. The death sentence which was imposed following the first sentencing hearing was vacated. Defendant received a new sentencing hearing, where the evidence was heard by an entirely new sentencing jury. Thus, whether the State improperly excluded these venirepersons is a moot issue, which we need not consider. See People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 281 (1990).\nDefendant does not contend that any venire members at his second sentencing hearing were improperly excluded. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights to an impartial sentencing jury were violated. This claim was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.\nIII. Fairness of the Sentencing Hearing\nDefendant next claims that his due process and equal protection rights were violated because his sentencing hearing was fundamentally unfair. In particular, he contends that (a) the judge who presided over his sentencing hearing was biased, (b) inadmissible \u201chypnotically enhanced\u201d testimony was presented, and (c) under the heading of \u201cother claims,\u201d eight additional errors denied him a fair sentencing hearing.\n(a) Judicial Bias\nDefendant attached to his post-conviction petition two affidavits in support of his claim that the judge who presided over his sentencing hearing was biased against him. The first affiant was Martha Fitzsimmons, an attorney employed by the Cook County public defender\u2019s office, who represented defendant at his second sentencing hearing. Fitzsimmons attested to the fact that she had visited the judge\u2019s chambers and saw \u201cprominently displayed on the wall, a framed and matted souvenir.\u201d Fitzsimmons said she later learned that this \u201csouvenir\u201d had been given to the judge by the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys who had originally tried defendant\u2019s case. The framed \u201csouvenir\u201d held a picture of two girls \u2014 Urica Winder and her sister \u2014 and a handwritten letter from Urica. According to Fitzsimmons, the letter said \u201csomething to the effect of... thank you Judge Urso for helping me during the trial and putting those bad men away for good.\u201d Fitzsimmons stated that she informed appellate counsel of this \u201cevidence of prejudice,\u201d but that the issue of judicial bias was not raised on appeal.\nThe second affiant was Steven Clark, an attorney employed by the office of the State Appellate Defender and defendant\u2019s counsel for both of defendant\u2019s direct appeals to this court and for his appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Clark averred that he had been present in the courtroom on several occasions during defendant\u2019s second death penalty hearing and\n\u201con 5 to 10 occasions during the proceedings, in the presence of the jury, Judge Urso reacted to objections and requests for side bars by defense counsel by at various times frowning, raising the volume of his voice, rolling his eyes, looking at the ceiling, or abruptly moving his arms or body. Each of these reactions indicated that the Judge was angry with defense counsel.\u201d\nAs stated, a post-conviction petition is not an appeal, but a collateral proceeding, and issues that could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, may be deemed waived. People v. Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d 472 (1995); People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 372 (1988). Waiver will apply unless principles of fundamental fairness require review of the issue. People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1989). \u201c \u2018 \u201cFundamental fairness\u201d requires courts to review procedurally defaulted claims in collateral proceedings only when a defendant shows cognizable \u201ccause\u201d for his failure to make timely objection, and shows \u201cactual prejudice\u201d flowing from the error now complained of.\u2019 \u201d People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (2001), quoting Owens, 129 Ill. 2d at 317, citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977). See also People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154 (2000). As detailed in Hudson:\n\u201c \u2018[Clause\u2019 denotes \u2018 \u201c \u2018some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel\u2019s efforts\u2019 to raise the claim\u201d in an earlier proceeding.\u2019 People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (1992), quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517, 544, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397, 408, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has identified objective factors that constitute cause to include \u2018 \u201c \u2018interference by officials\u2019 \u201d that makes compliance with the State\u2019s procedural rule impracticable, and \u201ca showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.\u201d [Citation.] In addition, constitutionally \u201c[i]neffective assistance of counsel ... is cause.\u201d [Citation.] Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does not constitute cause ***.\u2019 McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493-94, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 544, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. To establish actual prejudice, a petitioner \u2018must show \u201cnot merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.\u201d \u2019 Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 106 S. Ct. at 2648, quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816, 832, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982).\u201d Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d at 123-24.\nIn the present case, judicial bias was not raised in defendant\u2019s direct appeal. While we acknowledge that the waiver rule is less rigidly applied where the basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge (People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455 (1990)), principles of fundamental fairness do not require that we ignore the procedural bar in this case.\nAlthough defendant fails to mention it, a substitution of judge motion was filed prior to defendant\u2019s resentencing hearing. In this motion, allegations of Judge Urso\u2019s lack of impartiality were premised, primarily, on the framed photograph and letter from Urica which Judge Urso kept in his chambers. The motion was heard by Judge Gaughan, who held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. At this hearing, the court heard testimony which established that the framed letter stated simply, \u201cJudge Urso, Thank you. Urica.\u201d Furthermore, other witnesses testified that this framed keepsake was only one of many pictures, artists\u2019 sketches, and pieces of memorabilia which cluttered the judge\u2019s chambers. After hearing argument on the motion, Judge Gaughan denied the substitution motion.\nWhen Clark represented defendant in his direct appeal following the resentencing, he did not challenge the correctness of this ruling. Nor did Clark raise judicial bias as an issue on appeal, even though Clark now claims to have witnessed the judge exhibiting body language during the sentencing hearing which suggested that the judge was not being impartial.\nUnder the circumstances, the claim of judicial bias which is being raised in the post-conviction petition is not based on \u201cnew evidence\u201d unknown to appellate counsel, nor can defendant show that efforts to raise the issue of judicial bias in a timely fashion were impeded. Thus, he cannot show cognizable cause.\nMoreover, defendant cannot show a reasonable possibility that he was prejudiced as a result of judicial bias. The trial court, after an evidentiary hearing, decided that the framed keepsake was not a basis for disqualifying Judge Urso from presiding over the sentencing hearing. We agree.\nDisqualification of a judge is not a decision to be made lightly. People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239 (1997); People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171 (1979). A judge is presumed to be impartial even after extreme provocation. People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 407 (1986). It is assumed that judges, regardless of their personal backgrounds and experiences in life, will be able to set aside any biases or predispositions they might have and consider each case in light of the evidence presented. People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1 (1990). \u201c[Only under the most extreme cases would disqualification for bias or prejudice be constitutionally required.\u201d People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 541 (1995); People v. Del Vecchio, 129 Ill. 2d 265, 275 (1989).\nThe \u201cthank you\u201d note and picture were apparently given to Judge Urso soon after defendant\u2019s initial trial, which took place in 1988. There is no evidence that Judge Urso had any contact with Urica closer in time to the resentencing hearing, which took place years later. Under the circumstances, the keepsake is not evidence that Judge Urso could not remain impartial in the subsequent resentencing hearing.\nClark\u2019s affidavit is equally unpersuasive in demonstrating judicial bias. Allegations of judicial bias must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in terms of the trial judge\u2019s specific reaction to the events taking place. See People v. Hannon, 48 Ill. 2d 462 (1971) (when evaluating bias based upon a judge\u2019s comment, reviewing court will review entire context of comment); People v. Martin, 285 Ill. App. 3d 623 (1996). Here, this court is unable to consider the judge\u2019s reactions in context because Clark\u2019s affidavit fails to identify the location in the record where Judge Urso\u2019s reactions allegedly took place. Moreover, the fact that Judge Urso may have displayed irritation with defense counsel is not necessarily evidence of judicial bias against defendant. See People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239 (1997) (a judge\u2019s displeasure with counsel\u2019s behavior is not a basis for automatic recusal). Nothing that has been presented to this court suggests that Judge Urso was unable to \u201chold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.\u201d See People v. Del Vecchio, 129 Ill. 2d 265, 275 (1989), citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 71 L. Ed. 749, 758, 47 S. Ct. 437, 444 (1927). Since principles of fundamental fairness do not require a relaxation of the procedural bar, the issue of judicial bias is waived.\n(b) Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony\nDefendant next contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was denied a fair resentencing hearing because \u201chypnotically enhanced\u201d testimony was introduced through Urica Winder. An evidentiary hearing is warranted, however, only when the allegations in the petition, supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights have been violated. People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179 (2000); People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998). In the case at bar the record and supporting documents do not support a finding that Urica Winder\u2019s testimony was \u201chypnotically enhanced.\u201d\nDefendant relies on a July 10, 1988, Chicago Tribune article as evidence that \u201cdream analysis\u201d may have been used on Urica. However, the article contains only Dr. Soter\u2019s recollection of a dream that Urica once told him about. Dr. Soter was Urica\u2019s treating physician and he provided no psychological counseling or therapy. The article is not evidence that hypnosis or \u201cdream analysis\u201d were techniques employed in any therapy Urica might have received.\nFurthermore, the record does not support defendant\u2019s assertion that Urica\u2019s testimony \u201cevolved and became more detailed over the course of time.\u201d Our review of the record indicates that Urica was consistent in her testimony throughout all of the proceedings. We conclude that defendant\u2019s claim that the State employed Urica\u2019s \u201cartificially enhanced\u201d testimony at his sentencing hearing is speculative and does not rise to the level of a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.\n(c) Other Claims\n. Defendant presents, in list form, eight additional claims of error. However, his argument is directed only to his eighth claim, in which he contends that his constitutional rights were violated because he was denied the right of allocution at his resentencing.\nOn several occasions, this court has held that a defendant has no statutory or constitutional right to allocution in a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1 (2000); People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348 (2000); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484 (1996). As to the remaining claims, we decline to address them. Our rules provide that an appellant\u2019s brief must contain \u201c[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on\u201d and \u201c[p]oints not argued are waived.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Consequently, the remaining claims of error are waived.\nBecause defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional right to a fair sentencing hearing was violated, we find that the trial court properly dismissed these claims without an evidentiary hearing.\nIV Appropriateness of the Death Penalty\nIt is defendant\u2019s contention that death is not an appropriate penalty in this case. He argues that, \u201cwhen proper consideration is given to the circumstances of the crime in this case, as well as to [defendant\u2019s] life history, it is evident that he is not the type of person who should be permanently eliminated from society.\u201d Noting that his codefendant received a natural life sentence, defendant asks this court to vacate his death sentence and remand for a sentence other than death.\nClearly, the legislature never intended that every defendant who is eligible for the death penalty receive a death sentence (People v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338 (1996)), and this court has not hesitated to vacate a death sentence where the circumstances did not indicate that death was an appropriate sentence (see People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992); People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253 (1989); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986); People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145 (1980)). However, whether a death sentence is excessive or inappropriate depends on the facts and circumstances of the case (People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 26-27 (1990)), and we cannot say, based on our review of the record, that a death sentence is excessive or inappropriate in this case.\nThe horrific facts of this case have been detailed in defendant\u2019s two direct appeals. See People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43 (1991); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998). Briefly, however, the record reveals that defendant and his friend, Driskel, while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, went to the apartment of an acquaintance (Mark Brown) after devising a plan to steal Brown\u2019s belongings, which they intended to sell to obtain money for more drugs. Before entering Brown\u2019s apartment, defendant gave Driskel a knife and, upon entering the apartment, they began stabbing Mark Brown, without provocation or warning, as Brown lay asleep on the couch. When Brown\u2019s fianc\u00e9e, Vernita Winder, saw what was happening, she tried to escape with her four-year-old and six-year-old daughters to a back bedroom. Vernita and her friend, Shirley Martin, tried desperately to hold the bedroom door closed against defendant and Driskel. Defendant, however, broke down the door and began stabbing the women, while Driskel stabbed the children. Four individuals, including a four-year-old child, died as a result of multiple stab wounds. Collectively, they received over 115 incised wounds. Urica, who was only six years old, also was stabbed repeatedly and left for dead.\nAdditional evidence in aggravation showed that defendant had a criminal history and an extensive prison disciplinary record. There was evidence that, while incarcerated, defendant threatened correctional officers and assaulted both guards and inmates on several occasions. One correctional officer, who had 27 years of experience, testified that he would rank defendant fourth in terms of dangerousness out of more than a thousand prisoners he had contact with.\nDefendant, who was 22 at the time of the murders, never held a legitimate job. He had supported himself by selling drugs. There was also evidence that defendant had been involved with gangs both inside and outside of prison.\nIn mitigation, the defense showed that defendant had been severely abused as a child and that he suffered from abnormal brain functioning, most probably as a result of head injury. Although defendant had obtained a GED, he had a borderline IQ and had never done well in school. He used drugs and alcohol since the age of nine.\nOn balance, we cannot say that the mitigation evidence outweighs the seriousness of the crimes and the additional aggravating evidence presented. Furthermore, we have already considered, and rejected, the argument made in defendant\u2019s direct appeal that his death sentence is unreasonably disparate from his codefendant\u2019s life sentence. For these reasons, we do not find that the sentence of death was excessive or inappropriately applied in this case.\nV Improper Questions Posed to the Venire\nIn this claim, defendant argues that he was denied a fair death penalty sentencing hearing because the trial court, when questioning the venire, \u201csuggested that a jury would have to be unanimous as to any findings of mitigating factors.\u201d\nThe State correctly argues that this issue is procedurally defaulted because defendant failed to raise this issue on direct appeal. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996). It is necessary, however, to consider whether principles of fundamental fairness require that we review the issue.\nAs stated, fundamental fairness is essentially a cause and prejudice test (see People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 173 (2000)), with \u201ccause\u201d defined as \u201can objective factor that impeded defense counsel\u2019s efforts to raise the claim on direct review\u201d and \u201cprejudice\u201d defined as \u201can error which so infected the entire trial that the defendant\u2019s conviction violates due process.\u201d People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1995). Upon review of the record in this case, we have determined that defendant is unable to satisfy the prejudice prong of the \u201ccause and prejudice\u201d test. Even if some of the questions posed to members of the venire were misleading, as defendant contends, the likelihood that this had an effect on the sentencing jury\u2019s verdict is too remote to require reversal.\nThe purpose of voir dire is not to instruct the jury, \u201c \u2018[t]he purpose of voir dire is to ascertain sufficient information about prospective jurors\u2019 beliefs and opinions so as to allow removal of those members of the venire whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that they cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance with their oath.\u2019 \u201d People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 476 (2000), quoting People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 495-96 (1993). Defendant does not contend that the trial court failed to adequately screen the venirepersons for bias. The members of the venire who were selected to sit on the jury were fully and properly instructed on their duties with regard to imposition of the death penalty. Thus, any confusion that might have arisen due to the court\u2019s preliminary inquiries to members of the venire would have been cured when, at the close of the aggravation/ mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued to the jury that \u201c[a] 11 of you don\u2019t have to decide that there is a mitigating factor, just one,\u201d and \u201cit only takes just one to say that there are sufficient mitigating factors which will prevent [defendant] from receiving death\u201d and when the trial court instructed the jury and provided it with verdict forms which accurately stated the requirements for imposition of the death penalty. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 471-72 (1996). There is no reasonable probability that defendant was prejudiced as a result of the voir dire questioning, which occurred long before the jury ever heard any evidence or determined whether defendant was eligible for the death penalty. Defendant\u2019s claim of error is waived.\nVI. Cumulative Effect of the Above Errors\nRecognizing that each of the claims of error raised in his post-conviction petition and in this appeal, standing alone, may be insufficient to warrant relief, defendant asks this court to assess the fairness of his trial and sentencing hearing after looking at the totality of the circumstances. He asks this court to decide whether these errors, which individually may be deemed harmless, cumulatively amount to a denial of due process.\nThis court has recognized that individual errors may have the cumulative effect of denying a defendant a fair hearing (People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 350 (2000); People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 376 (1992)) and has reversed convictions and sentences when it was clear that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the defendant of due process (see People v. Walker, 91 Ill. 2d 502, 516-17 (1982); People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 341-42 (1982); People v. Romero, 36 Ill. 2d 315, 319-20 (1967)). However, this case does not present such a situation.\nNone of the claims of error raised by defendant here were found to be of any merit. Thus, whether considered individually or in the aggregate, defendant\u2019s claims do not demonstrate a substantial violation of his constitutional rights. There is no basis for granting defendant an evidentiary hearing or any alternate relief requested.\nVII. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute\nDefendant next contends that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it lacks a burden of persuasion, thus making the death penalty mandatory where the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating evidence is offered.\nOn more than one occasion, this court has considered and rejected the identical argument presented in this appeal. See People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 429 (2000); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 62-63 (1996); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996); People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 227 (1989); People v. Christiansen, 116 Ill. 2d 96, 130 (1987); People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 265-66 (1983). We adhere to our prior decisions.\nFurthermore, we note that when a similar argument was presented in defendant\u2019s second direct appeal, this court upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute, finding that the statute places a burden of persuasion on both the State and the defendant, with the primary burden being on the State to persuade \u201c \u2018the jury that, as the statute states, there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the sentencer from imposing the sentence of death for which the defendant is eligible.\u2019 \u201d Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d at 94-95, quoting People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 139 (1990). Defendant\u2019s claim here must fail.\nVIII. Exemption From Death Penalty for Persons Who Require Special Forms of Communicative Assistance\nSection 104 \u2014 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 22 (West 2000)) recognizes that defendants with certain disabilities, who may otherwise be unfit to stand trial, may become fit if special provisions are made or assistance provided. However, the legislature has also determined that any defendant \u201cconvicted following a trial under Section 104 \u2014 22 shall not be subject to the death penalty.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/104\u2014 26(b) (West 2000). Defendant contends that this exemption renders the death penalty statute unconstitutionally discriminatory, arbitratry and capricious because it exempts from the death penalty a defendant who requires \u201ca translator or needs special assistance because of unfitness due to a physical disability.\u201d\nThe argument posited by defendant has been rejected by this court on previous occasions. This court has held that the death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because it exempts persons in need of special assistance. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123 (1989); People v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 90 (1988); People v. Perez, 108 Ill. 2d 70, 94-95 (1985). Furthermore, this court, in construing section 104 \u2014 10, has held that the statutory scheme does not intend that those defendants who are merely unable to speak or understand English be exempted from the death penalty. People v. Britz, 123 Ill. 2d 446 (1988). See also People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 294 (1988); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 202-03 (1988); People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 105 (1987). In fact, this court has held that any interpretation of sections 104 \u2014 22 and 104 \u2014 26(b) that would allow for such an exemption reflects \u201ca serious misunderstanding\u201d of the statutory scheme. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201, 212 (1985). Because defendant\u2019s premise is flawed, there is no merit to his argument that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing defendant\u2019s amended petition for post-conviction relief. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Tuesday, March 12, 2002, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Cook County is to be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119 \u2014 5 (West 1994)). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.\nAffirmed.\nA detailed account of the murders can be found in the opinions issued by this court in defendant\u2019s direct appeals. See People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43 (1991); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30 (1998).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" }, { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON,\ndissenting:\nThe proceedings which culminated in Jackson\u2019s sentence of death were fatally flawed because they did not comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 631-36 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now coming before us. Because Jackson was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.\nEven if Jackson were not entitled to the benefit of the new rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2). Absent the new rules, there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum, Jackson\u2019s sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 l(j) (West 1994). Because he was convicted of murdering more than one victim, the term of imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS 5/5_8 \u2014 l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1994).\nJUSTICE KILBRIDE,\nalso dissenting:\nFor the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe this cause should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with the new rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this court\u2019s adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights. For this reason, I believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen E. Eberhardt, of Crestwood, and Eric J. Bell, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Linda Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 88474.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LAWRENCE JACKSON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed December 20, 2001.\nRehearing denied April 1, 2002.\nHARRISON, C.J., and KILBRIDE, J., dissenting.\nStephen E. Eberhardt, of Crestwood, and Eric J. Bell, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Linda Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0247-01", "first_page_order": 259, "last_page_order": 298 }