{ "id": 974982, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. COREY MOORE, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moore", "decision_date": "2003-05-22", "docket_number": "No. 87958", "first_page": "68", "last_page": "82", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 68" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2481783 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578045 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" }, { "page": "401-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5107868 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/1026-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304-05", "parenthetical": "noting that trial court heard defendant describe in detail the factual basis of claim, and that the court then concluded that defendant's claim was without merit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778578 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5262481 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576, 583-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 833", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372842 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0833-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464787 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662-63" }, { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260329 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "465-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278448 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" }, { "page": "252-53" }, { "page": "252-53", "parenthetical": "\"the trial court conducted a proper examination of the factual bases for defendant's claims\" and found them to be meritless" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3436205 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 823", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5261249 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0823-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781337 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "\"the trial court made a significant effort to explore the matters raised in defendant's motion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591083 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "134-35" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57337 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199-200" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "200-01" }, { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "\"The [trial] court made every effort to ascertain the nature and substance of defendant's ineffectiveness claim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "210-11", "parenthetical": "noting that the trial court found defendant's allegations to be spurious only after hearing from defendant and his trial counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096308 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "228-29" }, { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "\"The record reveals that the trial court made a significant effort to explore the matters that defendant raised in the motion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156888 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-89" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55983 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535949 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5328532 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Or. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 4825531 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/239/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Va. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2130637 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/218/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4719826 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/257/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58901 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442043 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0319-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 987, "char_count": 23568, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.150875359217828e-07, "percentile": 0.9744458074582727 }, "sha256": "8b6b8a481c1ba288d1855386bdbd74f4ba7b11ab37e2492ab912b33ee2666d35", "simhash": "1:bba7f42676465df7", "word_count": 3854 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:03:43.298683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. COREY MOORE, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Corey Moore, was convicted of the first degree murder and the aggravated unlawful restraint of Kimberly Fort. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a), 10\u2014 3.1 (West 1996). At a separate sentencing hearing, the court found defendant eligible for the death penalty and further determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to death.\nDefendant prepared a pro se motion for the appointment of counsel other than the public defender. The motion contained a number of allegations of trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness. At the posttrial hearing, the trial court refused to consider defendant\u2019s pro se motion.\nDefendant\u2019s death sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). Subsequent to the filing of defendant\u2019s appeal, then-governor George Ryan commuted defendant\u2019s death sentence to natural life without possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release.\nAn appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or presents no controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). An issue can become moot if circumstances change during the pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from being able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2002). Commutation removes a judicially imposed sentence and replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed sentence. People ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566 (1913); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999).\nTherefore, the commutation rendered defendant\u2019s sentencing issues moot. See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964). We exercise our discretion to address the nonsentencing issues in this case. See, e.g., McGill v. Illinois Power Co., 18 Ill. 2d 242, 244 (1959). Addressing only one nonsentencing issue, we now remand the cause to the trial court with instruction to conduct an appropriate inquiry into defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motion.\nBACKGROUND\nThe record contains the following pertinent and uncontested facts. Defendant was indicted in Cook County in two separate cases. In case No. 97 \u2014 CR\u20141779, the charges arose from the September 3, 1996, fatal shooting and armed robbery of Lonnie Williams and the attempted shooting of Melanie Williams. In the case before us, No. 97 \u2014 CR\u20141780, the charges arose from the November 21, 1996, shooting of Kimberly Fort.\nDefendant waived a jury for both the guilt phase and the death sentencing hearing in each case. The court conducted separate bench trials to determine defendant\u2019s guilt.\nThe State\u2019s case in No. 97 \u2014 CR\u20141779 included the following evidence. Melanie Williams and Lonnie Williams were business partners in an ice cream store in Chicago. On September 3, 1996, Lonnie and Melanie closed the store; Lonnie took with him a bag containing money from the store\u2019s sales for the week. They lived in the second-floor apartment of a two-flat building in Chicago. They arrived home at approximately 10:25 p.m. Melanie followed Lonnie toward the front porch. Defendant, a former employee, grabbed Melanie and put a handgun to her head. Defendant told her to be quiet.\nNear the top of an inner stairway, Lonnie became aware of defendant\u2019s presence and turned to face him. Lonnie pulled Melanie behind him. Defendant demanded money. Lonnie handed defendant the money from the store. Defendant then said, \u201cYou all shouldn\u2019t have done me like you did.\u201d Melanie then heard the gun discharge. Melanie ran inside her apartment, with defendant in close pursuit. Facing defendant, who was aiming the gun at her, Melanie backed up to a couch and fell on it. Defendant pulled the trigger three times, but the gun failed to discharge. Defendant turned and ran out of the apartment. Lonnie died from a gunshot wound to the face.\nIn the case before us, No. 97 \u2014 CR\u20141780, the State\u2019s evidence against defendant, which included his statement to police, was as follows. Fort was defendant\u2019s girlfriend and they lived together. Beginning on the night of the Lonnie Williams shooting, law enforcement officials spoke with Fort regarding defendant\u2019s whereabouts. She cooperated with police and gave them another possible address for defendant and a photograph of him.\nOn November 21, 1996, at approximately 9 a.m., defendant returned to the house he shared with Fort. He was armed with a 12-gauge, double-barreled, sawed-off shotgun concealed under his coat. Defendant was armed that day because he had killed Lonnie Williams and people were trying to kill defendant in retaliation. He tried to open the door with his key, but Fort had changed the locks.\nWhile defendant was breaking into the house, Fort escaped and ran down the street. Defendant chased and eventually caught Fort. He pulled her down the street toward the house. Defendant reasoned that Fort was afraid of him because she had told police about Lonnie Williams\u2019 murder. When they were near, defendant ordered her to walk down a side gangway and enter the house. While Fort was about 10 feet in front of defendant, he shot her in the back, firing both barrels. Fort died from the shotgun blast.\nAt the close of the bench trial in this case, the court convicted defendant of the first degree murder and the aggravated unlawful restraint of Fort. Regarding the Williams shooting, the court convicted defendant of the first degree murder and armed robbery of Lonnie Williams and the attempted murder of Melanie Williams.\nThe trial court then held a joint death sentencing hearing. In this case, the court concluded that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, finding the presence of two statutory aggravating factors: defendant was convicted of murdering two or more individuals; and defendant murdered Fort with the intent to prevent her from testifying in a criminal prosecution or giving material assistance to the State. See 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b)(3), (b)(8) (West 1996). We note that the trial court also found defendant eligible for the death penalty for the Williams murder.\nAt the second stage of the joint death sentencing hearing, the court considered evidence in aggravation and mitigation. In this case, the court found: \u201c[T]he aggravating factors presented are not \u2014 are not overcome by the mitigating factors,\u201d i.e., that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to death on the Fort murder conviction. Regarding the Lonnie Williams murder conviction, we note that the court found that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to a prison term of natural life.\nAt the hearing on posttrial motions in the two cases, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant had prepared a pro se motion for the appointment of counsel other than the public defender. The court directed counsel to proceed with his motions for new trials and, afterwards, the court would consider defendant\u2019s pro se motion for the appointment of other counsel. The trial court then considered, and denied, defense counsel\u2019s motions for new trials in this case and in case No. 97\u2014 CR \u2014 1779.\nDefendant\u2019s trial counsel then reminded the court that defendant\u2019s pro se motion for other counsel was yet pending. In response, the court stated:\n\u201cAs to the pro se motion, I am assuming that I would allow the \u2014 I would be upon notice of appeal by \u2014 I assume is going to be filed in this case, I would appoint the state\u2014 appointment of state appellate defender, so there would be an appointment of different counsel which is which [szc] Mr. Moore is requesting.\u201d\nThe trial court next denied defense counsel\u2019s motion to reconsider the death sentence imposed on the Fort murder conviction. The following colloquy next occurred:\n\u201c[Defense counsel]: Judge, Mr. Moore has asked whether [sz'c] for a little clarification on the pro se motion. That is granted as to\u2014\nTHE COURT: As to the Appellate \u2014 State Appellate Defender. I\u2019d ask that the public defender do file the notice of appeal. At least as to the 1779, that is a life sentence. So I believe that would go to the Appellate Court as opposed to the Illinois Supreme Court. You can file that.\nBut upon filing that, the Appellate Defender would be appointed as counsel. As to both cases.\n[Defense counsel]: Thank you, judge.\u201d\nNo further discussion was had, nor was any further action taken, on defendant\u2019s pro se motion.\nThe trial court then sentenced defendant on his non-murder convictions. In this case, for the aggravated unlawful restraint of Fort, the trial court imposed a five-year prison term. Regarding case No. 97 \u2014 CR\u20141779, we note that the trial court sentenced defendant to 30-year prison terms on the convictions for the armed robbery of Lonnie Williams and the attempted murder of Melanie Williams.\nDefendant appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be discussed in the context of the issues presented.\nANALYSIS\nDefendant raises several issues for review. His first claim is that the trial court erred in failing to consider his pro se posttrial motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender. He asks us to remand the cause to the trial court for an appropriate inquiry into his pro se posttrial motion. We address only this issue, which is meritorious and dispositive.\nWe note at the outset our standard of review. The State contends that \u201cthe trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to substitute counsel in view of the meritless nature of defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d However, as we will explain, the trial court neither \u201cdenied\u201d defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motion nor found the allegations therein to be \u201cmeritless.\u201d Rather, the trial court operated under the legal misapprehension that defendant\u2019s claim could be resolved by appointment of different counsel on appeal. A trial court must exercise its discretion within the bounds of the law. A reviewing court determines a legal question independently of the trial court\u2019s judgment. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999), quoting In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996).\nDuring pretrial discovery, defendant repeatedly informed the trial court that he did not want his appointed trial counsel, an assistant public defender, to defend him. During an appearance on April 21, 1997, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE DEFENDANT: I don\u2019t want him defending me. May I speak to the judge?\nTHE COURT: You may if it doesn\u2019t concern the facts of the case.\nTHE DEFENDANT: I don\u2019t feel that he can defend me in this case. He\u2019s not \u2014 he doesn\u2019t come to see me and he don\u2019t talk to me like he trying to help me. He act like he against me, and I don\u2019t feel that he can defend me in this case. My case is too serious.\nTHE COURT: I have had [the assistant public defender] on several cases in this courtroom. He is a very good attorney, from the top unit in the Public Defender\u2019s Office, the Murder Task Force. I can only appoint the Public Defender\u2019s Office, and that\u2019s where it\u2019s going to stay. I\u2019m sure he will speak to you.\u201d\nNine months later, defendant\u2019s concerns had not been allayed.\nOn January 30, 1998, approximately one year prior to trial, defendant informed the trial court that he wanted to file a written motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender. The following colloquy ensued:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Well, I have appointed the public defender and have Murder Task Force and they are excellent attorneys. And I have had \u2014 I think [the assistant public defender] is an excellent attorney. You have a right to represent yourself but the only attorney I am appointing on this case is the public defender, so if you do not wish \u2014 I would speak with [the assistant public defender] but I\u2019m not going to appoint outside counsel.\nTHE DEFENDANT: So I wouldn\u2019t need to file this paper?\nTHE COURT: You can file it so it\u2019s on the record, but if it gets to that point it is needed for appeal.\u201d\nIn his written pro se motion, defendant alleged that his appointed trial counsel: visited defendant in jail only a few times; failed to file various pretrial motions or investigate the facts; and advised defendant that his \u201cfirst order of business was to effect the least possible sentence through plea bargaining.\u201d The record does not disclose any action taken by the trial court on defendant\u2019s pro se motion.\nAs earlier stated, defendant prepared a pro se post-trial motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender. As with his first motion, defendant\u2019s posttrial motion claimed that \u201cno line of meaningful communication was established\u201d between defendant and trial counsel, whose \u201centire attitude\u201d showed that counsel was unconcerned with the defense of the case. Defendant repeated his allegations contained in his first pro se motion. He also alleged that trial counsel: wrongly advised defendant to waive a jury for trial and for sentencing and not to testify on his own behalf at trial; and failed to adequately cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses where their testimony conflicted with police reports. Defendant also complained that the trial court denied his first motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender \u201cwithout a hearing or giving any reason.\u201d\nWe earlier quoted the entire discussion of record concerning defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motion. The trial court\u2019s sole response to the motion was to appoint the State Appellate Defender as defendant\u2019s counsel on appeal.\nIn People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), the defendant\u2019s trial counsel failed to contact an alibi witness or to present an alibi defense at trial. The defendant raised a pro se posttrial challenge to his attorney\u2019s competence at trial. The parties agreed that the trial court should have appointed counsel, other than his originally appointed counsel, to represent defendant at the posttrial hearing regarding his claim of ineffective assistance. This court remanded the matter for a new hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion with newly appointed counsel. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 187-89.\nIn interpreting Krankel, the following rule developed. New counsel is not automatically required in every case in which a defendant presents a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, when a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant\u2019s claim. If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 230 (2000); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 210 (1998); People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 199-200 (1996); People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134 (1991) (and cases cited therein). The new counsel would then represent the defendant at the hearing on the defendant\u2019s pro se claim of ineffective assistance. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d at 200; Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 134-35. The appointed counsel can independently evaluate the defendant\u2019s claim and would avoid the conflict of interest that trial counsel would experience if trial counsel had to justify his or her actions contrary to defendant\u2019s position. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 230; see generally 14B Ill. L. & Prac. Criminal Law \u00a7 578 (1999).\nThe operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant\u2019s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 125 (1994). During this evaluation, some interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is warranted on a defendant\u2019s claim. Trial counsel may simply answer questions and explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant\u2019s allegations. See People v. Parsons, 222 Ill. App. 3d 823, 829 (1991); People v. Jackson, 131 Ill. App. 3d 128, 139 (1985); see, e.g., Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 211. A brief discussion between the trial court and the defendant may be sufficient. See, e.g., Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 228-29; Munson, 171 Ill. 2d at 200-01; People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 252 (1991). Also, the trial court can base its evaluation of the defendant\u2019s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance on its knowledge of defense counsel\u2019s performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant\u2019s allegations on their face. People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 466 (1996); Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 252-53.\nIn this case, it is quite clear from the record that the trial court was unaware of this rule. The trial court conducted no inquiry of any sort into defendant\u2019s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, the record does not show whether the trial court ever read defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motion. Rather, the court apparently concluded that defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could be resolved by the appointment of different counsel on appeal.\nThe law requires the trial court to conduct some type of inquiry into the underlying factual basis, if any, of a defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. No such investigation occurred in this case. Accordingly, we must remand the cause to the trial court for that limited purpose.\nThe State contends that defendant waived this issue when he and his trial counsel \u201cstood mutely and did nothing to request further inquiry.\u201d This contention lacks merit. It would be inappropriate for trial counsel to argue a motion that is predicated on allegations of counsel\u2019s own incompetence. See Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 135; see also People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 330, 333 (1996); People v. Jameson, 155 Ill. App. 3d 650, 662-63 (1987). Further, a pro se defendant is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court\u2019s attention, which the defendant did in this case. See, e.g., People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App. 3d 833, 846-47 (1994); People v. Finley, 222 Ill. App. 3d 571, 576, 583-85 (1991). In any event, we note that trial counsel asked the trial court to clarify its disposition of defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motion.\nThe State continues: \u201cEven, assuming, arguendo, that the trial court should have considered defendant\u2019s motion more fully, the meritless nature of defendant\u2019s claims would still remain.\u201d The State reasons that \u201c[t]he insubstantial nature of defendant\u2019s claims would not have changed despite any procedural steps taken by the trial court, therefore, any error was harmless.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s contention misses the mark. Again, this is not a question of whether the trial court should have considered defendant\u2019s motion \u201cmore fully.\u201d Rather, the trial court did not consider defendant\u2019s motion at all. \u201cWhile defendant\u2019s claims may be without merit, the trial court should have afforded the defendant the opportunity to specify and support his complaints. In short, the defendant\u2019s motion was precipitously and prematurely denied.\u201d People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 86 (1993).\nA trial court\u2019s failure to appoint new counsel to argue a defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 135. However, in Nitz, the trial court produced a record that demonstrated the meritless nature of defendant\u2019s claims. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 135; see, e.g., Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 230 (\u201cThe record reveals that the trial court made a significant effort to explore the matters that defendant raised in the motion\u201d); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 210-11 (noting that the trial court found defendant\u2019s allegations to be spurious only after hearing from defendant and his trial counsel); Towns, 174 Ill. 2d at 465-66 (noting that trial court not only considered and denied defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motion, but further allowed defendant to file amended motion, which court considered and denied); Munson, 171 Ill. 2d at 201 (\u201cThe [trial] court made every effort to ascertain the nature and substance of defendant\u2019s ineffectiveness claim\u201d); People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 304-05 (1995) (noting that trial court heard defendant describe in detail the factual basis of claim, and that the court then concluded that defendant\u2019s claim was without merit); Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d at 125 (\u201cthe trial court made a significant effort to explore the matters raised in defendant\u2019s motion\u201d); Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 252-53 (\u201cthe trial court conducted a proper examination of the factual bases for defendant\u2019s claims\u201d and found them to be meritless).\nIn contrast, in the present case, no record at all was made on defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, unlike the above-cited cases, it is simply not possible to conclude that the trial court\u2019s failure to conduct an inquiry into those allegations was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1036-37 (1993). \u201cIn the absence of a ruling by the trial court on the defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motion, we decline to consider its merits ***.\u201d People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 394, 401 (1987).\nAccordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual basis of defendant\u2019s allegations against his appointed trial counsel. \u201c[W]e emphasize that we are not remanding for a full evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel on the issue of trial counsel\u2019s incompetence.\u201d Parsons, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 831. Rather, we remand the cause for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the required preliminary investigation. If the court determines that the claim of ineffectiveness is spurious or pertains only to trial strategy, the court may then deny the motion and leave standing defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences. If the trial court denies the motion, defendant may still appeal his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel along with his other assignments of error. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189; see, e.g., People v. Bell, 197 Ill. App. 3d 613, 618-19 (1990); Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 401-02; Jameson, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 663.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we remand the cause to the circuit court of Cook County for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nRemanded with directions.\nWe took with the case defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw certain sentencing issues. We now deny that motion as moot.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Charles W Hoffman, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb and Jon J. Walters, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 87958.\nRemanded.)\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. COREY MOORE, Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 22, 2003.\nRehearing denied September 29, 2003.\nCharles Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Charles W Hoffman, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb and Jon J. Walters, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0068-01", "first_page_order": 80, "last_page_order": 94 }