{ "id": 2463141, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DeANGELO JOHNSON, Appellee; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CLYDE COWLEY, Appellee; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JIMMIE PARKER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johnson", "decision_date": "2003-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 90678; No. 90693; No. 90706", "first_page": "53", "last_page": "117", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 53" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236817 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453257 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780288 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131039 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453255 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 1145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279612 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/1145-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578251 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2859650 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "it is proper for the prosecutor to say defendant's confession was \"obviously voluntary\" where the trial court had so ruled prior to trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570265 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5274549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" }, { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487047 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483570 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229707 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909168 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307255 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209989 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821403 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 F.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1421684 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/609/1233-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442044 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370-71", "parenthetical": "improper polygraph evidence preceded its relevance for any limited purpose" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291641 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "jury was informed that defendant had spoken with a \"technician\" or an \"examiner\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926982 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "492, 497" }, { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "voluntariness of a confession is to be determined by the judge alone; however, a defendant may still present evidence to the trier of fact challenging the statement's reliability or truth" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238211 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781337 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236590 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29942 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224817 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "this court sent \"a clear message to both bench and bar\" regarding a defendant's due process rights in postconviction proceedings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821413 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 279", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11318776 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "1265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 461", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652245 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466-67" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "1548-49" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "1549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183262 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278412 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096300 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 1087", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571621 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1089" }, { "page": "1089" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567019 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "159" }, { "page": "159" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496344 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829", "parenthetical": "\" 'The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256313 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888", "parenthetical": "improper for prosecutors to shift the focus of attention away from the actual evidence in the case" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279605 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202-03", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he prosecutor [improperly] turned the jury's attention away from the issues in an effort to turn the case into a referendum on attitudes toward gangs\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5247147 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "prosecutor could properly admonish the jury during closing argument to \" 'send a message to the community' that violent crime will not be tolerated\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872484 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Am. J. Crim. L. 565", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Am. J. Crim. L.", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. Prac. & Process 115", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "J. App. Prac. & Process", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026033 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0834-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224818 ], "weight": 21, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138-39" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "138-40" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "134" }, { "page": "133" }, { "page": "132-34" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "134, 139" }, { "page": "138-40" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "138-39" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0099-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2955, "char_count": 113812, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.746768179771891e-07, "percentile": 0.929917728794227 }, "sha256": "54d18ad485e148a65e333fdcf6efa2df4f1f2efbf53372bee32eca122668412b", "simhash": "1:9e25bd4277275bda", "word_count": 18676 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:08.297395+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DeANGELO JOHNSON, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CLYDE COWLEY, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JIMMIE PARKER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RARICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThese consolidated cases come before us in the wake of our decision in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138-39 (2000), wherein a unanimous court held that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and trial error had deprived the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial and thus warranted reversal notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. In Blue, this court recognized that a pervasive pattern of error, engendered in the main by prosecutorial misconduct, had divested defendant of his right to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial, a substantial right that inures to a criminal defendant \u201c \u2018whether guilty or innocent.\u2019 \u201d Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138, quoting People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). In Blue, where the trial was permeated by the presentation of emotionally charged evidence, and the prosecutors \u201cencouraged the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the facts\u201d (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), the members of this court, acting \u201cas guardians of constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system\u201d (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), reversed and remanded for a new trial. Disposition of the instant cases requires that we further delineate the dimensions of Blue, applying the principles and standards of review utilized in that case.\nConsolidated for purposes of appeal are the cases of People v. Johnson, No. 90678, People v. Cowley, No. 90693, and People v. Parker, No. 90706.\nDefendants Cowley and Parker were codefendants of Murray Blue, and their trials involved the same prosecutors. Cowley\u2019s case was severed from Blue\u2019s and the two were tried simultaneously, but with separate juries. Parker\u2019s jury trial took place several months later. Ultimately, Parker and Cowley were each convicted of first degree murder and two counts of attempted murder. In addition, Cowley was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; Parker was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.\nThe appellate court reversed the convictions of both defendants, relying upon our decision in Blue. In Cowley, the appellate court noted the errors this court had identified in Blue, and the bases of this court\u2019s disposition in that case, concluding, \u201cOur supreme court reviewed the exact record before us, and we are bound by its findings of error.\u201d Cowley, 317 Ill. App. 3d 834, 842. The appellate court \u201creverse[d] in accordance with\u201d Blue. Parker, 317 Ill. App. 3d 845, 853. In Parker, the court similarly stated:\n\u201cBecause the supreme court reviewed a similar record and found error as to identical evidence and similar tactics as evidence[d] in this record, and found that Blue did not receive a fair trial despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we are bound by the findings of the supreme court that the errors were so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process and of such magnitude that the accused here was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, this defendant\u2019s convictions should be reversed as he was denied a fair trial.\u201d Parker, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 850.\nThe records in Parker and Cowley are indeed similar to that of Blue-, they are not identical.\nDefendant Johnson was tried before a jury and convicted of first degree murder and three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The appellate court reversed and remanded, stating:\n\u201cThe defendant claims he was the victim of prosecutorial excess during his murder trial before a jury. He was. He was inaccurately described at trial as a convicted narcotics salesman and a convicted felon. In addition, his failure to testify was argued by inference and his lawyer was referred to as \u2018a professional criminal defense lawyer.\u2019 *** We conclude that serious trial errors, taken in combination, were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d 666, 667-68.\nThe appellate court also concluded that it was not required to decide whether any one error would result in reversal. Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 676-77. The court quoted from Blue: \u201c \u2018Cumulatively, we find that the errors created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant\u2019s case.\u2019 \u201d Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 677, quoting Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139.\nThus, the common threads that bind these cases for purposes of appeal are alleged patterns of prosecutorial misconduct and related trial error, the utilization of cumulative-error analysis, and reliance upon this court\u2019s opinion in Blue.\nThe State raises multiple issues, only some of which are actually germane to our disposition of these consolidated cases. Among these are the following arguments. The State contends, \u201cunder due process analysis there was no cumulative error that justified the reversal of DeAngelo Johnson\u2019s convictions.\u201d With respect to defendants Cowley and Parker, the State argues that the appellate court misapplied Blue, as there was \u201cno pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct\u201d in either case and the juries were called upon to return verdicts \u201cbased on a dispassionate evaluation of the facts and the complex rules of accountability rather than emotion and sympathy for the victim.\u201d\nOther issues raised by the State are, in the context of this appeal, little more than requests for abstract pronouncements from this court. For example, the State in oral argument requested that we declare the plain-error rule to be a standard of review rather than an exception to the \u201cwaiver doctrine.\u201d The State also claims that \u201cthe closely balanced evidence test applied to Supreme Court Rule 615(a)\u2019s plain error clause is *** confusing and unworkable, it creates an internal conflict with Rule 615(a)\u2019s harmless error clause, and should therefore be abandoned and replaced by the test used in the federal system to identify plain error.\u201d The State urges us to abrogate our long-standing formulation of plain-error analysis and adopt the \u201cfederal test,\u201d as set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 518, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). Application of the Olano standard, the State submits, would result in reversal of the appellate court\u2019s judgment in defendant Johnson\u2019s case.\nWe have considered these issues; however, for reasons which will become manifest in the course of our discussion, we decline to address them, as they are not pertinent to our resolution of these cases. Although the second prong of plain-error analysis does figure in our resolution of Cowley\u2019s and Parker\u2019s cases, the closely balanced evidence component of plain-error analysis is not a factor in our disposition. Since defendants did not object to some of the claimed errors in these cases, we begin with a discussion of basic principles of plain-error analysis.\nIllinois reviewing courts, faced with allegations of plain error, examine, substantively, on a rudimentary level, the records before them to determine if the claimed errors constitute \u201cplain\u201d and \u201creversible\u201d errors. People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 526 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).\nOur plain-error rule is set forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a), which states as follows:\n\u201cAny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).\nOur prior decisions make clear that this court may invoke the plain-error rule to review alleged errors not properly preserved when (1) the evidence in a criminal case is closely balanced or (2) the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused is denied the right to a fair trial and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45, 54 (2002), quoting People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 502-03 (2002); People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 335 (2000); People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 348 (2000). Absent reversible error, there can be no plain error. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 348. \u201c[T]o determine whether a purported error is \u2018plain\u2019 requires a substantive look at it. But if, in the end, the error is found not to rise to the level of a plain error as contemplated by Rule 615(a), the procedural default must be honored.\u201d Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 17.\nInitially, we note that a pattern of intentional prosecutorial misconduct may so seriously undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings as to support reversal under the plain-error doctrine. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 33 n.16, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 24 n.16, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1055 n.16 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall and Black-mun, JJ.); People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 189 (2001) (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.). Indeed, concern over the cumulative effect of errors that \u201ccreated a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice,\u201d much of it attributable to misconduct of the prosecutors, is what drove this court\u2019s analysis in Blue. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138-40. This court recognized in Blue the \u201csynergistic effect\u201d that multiple errors of this kind can have in a trial. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139. See also People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 847, 952 P.2d 673, 699, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 682 (1998) (a unanimous California Supreme Court, foregoing harmless error analysis, reversed a death penalty conviction due to pervasive prosecutorial misconduct and trial errors that, cumulatively, \u201ccreated a negative synergistic effect, rendering the degree of overall unfairness to defendant more than that flowing from the sum of the individual errors\u201d).\nBlue represents an important step this court has taken to stem prosecutorial misconduct, a problem that courts across the country have, for the most part, been unable or unwilling to control. See E Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 115, 115-18 (1999) (\u201cDespite long-standing and widespread dissatisfaction, there does not seem to be any substantial change in the perception of the performance of prosecutors or courts. The volume of reported appellate cases of misconduct in argument remains high; there are frequent findings of improper argument, but only occasional reversals; and the volume of scholarly criticism is, if anything, increasing\u201d). To suggest that the problem is proliferating is not to say that it is of recent origin. Roscoe Pound commented on it over 70 years ago. R. Pound, Criminal Justice in America 187 (1930); 1 J. App. Prac. & Process, at 115. Over 50 years ago, Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals weighed in on the same exasperating issue:\n\u201cThis court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing government counsel for such conduct as that of the United States Attorney here. But, each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual condonation of counsel\u2019s alleged offense, coupled with verbal disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as if we declared in effect, \u2018Government attorneys, without fear of reversal, may say just about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win verdicts as a result of \u201cdisapproved\u201d remarks, we will not deprive them of their victories; we will merely go through the form of expressing displeasure. The deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely ceremonial.\u2019 Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The practice of this court \u2014 recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters \u2014 breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciaiy.\u201d United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946).\nSee also Dardeen v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 205-06, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144, 173, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2484 (1986) (Black-man, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.), quoting Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d at 661; 1 J. App. Prac. & Process, at 116.\nMembers of this court have recently expressed concern over the frequency with which this court is seeing instances of prosecutorial misconduct:\n\u201cUnfortunately, the kind of courtroom tactics which occurred in this case does not appear to be an isolated occurrence. This court recently cited the conduct of two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys as lacking in maturity and professionalism, once again in a Cook County courtroom during a capital trial. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 142 (2000). The frequency with which this court is seeing such behavior is not only alarming, but causes legitimate public concerns regarding the fairness and integrity of these proceedings.\u201d Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 191 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.).\nThe Moss dissent also conveys a sense of exasperation with the \u201chelpless piety\u201d that afflicts our judiciary. In Moss, our distinguished colleagues in dissent observed that threats of reversal, and words of condemnation and disapproval, have been less than effective in curbing prosecutorial misconduct and are unlikely to achieve any greater success in the future:\n\u201cIt is obvious to me that our admonishments \u2014 that such behavior risks reversal \u2014 have not been heeded. ***\n* * *\n*** [M]y colleagues\u2019 disposition of this issue will serve only to embolden those who would engage in such highly charged rhetoric and confuse the trial judges who have to deal with it. This court cannot expect the trial judges to vigorously guard against improper conduct if we ourselves fail to address the problem with any consistency. *** [N]otions of reform ring hollow when this court, faced with conduct which requires reversal, fails to acknowledge it.\u201d Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 191, 195-96 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.).\nWithin this milieu, and against the precedential backdrop of Blue, we now turn our attention to the facts of these consolidated cases. We begin with the cases of Blue\u2019s codefendants, Clyde Cowley and Jimmie Parker.\nThe tragic events of March 8, 1995, and the details of the resulting trials have been set forth with specificity in this court\u2019s opinion in Blue and the appellate court\u2019s opinions in Parker and Cowley. We reiterate evidence common to Parker\u2019s and Cowley\u2019s trials as necessary to provide a factual framework for our disposition.\nThese cases involve two shootings at different times and different locations: the shooting of Victor Young (the first shooting) and, later the same day, the contemporaneous shooting of Officers Daniel Doffyn and Milan B\u00fabalo (the second shooting). The evidence suggests that Young was shot because he sold drugs for a rival street gang and, perhaps, because Blue believed Young had discussed Blue\u2019s activities with the police. The officers were later shot as they tried to apprehend Blue, Cowley and Parker as they fled from Blue\u2019s apartment.\nYoung testified that, on the day he was shot, he had exchanged words with Blue, who was at the time visible in the first-floor window of an apartment building on Maypole Street in Chicago. When Blue produced a gun, Young began to run and was felled by gunshot wounds to the hip or buttocks. From the ground, Young looked behind him and saw Blue run out of the apartment building, accompanied by Cowley and Parker. Parker was holding a weapon and, at Blue\u2019s direction, also shot at Young. Blue then said, \u201cLet\u2019s get out of here. It\u2019s getting too hot.\u201d Young testified that he saw Blue, Cowley and Parker run through a vacant lot. A few minutes later, Young observed a black Lincoln Continental drive north on Kildare Street. Young knew the car belonged to Blue.\nBlue, Cowley, and Parker fled to Blue\u2019s apartment at 750 North Lorel Avenue, which is located across the street from Chicago\u2019s 15th District police station. Because Blue had forgotten his keys, he had to break the glass of his front window to gain entry. That resulted in a neighbor\u2019s report of a burglary in progress.\nOfficer Elois Jackson testified that she was at the 15th District police station when she heard a report over her police radio of a burglary in progress. Jackson told the dispatcher she could respond to the call. She and several other police officers proceeded to the apartment building across the street, the location given in the report.\nOfficer Jackson testified that, as she approached the building, she saw Officers B\u00fabalo and Doffyn walking to the front of the building. She entered a gangway at the south side of the building, leading toward its rear. As she reached the far end of the gangway, she was approached by two black males. One carried a gun with his hands extended in front of him. The other male appeared to be unarmed. Jackson keyed in her radio that she had an emergency, pointed her gun at the men, and yelled at them to get on the ground.\nThe unarmed man, later identified as Parker, raised his hands in the air, but did not immediately go to the ground. The other man turned and started to run away. Eventually, Parker followed Jackson\u2019s command to get to the ground. As he did so, Jackson heard gunfire. Jackson remained behind the wall of the gangway, with her gun trained on Parker, until other officers arrived.\nOfficer B\u00fabalo testified that he and Officer Doffyn were in the parking lot of the police station when they learned of the suspected burglary across the street. They went to investigate the reported burglary and saw broken glass on the ground from a window next to the entrance of the building. B\u00fabalo testified that he went inside the building followed by Doffyn. B\u00fabalo knocked on the front door of the apartment with the broken window. He heard the sound of several feet running to the back of the apartment and the sound of breaking glass.\nOfficer B\u00fabalo further testified that Doffyn ran down the steps from the first-floor landing and out of the building. B\u00fabalo followed Doffyn as Doffyn ran from the front of the building to the rear, through a gangway at the north side of the building. When B\u00fabalo entered the gangway, Doffyn was already rounding the far corner of the gangway, into the backyard of the building. According to B\u00fabalo, Doffyn never drew his service weapon at any time.\nWhen B\u00fabalo reached the backyard of the building, he saw Doffyn struggling with a black male. Doffyn had the man, whom B\u00fabalo identified in court as Cowley, in a \u201cbear hug\u201d and Cowley was trying to break free. Almost immediately, B\u00fabalo heard several gunshots fired in quick succession. Both Doffyn and Cowley fell to the ground, with Doffyn lying facedown on top of Cowley.\nB\u00fabalo testified that, just as Doffyn and Cowley dropped, B\u00fabalo himself sustained a gunshot wound to his left hip. As he fell to the ground, B\u00fabalo saw Blue running toward him from \u201caround the corner.\u201d Blue fired a gun at B\u00fabalo and B\u00fabalo returned fire. B\u00fabalo fired a total of five shots; one struck Blue in the back of the head as Blue ran past B\u00fabalo. This shot caused Blue to fall face forward to the ground, slightly behind B\u00fabalo.\nAfter Blue fell, B\u00fabalo radioed for help, disarmed Blue, and crawled to the aid of Doffyn and Cowley. B\u00fabalo underwent surgery the next day for a total replacement of his left hip. Officer Doffyn died from a gunshot wound to his head.\nPolice officers searched the first-floor apartment with the broken front window. They discovered that the window of the rear door to the apartment had also been broken. Not knowing whether there were other offenders inside, they entered and searched the apartment. No one was inside. In the living room, they found several bags of marijuana on a table and a jacket with .38-caliber bullets in its pocket. In the bedroom, they found plastic bags containing rock cocaine and folded tin packets containing heroin. Also in the bedroom were $5,385 in cash, a scale and a razor blade. An open box of nine-millimeter cartridges lay on the bed. They did not see any mail, receipts, bills or other papers connecting Cowley or Parker to the apartment. A drinking glass on the living room table had Cowley\u2019s fingerprint on it.\nIn addition to the foregoing evidence, each defendant gave a statement that was ultimately admitted at his trial. Cowley gave both an oral statement to a police officer, shortly after the shooting, and a subsequent written statement to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney at the hospital. Cowley told the assistant State\u2019s Attorney that on the afternoon of March 8, 1995, Blue, Parker and Charlie \u201cChow Mein\u201d pulled up in Blue\u2019s Lincoln Continental and told Cowley they had to take care of business with Puff, a rival drug dealer infringing on their territory. Blue gave Cowley a loaded .38-caliber gun to protect himself and \u201cwatch the others\u2019 backs.\u201d The four men then went to a building at 4300 Maypole to wait for Puff and his workers. They intended to kill Puff or one of his workers to teach them a lesson. Before Puff or any of his workers arrived, Charlie left the building. Shortly thereafter, Parker saw Charlie talking to Victor Young. Young had sold drugs for Blue in the past, but at the time of the incident was selling drugs for someone else and had been known to \u201cstick up\u201d Blue\u2019s workers. Although Young did not work for Puff, Blue said, \u201cLet\u2019s shoot him,\u201d and started shooting. As Blue, Parker and Cowley left the building to run to Blue\u2019s car, Parker also fired at Young. Cowley still had the .38-caliber gun when they left the scene of the first shooting.\nCowley indicated that they drove down Lake Street fast because they thought Puffs guys or the police would be looking for them. Their intent was to \u201cchill\u201d at Blue\u2019s apartment and then continue the plan to kill Puff or one of his workers. Blue let Parker and Cowley in the back door of the apartment and told them he had to break the front window because he had forgotten his keys. Blue and Parker went to the bedroom to hide a couple of extra shotguns under the bed, and Cowley went to the living room to drink a glass of soda pop. Parker then reported that the police had arrived. Upon hearing this, Blue stated, \u201cWe\u2019re all in this together!\u201d Blue then grabbed the TEC-9 he had just used to shoot Young and followed Parker outside through a window. Cowley, still armed with the . 38-caliber weapon, followed Parker and Blue out the window and into the alley. Cowley then heard someone yell, \u201cPolice! Stop!\u201d He turned around and ran into a police officer who grabbed him. Blue began shooting and hit the officer and Cowley. Both fell.\nParker\u2019s written statement was consistent with the State\u2019s proof as to the shooting of Young. The written statement also indicated that Parker had placed shotguns under the bed in the bedroom of Blue\u2019s apartment after the shooting of Young and had retrieved some beer from the kitchen. Shortly thereafter, he informed Blue and Cowley that the police had arrived. Parker also stated that, when police knocked on the door, he wanted to grab a gun, but he did not have enough time. When Blue said, \u201cthey were all in this,\u201d Parker knew Blue meant they were not going to get caught and would shoot it out. Cowley and Blue grabbed weapons and all three jumped out the window together.\nParker testified at trial, inter alia, that when police began to arrive at the apartment, he had wanted to escape because he thought Cowley and Blue would have a shoot-out with police. He did not want to get caught, and lowered himself out of the window while Blue and Cowley were still in the apartment. He then ran into the alley, but turned around to head to the car. He had escaped from the apartment, unarmed and ahead of his codefendants. Further, Parker testified he was stopped by a police officer before the second shooting involving Officers Doffyn and B\u00fabalo.\nIn both Parker\u2019s and Cowley\u2019s cases, the State utilized an exhibit and evidence which, in Blue, this court held warranted reversal when considered in conjunction with the prosecutors\u2019 improper closing argument and testifying objections. More to the point, the prosecutors obtained admission and display of Officer Doffyn\u2019s blood- and brain-splattered uniform, they presented the emotionally charged testimony of Officer Doffyn\u2019s father, much of which was irrelevant and obviously intended to appeal to the jury\u2019s emotions, and they succeeded in compounding these errors by the introduction of transparently inflammatory testimony that served only to highlight the ceremonies and oath associated with Officer Doffyn\u2019s service and duties as a police officer, matters irrelevant to defendants\u2019 guilt or innocence.\nDuring each defendant\u2019s trial, the bloodied and brain-splattered uniform of Daniel Doffyn was displayed on a life-size, headless mannequin, which was later taken into the jury room during deliberations. The uniform consisted of Doffyn\u2019s shirts, police jacket and bulletproof vest. The clothing was torn as a result of medical treatment rendered to Officer Doffyn.\nIn Blue, this court found \u201cthe potential prejudice of the uniform outweighed its probative value.\u201d Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 125. This court observed: \u201c[W]e perceive a coalescence of facts that tip the evidentiary scale from items that are merely useful to those that are aimed directly at the sympathies, or outrage, of the jury.\u201d Blue, 185 Ill. 2d at 126. That pattern was to continue throughout Blue\u2019s trial, and it is impossible not to notice it in the trials of Cowley and Parker as well.\nIn the trial of these cases, as in Blue, the testimony of Officer Doffyn\u2019s father, Roger Doffyn, was presented by the State, ostensibly for the purpose of identifying the victim as Daniel Doffyn and proving that he was alive, and subsequently died, on the date of the crimes. However, this court in Blue noted that the State had apparently elicited a portion of Mr. Doffyn\u2019s testimony for another purpose:\n\u201c[S]ome of the evidence admitted through Mr. Doffyn, such as the age of his granddaughter, the number of years he has been married to decedent\u2019s mother, and the living arrangements of the Doffyn family, was not probative of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. This evidence served only one purpose, namely, to highlight the poignancy of the Doffyn family\u2019s loss and to suggest to the jury that the family\u2019s pain could be alleviated by a guilty verdict. Moreover, the knowledge of these facts surely heightened the impact of the State\u2019s emotional closing argument on the jury.\u201d Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 131.\nIn the trial of these cases, as in Blue, the prosecutors presented the testimony of Commander Joseph Delopez of the Chicago police department. In Cowley\u2019s case, Delopez testified in person; in Parker\u2019s trial, the testimony was offered by way of stipulation. Delopez was the commander of the training division of the department. He was present for the \u201cstar ceremony\u201d when Daniel Doffyn took his oath of office as a police officer. As part of Delopez\u2019s testimony, the oath of office sworn by Officer Doffyn was read to the jury. The oath states:\n\u201cI, Daniel Doffyn, having been appointed to the office of police officer, do solemnly swear that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of such to the best of my abilities.\u201d\nDelopez was also permitted to testify that Doffyn\u2019s police badge was retired and is now displayed in the \u201chonored star case\u201d at Chicago police department headquarters.\nThis court in Blue held that the testimony was irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence and speculated whether the evidence was elicited \u201cby design\u201d to intensify the State\u2019s \u201cnakedly prejudicial\u201d closing argument which followed. This court\u2019s comments in Blue obviously apply to the instant cases as well.\nWe find no meaningful differences between these three instances of error identified in Blue and their occurrence and impact in the trials of Cowley and Parker. Indeed, there was no difference at all in the presentation of this evidence in Blue\u2019s and Cowley\u2019s cases, as the two were tried simultaneously in the same courtroom.\nAs the State notes, one kind of error identified in the evidentiary portion of Blue\u2019s trial is not present in either Parker\u2019s or Cowley\u2019s case. The juries in these cases were not exposed to the prosecutors\u2019 \u201ctestifying objections\u201d during the cross-examination of Etoya Nelson. In a bit of wishful advocacy, the State suggests that this violation of the advocate-witness rule was the \u201cmost egregious error\u201d identified in Blue.\nWhile the prosecutors\u2019 conduct in this respect was undoubtedly unprofessional and improper, and certainly contributed to this court\u2019s decision in Blue, the error does not bear the weight the State attributes to it. The subject matter of Nelson\u2019s testimony was relatively insignificant when considered in the context of Blue\u2019s trial. The State had called her to establish Blue\u2019s purported hostility toward police, and his belief that the police were pursuing him in the days preceding the shootings. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 134. The prosecutors\u2019 quibbling with the witness over minor points or collateral issues during the course of that testimony was a factor in this court\u2019s disposition in Blue, but it was hardly the \u201cmost egregious error\u201d in that case. Indeed, the predominant feature of this court\u2019s cumulative error analysis in Blue concerned the prosecutors\u2019 relentless appeal to the jurors\u2019 passions and emotions, culminating in a \u201cnakedly prejudicial\u201d closing argument.\nWe now consider the State\u2019s closing arguments in these cases, and we begin with the State\u2019s closing argument in Parker\u2019s trial. There is no mistaking that much of the argument was aimed directly at the sympathies of the jury or was intended to evoke outrage.\nThough the prosecutor did not explicitly ask the jury to send a message of support to law enforcement, the jury could not have missed the import of his argument, which was clear from the outset:\n\u201cIn March of 1995, Daniel Doffyn was a 40 years [sic] old rookie police officer. And you have learned, ladies and gentlemen, over the course of the last few days that on March 8, 1995, he was more than just a 40 year old rookie police officer.\nYou have learned, ladies and gentlemen, that he was a hero. He risked his life in the backyard at 750 North Lorel as did his partner, Milan Bubalo[,] to serve and to protect the people who lived in the 15th District.\nAnd you have also learned, ladies and gentlemen, that in March of 1995, this guy sitting right over here was a gun tooting [sic], drug dealing cop killer. And while Dan Doffyn\u2019s duty and oath was to serve and protect, Jimmie Parker\u2019s duties was [sic] to maim, kill and destroy.\n* * *\nAnd while Dan Doffyn was in the police station at the 15th District with his shiny uniform on, what was then a clean blue uniform shirt and a brand new leather jacket, as Dan Doffyn talked with his partners Dan Doffyn clipped on the radio to his jacket[,] and as Dan Doffyn talked to his sergeant and was told about the days events, who to look out for, how better to serve and protect the good people of the community, this guy was talking about the problems he and his partners are facing in business. About how he and Murray [Blue] and Clyde [Cowley] and the rest didn\u2019t like getting ripped off.\u201d\nThe prosecutor\u2019s theme and emotional appeal continued as he discussed the events immediately preceding the shooting of Officer Doffyn:\n\u201cDan Doffyn is now struggling with Clyde Cowley as Milan B\u00fabalo told you. And Dan Doffyn was just doing his job. And as he struggled with Dan, with Clyde, Dan Doffyn, who looked like this when he was sworn in to be a police officer for us, to serve us, and to protect us, later looked like this with his head shaved at the Cook County Hospital where they looked at that horrible gunshot wound to his skull. *** And that shiny bright uniform is covered in blood and brain matter.\nAnd a 40 year old hero falls to the ground. And within hours he\u2019s dead.\u201d\nWe must consider the foregoing remarks in conjunction with others in the prosecutor\u2019s well-orchestrated argument \u2014 companion comments which were clearly intended to do service to the same theme and achieve the same end of arousing the jury\u2019s passion and outrage. Although these isolated comments might otherwise occupy the margins of proper argument as exhortations to fearlessly administer justice, an overview of the prosecutor\u2019s argument reveals their dichotomous presentation was likely calculated to avoid the appearance of urging the jurors to use their verdict to send a message of support to the police, a tactic that this court deemed improper in Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 133. See People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 390 (1972) (\u201cWhat are you going to tell this community and what are you going to tell 12,000 Chicago policemen?\u201d); People v. Swets, 24 Ill. 2d 418, 423 (1962) (the prosecutor observed that a lot of people were watching the case \u201cand if [defendant] can get away with it there are a lot of sharpies that will figure they can and they\u2019ll try it\u201d); see also People v. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d 723, 731 (2001).\nReferring to Parker, Cowley and Blue explicitly, and unidentified others implicitly, the prosecutor in this case stated:\n\u201c[TJhey think they run this society. Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to ask that you respond affirmatively that they do not. We as a society do not have to live in their twisted world. We do not have to accept their values. We don\u2019t have to allow that to happen in our community. We don\u2019t have to allow these guys blasting sawed off shotguns at other human beings. We as a people can stand together and say, no, you\u2019re not going to do it here. And if you do, you have the \u2014 you will be held responsible for your actions.\nConsider what the defense is suggesting that you do. Consider the message that they want you to send. That by allowing him to escape responsibility for the actions that he has placed in motion, think about what message would be sent out to the streets. Hey, go ahead and get those sawed off shotguns. Go ahead and plan those murders. Grab your best Tec 9s, your best .38 and get them all over to the drug spots, deal dope and go ahead and blast away.\nAnd when you blast away, go ahead and flee. Flee to another location because there if a police officer responds and gets killed, don\u2019t worry, just say, not me, had nothing to do with it.\nThink about that message.\u201d\nTo the extent that the concept of general deterrence is employed in our criminal justice system, it is generally associated with punishment and imposition of sentence. The broader problems of crime in society should not be the focus of a jury considering the guilt or innocence of an individual defendant, lest the remediation of society\u2019s problems distract jurors from the awesome responsibility with which they are charged. \u201cAt least in theory, it should be obvious that any conviction ought to be summarily overturned if it turned out the jurors thought their verdict was supposed to be a referendum on whether their state ought to surrender to some heinous crime, or whether they should convict in order to \u2018send a message\u2019 that the crimes charged \u2018will not be tolerated in this state.\u2019 \u201d J. Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask Them to \u201cSend a Message\u201d With Their Verdict?, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 565, 569 (1995).\nWe are aware that courts have, in the past, both sanctioned and condemned prosecutors\u2019 exhortations to \u201csend a message\u201d that crime in general will not be tolerated. See People v. Chavez, 265 Ill. App. 3d 451 (1994); People v. Batson, 225 Ill. App. 3d 157, 168 (1992) (prosecutor could properly admonish the jury during closing argument to \u201c \u2018send a message to the community\u2019 that violent crime will not be tolerated\u201d); People v. Fluker, 318 Ill. App. 3d 193, 202-03 (2000) (\u201c[T]he prosecutor [improperly] turned the jury\u2019s attention away from the issues in an effort to turn the case into a referendum on attitudes toward gangs\u201d); People v. Herrero, 324 Ill. App. 3d 876, 888 (2001) (improper for prosecutors to shift the focus of attention away from the actual evidence in the case); People v. Martin, 29 Ill. App. 3d 825, 829 (1975) (\u201c \u2018The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law\u2019 \u201d).\nIn People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 159 (1989), this court condoned the prosecutor\u2019s incitement of the jury to do something about crime on the streets:\n\u201cEverybody hears about crime. Nobody does anything about it. You have a unique opportunity to actually do something about crime on your streets.\u201d Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 159.\nHowever, the prosecutor in Harris concluded with specificity: \u201c \u2018You are the only ones that sit between this man, this ticking bomb, and that door.\u2019 \u201d Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 159. This court noted that the remarks \u201cwere apparently intended to persuade the jurors to convict because by convicting they would prevent both crime in general, and further crime by this defendant. As such, they were proper.\u201d Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 159.\nTo the extent that Harris and the cases cited therein stand for the proposition that limited prosecutorial exhortations are proper where it is made clear to the jury that its ability to effect general and specific deterrence is dependent solely upon its careful consideration of the specific facts and issues before it, we will not disavow the holding of Harris. However, where, as here, the prosecutor blurs that distinction by an extended and general denunciation of society\u2019s ills and, in effect, challenges the jury to \u201csend a message\u201d by its verdict, he does more than urge \u201cthe fearless administration of justice,\u201d he interjects matters that have no real bearing upon the case at hand, and he seeks to incite the jury to act out of undifferentiated passion and outrage, rather than reason and deliberation. In that respect, the prosecutor\u2019s comments were improper.\nMoreover, the exhortation to \u201csend a message\u201d was exacerbated by the prosecutor\u2019s attempt to identify and merge his position, on some irrelevant and ethereal level, with the jury, the society, and the community:\n\u201cWe as a society do not have to live in their twisted world. We do not have to accept their values. We don\u2019t have to allow that to happen in our community. We don\u2019t have to allow these guys blasting sawed off shotguns at other human beings. We as a people can stand together\nWe reiterate this portion of the prosecutor\u2019s argument in part to underscore its similarity to an argument held improper in People v. Thomas, 146 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1089 (1986) , where the prosecutor told the jury, \u201c \u2018There\u2019s nobody here for the People, just you.\u2019 \u201d The appellate court in Thomas considered the remark plain error, holding that it \u201cwas a perversion of the principle that a jury is composed of nonpartisans who function under the presumption that a defendant is innocent until proved otherwise.\u201d Thomas, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. Indeed, such arguments seek to engender an \u201cus-versus-them\u201d mentality that is, as the Thomas court held, inconsistent with the inherent principles of the criminal trial process.\nMoreover, the prosecutor twice utilized a metaphor in his argument on accountability which likened defendant to an animal: \u201cIf you run with the pack, you share the kill.\u201d Remarks referring to defendant as an animal are improper. People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 139 (1987) ; see People v. Ivory, 333 Ill. App. 3d 505, 517 (2002) (the prosecutor stated that defendant was \u201c \u2018just a wolf in sheep\u2019s clothing\u2019 \u201d and was \u201c \u2018part of a pack of predators\u2019 \u201d). The prosecutor, near the conclusion of his argument, quoted the English statesman Edmund Burke, stating, \u201cAll it takes for evil to thrive [is] for good men and women to do nothing.\u201d The prosecutor immediately followed up with the entreaty, \u201cLadies and gentlemen, we ask that you do something today.\u201d Again, such tactics serve only to divert the jury\u2019s attention from the more tangible issues to be considered. It is improper to characterize a defendant as \u201cevil\u201d or to cast the decision of the jury as a choice between \u201cgood and evil.\u201d People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 457 (1993); see People v. Williams, 295 Ill. App. 3d 456, 467 (1998).\nThe prosecutor also mischaracterized evidence and the applicable law, and suggested that the defense was deceptive in its dealings with the jurors.\nThe prosecutor repeatedly stated that defendants had \u201ccelebrated\u201d by drinking beer upon their return to Blue\u2019s apartment after the first shooting.\n\u201cAnd think about who Jimmie Parker is at that moment. Picture if you will, just twenty minutes earlier you have fired a loaded sawed off shotgun at an unarmed human being. What do you do?\nDoes it affect you? Does it bother you? It didn\u2019t bother Jimmie. He goes into the kitchen, grabs a couple of bottles of beer for him and his buddies and they have a few cold ones. And he sits there and he watches a tape. That is cold blooded.\n* * *\nHe drinks with Murray Blue. He celebrates shooting other human beings with Murray Blue.\n* * *\nThey, as we had heard, they were having their beers. They were celebrating and the sad part about it is most of us in civilized society celebrate fife.\nThese guys were celebrating death. And you have to look at the person inside and their actions to determine what they actually meant that day. And I submit to you those actions speak volumes about the soul of Jimmie Parker.\u201d\nThere was no evidence that Parker, by drinking beer after the first shooting, was \u201ccelebrating death.\u201d This is simply another instance of the prosecutor\u2019s tactic of attempting to stir outrage in the jury. Moreover, evaluation of Parker\u2019s soul was not a matter for the jury\u2019s consideration: the jury was charged with determining Parker\u2019s guilt or innocence by applying the applicable law.\nAt one point in his argument, when he was discussing the law of accountability, the prosecutor incorrectly advised the jury that Parker\u2019s state of mind was irrelevant to guilt or innocence, then, after an objection was overruled, suggested that the defense was engaging in deception or trying to confuse the jury.\n\u201c[U]nder the law Jimmie Parker killed Dan Doffyn, too.\n* * *\nThat\u2019s the law that you told us under oath you would uphold, you would enforce. Regardless of what was going through Jimmie Parker\u2019s mind, when he jumped out that window that afternoon on North Lorel, whatever was going through his mind, that don\u2019t [szc] matter.\nMS. GROHS: Objection. That is not the law.\nTHE COURT: Overruled. He may argue.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: That\u2019s the law. They don\u2019t want you to read the law.\u201d\nUnless predicated on evidence that defense counsel behaved unethically, it is improper for a prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of attempting to create reasonable doubt by confusion, misrepresentation, or deception. See People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 551 (2000); People v. Kidd, 147 Ill. 2d 510, 541-42 (1992); see also People v. Abadia, 328 Ill. App. 3d 669, 683 (2001).\nLater in rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again implied (ironically) that the defense was interested in something other than a result grounded on the applicable law.\n\u201cRemember when we stepped up here and we were selecting you folks as jurors. We were very brief in what [we] wanted to know. We wanted to know ourselves based on your answers to the questions that Judge Kelley posed to you, whether or not you were good solid citizens and we were confident that each of you were.\nYou represent your community. And we are content with each and every one of you. Secondly, we wanted to know if you would follow the law. And that was it. That\u2019s all we wanted to know. And we sat down.\nNow, defense counsel asked all sorts of other questions.\nMS. GROHS: Objection. We have the right to ask questions. He makes it sound like we did something improper.\nTHE COURT: There is nothing improper about it. He can argue. Go ahead.\u201d\nAlthough the prosecutor did, immediately thereafter, acknowledge that it was not improper to ask additional questions, the ambiguity of the trial court\u2019s ruling on the objection may well have reinforced the impression of defense deception left by the State\u2019s earlier comment.\nAlthough instances of identified error in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument at Parker\u2019s trial are already legion, we note, in conclusion, two final examples of irrelevant argument obviously intended to inflame the passions of jurors. In two instances, early in his closing argument, the prosecutor made reference to a school\u2019s proximity to the location where the defendants parked upon their return to Blue\u2019s apartment.\n\u201cYou will notice, folks, that they didn\u2019t park out front where the police station is. They parked right by a grammar school.\n* * *\nAnd with these guns on a school day with children in that school, they walk these guns into that apartment.\u201d\nThe proximity of the school to Blue\u2019s apartment was irrelevant to any issue properly before the jury.\nFinally, as in Blue, the prosecutor interjected references to Officer Doffyn\u2019s family that, given their context, can only be construed as strained attempts to invoke the jury\u2019s sympathy and thus influence its decision.\n\u201cYou know what is even more sad, more pathetic!,] is the Doffyn family has to five with the understanding that one of the last persons to see their son alive is this guy.\nHe peered out that window and saw a forty year old police officer, who just left his family, family didn\u2019t even see him last. He did.\u201d\nThe quoted remarks shed no light on the pertinent issues in this case. They were not probative of defendant\u2019s guilt for the several crimes with which he was charged. They are nothing more than thinly veiled, emotion-laden appeals to the jury, meant to intensify improper evidence previously introduced and to reinforce the poignancy of the Doffyn family\u2019s loss. Such matters were irrelevant at that point in the proceedings. The comments improperly shifted the focus of attention away from the actual evidence in the case. See generally Herrero, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 888. They are the same kinds of remarks we held improper in Blue. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 132-34.\nAs in Blue, we see in this case cumulative error and a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice that denied defendant a fair trial and cast doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139. We note that the prejudice in this case, as in Blue, was engendered in the main by prosecutorial misconduct. As in Blue, the coalescence of improper, emotion-laden evidence, and inflammatory argument obviously designed to exploit that evidence, created a synergism of parallel errors. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 134, 139. As in Blue, a new trial is necessary in this case to preserve and protect the integrity of the judicial process, as \u201cthe trial court allowed the guilty verdict to rest on considerations other than the evidence alone.\u201d See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138-40. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 90706.\nIn passing, we note that our disposition would be the same had we applied the Olano standard. Under Olano, a reviewing court can correct an error not raised at trial, if there is \u201c(1) \u2018error,\u2019 (2) that is \u2018plain,\u2019 and (3) that \u2018affect[s] substantial rights.\u2019 [Citation.] If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error \u2018 \u201c \u2018seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 727, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 518, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). With regard to the two critical factors in that test, we note that pervasive prosecutorial misconduct which is designed to \u201cencourage[ ] the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the facts\u201d (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), adversely affects a defendant\u2019s \u201csubstantial right\u201d to a fair trial, and in our view certainly qualifies as a structural \u201c \u2018defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds.\u2019 \u201d See generally Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 728, 117 S. Ct. at 1549, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 331, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991). Moreover, with respect to the final Olano factor, pervasive prosecutorial misconduct of the kind that contaminated the proceedings in Blue and this case clearly undermines the \u201ctrustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process,\u201d affecting the very \u201cintegrity of the judicial process\u201d itself, as this court unanimously acknowledged in Blue. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138-39. In Blue, we held those considerations warranted reversal irrespective of the state of the evidence. The facts of this case dictate the same result.\nWe now turn our attention to Clyde Cowley\u2019s case. Many of the errors we have noticed in Blue\u2019s and Parker\u2019s trials occurred in Cowley\u2019s trial as well. Therefore, our discussion of the legal principles applicable thereto applies with equal force to disposition of the State\u2019s appeal in cause No. 90693. Of course, Cowley was tried simultaneously with Blue; therefore, with the exception of the prosecutors\u2019 violation of the advocate-witness rule, the identical evidentiary errors identified in Blue were also present in Cowley\u2019s trial. Specifically, Cowley\u2019s trial was tainted by the display of Doffyn\u2019s bloodstained, brain-splattered uniform and the irrelevant, inflammatory portions of testimony given by Roger Doffyn and Commander Joseph Delopez.\nThere are also striking parallels in the prosecutors\u2019 closing arguments in the three trials. The similarities are obvious from the outset of the State\u2019s closing argument in Cowley\u2019s case.\n\u201cLadies and gentlemen, on March 8th, 1995, Daniel Doffyn said good-bye to his daughter, Britanny, for the last time. While she was in school, Daniel Doffyn put on his uniform for the last time. He put on his badge for the last time. He put on his gun and holster for the last time. He said good-bye to his mom and his dad for the last time, and he went to work. He went to work at the 15th District because he was a Chicago Police Officer.\nHe went to work with that oath that he took at that star ceremony just a few months before where he promised that he would uphold the laws of the State of Illinois and the Constitution of the United States, and he went to the roll call room for the last time, and he got his radio and put it in its holster for the last time.\nAnd he went outside in the parking lot waiting for his partner, about to begin his shift, and you know what happened just a few minutes later, and you know why you can\u2019t meet Dan Doffyn today.\u201d\nLater, the prosecutor used the same predatory metaphor we found objectionable in his closing argument in Parker\u2019s case: \u201cIf you run with the pack, you share in the kill, and he never broke from the pack.\u201d\nThe prosecutor included the same irrelevant reference to the nearby grammar school. Referring to the location where Blue\u2019s car was parked when the defendants returned to Blue\u2019s apartment after the first shooting, the prosecutor stated, \u201cIt\u2019s parked down the way right by the grammar school with the kids ready to get out.\u201d\nWe see in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument the same exhortation to \u201csend a message\u201d to the community:\n\u201cConsider, ladies and gentlemen, what the defense wants you to do. Consider the message that they want you to send. By not holding him responsible, consider what message that would give this guy and all others like him.\n* * *\nWe do not as a civilized society have to live in this twisted world that they attempt to drag us into. We do not have to put up with it. We do not.\u201d\nFinally, as he did in Parker\u2019s closing argument, the prosecutor in Cowley\u2019s case ended his argument by casting the jury\u2019s decision as a choice between good and evil:\n\u201cWhat they want, ladies and gentlemen, is for you folks, good citizens of our community, to do nothing. To do nothing. There was an English statesman by the name of Edmund Burke, and one of the things he said was all it takes for evil to thrive is for good men and women to do nothing. Ladies and gentlemen, do not let evil thrive in this community.\u201d\nWe have discussed the legal principles applicable to comments of this kind, and we need not reiterate them here. Suffice it to say that these remarks are improper. Their prejudice is enhanced by the parallel evidence the State adduced in this case. Although we acknowledge that much of the middle portion of the State\u2019s argument was properly based upon relevant evidence and represents a studied and laudable discussion of principles of accountability, we believe that the coalescence of the factors we have discussed in this opinion requires a new trial and affirmance of the appellate court\u2019s judgment, as a means of preserving the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 90693.\nWe need not render a pro forma accounting of which errors were properly preserved for purposes of appeal and which were not, as the second prong of our plain-error analysis clearly justifies affirmance of the judgments of the appellate court in these cases. As the appellate court held in each case, the evidence is sufficient to support retrial. Therefore, there is no double jeopardy bar to new trials. See People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 110 (1998).\nBefore turning our attention to DeAngelo Johnson\u2019s case, we feel compelled to reiterate that prosecutorial misconduct, such as that which permeated the trials of Blue, Parker, and Cowley, undermines the very foundations of our criminal justice system. Our system of justice requires that a defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence be determined based upon relevant evidence and legal principles, upon the application of reason and deliberation by a jury, not the expression of misdirected emotion or outrage by a mob. Though perhaps not as egregious as the prosecutors\u2019 misconduct in these cases, we are seeing such behavior with an \u201calarming\u201d frequency, which \u201ccauses legitimate public concerns regarding the fairness and integrity\u201d of criminal trials. See Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 191 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.). Misconduct on the part of prosecutors cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. To call it \u201cerror\u201d is to mischaracterize it, as it represents nothing less than an attempt to subvert a defendant\u2019s fundamental right to a fair trial. Multiple instances of this kind of conduct in the course of a criminal trial threaten the trustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), and this court will take corrective action to preserve the integrity of the process (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138). We mean it as no hollow warning when we say that prosecutors risk reversal of otherwise proper convictions when they engage in conduct of this kind. See Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 179 (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.) (\u201cOur past \u2018messages\u2019 appear to go unheeded as this case more than amply demonstrates\u201d); People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 435 (1999) (this court sent \u201ca clear message to both bench and bar\u201d regarding a defendant\u2019s due process rights in postconviction proceedings).\nWe now consider the State\u2019s appeal in cause No. 90678, the case of DeAngelo Johnson. In the appellate court, Johnson raised five issues, claiming that he had been denied a fair trial by: (1) improper evidence of his gang membership; (2) veiled evidence he had failed a polygraph test; (3) evidence of his prior arrests and \u201cconvictions\u201d; (4) the prosecution\u2019s closing argument; and (5) his attorney\u2019s ineffectiveness. The appellate court noted that Johnson had \u201cfailed to raise the first three issues in a post-trial motion and did not consistently object in a timely manner.\u201d Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 668. Johnson attributed those omissions to ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court did not address Johnson\u2019s contention of ineffective assistance, as it determined that the failure to preserve the issues implicated the plain-error rule. Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 668-69. The appellate court then considered Johnson\u2019s first four issues and ultimately concluded that the third and fourth issues were meritorious and, \u201c \u2018[cjumulatively,\u2019 \u201d those errors \u201c \u2018created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice,\u2019 \u201d warranting reversal of Johnson\u2019s convictions. Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 677, quoting Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139.\nWe begin with a recitation of the facts we consider pertinent to our resolution. On August 23, 1996, two young men wearing black sweatshirts fired gunshots into a group of people gathered near a bar on Chicago\u2019s west side. Four persons were hit by bullets; Gary Thomas died as a result of his gunshot wounds. Johnson and Bernard Williams were ultimately indicted for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, armed violence, and aggravated battery. On November 10, 1998, a jury found Johnson guilty of first degree murder and three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm.\nPrior to trial, Johnson filed a motion to suppress his confession. At the hearing on that motion, Dr. Dawna Gutzmann, a staff psychiatrist at Forensic Clihical Services for the Circuit Court, testified that, in her opinion, Johnson was mildly retarded and cognitively impaired. She believed Johnson, who was 17 years old at the time of the offense, was not capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights. Dr. Daniel Hardy, a psychiatrist hired by defense counsel, agreed with Dr. Gutzmann\u2019s diagnosis and conclusions.\nDr. Stafford Henry, Gutzmann\u2019s colleague at Forensic Legal Services, testified to a diametrically opposed conclusion. Henry believed that Johnson\u2019s apparent limitations in understanding were deceptive and self-serving, that he had normal intelligence with no gross cognitive impairment, and that he was capable of understanding and waiving Miranda rights. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Susan Zeigler, who interviewed Johnson and prepared his written statement, testified to the measures she took to ensure Johnson\u2019s understanding of his rights. She indicated that Johnson was able to read a preprinted form setting forth his constitutional rights. She also explained those rights to him. Her testimony does suggest that Johnson\u2019s reading ability was somewhat limited and he required additional explanation as to some aspects of his Miranda rights. After she took Johnson\u2019s statement, she went over it with him and there were additions and corrections made to the statement. Johnson then signed each page of the statement.\nJohnson testified that Detective Kriston Kato beat him during interrogation. Kato promised to let him go if he took and passed a polygraph test. Detective Kato testified that he never abused Johnson and the polygraph examination was Johnson\u2019s idea.\nThe circuit court found the State\u2019s witnesses more credible and denied Johnson\u2019s motion to suppress. Thereafter, Johnson and Bernard Williams were tried in simultaneous, but severed, proceedings.\nPrior to trial, defense counsel made a motion in limine, requesting \u201cthat there be no questions asked concerning [Johnson\u2019s] prior arrest or convictions.\u201d The trial court responded:\n\u201cAppellate courts have repeatedly held that prior contact with the police department[ ] and whether or not the person had previously been read and advised of his constitutional rights in an arrest situation were highly relevant to whether or not this person understood his Miranda rights.\u201d\nAlthough the court\u2019s comments indicated its intent to allow questioning as to Johnson\u2019s prior experience with the criminal justice system, the court never explicitly so ruled. Thus, the prosecutor sought to clarify the court\u2019s ruling:\n\u201c[J]ust so I am clear, those are factors that go to whether or not, whether he knowingly, intelligently waived the Miranda rights. If [defense counsel] is going to call an expert to say that this defendant cannot knowingly, intelligently waive his Miranda warnings, those are areas that I can explore, it\u2019s something that [Dr. Gutzmann] considered or not [szc] considered. *** But I should be allowed to question with regard to the issue.\u201d\nImmediately thereafter, defense counsel interjected that he understood the court\u2019s ruling and he directed the court\u2019s attention to another motion. Thus, the breadth of the court\u2019s ruling was not clearly established. It does not appear that the court balanced the prejudicial impact of such evidence against its probative value.\nAlso prior to trial, the prosecutor made a motion in limine to allow evidence of Johnson\u2019s gang affiliation. The trial court provisionally indicated it would not allow the evidence, but noted it would revisit the issue during trial if warranted.\nAt trial, the State presented the eyewitness testimony of Martin Nash. Nash was a member of the Dog Pound street gang, as was the target of the shooting, Eric Smith, also known as \u201cPuff.\u201d Nash testified that he, Puff, Gary Thomas, and Irving Young were standing on the street when Puff advised them of the approach of two men, stating, \u201cMan, look, here come those mother fucker niggers; man, mother fucker travelers.\u201d When the prosecutor asked Nash what Smith meant, defense counsel objected.\nIn a sidebar conference, the prosecutor explained his view of the motive for the shooting:\n\u201cThe Dog Pound is trying to recruit a couple of Traveling Vice Lords to sell drugs for the Dog Pound. The Dog Pound is a renegade street gang comprised of many different street gangs, most of whom are Vice Lords. He [Smith] tries to recruit two people to come to his gang to sell drugs for him. There may have been a previous altercation, but the retaliation by the Traveling Vice Lords is to get Puff, the leader of the Dog Pound. It is clear it is a gang motive. It is a gang retaliation.\u201d\nThe court overruled the objection: \u201cI will allow the State to continue this line of inquire [sic] on the basis that the statement apparently indicates the reason for their going after Puff. And that being so, if Puff is a member of a different gang as related by this person who knows Puff, I would allow it.\u201d\nWhen testimony resumed, Nash stated that he understood Puffs comment to mean that members of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang were approaching. Nash said he looked up and saw two persons walking toward him. They were wearing black hoods, black sweatshirts and black leather gloves. Nash identified the two men as Johnson and codefendant Bernard Williams. Nash stated that Johnson and Williams came to within 20 feet of him when they produced weapons and opened fire. Nash and those with him fled. Thomas was felled by the gunfire.\nNash later spoke with officers at Cook County Hospital and told them he would recognize the shooters if he saw them again. He indicated that Puff would probably know who they were because they were members of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang. Nash testified that officers later showed him a photo array, and he identified both Johnson and Williams. He subsequently picked them out of a lineup at the police station. The jury was apprised that Nash was serving a four-year narcotics sentence at the time of the trial, and he had been previously convicted of burglary.\nDetective Kriston Kato testified that he was assigned to the investigation of this case. On September 2, 1996, Kato and his partner located and spoke to Puff. Thereafter, they began looking for Williams. They obtained a photograph of Williams and showed Nash a photo array that included the Williams photo. Nash identified Williams as one of the shooters. Kato testified that, contrary to Nash\u2019s testimony, Nash had identified only Williams, as there had been no photograph of Johnson in the photo array. Kato eventually located Williams driving a car in which Johnson and Shawn Harris were passengers. All three men were taken to Area Four headquarters. Williams initially claimed that Harris and Johnson could provide him an alibi. After the police interviewed Harris, Johnson became a suspect.\nPrior to questioning, Johnson was advised of his constitutional rights. He indicated he understood and agreed to speak with the officers. Johnson denied any knowledge of, or involvement in, the shooting, stating he had been in Evanston at the time. When he was confronted with information obtained from Williams and Harris, Johnson said they were lying. When the officers asked Johnson about his alibi, he was unable to provide any specific information about his whereabouts in Evanston. Kato told Johnson they would conduct a lineup after Kato had located a witness. Johnson agreed to participate in a lineup in order to prove that Williams and Harris were lying. Both Williams and Johnson participated in the lineup, and Nash identified them as the shooters.\nAfter the lineup, Johnson was again advised of his rights and agreed to speak with the officers. Kato testified that Johnson continued to deny involvement in the shooting even after the officers advised him he had been identified in the lineup. Kato then confronted Johnson with additional information obtained from Williams. According to Kato, Johnson asked to be interviewed by another investigator at Chicago police headquarters at State and 11th Streets and suggested that Williams submit to an interview by the same investigator. Kato scheduled the interview for Johnson and then asked Williams if he wanted to participate. Williams eventually declined.\nWhen Johnson was returned from \u201cthe interview,\u201d he was again advised of his rights and was \u201cconfronted with the results *** of his interview downtown.\u201d According to Kato, Johnson then agreed to tell the truth. He admitted that his real name was DeAngelo Johnson, not Donald Ware, as he had led the officers to believe. According to Kato, Johnson said he and Williams had shot at the members of the Dog Pound because they had been harassing and shooting at Williams. The primary target was Puff. The conflict between Williams and Puff was the result of Williams\u2019 refusal to sell drugs for Puff. Johnson acknowledged his membership in the Traveling Vice Lords street gang.\nAccording to Kato, Johnson then gave a statement regarding the shooting. Johnson said he was driving Williams\u2019 car when they observed Puff and the other Dog Pound members standing in front of a liquor store. Johnson said he and Williams then went to a friend\u2019s house and obtained two nine-millimeter handguns, two black hooded sweatshirts and two pairs of gloves. Thereafter, they returned to the liquor store, parked nearby, got out of the car, and approached Puff and the other Dog Pound members. They fired at Puff and \u201cElroy\u201d from a distance of 15 to 20 feet, and then fled on foot. Johnson said he threw his gun in the park on his way home. He and Williams later burned the sweatshirts and gloves. Kato testified that he had advised Johnson of his rights on three separate occasions, and Johnson had never asked him to explain or clarify those rights.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Zeigler offered testimony substantially similar to that she had given at Johnson\u2019s suppression hearing. Initially, she advised Johnson of his rights, and he indicated he understood. She then spoke with him about the murder of Gary Thomas. After a 30-minute conversation, Johnson agreed to give a handwritten statement. Prior to the preparation of this statement, Zeigler spoke with Johnson outside the presence of Detective Kato to determine how Johnson had been treated by the police. Johnson said he had been treated well and had no complaints.\nKato then returned to the room and Zeigler wrote out Johnson\u2019s statement. Zeigler asked Johnson to demonstrate his ability to read and write. She had him read aloud the preprinted rights form and the first paragraph of the handwritten statement. After Johnson read the form, Zeigler had him sign the waiver. At one point, Johnson sounded out the word \u201cconstitutional,\u201d and Zeigler asked him if he understood what the word meant. Johnson said he did not. Zeigler explained that the term referred to the rights they had just read, and Johnson then indicated he understood. After the statement was finished, Zeigler went over the statement with Johnson word for word and gave him the opportunity to make additions or corrections, which he did. Thereafter, Johnson signed each page of the statement. Zeigler read the statement to the jury:\n\u201cDeAngelo and Bernard were in a car when they saw [Eric Smith,] Puff. When they saw Puff he was with three of his friends[,] one was Elroy. When they saw Puff they decided to go and get guns to teach him a lesson to leave DeAngelo and Bernard alone. Puff was the leader of a gang called the Dog Pound. When DeAngelo and Bernard wouldn\u2019t sell drugs for Puff he threatened them. On Aug 21, 1996 Puff shot Bernard\u2019s house up meaning they [sic] fired 15 shots into Bernard\u2019s house. So on Aug 23, 1996 when Bernard and DeAngelo saw Puff they decided to teach Puff a lesson.\u201d\nThe State presented evidence that nine-millimeter cartridge casings were recovered from the scene of the shooting. Two bullets were recovered and examined, and they too were from a nine-millimeter weapon.\nThe defense presented two witnesses: Dr. Dawna Gutzmann and Cordelia Parker, Johnson\u2019s eighth-grade special education teacher. Both witnesses testified that Johnson had low intelligence and limited reading and comprehension skills.\nParker testified that, when the 1992 school year began, Johnson was reading out of a third-grade reading book; however, she believed he had advanced to a fourth-grade reader by the end of the year. He passed a modified constitution test and graduated from elementary school pursuant to a Chicago Board of Education policy that required the promotion to high school of all students over 15 years of age. Parker acknowledged that her report on Johnson indicated that his ability to express himself verbally was adequate.\nGutzmann testified she was appointed to interview Johnson and did so on separate occasions. The purpose of her initial examination was to form and render an opinion regarding Johnson\u2019s ability to comprehend Miranda warnings and waive his constitutional rights. She first advised Johnson that what he said was not confidential and what he said could later be brought out in court. Gutzmann said she discovered that Johnson had not understood her initial explanation. After she repeated it several times, Johnson indicated he understood.\nIn her first interview with Johnson, Gutzmann questioned Johnson about the meaning of key concepts regarding Miranda warnings. Johnson told her he had never signed a statement prior to the one at issue in this case. Gutzmann reviewed some pertinent psychological reports and learned that Johnson had a score of 57 on a verbal subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Test. She noted that a complete IQ test involves more than just the verbal test.\nBased upon her initial interview, Gutzmann made a provisional diagnosis of major depressive disorder and mild mental retardation. She noted that a firm diagnosis would require additional information regarding Johnson\u2019s adaptive functioning and a full IQ test. After her initial meeting with Johnson, it was her impression that he had dependent features to his personality which were manifest in a tendency to be deferential. Johnson seemed to have low self-esteem, and he appeared to be easily influenced by her authoritative position.\nIn her second examination of Johnson, Gutzmann tried to obtain more information about a prior arrest and Johnson\u2019s recollection of it. With respect thereto, Johnson said he could not recall having been given Miranda warnings.\nIn her first and third examinations of Johnson, Gutzmann discussed with him the statement he had given in this case. She reviewed with Johnson the typewritten portion of the statement that set forth Miranda warnings. With the exception of the phrase \u201cI understand that I have the right to talk to a lawyer,\u201d Johnson indicated he either did not understand, or could not explain, the preprinted rights. When Gutzmann asked Johnson about the meaning of various words of the Miranda warnings, taken out of context, he appeared confused. For example, when asked the meaning of the word \u201cright,\u201d he responded, \u201clike on paper.\u201d When asked about the word \u201cpresent,\u201d he took it to mean a gift. When asked, \u201cWhat does question mean?\u201d he responded, \u201cSomebody telling you something.\u201d He did associate \u201ccourt\u201d with courtroom and \u201clawyer\u201d with a person who could defend him in court.\nGutzmann asked Johnson to read a part of the handwritten statement. According to Gutzmann, he read the simpler, shorter words and skipped the longer, more complex words. Gutzmann rendered her opinion that Johnson was not capable of reading all the words in the statement. Gutzmann believed that Johnson was not malingering.\nBy the time of the third interview, Gutzmann had Johnson\u2019s school records from 1991. Johnson had attended classes for children with learning and behavioral disabilities. At that time, defendant was reading at a fourth-grade level. The school records revealed that Johnson last attended school in June of 1993, but Gutzmann did not have test results for that time period when she did her initial evaluations. Gutzmann stated that it is commonly believed a sixth-grade reading level is required to understand Miranda warnings. She acknowledged that IQ is only one factor to consider in determining whether a person is capable of waiving his or her rights. Gutzmann acknowledged that a mentally retarded person who has had experience in the judicial system might have gained pertinent knowledge from that experience. However, it was Gutzmann\u2019s opinion that Johnson was not capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional rights. She also believed he was more susceptible to suggestion than the average person.\nGutzmann conceded that defense counsel had provided her with records indicating Johnson\u2019s full-scale IQ might have been as high as 80 at some point. She stated she had received that information after she had rendered her initial opinion, but it had not changed her opinion. After she had received Johnson\u2019s full-scale IQ scores, she did change her opinion regarding Johnson\u2019s overall intellectual capacity, concluding that he was not mentally retarded. Gutzmann also admitted she had belatedly received a computer printout indicating that Johnson\u2019s reading level was 6.7, or the sixth grade, seventh month, but she said the way he read to her was not consistent with the sixth-grade assessment. Other records she subsequently obtained where consistent with her assessment of fourth-grade reading skills. Gutzmann said she was aware that defendant had been previously arrested and she assumed he had been read the Miranda warnings. She had taken that information into account in rendering her opinion that Johnson had not knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights.\nGutzmann\u2019s testimony on cross-examination revealed that Johnson had not been entirely forthcoming in the information he had provided her. Although he told her he had never had a job, she knew he had actually had two different jobs. Though he told her he had only been arrested once, she later learned he had been arrested more than once.\nGutzmann stated she would find it relevant if she had known that Johnson had been given Miranda warnings on three separate occasions, but it would not change her opinion because she believed a person\u2019s familiarity with the criminal justice system does not necessarily guarantee that he understands his rights. Gutzmann noted that it is the experience of giving up rights and actually suffering consequences as a result thereof that causes people to comprehend the significance of those rights. She knew Johnson had been arrested before, and she assumed he had been read Miranda warnings, but she did not have any specific information to that effect.\nToward the latter stages of the prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination of Gutzmann, he asked whether Gutzmann had \u201ctaken into account the defendant\u2019s background that he had actually been convicted of two separate crimes in 1994.\u201d Defense counsel requested a sidebar. The trial court denied the request for a sidebar and sustained \u201cthe objection.\u201d A short time later, the prosecutor asked, \u201cWould you consider it relevant if the defendant had previously spent time in the Department of Corrections?\u201d An objection was overruled, and the witness responded, \u201cWell, its relevant but I wouldn\u2019t know what to make of it.\u201d The prosecutor continued, \u201cAnd it\u2019s relevant because people who are housed in the Department of Corrections often talk about their cases, don\u2019t they?\u201d Defense counsel objected that the question called for speculation. The court sustained the objection.\nOn redirect examination, defense counsel asked Gutzmann about defendant\u2019s previous charges: \u201cNow you heard [the prosecutor] talk about Miranda warnings having been given in the past to Mr. DeAngelo Johnson. Had Mr. DeAngelo Johnson ever been charged with murder before in the past?\u201d Gutzmann responded that he had not.\nOn re-cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Gutzmann first about the nature of Johnson\u2019s prior charges, then about his prior \u201cconvictions,\u201d and finally whether Johnson had been represented by counsel during those proceedings:\n\u201cQ. He was arrested in 1994 on two separate occasions for selling narcotics?\nA. Okay.\nQ. He was convicted on both of those charges?\nA. Okay.\nQ. Before being convicted on any of those charges, he was sent to court and had a lawyer appointed for him?\nA. All right.\nQ. He had a lawyer represent him throughout the first charge of selling narcotics?\u201d\nBefore Dr. Gutzmann could answer, defense counsel objected. The court said, \u201cI don\u2019t know if the witness will be able to answer that. It would be hearsay.\u201d The prosecutor continued: \u201cYou are aware that the defendant spent time in custody on those crimes?\u201d The court then sustained a defense objection to the relevance of that line of questioning.\nThe State presented the testimony of Dr. Stafford Henry to rebut Dr. Gutzmann\u2019s testimony. Henry said when he tried to ask Johnson about his Miranda rights, Johnson repeatedly stated, \u201cI don\u2019t know,\u201d or \u201cI can\u2019t catch on.\u201d Johnson told Henry that this case was his first contact with the criminal justice system. Henry informed Johnson he was aware of Johnson\u2019s criminal history. Based on that occurrence and other information, Henry stated his opinion that Johnson was being \u201cuntruthful.\u201d Henry testified that Johnson\u2019s responses regarding the circumstances of his arrest indicated that he was thinking clearly on the day he was arrested. Johnson appeared to be of average intelligence. It was Henry\u2019s opinion that Johnson understood and was able to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.\nIn his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed Detective Kato\u2019s testimony and the events leading up to Johnson\u2019s custodial statement:\n\u201c[Johnson] knows they are on to him. He knows they are \u2014 it\u2019s starting to stack up against him. One last chance. Let me go downtown. I\u2019ll show you. When he bombs that and he comes back in, he\u2019s confronted with the results of his interview downtown, he knows it\u2019s over.\u201d\nDefense counsel did not object to this argument. Again speaking of Johnson\u2019s statement, the prosecutor made the following comments:\n\u201cThere is absolutely no evidence before you to \u00e1ttack the validity of [Johnson\u2019s inculpatory] statement. Nothing. It is uncontested. An attorney can stand before you and argue all he wants about what he wishes the statement to say or what it doesn\u2019t say. But you know what? There is no evidence to contradict the validity of the statement. None.\u201d\nLater, referring to Johnson, the prosecution returned to the same theme:\n\u201cYou know, how dare this guy complain about his rights? What about the rights of Mr. Thomas? Never mentioned anything about those rights. Unfortunately for Gary Thomas, this guy and his partner over here, Bernard Williams, were his judge, his jury, and his executioner. Now this guy, without presenting any evidence, wants to complain through his lawyer standing at a podium about his rights.\u201d\nDefense counsel objected, and the court instructed the jury, \u201cThe defendant does not have to take the stand in his own defense.\u201d The judge did not rule on the defense objection, and he did not instruct the jury to disregard the statement. The prosecutor then stated: \u201cYou know, it never ends. They have no defense.\u201d\nThe prosecutor also commented on the manner in which defense counsel conducted the cross-examination of State witness Martin Nash.\n\u201c[D]o you think that was easy for Martin Nash to be pulled up here from the Department of Corrections and be asked questions by a bunch of lawyers only to have a professional criminal defense lawyer hired to represent one of the two people who almost killed you get up there and ridicule you and belittle you and then stand before a jury and call him a buffoon and a clown. Then we wonder why people don\u2019t come forward.\u201d\nWe begin our analysis by examining the admissibility of evidence concerning gang affiliation. The circuit court\u2019s evidentiary rulings with respect to gang-related evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 232 (2001); People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489-90 (1991). Such evidence may be admitted so long as it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 232; People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 118 (1994). Evidence of gang membership is admissible only when there is sufficient proof that membership is related to the crime charged. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990). Evidence of gang affiliation is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 232-33.\nAlthough we see no overt indication in the record that the circuit court actually considered whether the probative value of this evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, we find that it does. First, as to relevance, Detective Kato testified regarding Johnson\u2019s initial oral statement and stated that Johnson had referred to the dispute as one involving gang rivalry. Johnson had identified himself as a member of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang and had referred to Puff and \u201cthe Dog Pound\u201d as the instigators of the prior incident of violence. Second, we believe the potential for prejudice was minimal in this instance. In fact, it would seem that evidence of the rival gang affiliations of Johnson and Nash would as likely work to Johnson\u2019s benefit as his detriment, as this court\u2019s recent decision in People v. Blue, 205 Ill. 2d 1 (2001), demonstrates. In Blue, this court held that the trial court had erred in precluding defense counsel from cross-examining State\u2019s witnesses regarding their gang affiliation, and found that error was not harmless. This court acknowledged the obvious: there is a clear motive to lie when witnesses identifying a defendant are members of a rival gang. Blue, 205 Ill. 2d at 15. Therefore, while the gang affiliations provided a motive for the shooting, they also provided a motive for Nash to lie about Johnson\u2019s involvement. Thus, we find that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact, and its admission was not error.\nMoreover, we find no error in the admission of Kato\u2019s testimony regarding Johnson\u2019s \u201cinterview\u201d at Chicago police headquarters and Kato\u2019s confrontation of Johnson with the \u201cresults of his interview downtown.\u201d In closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury that Johnson had asked to \u201cgo downtown\u201d to \u201cshow\u201d the officers. The prosecutor observed, \u201c[H]e bombs that and he comes back in, he\u2019s confronted with the results of his interview downtown.\u201d\nAfter considering our precedents on this point, we cannot say that the testimony adduced at trial clearly signaled the jury that Johnson had taken and failed a polygraph. In People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486, 497 (1998), this court held that testimony from a witness, that an unspecified appointment had been made for defendant with \u201ca technician,\u201d was sufficiently vague and would not have led the jurors to any improper speculation that defendant had been scheduled to take a polygraph examination. There is no reference to a \u201ctechnician\u201d or \u201cexaminer\u201d in this case, terms that might alert the jury that a testing device was employed in the interview. The absence of such terminology distinguishes this case from People v. Mason, 274 Ill. App. 3d 715 (1995) (jury was informed that defendant had spoken with a \u201ctechnician\u201d or an \u201cexaminer\u201d). We find that Kato\u2019s testimony did not improperly apprise the jury that Johnson had taken and failed a polygraph.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s comments in closing argument, when considered with Kato\u2019s testimony, do suggest that Johnson had taken and failed a polygraph test. By stating that Johnson intended to \u201cshow\u201d the officers something by participating in an interview elsewhere, the prosecutor suggested that Johnson could conclusively demonstrate his innocence to authorities merely by his participation in \u201cthe interview\u201d and that his guilt or innocence could be objectively verified by \u201cthe interview\u201d itself. The fact that the interview took place elsewhere suggested that it entailed something other than mere discussion with police officers; otherwise, there would have been no need for Johnson to go anywhere. By stating that Johnson had \u201cbombed\u201d the interview, the prosecutor used a term commonly associated with failure, particularly with failing a test.\nHowever, even if the jury speculated at that point in the trial as to the prosecutor\u2019s references, and the nature of the evidence upon which those references were based,\nthe inference that Johnson had taken and failed a polygraph was, by that point in the proceedings, properly drawn and considered. Evidence that a polygraph exam had taken place could be properly considered because defense counsel had made the \u201creliability\u201d of Johnson\u2019s statement an issue in his opening remarks to the jury and, by the time of closing arguments, he had elicited testimony calling into question the circumstances of Johnson\u2019s confession. Thus, the reliability of Johnson\u2019s statement was an issue from the outset. Comments regarding the timing of Johnson\u2019s confession soon after his \u201cinterview,\u201d or polygraph if that is the characterization of the evidence one prefers, unequivocally became proper after Johnson raised the issue of reliability at trial, first through the opening comments of his counsel, and later by testimony. Cf. People v. Jackson, 202 Ill. 2d 361, 370-71 (2002) (improper polygraph evidence preceded its relevance for any limited purpose). As this court noted in Jefferson, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979), upheld a trial judge\u2019s ruling that if a defendant were to testify that his confession had been coerced, the prosecution could then introduce evidence showing that the defendant made the confession after he was told that he had failed a polygraph test. The Kampiles court explained, \u201cIt would have been unfair to allow defendant to present his account of his admissions *** without allowing the Government to demonstrate the extent to which failure of the polygraph precipitated the confession.\u201d Kampiles, 609 F.2d at 1244. As we observed in Jefferson, although the general rule in Illinois is to preclude introduction of evidence regarding polygraph examinations and the results of those tests, evidence of this kind may become admissible when a defendant, during trial, offers an alternative explanation for the reasons that led to a confession. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 492, 497.\nWe believe that the prosecutor\u2019s argument in this respect was not improper, as Johnson\u2019s subsequent introduction of evidence, making the circumstances of his confession an issue in the case, opened the door for a prosecutorial argument suggesting \u2014 without specifically stating \u2014 that Johnson had confessed after he failed a polygraph exam.\nWe now consider whether testimony regarding Johnson\u2019s prior arrests and adjudications of delinquency \u2014 characterized at trial as \u201cconvictions\u201d \u2014 was improperly admitted at trial. Johnson called Dr. Gutzmann as an expert witness at trial for the avowed purpose of challenging the \u201creliability\u201d of his statement, though it appears that Gutzmann\u2019s testimony often ranged beyond reliability and addressed matters bearing upon the voluntariness of Johnson\u2019s statement. As noted in our recitation of facts, Gutzmann testified that she believed Johnson lacked the intelligence, experience, and ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. She also stated her belief that he was more susceptible to suggestion than the average person.\nGutzmann acknowledged that a person with prior experience in the judicial system might have gained pertinent knowledge from that experience. She said she was aware that defendant had been previously arrested on more than one occasion and she assumed he had been given Miranda warnings. Gutzmann stated she would find it relevant if she had known that Johnson had been given Miranda warnings on three separate occasions, but it would not change her opinion because she believed a person\u2019s familiarity with the criminal justice system does not necessarily guarantee that he understands his rights. In that respect, Gutzmann noted that it is the experience of giving up rights and actually suffering consequences as a result thereof that causes people to comprehend the significance of those rights.\nThe prosecutor then attempted to ask Gutzmann a series of questions in an apparent attempt to ascertain the extent of Gutzmann\u2019s knowledge concerning Johnson\u2019s experience with the criminal justice system and whether she had taken any such experience into account when reaching her opinion. The prosecutor first asked whether Gutzmann had \u201ctaken into account the defendant\u2019s background that he had actually been convicted of two separate crimes in 1994.\u201d Although defense counsel only asked for a sidebar in response to the question, the trial court sustained \u201cthe objection.\u201d The prosecutor asked whether Gutzmann would consider it relevant if the defendant had previously spent time in the Department of Corrections. An objection was overruled, and the witness responded, \u201cWell, it\u2019s relevant but I wouldn\u2019t know what to make of it.\u201d\nOn redirect examination, defense counsel asked Gutzmann about the specific nature of Johnson\u2019s previous charges: \u201cNow you heard [the prosecutor] talk about Miranda warnings having been given in the past to Mr. DeAngelo Johnson. Had Mr. DeAngelo Johnson ever been charged with murder before in the past?\u201d Gutzmann responded that he had not.\nOn re-cross-examination, the prosecutor then asked more pointed questions about Johnson\u2019s prior experience, including whether his arrests in 1994 were for delivery of \u201cnarcotics,\u201d whether he was \u201cconvicted\u201d on those charges, and whether he had been appointed an attorney to represent him in the proceedings on those charges. Gutzmann responded either \u201cOkay\u201d or \u201cAll right\u201d to the prosecutor\u2019s questions. It is unclear from the cold record whether these responses were meant as affirmative responses to the questions asked \u2014 perhaps Gutzmann was verifying the accuracy of the information conveyed by the questions from memory or by referring to documents at her disposal \u2014 or whether she was acknowledging the information for purposes of some hypothetical question she anticipated; however, it appears by the actions of all involved that the parties and court took Gutzmann\u2019s answers to be affirmative responses to the prosecutor\u2019s questions.\nIn the appellate court, Johnson claimed that this evidence of his prior arrests and \u201cconvictions\u201d denied him a fair trial. The appellate court found that defense counsel had \u201copened the evidentiary door\u201d to questions about Johnson\u2019s prior arrests, but the defense had not opened the door \u201cto questions about Johnson\u2019s 1994 and 1995 delinquency findings in the juvenile court.\u201d Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 674. We disagree. Johnson\u2019s defense, as presented through Gutzmann\u2019s testimony, made his experiences in the juvenile and criminal justice systems a proper area of inquiry.\nEvidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant to establish any fact material to the prosecution. People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 284 (1998). A defendant\u2019s previous experience with the criminal justice system is a relevant factor in determining whether a defendant is aware of his rights (People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 199 (1998)) and whether a statement was given voluntarily (People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 479 (1995)). Prior prosecutions are relevant (People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 451 (1996), overruled on other grounds by In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37 (2000)), as are prior convictions (People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 463 (1995); see also People v. Smith, 333 Ill. App. 3d 622, 630 (2002); People v. Marquez, 324 Ill. App. 3d 711, 720 (2001)). It follows that such evidence is relevant to a determination of whether Johnson\u2019s custodial statement was \u201creliable\u201d or truthful, an inquiry closely related to the question of voluntariness. See generally Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 498 (voluntariness of a confession is to be determined by the judge alone; however, a defendant may still present evidence to the trier of fact challenging the statement\u2019s reliability or truth). Indeed, the evidentiary line between voluntariness and reliability was often blurred in this case, which was, no doubt, the prosecutor\u2019s concern when he moved in limine to bar such testimony, arguing, \u201cWe should not be relitigating the motion to suppress.\u201d\nWhile there is no question that Johnson had the right to adduce evidence bearing upon the reliability of his statement, the State had the right to respond with evidence of Johnson\u2019s prior experience with the justice system, the relevance of which was implicitly acknowledged by Johnson\u2019s own expert. Clearly, evidence of Johnson\u2019s progression through the justice system on prior occasions to the point of adjudication was relevant to the issue Johnson\u2019s attorney had placed before the jury. By reason of his prior adjudications of delinquency, Johnson experienced the consequences of choices he had made, he was undoubtedly apprised of basic rights at some point, and he was afforded an attorney who presumably counseled him in that regard as well. In our view, admission of this evidence was subject only to a determination that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 156. Although it is not apparent that the circuit court made such a determination, we believe the evidence unquestionably qualified for admission under the appropriate standard.\nAlthough the appellate court found it significant that the parties erroneously referred to Johnson\u2019s adjudications as \u201cconvictions,\u201d we do not. The testimony in question was adduced to establish Johnson\u2019s familiarity with the criminal justice system and to show that he had experienced the \u201cconsequences\u201d of that system, something that Gutzmann had indicated was relevant to a defendant\u2019s ability to understand the significance of his rights. For that purpose, the difference between adjudications and convictions is not particularly significant. In either situation, the consequences of the justice system are manifest to the person subject to the proceeding.\nWe next address the appellate court\u2019s holding that various comments of the prosecutor in closing argument were improper.\nAt one point in his argument, the prosecutor referred to defense counsel as \u201ca professional criminal defense lawyer.\u201d The appellate court held that reference was improper. Again, we disagree. In support of its holding, the appellate court cited People v. Hawkins, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1016 (1996), wherein the appellate court held that a prosecutor\u2019s reference to defense counsel as a \u201cpaid advocate\u201d was improper. The Hawkins court relied upon cases that held it improper to refer to a defense attorney as a \u201chired gun.\u201d See People v. Everette, 220 Ill. App. 3d 453, 458 (1991); People v. Shaw, 98 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685 (1981). According to the Hawkins court, \u201cThe term \u2018paid advocate,\u2019 while slightly less pejorative than the term \u2018hired gun,\u2019 nevertheless denigrates the assistance of counsel to which the accused is constitutionally entitled and thus falls within the scope of Everette and Shaw.\u201d Hawkins, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 1016.\nWe express no opinion regarding the reasoning or holding of Hawkins-, however, we will not extend its holding to this case. We agree that it is error to refer to defense counsel as a \u201chired gun,\u201d as the term and its connotations are in fact more pejorative. Moreover, we note that the prosecutor\u2019s use of the term \u201chired gun\u201d in Shaw was coupled with the accusation \u201c \u2018they\u2019re paid to do a job to mislead you, to confuse you.\u2019 \u201d Shaw, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 685. The use of the term in Everette was in the context of an argument which suggested that defense counsel approached the trial process as \u201c \u2018some kind of a card game.\u2019 \u201d Everette, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 458. These elements are not present in this case. The remarks in this case do not suggest deception or trickery on the part of defense counsel, a factor which is dominant in the cases we have found on this point. Frankly, defense counsel was \u201ca professional criminal defense attorney,\u201d just as the attorney for the State was a professional prosecutor. The jurors are not so naive that they fail to recognize these distinctions, and we do not believe that these comments, without more, warrant the label of \u201cerror.\u201d\nThe appellate court also found that the prosecutor improperly commented on Johnson\u2019s right not to testify when he told the jury, \u201cThere is absolutely no evidence before you to attack the validity of [Johnson\u2019s inculpatory] statement. Nothing. It is uncontested. *** There is no evidence to contradict the validity of the statement.\u201d It is not entirely clear what the prosecutor meant by the \u201cvalidity\u201d of the statement. If by \u201cvalidity\u201d he meant to comment on the \u201cvoluntariness\u201d of the statement, or point out that it was uncontested that a statement was made, or even that there was no evidence the statement was untruthful or unreliable, his comment was not improper. Johnson\u2019s statement had been determined to be voluntary and it was properly before the jury. While Johnson was still entitled to present evidence to the trier of fact challenging the statement\u2019s reliability or truth, and the jury was entitled to consider any such evidence as it bore upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the confession (see Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 498), much of Gutzmann\u2019s testimony focused on her opinion that Johnson was incapable of knowingly and understandingly waiving his Miranda rights, matters pertinent to voluntariness. Moreover, to the extent that Gutzmann\u2019s testimony insinuated that the content of Johnson\u2019s statement may have been the product of police suggestion or overreaching, the result of a dependent personality influenced by those in authoritative positions, that testimony too was the proper subject of comment. Indeed, the jury heard testimony that suggested Johnson may\nnot have understood his rights and thus may not have knowingly and intelligently waived them with a full appreciation of the consequences; however, the jury heard no testimony that explicitly challenged the truth or reliability of Johnson\u2019s statement, or the \u201cvalidity\u201d of the statement, if that is the way one chooses to refer to it.\nWhen determining whether the accused\u2019s right not to testify has been violated, a reviewing court must examine the challenged prosecutorial comments in the context of the entire proceeding. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 21; People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 126 (1989). As this court stated in Keene-.\n\u201c[T]he State may comment that evidence is uncontradicted and may do so even if the defendant was the only person who could have provided contrary proof. [Citation.] To put it differently, the State is free to point out what evidence was uncontradicted so long as it expresses no thought about who specifically \u2014 meaning the defendant \u2014 could have done the contradicting.\u201d Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 21.\nWhether the prosecutor\u2019s comments are construed as references to reliability or voluntariness, the prosecutor in this case stayed within the boundaries of proper argument. See People v. Williams, 38 Ill. 2d 115, 125 (1967) (it is proper for the prosecutor to say defendant\u2019s confession was \u201cobviously voluntary\u201d where the trial court had so ruled prior to trial). We find that the comments were proper.\nIn our opinion, the prosecutor barely crossed the line of propriety when, referring to Johnson in rebuttal argument, he stated, \u201c[H]ow dare this guy complain about his rights? *** Now this guy, without presenting any evidence, wants to complain through his lawyer standing at a podium about his rights.\u201d In response to a defense objection, the court instructed the jury, \u201cThe Defendant does not have to take the stand in his own defense.\u201d However, the judge did not rule on the defense objection, nor did he instruct the jury to disregard the statement. The prosecutor continued, \u201cYou know, it never ends. They have no defense.\u201d\nA prosecutor may respond to comments made by defense counsel in closing argument that clearly invite a response. People v. Munson, 206 Ill. 2d 104, 145 (2002); Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 154. Such comments must be considered in the proper context by examining the entire closing argument of the parties. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 154; see People v. Mendez, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1145, 1152 (2001).\nDuring his closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly misstated the law and the evidence, and argued inferences which were not premised upon any evidence before the jury. We provide a few examples to illustrate the nature and tone of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument.\nDefense counsel argued that Johnson had \u201ca reading score of 4.3. Uncontradicted.\u201d The trial court sustained an objection to that statement, presumably because it was contrary to the evidence before the court. Defense counsel immediately reiterated that statement in service of an argument that intensive police interrogation had produced Johnson\u2019s statement:\n\u201cThey knew they would never convict [defendant] based upon the testimony of Mr. Nash. This is about a confession. That\u2019s all this case is about. It\u2019s not about evidence. It\u2019s about a confession.\n* * *\nYou know what the force of interrogations are like. You have seen it in this courtroom. Who can stand that pressure? They wanted to get a statement out of him, whether he is retarded or whatever. That\u2019s what Miranda is about. Psychological coercion.\u201d\nThe prosecutor objected that there was \u201cno evidence there was any psychological coercion.\u201d The trial court sustained the objection.\nDefense counsel then embarked upon an argument suggesting that Johnson\u2019s statement to authorities had been altered. After repeated objections by the prosecutor that there had been no testimony or evidence to that effect, the trial court eventually advised defense counsel that he was required to argue from the evidence presented at trial. Defense counsel replied, apparently seeking clarification, \u201cI can argue from the document.\u201d The court responded, \u201cThe document may be argued. There is no testimony regarding that. Counsel may argue.\u201d\nContinuing with an argument laden with innuendo and founded upon little or no evidence, defense counsel stated:\n\u201cThink about the testimony of Mr. Nash. The fact that nothing corroborates what was in his statement.\n* * *\nLook at [defendant\u2019s] statement, because this is made on facts, not on emotion. Doesn\u2019t mean anything to run up to him and call him all kinds of names and do all those kinds of things that call him the scum of the earth.\u201d\nThe prosecutor objected, noting that \u201cno one called him the scum of the earth.\u201d The objection was sustained. Undaunted, defense counsel asked the jurors if they believed Johnson had gone to the police station \u201cvoluntarily\u201d to participate in the investigative process. The prosecutor again objected and, when asked his basis, he responded, appropriately, \u201cThere is no evidence otherwise.\u201d The trial court allowed defense counsel to continue with his line of argument.\nDefense counsel concluded his argument by returning to his earlier theme that the police had not done enough to corroborate the facts included in Johnson\u2019s statement, suggesting they were under a legal obligation to do so:\n\u201cDid they do anything to corroborate anything in this statement? Nothing. If you believe they didn\u2019t do anything to corroborate, and it\u2019s reasonable for them to do it and they didn\u2019t do it, then they have not proven him guilty.\u201d\nResponding to the State\u2019s ensuing objection, the trial court advised the jury, \u201cThat\u2019s counsel\u2019s argument. That is not the law.\u201d\nIt was in response to these arguments that the prosecutor made the final comments of which Johnson complains. Defense counsel\u2019s argument clearly invited appropriate State comments on many levels. However, while we can appreciate the prosecutor\u2019s frustration with defense counsel\u2019s conduct during closing argument, and indeed the presentation and theory of Johnson\u2019s defense, we believe the circumstances called for a more measured response. It would have been enough to simply point out that there was neither evidence of coercion, nor testimony that Johnson\u2019s rights had been violated in any way. Defense counsel\u2019s argument did not grant the prosecutor a license to say anything he desired. The comments suggesting that Johnson was required to \u201cpresent evidence\u201d were improper, notwithstanding defense counsel\u2019s comments.\nNevertheless, even though the prosecutor\u2019s comment exceeded the bounds of proper argument, the verdict will not be disturbed unless the remark caused substantial prejudice to the defendant, taking into account the content and context of the comment, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573 (2000), quoting Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 152. Applying these criteria to the facts of this case, we find that the prosecutor\u2019s remark did not result in substantial prejudice to defendant and was not a material factor in his conviction.\nDefense counsel repeatedly suggested in his closing argument that there was coercion in the procurement of Johnson\u2019s confession even though the State\u2019s evidence did not so indicate and there was no testimony presented by the defense to that effect. It is improper to argue assumptions or facts not based upon the evidence in the record. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 151. We expect defense attorneys to adhere to the same rules we apply to prosecutors. Johnson had not sustained his burden during the pretrial suppression hearing of showing that his statement was involuntary and much of defense counsel\u2019s closing argument appears to have been \u2014 as the prosecutor predicted \u2014 an attempt to relitigate that issue before the jury. Under the circumstances, we find the impropriety of the prosecutor\u2019s comment was marginal.\nMoreover, when the prosecutor made the remark, the trial judge immediately advised the jury that defendant was not required to take the stand in his own defense. Subsequently, the jury was properly instructed pursuant to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.03 (3d ed. 1992):\n\u201cThe Defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This presumption remains with him throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on the verdict and is not overcome unless from all the evidence in this case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.\nThe State has the burden of proving the guilt of the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden remains on the State throughout the case. The Defendant is not required to prove his innocence.\u201d\nThe jury was also instructed: \u201cThe fact that the Defendant did not testify must not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your verdict.\u201d As this court has frequently stated, the prompt sustaining of an objection combined with a proper jury instruction usually is sufficient to cure any prejudice arising from an improper closing argument. People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 297 (1999); People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 298 (1994). Although the trial court did not sustain defense counsel\u2019s objection, the court immediately and unequivocally advised the jury that defendant was not required to take the stand in his own defense. That admonition, together with subsequent instructions given the jury, sufficed to cure any error associated with the prosecutor\u2019s comments, which were brief and isolated. See People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 396-98 (2000); Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d at 298; People v. Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d 548, 564-65 (1991). Given the content and context of the comments, and their relationship to the evidence, the prosecutor\u2019s comments did not deny Johnson a fair trial.\nWe note that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced. The jury had before it Johnson\u2019s confession, physical evidence corroborating the statement Johnson made to Detective Vucko in the nine-millimeter shell casings and bullets recovered after the shooting, and the uncontradicted testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting. Nash\u2019s version of the shooting was consistent with what Johnson told police regarding his participation in the shooting. Moreover, Nash\u2019s identification of Johnson as one of the two shooters was not contradicted by either positive testimony or by circumstances.\nIn sum, the prosecutor\u2019s comments, quite simply, did not result in substantial prejudice to Johnson under these circumstances, and thus, they do not warrant reversal of Johnson\u2019s convictions. As there was neither cumulative error, nor a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct and related trial error, the appellate court\u2019s reliance upon Blue was misplaced. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 90678 and remand the cause to the appellate court with directions that the appellate court address defendant\u2019s argument concerning ineffective assistance of trial counsel.\nWe note that our decision in Blue does not furnish a license to courts of review to adopt a cursory or skeletal analysis of the facts and issues before them. It does signal our intolerance of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct that deliberately undermines the process by which we determine a defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\nNo. 90678 \u2014 Appellate court judgment reversed; cause remanded with directions.\nNo. 90693 \u2014 Appellate court judgment affirmed.\nNo. 90706 \u2014 Appellate court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RARICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle, Alan J. Spell-berg, Susan Schierl Sullivan and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, Janet Powers Doyle, Susan Schierl Sullivan and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.", "James E. Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers and Linda Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon Malavia, Alan J. Spellberg, Janet Powers Doyle, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Michael J. Hewlett, Jr., and Annette Collins, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Darrell Widen, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 90678.\n(No. 90693.\n(No. 90706.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DeANGELO JOHNSON, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CLYDE COWLEY, Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JIMMIE PARKER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 17, 2003.\nModified on denial of rehearing January 26, 2004.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle, Alan J. Spell-berg, Susan Schierl Sullivan and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, Janet Powers Doyle, Susan Schierl Sullivan and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.\nJames E. Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers and Linda Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon Malavia, Alan J. Spellberg, Janet Powers Doyle, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Michael J. Hewlett, Jr., and Annette Collins, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nDarrell Widen, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0053-01", "first_page_order": 63, "last_page_order": 127 }