{ "id": 1578352, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JUAN CABALLERO, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Caballero", "decision_date": "2002-10-18", "docket_number": "No. 88784", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "104", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156739 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Caballero I" }, { "page": "33-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557518 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Caballero II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603144 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Caballero III" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801351 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Caballero IV" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474529 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "acknowledging \"this court's duty to ensure that the cases in which death is imposed are rationally distinguished from those in which it is not imposed\"" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "170-71" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "152-53, 171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295591 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549", "parenthetical": "commenting that the doctrine \" 'estops a party from playing \"fast and loose\" with the court' \"" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372614 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "holding that the State did not take contradictory positions in two proceedings where, in the first proceeding, Jones pleaded guilty to murder and identified Cooks as the shooter and, in the second proceeding, the State charged Gayfield with the murder and identified him as the shooter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5255224 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "holding the State estopped from using results of breathalyzer test in DUI prosecution when it had previously taken the position that defendant refused to take the test in proceeding to obtain summary suspension of his driver's license" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 F.3d 1045", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11461899 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1049" }, { "page": "1052" }, { "page": "1052" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/205/1045-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 F.3d 1045", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 224521 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1056" }, { "page": "1057" }, { "page": "1058" }, { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/120/1045-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 538", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11503916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 720", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 F.3d 989", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11198844 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/217/0989-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 F.2d 990", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1934447 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/727/0990-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783176 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096308 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "stating that de novo review is appropriate when there are no factual or credibility disputes and the appeal, therefore, \"involves a pure question of law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725355 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21", "parenthetical": "stating that de novo review is applicable to questions of statutory interpretation or other questions of law" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453255 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317113 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224772 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "498" }, { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "noting that codefendant's prison record over four years shows \"repeated disciplinary violations involving violence, including possession of a weapon, attacking prison staff members, and fighting\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302605 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "finding defendant's poor adjustment to incarceration \"as evidenced by his possession of weapons and his receipt of 44 disciplinary tickets while in prison\" relevant to the comparison of criminal records of the codefendants" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302618 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134", "parenthetical": "affirming death penalty where codefendant's criminal record was \"quantitatively more severe than defendant's\" but defendant's participation in the multiple homicides was \"not significantly less\" than that of the codefendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596222 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "holding that an unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants violates the United States and Illinois Constitutions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781339 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "45-46" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176749 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" }, { "page": "883" }, { "page": "2932" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 280", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177464 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "961" }, { "page": "2991" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563775 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317114 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096299 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29953 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 U.S. 279", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6214785 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292-93" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "1767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 456", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11745202 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "1487" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "1487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801351 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220-21" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609695 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636-40", "parenthetical": "Kilbride, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609709 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581-85", "parenthetical": "Kilbride, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0536-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1939, "char_count": 70014, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0811996702125746e-07, "percentile": 0.7590963797503252 }, "sha256": "16bbb6ca4b469b0b72c005c7225aeb4bf5c1823441608930c0c32805a0928306", "simhash": "1:fbf756b57680e618", "word_count": 11570 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:03.084702+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JUAN CABALLERO, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nLate on a February night in 1979, three teenaged boys left an all-night diner in Chicago. On their way out of the restaurant, one of them approached a group of four others in an attempt to purchase marijuana. Not knowing that the four were members of the Latin Kings, he falsely claimed membership in a rival gang, the Latin Eagles. Before the night was over, the three were lured into an alley and murdered.\nThree of the four killers, defendant, Luis Ruiz, and Placido LaBoy, were apprehended within days, but LaBoy was released after a preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause. Defendant and Ruiz were both tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. The fourth, Nelson Aviles, fled to California, where he was eventually arrested in 1988. He agreed to plead guilty and to testify against LaBoy, in return for a sentence of 40 years\u2019 imprisonment. The State unsuccessfully sought the death penalty for LaBoy, who received three consecutive natural life sentences.\nThis is the fifth occasion we have had to consider whether defendant was properly sentenced to death for his involvement in the brutal slayings of Michael Salcido, Arthur Salcido, and Frank Mussa. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions of murder, armed violence, and unlawful restraint and the imposition of the death sentence. People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23 (1984) (Caballero I). Following the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of defendant\u2019s first post-conviction petition, this court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on defendant\u2019s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly prepare and present evidence in mitigation. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (1989) (Caballero II). On remand, the circuit court held the required hearing and again dismissed defendant\u2019s claim. We affirmed. People v. Caballero, 152 Ill. 2d 347 (1992) (Caballero III). Defendant\u2019s second post-conviction petition claimed that his death sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentences imposed on Aviles and LaBoy. The circuit court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We rejected his claim as to Aviles, on the basis that Aviles\u2019 guilty plea justified the substantial disparity in their sentences. As to LaBoy, however, we reversed in part and remanded to the circuit court for a hearing. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205 (1997) (Caballero IV). The circuit court held the required hearing and rejected defendant\u2019s claim.\nDefendant raises two claims in the present appeal: (1) his constitutional right to due process was violated because he did not receive a full and fair hearing before the circuit court on remand, and (2) his death sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to LaBoy\u2019s life sentences. In addition, we granted leave to the United Mexican States to submit a brief amicus curiae. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. Caballero Trial and Sentencing\nAt defendant\u2019s trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence of a statement made by defendant on the night of his arrest. Defendant denied making the statement, claiming that he was beaten by two police officers and threatened with more beatings if he did not sign a written statement that they placed in front of him. The State\u2019s witnesses testified that when defendant was told by the investigating officer that Ruiz had already made a statement implicating him, he gave his own version of the killings. He was advised of his rights and a court reporter took his statement, which he voluntarily signed.\nDefendant\u2019s written statement said that he, Ruiz, LaBoy, and Aviles were entering a restaurant called King Castle as three other young men were leaving. One of them, Michael, approached Ruiz and asked if he knew where they could buy some marijuana. After Ruiz said no, Michael asked if he knew Juan Cortez. The four were members of the Latin Kings and they knew that Cortez was a Latin Eagle, but they played along with Michael, letting him think that they were members of the same gang as Cortez. Michael bragged about his connections to the Latin Eagles and claimed to have driven the car during several \u201chits.\u201d\nThe three got into the front seat of their car, the four others got in the back seat, and they drove into a nearby alley on the pretense of making a drug deal. Arthur and Frank were told to stay in the car while the four walked down the alley with Michael. Once they were out of sight, they began to beat and kick Michael. When he was on the ground, they revealed that they were Latin Kings.\nDefendant and Aviles stayed with Michael while Ruiz and LaBoy returned to the car. They came back a few minutes later, with the car. LaBoy was driving, with Arthur and Frank still in the front seat. Ruiz was in the back seat. Defendant, Aviles, and Michael got in the back seat and LaBoy drove to another alley. During this brief drive, the four conversed in Spanish and decided that they had to kill the three young men so that they could not identify them.\nAfter they stopped, Ruiz handed defendant a gun. Defendant and LaBoy walked Michael and Frank down the alley and ordered them to lie facedown in a snowbank. Defendant gave the gun to LaBoy and told him to stay there while he went back to the car to see what was happening. When he got there, he saw Aviles repeatedly stabbing Arthur, who was in the right front seat of the car.\nDr. Robert Kirschner, the medical examiner, had testified earlier in the trial that Arthur was found in the front passenger seat of the car, with 18 neck wounds and eight chest wounds. The neck wounds severed both carotid arteries and both jugular veins as well as the trachea. He had no defensive wounds.\nRuiz told defendant to \u201cgo get the other guy.\u201d Frank was led back to the car and told to close his eyes and get in the left front seat. LaBoy told defendant to stab him, but defendant stated that he had never stabbed anyone and would rather shoot him. LaBoy grabbed the knife from Aviles and began stabbing Frank. Defendant stated, \u201cI told him to slice his throat.\u201d Defendant then went back to where Michael was lying in the snow to watch him.\nKirschner testified that Frank was found in the driver\u2019s seat and died as a result of 21 stab wounds to the neck, jaw, chest, and back. He also had an incised wound of the face. He had no defensive wounds.\nFinally, defendant led Michael back to the car and told him to keep his eyes closed and get in the back seat. Michael opened his eyes and, when he saw the others, began to resist. Defendant took the knife from LaBoy, grabbed Michael by his hair, and slashed his throat. He continued to stab Michael until he got tired. Michael yelled, \u201cI\u2019m dead. I\u2019m dead. Don\u2019t stab me.\u201d Defendant stabbed him a few more times. LaBoy took the knife and stabbed him several more times, to make sure he was dead.\nKirschner\u2019s testimony was that Michael had multiple stab wounds, including 24 to the face and neck, 5 to the chest and abdomen, and 3 to the back. Michael had defensive wounds to the right hand and forearm. He was found in the back seat of the car.\nDefendant said that Ruiz, LaBoy, and Aviles then took several pairs of socks from a suitcase they had found in the car, put the socks on their hands, and attempted to wipe off any fingerprints they might have left. The police recovered two bloody socks near the scene, which were admitted into evidence. In addition, one fingerprint matching Ruiz was found on an outside rear window of the car. As they walked away, LaBoy discarded the knife in a snowbank. The four went to LaBoy\u2019s house to clean up. Ruiz stated that he had to return the gun he had been carrying to the person from whom he borrowed it. The others got in a cab to go home.\nThe assistant State\u2019s Attorney who questioned defendant testified that he read the transcribed statement, made some corrections, and signed it. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney asked defendant whether, if he had it to do over, he would do the same thing again. Defendant replied, \u201c[I]f it was a sure thing.\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney answered, \u201c[T]here\u2019s no such thing as a sure thing. You got caught.\u201d Defendant\u2019s response was, \u201c[A] lot of Kings kill people without getting caught. *** I\u2019d kill Michael for sure, but I don\u2019t know about the other two.\u201d\nDefendant agreed to return to the scene with the detectives and to point out where the knife had been discarded. They did not recover the knife at that time. A knife was discovered in a snowbank several days later by a passerby, who turned it over to the police. It had minute bloodstains that were insufficient to type or identify.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges and the sentencing stage began several days later. As to defendant\u2019s history of prior criminal activity, the State introduced evidence of defendant\u2019s prior conviction for unlawful use of a weapon in 1978, for which he received a sentence of probation. The jury also heard testimony that while in custody awaiting trial, defendant solicited another prisoner who was about to be released to put out a \u201chit\u201d on the individual defendant suspected of informing the police of his involvement in the three murders.\nB. LaBoy Trial and Sentencing\nOver a decade later, Aviles testified that he had been a 17-year-old gang member in 1979 when he and three older members of the Latin Kings \u2014 Caballero, Ruiz, and LaBoy \u2014 met three young men as they were leaving the King Castle restaurant, which was on Latin Eagle \u201cturf.\u201d One of the young men said that he was looking for Juan Cortez because he wanted to buy some marijuana. Aviles and his companions knew that Cortez was the leader of the Latin Eagles. Ruiz told the boys that he knew where they could buy some \u201cweed,\u201d but they needed a ride to get there. All seven got into the car, the three eventual victims in the front seat and the four Latin Kings in back. As they drove, Michael Salcido bragged about having done \u201ca couple of hits on Latin Kings.\u201d Speaking in Spanish, Ruiz told Aviles and the others that they were going to \u201crob these guys.\u201d The three boys in the front seat did not react. None of them spoke Spanish.\nRuiz directed the driver to an alley. He stayed with Arthur and Frank at the car while Aviles, Caballero, and LaBoy took Michael around a corner, ostensibly to make the marijuana purchase. As soon as they were out of sight of the others, LaBoy \u201cjumped on him\u201d and started to beat him up. Michael fell to the ground and Aviles picked him up. Michael was \u201chysterical.\u201d He screamed that he was not an Eagle, that he had just wanted to be their friend. LaBoy yelled at him to shut up and continued to beat him. Eventually, they walked Michael back to the car. When the others saw Michael crying and beaten and asked what was going on, Ruiz pulled a gun. Aviles and the others began to rob the victims, taking their watches and the contents of their pockets. Michael told them to take whatever they wanted and promised that they would not go to the police. LaBoy struck him in the face and told him to shut up.\nAt that point, Ruiz said, in Spanish, that they had to kill the three boys. Aviles responded, still in Spanish, that he thought they were only going to rob them. LaBoy said that the three had seen their faces, so they could not let them go, but he had a better way of dealing with it than Ruiz\u2019s gun. He pulled a knife, which he handed to Ruiz. Then he grabbed the boy who had been driving (Arthur) and shoved him into the front seat of the car on the passenger side. Caballero and LaBoy walked Michael and Frank down the alley. Ruiz called Aviles around to the other side of the car, handed him the knife, and told him to get in the car and \u201cdo the guy.\u201d Aviles hesitated, but Ruiz kept telling him to go ahead. Ruiz was pointing the gun at Arthur as Aviles stabbed him in the chest three or four times. When Arthur put his hands up as if to resist, Aviles panicked and dropped the knife. Then the passenger side door burst open and LaBoy grabbed the knife. He began stabbing Arthur, while screaming at Aviles for not \u201ctaking care of business.\u201d LaBoy grabbed Arthur by the head and slit his throat, telling Aviles, \u201cThis is how you do it.\u201d He sliced repeatedly at Arthur\u2019s throat and stabbed him in the chest several times. When he was done, he licked the blood from his hand as he told Aviles that he had \u201cno heart\u201d and that this was how a \u201ctrue King takes care of business.\u201d Aviles told LaBoy that he \u201cdidn\u2019t want any part of this,\u201d so LaBoy sent him down the alley to act as a lookout.\nAs he walked down the alley, he saw Caballero, who had the other two boys on the ground in the snow. Aviles threw up in some bushes. Later, he saw LaBoy take \u201cthe guy that was doing all the talking\u201d (Michael) back to the car and force him into the back seat. Michael begged him not to kill him, screaming that he was not an Eagle. LaBoy told him to shut up and started stabbing him.\nRuiz, LaBoy, and Caballero eventually motioned for Aviles to come back to the car. When he did, he saw th\u00e1t all three of the boys were dead, two in the front seat of the car and one in the back. LaBoy and Ruiz said that they had to wipe the car down. LaBoy took the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk. He opened a suitcase he found inside and started passing out the socks they used to wipe the car of fingerprints. They threw the bloody socks into backyards along the alley as they walked away. LaBoy shoved the knife into a pile of snow. Ruiz left, and the others went to LaBoy\u2019s home.\nThe jury found LaBoy guilty. At the sentencing phase, the State argued that LaBoy was the most culpable of the four killers, and that he was responsible for all 24 stab wounds inflicted on Michael. Reflecting Aviles\u2019 testimony, the State\u2019s only mention of defendant was to describe him as aiding, abetting, or attempting to aid LaBoy.\nC. The Evidentiary Hearing\nIn Caballero IV, this court found that defendant had made \u201ca substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated so as to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on the disparity between his death sentence and LaBoy\u2019s life sentence.\u201d Caballero IV, 179 Ill. 2d at 217, citing People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145, 166 (1980) (acknowledging \u201cthis court\u2019s duty to ensure that the cases in which death is imposed are rationally distinguished from those in which it is not imposed\u201d).\nThe evidence before the circuit court at the evidentiary hearing consisted of the transcripts of the trials and sentencing hearings of defendant and LaBoy. No additional testimony was presented. Defense counsel preceded her argument with a summary of the factors relevant in the analysis of sentencing disparity: the relative culpability of the offenders (Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 166), their rehabilitative prospects (Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 171), and their criminal histories (Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 170-71). Defense counsel argued that defendant\u2019s only criminal record, prior to being found guilty of these three murders, was for unlawful possession of a weapon. He received a sentence of probation. In contrast, after the murders at issue here, but before his trial, LaBoy was convicted of three major felonies, all involving armed violence, and one of which was the attempted aggravated sexual assault of a 16-year-old girl. Counsel also noted that defendant has been a model prisoner for 20 years, thus demonstrating his potential for rehabilitation, while LaBoy\u2019s subsequent actions show that he is unlikely to ever be rehabilitated. In addition, LaBoy took pleasure in the three murders, smiling and licking the blood from his fingers in a \u201cparticularly ghoulish\u201d display that further demonstrated his lack of rehabilitative potential. As to the relative culpability of the two, counsel argued that it was LaBoy who initiated the beating of Michael and then rejected Ruiz\u2019s plan to use a gun and produced the knife. Defendant had \u201cno role\u201d in the killings of Arthur and Frank. He did stab Michael, but so did LaBoy. LaBoy also took the lead in the attempt to wipe down the car and dispose of the murder weapon. Counsel also pointed to the State\u2019s closing argument at LaBoy\u2019s trial that he was the principal in at least two of the killings while defendant was merely aiding and abetting. Defense counsel concluded that LaBoy was the \u201cworst actor\u201d under all three factors of the analysis.\nThe State responded that defendant was an \u201cactive and willing participant\u201d in all three killings. He participated in the beating of Michael, took part in setting up the murder, encouraged LaBoy to use a knife instead of a gun, escorted two of the victims back to the car to their deaths, and actually killed one of them. Thus, he was not simply a follower or bystander.\nThe State also explained that the evidence presented in the two cases was slightly different. At defendant\u2019s trial, his own statement about his role in the events of that night was introduced into evidence. The statement was not admitted in the LaBoy trial. Aviles\u2019 testimony was the linchpin of the State\u2019s case against LaBoy, but Aviles\u2019 perspective was slightly different from defendant\u2019s and, as a result, different facts were emphasized. For example, because Aviles walked away from the scene for awhile, he did not observe some of the events that defendant described. Aviles portrayed LaBoy as the ringleader, while defendant\u2019s version suggested that he, Ruiz, and LaBoy were equals in this regard.\nThe State argued that defendant is the \u201cmost culpable\u201d of the four killers because he took a \u201cmore active role\u201d in setting up the murders. He forced two of the victims to lie facedown in the snow while they waited to be taken back to the car where they were murdered. He urged LaBoy to slice Frank\u2019s throat and \u201csavagely murdered\u201d Michael. Ruiz may have come up with the initial plan or, perhaps, \u201cwas the first to speak it aloud,\u201d but defendant \u201ckept it going.\u201d As to rehabilitative potential, the State acknowledged that LaBoy had been convicted of several violent felonies during the years it took to bring him to trial for these killings and that these convictions demonstrated his lack of potential. However, defendant\u2019s own words and actions demonstrated his lack of rehabilitative potential. He showed no remorse and stated that he would kill again if it were a sure thing. He tried to arrange for another murder from his jail cell. In conclusion, the State argued that both defendant and LaBoy should have received the death penalty; however, just because one or more of the LaBoy jurors were not convinced of this, defendant\u2019s death sentence is not rendered unconstitutional.\nDefense counsel pointed out that, at each trial, the prosecutor argued that the person on trial was the most culpable. Such conduct by the prosecutors, counsel argued, is \u201cscandalous.\u201d The State responded that such argument is merely advocacy.\nAt the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that: (1) defendant was \u201cas involved\u201d as LaBoy and was an active and willing participant in the killings; (2) LaBoy had a more significant criminal history \u201cat the time of their respective sentencings\u201d than did defendant; and (3) at the time he was sentenced, defendant was \u201ca ruthless killer who exhibited absolutely no remorse for his crime and, in fact, indicated that he would do it again if he could get away with it,\u201d revealing that his potential for rehabilitation was \u201cabsolutely none.\u201d Therefore, the circuit court ruled, defendant\u2019s death sentence was not unconstitutionally disparate from LaBoy\u2019s life sentences.\nII. DUE PROCESS\nDefendant asserts that he was denied a full and fair evidentiary hearing before the circuit court, in violation of his constitutional right to due process. Specifically, he claims that the State argued before the LaBoy jury that LaBoy was the most culpable of the four killers while defendant was \u201caiding and abetting, [and] attempting to aid,\u201d and then, at the evidentiary hearing, argued that defendant was the more active participant in the killings and that LaBoy\u2019s conduct was peripheral. According to defendant, the State\u2019s characterization of his role in the killings \u201ccontradicted the theory\u201d the State advanced at LaBoy\u2019s trial and was \u201cincompatible with the evidence presented there.\u201d He further claims that he was prejudiced because the circuit court accepted the State\u2019s characterization of his actions as more blameworthy than LaBoy\u2019s. Defendant\u2019s brief describes the State\u2019s conduct as \u201ccho[osing] to misrepresent the facts.\u201d\nIn its brief, the State concedes that the comments made about defendant\u2019s culpability during closing argument at the LaBoy trial, which minimized defendant\u2019s involvement in the killings, were inaccurate, but were \u201cnothing more than a passing reference\u201d and \u201cnot a declaration of defendant\u2019s role in the murders.\u201d Further, because defendant\u2019s role in the killings was established by his 1979 confession and LaBoy\u2019s role was established by Aviles\u2019 1992 testimony, minor discrepancies between the two accounts are to be expected.\nThe State further acknowledges that it made a \u201cmistake\u201d at the evidentiary hearing by arguing that defendant is the most culpable of the four killers. Because this was argument to the bench, rather than an assertion of fact, and because the court had access to the transcripts of both trials, the State now argues that the mistake did not prejudice defendant.\nThe State\u2019s current position is that defendant and LaBoy are equally culpable in the three killings and that the death penalty would be appropriate for both. Although one or more members of the LaBoy jury chose to reject the death penalty, defendant\u2019s role as an active participant in the killings justifies the imposition of the death penalty. With regard to rehabilitative potential, the State\u2019s brief postulates that defendant\u2019s prospects for rehabilitation were \u201cdismal\u201d at the time he was sentenced and that LaBoy\u2019s were \u201cno better.\u201d During oral argument, however, the State argued that defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation is less than LaBoy\u2019s because LaBoy expressed remorse for the killings while defendant was \u201ccold-hearted\u201d and stated that he would do the same thing again if he thought he could get by with it. The State also suggests that their criminal records are not subject to comparison because, while LaBoy was at large committing several felonies, defendant was on death row where he had \u201cno further opportunity to offend.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s due process argument rests on the State\u2019s changing positions on the issues of culpability and rehabilitative prospects. Defendant claims that if the State \u201chad stayed true\u201d to the position argued to the LaBoy jury \u2014 that LaBoy is the most culpable \u2014 defendant would have prevailed before the circuit court on his sentencing-disparity claim. In addition, defendant argues that the State has admitted LaBoy\u2019s prospects for rehabilitation are \u201cno better\u201d than his and asks this court to \u201chold them to that.\u201d At oral argument, defense counsel characterized the State\u2019s conduct as \u201cplaying fast and loose\u201d with the court. The effect of the State\u2019s arguing \u201ca theory of culpability that [the prosecutor] knew was invalidated by evidence his office had stood by in the past\u201d was to make the evidentiary hearing \u201cfundamentally unfair.\u201d\nDefendant does not suggest what remedy would be appropriate if this court were to agree with his due process claim. His use of the expression \u201cplaying \u2018fast and loose\u2019 \u201d sounds in the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which \u201cprovides that a party who assumes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding.\u201d Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549 (1996) (commenting that the doctrine \u201c \u2018estops a party from playing \u201cfast and loose\u201d with the court\u2019 \u201d). The doctrine of judicial estoppel rests not upon due process concerns, but \u201cupon public policy which upholds the sanctity of the oath and its purpose is to bar as evidence statements and declarations which would be contrary to sworn testimony the party has given in the same or previous judicial proceedings.\u201d Bidani, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 549. Five elements are generally required for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply: the party to be estopped must have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from it. People v. Coffin, 305 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598 (1999). Application of the doctrine is within the discretion of the court. Bidani, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 550.\nThis court has rarely, if ever, had occasion to consider the doctrine, but our appellate court has done so in the context of criminal proceedings. See Coffin, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 598 (holding that the State is not estopped from using results of a blood-alcohol test performed on blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant for DUI, even though the State previously used defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary suspension of driver\u2019s license; the positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent); People v. Gayfield, 261 Ill. App. 3d 379, 386 (1994) (holding that the State did not take contradictory positions in two proceedings where, in the first proceeding, Jones pleaded guilty to murder and identified Cooks as the shooter and, in the second proceeding, the State charged Gayfield with the murder and identified him as the shooter); People v. Wisbrock, 223 Ill. App. 3d 173, 175 (1991) (holding the State estopped from using results of breathalyzer test in DUI prosecution when it had previously taken the position that defendant refused to take the test in proceeding to obtain summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license)-.\nThe doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply in the present case because the disputed statements by the State regarding relative culpability and rehabilitative prospects were matters of opinion, not of fact. Thus, despite invoking the familiar \u201cfast and loose\u201d mantra of judicial estoppel, defendant argues that his right to due process is violated when the State is allowed to offer argument that contradicts its earlier argument on the same issue. Defendant cites two cases in support of his claim that the State\u2019s shifting positions on the questions of relative culpability and potential for rehabilitation violate the due process clause. The State attempts to distinguish both cases on the basis that they involve the guilt phase of trial, not disparity of sentencing.\nIn Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered \u201cwhether the Due Process Clause forbids a state from using inconsistent, irreconcilable theories to secure convictions against two or more defendants in prosecutions for the same offenses arising out of the same event.\u201d Four juveniles were involved in the robbery and murders at issue in Smith. One of them, Lytle, gave two conflicting versions of the killings. The State used one version to convict Smith and the other version to convict Bowman. The court held that the State\u2019s \u201cuse of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of due process.\u201d Smith, 205 F.3d at 1052.\nIn Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 1997), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538, 140 L. Ed. 2d 720, 118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998), the circuit court of appeals found \u201cglaring inconsistenc[ies] between the prosecutor\u2019s theories, arguments, and factual representations\u201d at the separate trials of the two defendants. \u201cThe prosecutor manipulated evidence and witnesses, argued inconsistent motives, and at [the trial of the second defendant] essentially ridiculed the theory he had used to obtain a conviction and death sentence [at the trial of the first defendant].\u201d Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1057. The State\u2019s conduct in this case violated the \u201cbedrock principle[ ]\u201d that \u201cwhen no new significant evidence comes to light a prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories and facts regarding the same crime.\u201d Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058.\nWe agree with the State that no due process violation occurred. First, the State has not offered \u201cinconsistent theories and facts regarding the same crime\u201d (Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058). Rather, at defendant\u2019s trial, the State used his own statement as the basis for its argument to the jury that he deserved the death penalty. At LaBoy\u2019s trial, the State used Aviles\u2019 testimony, which contained more detail about LaBoy\u2019s conduct than defendant\u2019s earlier statement, to argue that LaBoy deserved the death penalty. As the Smith court noted, \u201cthe passage of time between trials *** may be a legitimate excuse for minor variations in testimony or defects in memory ***.\u201d Smith, 205 F.3d at 1052. At the evidentiary hearing and before this court, the State has not argued inconsistent facts. Instead, it has merely made different arguments from those facts.\nOur own research has identified the case of United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2000), in which the defendant was sentenced to death while his co-offender was given a life sentence. Both men shot at the victim during an armed robbery, but it was impossible to determine which gun caused the fatal wound. The prosecutor argued at both trials that the defendant on trial was the killer. Citing Smith, the court determined that there was no due process violation where the prosecutor made inconsistent arguments at the two trials, but did not use evidence that was \u201cfactually inconsistent and irreconcilable.\u201d Paul, 217 F.3d at 998.\nSimilarly, in Drake v. Francis, 727 F.2d 990 (11th Cir. 1984), the State\u2019s arguments at the trials of two defendants varied only with regard to the extent of their involvement in the murder. In the first case, the prosecutor argued that the defendant was the sole murderer. In the second case, the prosecutor argued that the first defendant had been too weak to commit the crime alone and that, therefore, the second defendant must have participated in the fatal attack. Drake, 727 F.2d at 994. Both were convicted and sentenced to death. The court of appeals found that the two theories were \u201cfairly consistent\u201d and that there was no due process violation. Drake, 727 F.2d at 994.\nThese cases stand for the proposition that a party is not as bound by his prior arguments as he is by prior assertions of fact. We conclude that no due process violation has occurred in the present case when the State\u2019s shifting positions involved matters of opinion, not of underlying fact. We, therefore, decline to hold the State to the argument it made to the LaBoy jury that he is the most culpable of the four killers. That argument was permissible in the context of the LaBoy trial and supported by the evidence presented to that jury. In this proceeding, however, the purpose is the direct comparison of the relative culpability of defendant and LaBoy. We do not find it necessary to constrain the State\u2019s argument on this issue.\nWe do, however, hold the State to its position that, at the time of sentencing, defendant and LaBoy had equally \u201cdismal\u201d prospects for rehabilitation, because the State has asserted this argument in its brief before this court. We will not consider counsel\u2019s remark at oral argument that defendant\u2019s prospects were \u201cworse\u201d because, unlike LaBoy, he did not express remorse for the murders.\nDefendant also argues his right to due process will be violated by allowing the State to base its relative-culpability argument on the record of his own trial, because the factual discrepancies between defendant\u2019s \u201cpurported\u201d confession and Aviles\u2019 testimony cannot be reconciled. As an initial matter, we reject the implication that defendant\u2019s statement should be considered less rehable than Aviles\u2019 because it allegedly was not voluntary. At defendant\u2019s trial, the court rejected defendant\u2019s claim of coercion and this court affirmed that ruling on appeal. Caballero I, 102 Ill. 2d at 33-37. Because the relative culpability of defendant and LaBoy must be determined by a comparison of their roles in the murders, we have examined both transcripts in depth to ascertain the extent and significance of the discrepancies.\nDefendant\u2019s statement described their stopping the car twice, in two different alleys. The beating of Michael took place at the first location and the killings at the second. Aviles did not mention getting back in the car and moving to another alley after the beating. In their descriptions of the beating, defendant had all four Kings participating, while Aviles made LaBoy primarily responsible.\nBoth defendant and Aviles testified that defendant and LaBoy took Frank and Michael down the alley to guard them while Arthur was killed. Aviles noted that, at that point, Ruiz had already pulled a gun and LaBoy had produced a knife. Aviles said that Ruiz gave the knife to him and he began to stab Arthur while Ruiz held the gun on them both. According to defendant\u2019s version, Ruiz could not have been holding the gun on Aviles, because defendant took the gun with him when he and LaBoy went down the alley. Defendant also said that he gave the gun to LaBoy and left him to guard Frank and Michael. Defendant walked back to the car in time to see Aviles stabbing Arthur.\nThe two versions differ at this point because Aviles stated that LaBoy returned to the car, took the knife from him, and began stabbing Arthur. According to Aviles, LaBoy licked blood from his fingers and bragged about how a King takes care of business, details that were clearly intended to portray to the LaBoy jury that he was the ringleader and the most culpable of the four. Aviles did not mention defendant\u2019s returning to the car. If, however, both defendant and LaBoy were at the car to see Aviles stabbing Arthur, no one was guarding Frank and Michael.\nDefendant said that Ruiz told him to go get Frank. He brought Frank back to the car and LaBoy told defendant to stab him. When defendant hesitated, LaBoy took the knife from Aviles and began to stab Frank. Thus, in both accounts, LaBoy took the knife from Aviles, but they differ as to whether he used it to stab Arthur or Frank. Defendant admitting telling LaBoy to slice Frank\u2019s throat before he went back to watch Michael.\nAviles, however, testified that after Arthur\u2019s killing, he was sent down the alley to act as a lookout; he did not see Frank being stabbed. Aviles claimed to have seen defendant still guarding Frank and Michael in the alley, which conflicts with defendant\u2019s description of his coming back to the car while Aviles was still stabbing Arthur and leaving LaBoy to stand guard.\nAviles also testified that he saw LaBoy take Michael back to the car, force him into the back seat, and stab him. Defendant said that he was the one who led Michael to the car, took the knife from LaBoy, slashed Michael\u2019s throat, and began stabbing him. Only when he tired did LaBoy take the knife back and stab him some more.\nThe State attributes any factual discrepancies in the two accounts to the passage of time and the fact that Aviles did not see everything that happened, because he went down the alley during the second killing.\nWe recognize that the two accounts differ somewhat. It is not certain whether LaBoy stabbed all three of the victims, or only two. LaBoy did apparently take the knife away from one of the others and continue to stab an already wounded victim, either taking the knife from Aviles to stab Arthur or taking the knife from defendant to stab Michael. Defendant and Aviles also gave differing accounts of who was at the car at various times and who held the gun. We reject, however, the suggestion that Aviles\u2019 testimony exculpates defendant. More than a decade passed between the events in the alley and LaBoy\u2019s trial. Memories fade. Aviles certainly told a version that implicated himself as little as possible. In addition, the State\u2019s purpose at the LaBoy trial was to elicit testimony from Aviles that fully described LaBoy\u2019s role in the killings, not the roles of Ruiz and defendant. Aviles\u2019 focus on LaBoy\u2019s conduct does not provide a basis for concluding anything about defendant\u2019s conduct that night.\nIn another case that involved a substantial delay between the trials of the two codefendants, the defendant in People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 184 (1994), was convicted and sentenced to death in 1982. His codefendant, Moore, was not tried until 1986. In his post-conviction proceeding, Thompkins argued that the testimony presented at Moore\u2019s trial established that Moore played a more significant role in the two murders of which they were both convicted. We rejected Thompkin\u2019s claim, finding that \u201c[ajlthough the testimony presented at Moore\u2019s trial provides a more complete picture of Moore\u2019s participation in these offenses, that evidence does not detract from the earlier depiction at the defendant\u2019s trial of defendant\u2019s own involvement in the crimes.\u201d Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d at 184. The same can be said of the present case.\nIn sum, we find no irreconcilable contradictions between the factual accounts offered by the State at the two trials that could be said to affect defendant\u2019s due process rights. Therefore, there is no need to limit the State\u2019s argument to the evidence presented at LaBoy\u2019s trial.\nIII. DISPARITY OF SENTENCES The defendant argues, and the State does not dispute, that de novo review is appropriate in a post-conviction case in which no new evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing that would require the circuit court to assess the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, because the circuit court only examined the records of the two trials and heard argument on behalf of each party, defendant urges this court to review the matter de novo.\nNo decision of this court has discussed the applicable standard of review in such a situation. The de novo standard of review is applicable when the issue presented is purely a question of law. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 217 (2000) (stating that de novo review is appropriate when there are no factual or credibility disputes and the appeal, therefore, \u201cinvolves a pure question of law\u201d); see also People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2000) (stating that de novo review is applicable to questions of statutory interpretation or other questions of law). In Hall, the defendant urged de novo review because the rulings at issue \u201cinvolved no fact-finding based on the demeanor or credibility of the witnesses because the evidence was written.\u201d Hall, 195 Ill. 2d at 21. We rejected this argument because the issue presented, whether certain evidence should have been admitted at trial, was not a pure question of law. Some deference was due to the trial court\u2019s rulings because \u201cthe trial court exercised discretion ***, i.e., the court based these rulings on the specific circumstances of this case and not on a broadly applicable rule.\u201d Hall, 195 Ill. 2d at 21.\nAlthough the circuit court in the present case heard no new evidence and credibility of witnesses was not a concern, the circuit court did have to weigh the facts and make inferences therefrom in order to rule on \u201cthe specific circumstances of this case.\u201d Nevertheless, we will apply a de novo standard of review because the circuit court had no special expertise or familiarity with the 1979 trial of defendant or the 1992 trial of LaBoy that would make it more capable than this court of weighing the facts presented by the written record and drawing necessary inferences.\nComparative proportionality review in capital cases is not required by either the United States Constitution or the Illinois death penalty statute. Thus, we will not compare the sentence received by one individual to sentences received by other persons convicted of similar crimes. This court does, however, have a constitutional duty to determine whether the death penalty has been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, or is unduly severe, considering the circumstances of the offense and the character and rehabilitative prospects of the defendant. To guarantee the individualized sentencing required by the eighth amendment, this court will consider whether a defendant\u2019s death sentence is disproportionately harsh in comparison to a lesser sentence imposed on a codefendant or accomplice convicted of the same crime. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 576 (2000).\n\u201cIn reviewing a death sentence, we examine the facts of the particular case and the evidence introduced at the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. The relevant factors in comparative proportionality review include the offenders\u2019 extent of involvement in the offense, the nature of the offense, the character and background of the offenders, including any criminal record, and their potential for rehabilitation. Similarly situated individuals must not receive arbitrary or unreasonably disparate sentences.\u201d Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 576.\nApplying these factors, defendant claims that LaBoy is more culpable than he, has a worse criminal record, and has similarly poor rehabilitative prospects. Thus, he argues, his death sentence must be vacated. The State responds that defendant is \u201cno less\u201d culpable than LaBoy, his rehabilitative prospects are \u201cno better\u201d than LaBoy\u2019s, and their criminal histories are not comparable because defendant was already on death row, with no opportunity to commit further crimes, while LaBoy was at large, committing three subsequent violent felonies. The State argues that the leniency of the LaBoy jury does not render defendant\u2019s death sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate to LaBoy\u2019s life sentence. We shall discuss each of the three factors in turn.\nA. Rehabilitative Potential Defendant formulates the question of rehabilitative potential as whether the potential for rehabilitation of the person who received the more severe sentence is \u201cdemonstrably poorer\u201d than that of his co-offender, citing Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 171, in which the defendant\u2019s death sentence was vacated because he had \u201cno criminal history, the personality of a doormat, and a problem with alcohol, was not the ringleader ***; nor [were] his rehabilitative prospects demonstrably poorer\u201d (emphasis added) than those of his codefendants who received prison terms.\nIn a subsequent case, after finding the death penalty excessive, we discussed, in dicta, the factors relevant to the analysis of disparate sentences for codefendants. We found the defendant\u2019s rehabilitative prospects \u201cnot demonstrably poorer than those of her codefendants who received terms of imprisonment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 103 (1997), citing Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 171.\nBased on our use of the phrase \u201cdemonstrably poorer\u201d in such cases, the defendant argues that his death sentence cannot stand because his prospects for rehabilitation are not demonstrably poorer than LaBoy\u2019s. We reject defendant\u2019s argument. In the past, we have not used the phrase \u201cdemonstrably poorer\u201d in Gleckler and its progeny to mean that the death penalty is precluded unless the defendant\u2019s rehabilitative prospects are found to be demonstrably poorer than those of his codefendant. Rather, we have stated that the comparison of rehabilitative potentials \u201cis only one factor we consider in determining whether a defendant\u2019s capital sentence is disproportionate to his codefendant\u2019s sentence.\u201d People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 498 (2000). In Emerson, although the defendant\u2019s behavior in prison suggested that his potential for rehabilitation was greater than that of his brother, the codefendant, we did not conclude that his death sentence was unconstitutionally disparate to his brother\u2019s prison sentence. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 498. Thus, while a defendant\u2019s demonstrably poorer rehabilitative potential may explain his being sentenced to death while a codefendant receives a prison sentence, codefendants with similar prospects for rehabilitation need not necessarily receive the same sentence.\nThe parties agree that LaBoy\u2019s potential for rehabilitation is nil. The State\u2019s claim that defendant\u2019s prospects are \u201cno better\u201d than LaBoy\u2019s relies on his lack of remorse for the killings, evidence that he solicited another prisoner to put out \u201ca hit\u201d on a person he suspected of informing on him, and his statement that he would have killed Michael again if he could have gotten away with it.\nDefendant counters that he has been a model prisoner for the past 20 years and that it is \u201cwrong\u201d to use the \u201cmere words of an eighteen-year-old boy as justification for his execution twenty years later.\u201d Defendant\u2019s arguments point to one of the conditions making the disparity analysis so difficult in this case \u2014 the lapse of over a decade between his trial and LaBoy\u2019s. In 1979, the death sentence was given to an 18-year-old confessed, remorseless killer, who revealed not only a willingness, but an eagerness, to kill again. In 1992, a killer in his thirties, whose life history demonstrated absolutely no likelihood that he could ever be rehabilitated, received three consecutive life sentences for the same crimes. We conclude that neither defendant nor LaBoy, at the time of their respective trials and sentencing, revealed any likelihood of rehabilitation.\nB. Criminal History\nDefendant argues that LaBoy\u2019s criminal history at the time of sentencing was \u201cmore substantial and violent\u201d than his own. In addition, defendant points to the lack of evidence of any misconduct on his part during 20 years in prison. The State responds that defendant had no further opportunity to commit crime after he was placed on death row.\nWe accept defendant\u2019s suggestion that the mere fact of incarceration does not necessarily prevent one from committing further offenses. See People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 172 (2001) (finding defendant\u2019s poor adjustment to incarceration \u201cas evidenced by his possession of weapons and his receipt of 44 disciplinary tickets while in prison\u201d relevant to the comparison of criminal records of the codefendants); Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d at 498 (noting that codefendant\u2019s prison record over four years shows \u201crepeated disciplinary violations involving violence, including possession of a weapon, attacking prison staff members, and fighting\u201d).\nNevertheless, it is difficult to compare the criminal histories of defendant and LaBoy when they were tried over a decade apart. Although LaBoy\u2019s three felonies are certainly more significant than defendant\u2019s single misdemeanor conviction, defendant is, in effect, suggesting that one offender may not be sentenced to death as long as one or more of his co-offenders are at large and may be committing further crimes.\nIn addition, even if there had not been a lengthy interval during which defendant was in prison while LaBoy was engaging in further crimes, the criminal history factor is not determinative. See People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 134 (2001) (affirming death penalty where codefendant\u2019s criminal record was \u201cquantitatively more severe than defendant\u2019s\u201d but defendant\u2019s participation in the multiple homicides was \u201cnot significantly less\u201d than that of the codefendant).\nWe conclude that this factor may weigh slightly in defendant\u2019s favor, but because of the unusual circumstances of the timing of the two trials, it is the least meaningful of the three factors that we must consider.\nC. Relative Culpability\nDefendant claims that, first, he may not be sentenced to death unless he is shown to be more culpable than his codefendant who did not receive the death penalty, and, second, because LaBoy was clearly the leader of the four, it would be impossible for defendant to have played a greater role in the murders than he. We find no support in the case law for the proposition that a defendant may be sentenced to death only if he is more culpable than his codefendant who receives a prison sentence. As we have noted above, the codefendants\u2019 relative culpability is but one factor of three to be considered.\nIn support of his assertion that LaBoy is more culpable, defendant argues that LaBoy was the \u201cprimary actor in two of the three killings\u201d; he produced the knife and suggested that it be used instead of Ruiz\u2019s gun; he was, at age 23, the oldest of the four; and he directed the others in wiping down the fingerprints and disposing of the weapon and other evidence. In addition, defendant points to LaBoy\u2019s words and actions that evinced his enthusiasm for the act of killing.\nThe State does not argue that defendant is more culpable than LaBoy. Instead, the State argues that defendant is no less culpable than LaBoy because he was an active participant, not a mere follower. He guarded Frank and Michael while Arthur was killed. He did not refuse to kill Frank, he merely demurred because he wanted to use a gun instead of a knife. When LaBoy did attack Frank with the knife, defendant urged him to slice the boy\u2019s throat. Finally, when Michael was the only one left alive, defendant sliced his throat and then stabbed him until he was too tired to stab any more. Defendant\u2019s own account of the killings reveals that he was not merely following LaBoy\u2019s lead.\nWhen we consider relative culpability, our purpose is to ensure that a passive participant, who may have had a less blameworthy mental state or whose conduct caused less harm, does not receive the ultimate penalty while an active participant, with a more culpable mental state or who caused the greater harm, serves a prison sentence. Thus, evidence that a defendant was a follower, rather than a leader, in the commission of the crime has been held to be a significant factor in the analysis of disparate sentences. People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 125 (1991), citing Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 171. In Gleckler, for example, the defendant\u2019s death sentence was vacated, in part, because he was less culpable than his companion who forced the victims off the road, ordered them from their car, and shot them, after which he ordered Gleckler, who had \u201cthe personality of a doormat,\u201d to shoot the victims again. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 152-53, 171.\nIn contrast, there is no evidence in the present case that defendant\u2019s mental state was any less blameworthy than LaBoy\u2019s. Defendant did not act under any sort of compulsion nor was he a less than willing participant in the three murders. As for the harm done, the attacks on Arthur, Michael, and Frank were so savage and brutal that it is impossible to say that LaBoy is more responsible for their deaths simply because he may have inflicted more wounds than defendant.\nThis case bears many similarities to People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1 (1994). Kitchen and Reeves were both convicted of the murders of two women and their three children. Kitchen, who was 22 years old, received the death penalty, while Reeves, age 29, received a sentence of natural life in prison. Kitchen argued that his death penalty should be vacated because Reeves was more culpable: Reeves was also convicted of five counts of aggravated arson; he was older and the ringleader; the State argued at Reeves\u2019s trial that he was the more culpable of the two; and he had been found eligible for the death penalty on two separate bases. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 43. In rejecting Kitchen\u2019s claim that he was less culpable, we noted that he had admitted to at least two other persons that he actually participated in the killings and said that, if necessary, he would do so again. Although he claimed in his statement to the police that he was a mere bystander while Reeves committed the murders, we did not credit his attempt to shift the blame to Reeves, and distinguished this case from Gleckler and others in which there were circumstances that mitigated the culpability of the defendant. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 45-46. In effect, we found that Kitchen\u2019s mental state and his participation in the killings were no less blameworthy than Reeves\u2019.\nDefendant has also attempted to shift blame to his codefendant, but his own statement reveals his mental state and his actions to be as blameworthy as LaBoy\u2019s. We find that defendant is no less culpable than LaBoy for these killings.\nD. Analysis of Three Factors\nIn sum, we have found that defendant and LaBoy are equally culpable for these crimes, neither showed any prospects for rehabilitation at the time of his conviction and sentencing, and although LaBoy has a more significant criminal record, this factor carries little weight because of the long delay between the two trials. Considering the cumulative effect of all three factors, we are left with the impression that they weigh more or less equally.\nDefendant argues that, all things being equal, his death sentence cannot stand because executing him while imprisoning LaBoy for life would violate the eighth amendment prohibition against arbitrary and capricious sentencing, citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976), and Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d at 119 (holding that an unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants violates the United States and Illinois Constitutions). Defendant reminds us of the words of Justice Stewart who, writing for the plurality in Wood- son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976), said that \u201c[djeath, in its finality, differs more from fife imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.\u201d Defendant asserts that he is \u201cno more deserving\u201d of the death penalty than LaBoy and, thus, this court should vacate his sentence.\nThe State argues that, all things being equal, it is not a violation of the constitution for one defendant to receive the death penalty while his codefendant receives a life sentence. Merely because one or more members of the LaBoy jury chose not to impose the death penalty does not render defendant\u2019s sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate.\n\u201cArbitrary and unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants is impermissible.\u201d Caballero IV, 179 Ill. 2d at 216. However, a disparity in the sentences of similarly situated codefendants does not, by itself, show a violation of fundamental fairness. Caballero IV, 179 Ill. 2d at 216. Although the State cites no authority for its statement about the effect of two separate juries reaching different conclusions about the death penalty, we have made similar statements in the past. See People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 54-55 (1989); Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d at 46. These statements reflect our understanding that sentences may be disparate without being unreasonably so. We are reading a cold record, many years after the trial. We did not hear the witnesses or observe the defendants in court. We do not know what considerations influenced one jury to recommend a sentence of death and one not. We cannot say, however, given the very slight differences between the two, that the different sentences were imposed arbitrarily or unreasonably.\nWe, therefore, affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment dismissing defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition. We do not find his sentence unconstitutionally disparate as compared to LaBoy\u2019s three consecutive life sentences.\nDefendant has also suggested that his sentence is fundamentally unfair because he is the only one of the four to face the death penalty. Aviles pleaded guilty in return for a sentence of 40 years. LaBoy will serve natural life. Ruiz, who was originally sentenced to death, has been granted a new sentencing hearing, based on ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368 (1997). Defendant also points to the circuit court\u2019s subsequent granting of Ruiz\u2019s motion to bar the State from seeking the death penalty in light of LaBoy\u2019s life sentence for the same crimes. This court, however, reversed and remanded for a capital sentencing hearing because it \u201cwould be premature to compare a sentence of death in his case with the sentences received by LaBoy.\u201d People v. Ruiz, 194 Ill. 2d 454, 464 (2000). Similarly, it is premature to compare defendant\u2019s death sentence with a sentence not yet determined for Ruiz.\nW. INTERNATIONAL LAW\nAlthough the transcript of defendant\u2019s trial reveals that his mother testified he was born in Mexico, the question of his citizenship was not raised. The brief amicus curiae of the United Mexican States (Mexico) now informs this court that defendant is a citizen of Mexico and that he is the only one of the four perpetrators who is not a United States citizen. The amicus brief also states, inaccurately, that defendant is the youngest of the four killers. In fact, Aviles was 17 at the time of the killings; defendant was 18. They were not the youngest persons present. Frank and Michael were 16 and 17.\nMexico asserts that defendant has been denied certain protections under international law and that he is entitled to a remedy for these alleged violations. Specifically, Mexico claims that defendant\u2019s death sentence violates the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Convention) (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force January 4, 1969; for the United States, November 20, 1994)), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976; for the United States, June 8, 1992).\nA. Role of Amicus Curiae\nIn Caballero IV, this court remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on a single issue\u2014 whether the sentences of defendant and LaBoy are unconstitutionally disparate. In its amicus brief, Mexico has made claims under international law that were not presented in defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition and are, therefore, not properly part of this appeal.\nBecause the sole function of an amicus curiae is to advise or make suggestions to the court, this court has \u201crepeatedly rejected attempts by amic[i] to raise issues not raised by the parties to the appeal.\u201d Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 62 (2001). \u201cAn amicus takes the case as he finds it, with the issues framed by the parties.\u201d People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 234 (1991). In Burger, when the amicus curiae sought \u201c \u2018to bring to the attention of this court additional argument which may be of interest to the court, but which is unlikely to be raised by either party\u2019 \u201d (Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 62), we declined to address the additional argument.\nIn the present case, Mexico is \u201c \u2018not a party to the action but is, instead, a \u201cfriend\u201d of the court.\u2019 \u201d Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 62, quoting PH., 145 Ill. 2d at 234. As such, Mexico is not entitled to present these claims in the present proceeding. Nevertheless, because Mexico has framed its arguments under the Convention and the ICCPR in terms of the disparity of sentencing between defendant and his three co-offenders, we choose to address Mexico\u2019s arguments.\nB. The International Convention for the Ehmination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination\nThe Convention was signed by the United States on September 28, 1966, but was not ratified by the Senate until October 21, 1994. By that date, defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death; his conviction and sentence had been affirmed on direct appeal (Caballero I, 102 Ill. 2d 23); his first-post conviction petition had been dismissed and that dismissal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing (Caballero II, 126 Ill. 2d 248); the circuit court had held the required hearing and again dismissed defendant\u2019s claim; and this court had affirmed that ruling (Caballero III, 152 Ill. 2d 347).\nMexico has not suggested that the Convention applies retroactively to actions taken by the State of Illinois prior to ratification. Nor does Mexico suggest that any specific actions taken by the State prior to the ratification of the Convention violated the Convention. Rather, Mexico argues that this court\u2019s refusal, at this time, to vacate defendant\u2019s death sentence would have an \u201cunmistakable discriminatory effect\u201d because he is \u201cthe only Mexican citizen among the four offenders\u201d and the only one of the four currently facing the death penalty.\nAs noted above, Aviles was sentenced to a term of 40 years\u2019 imprisonment and LaBoy received three consecutive life sentences. Ruiz was tried at the same time as defendant and was also sentenced to death. However, Ruiz\u2019s petition for post-conviction relief was granted and a new sentencing hearing ordered, based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the original capital sentencing hearing. See People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368 (1997). The matter is currently pending in the circuit court of Cook County.\nThe Convention requires signatory states to \u201cprohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law,\u201d including the \u201cright to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.\u201d International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 5(a). Discrimination is broadly defined: \u201cany distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public fife.\u201d (Emphasis added.) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 1.\nWe accept Mexico\u2019s assertion that this definition encompasses any discrimination that might occur in the context of a criminal proceeding. However, we take exception to the emphasis placed on the words \u201cor effect,\u201d and the lack of attention paid to the words \u201cbased on.\u201d Depending on the outcome of Ruiz\u2019s resentencing, defendant may, in the end, be the only one of the four killers to be executed for this crime. However, Mexico has not attempted to argue that this \u201ceffect\u201d is in any way \u201cbased on\u201d defendant\u2019s nationality.\nThe equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2) also prohibit the type of discrimination claimed by Mexico on defendant\u2019s behalf. A defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of demonstrating either discriminatory intent (McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 278, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1767 (1987)), or discriminatory effect (United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996)). To show discriminatory effect, the defendant must demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.\nDuring defendant\u2019s trial, he and his co-offenders were all believed to be United States citizens. After the defense suggested that defendant\u2019s written statement was coerced, or that he might not have understood what he was signing, the prosecutor tried to determine whether defendant was fluent in English. He asked defendant\u2019s mother, who was testifying for the defense, \u201cHe was born in this country, was he not?\u201d She answered, \u201cNo.\u201d \u201cWhere was he born?\u201d the prosecutor asked. \u201cIn Mexico,\u201d she replied. The State, thus, did not learn until after resting its case that defendant was born in Mexico and, even then, no follow-up questions were asked to determine his citizenship. Clearly, discriminatory intent was not present.\nAs for discriminatory effect, the State sought the death penalty for all three of the killers who went to trial. Only Aviles, who pleaded guilty and testified against LaBoy, received a fixed term sentence. For reasons only the 12 members of the jury know, LaBoy was spared the death penalty and received three consecutive sentences of natural fife in prison. Defendant and Ruiz were tried simultaneously before separate juries, both of which recommended a sentence of death. That Ruiz subsequently won a new sentencing hearing does not offer any support for the suggestion that this defendant was somehow disadvantaged because of his nationality.\nDefendant has received the benefit of every procedural safeguard provided by our state and national constitutions and state statutes, including two post-conviction proceedings and appeals, each of which resulted in remand for an evidentiary hearing. He has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination and, therefore, his claim under the Convention is rejected.\nThe remainder of the discussion in this section of Mexico\u2019s amicus brief is, in effect, an argument that defendant\u2019s sentence is disproportionate to LaBoy\u2019s. We have already rejected the argument that the two sentences are constitutionally disproportionate. We now reject the argument that the disparity between the two sentences violates the Convention. The Convention calls for individuals to be placed \u201con an equal footing\u201d regardless of their nationality. In this case, the State treated defendant no differently than Ruiz and LaBoy, despite the different outcomes of their cases.\nC. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\nThe ICCPR was ratified by the United States Senate on June 8, 1992. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976). As noted above, this event occurred long after the crime for which defendant was convicted and sentenced, and long after his direct appeal and the filing of his first post-conviction petition. It cannot be said that his initial prosecution, direct appeal, or first post-conviction proceeding violated the ICCPR because the United States was not a party to the Covenant at the time. The claim now advanced by Mexico must be read as a claim that actions by the State subsequent to June 8, 1992, have violated the ICCPR.\nMexico points to the disparity in sentences between defendant and LaBoy, implicitly acknowledging that until LaBoy was sentenced, defendant received every protection provided by the United States and Illinois Constitutions, including a jury trial, the assistance of counsel, and the protection against self-incrimination. He obtained prompt and thorough review of his conviction and sentence by this court, and twice availed himself of the protections of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The only \u201cviolation\u201d of the ICCPR that Mexico asserts is that it is simply unfair for defendant to face execution while LaBoy does not. We disposed of that argument above.\nIn addition, when ratifying the ICCPR, the United States attached a reservation, which stated that \u201cthe United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment.\u201d U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. 8070, par. 1(2) (1992). Because defendant\u2019s sentence has been found not to violate any constitutional constraints, it cannot violate the obligations undertaken by the United States when it ratified the ICCPR.\nDefendant has not demonstrated that his civil or political rights were in any way limited as a result of his nationality.\nV CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Tuesday, January 14, 2003, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Cook County shall be carried out. Petitioner shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119 \u2014 5 (West 2000). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where petitioner is now confined.\nAffirmed.\nJUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\ndissenting:\nFor the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe that defendant\u2019s convictions and sentence should be set aside because the trial proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this court\u2019s adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights. For this reason, the new rules should be applied retroactively. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Juliet Yackel, of Chicago, and Erika Cunliffe, of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, both of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Marie Quinlivan Czech, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Jeffrey Urdangen, of Chicago (Sandra L. Babcock, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, of counsel), for amicus curiae United Mexican States." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 88784.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JUAN CABALLERO, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 18, 2002.\nRARICK, J., took no part.\nKILBRIDE, J., dissenting.\nJuliet Yackel, of Chicago, and Erika Cunliffe, of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, both of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Marie Quinlivan Czech, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nJeffrey Urdangen, of Chicago (Sandra L. Babcock, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, of counsel), for amicus curiae United Mexican States." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 116 }