{ "id": 2462617, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. BENNIE STROUD, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Stroud", "decision_date": "2004-01-23", "docket_number": "No. 94823", "first_page": "398", "last_page": "414", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 398" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "248 F. Supp. 2d 691", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9343819 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreted the amended federal rules as prohibiting a defendant's request to plead guilty by video teleconferencing, but did not address the constitutionality of such a procedure" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/248/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "915 F.2d 1276", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10540964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1280" }, { "page": "1280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/915/1276-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 S.W.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10001854 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/769/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 561.031", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mo. Rev. Stat.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7 561.031", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mo. Ann. Stat.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "plea of guilty may be entered at arraignment via closed-circuit television upon waiver of any right such person might have to be physically present" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Miss. Code Ann. \u00a7 99", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Miss. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 977", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "guilty plea by closed-circuit television allowed upon execution of written waiver of right to be present and stipulation by the parties" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Mont. Code Ann. \u00a7 46", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mont. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 178.388", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "presence of defendant for plea at arraignment is not required if the court has provided for the use of closed-circuit television" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 522", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299581 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "1484" }, { "page": "526" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "1484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1498121 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/291/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Wis. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8673401 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/97/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Wis. 2d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11114877 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" }, { "page": "659" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/237/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 L. Ed. 2d 1546", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157728 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" }, { "page": "1256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/331/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172302 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ." }, { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ." }, { "page": "1642", "parenthetical": "Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ." }, { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ." }, { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ." }, { "page": "1642", "parenthetical": "Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/381/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ala. App. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala. App.", "case_ids": [ 1707724 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala-app/42/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2862118 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360761 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771759 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "1711-12" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "1712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251434 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12124816 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "1239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173132 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "1882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 337", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054264 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 U.S. 730", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219896 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" }, { "page": "647" }, { "page": "2667" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "647" }, { "page": "2667" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "647" }, { "page": "2667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/482/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477013 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" }, { "page": "55, 57" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "58" }, { "page": "58-59" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "62-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 1044", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349635 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1047" }, { "page": "1046-47" }, { "page": "1046-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/1044-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521961 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" }, { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5595934 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058257 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "1469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2989804 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852935 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141477 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810080 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486607 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0416-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1092, "char_count": 28181, "ocr_confidence": 0.799, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0524849244719961e-07, "percentile": 0.5542929336806894 }, "sha256": "e91e2994f14dd645b1ca9d33d93e4aa86c3c49b94c57b8bf00d4d299f02bd75e", "simhash": "1:80623611674c6a66", "word_count": 4624 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:08.297395+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. BENNIE STROUD, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case presents the question of whether defendant\u2019s constitutional right to be present at his guilty plea hearing was violated when the circuit court accepted his plea via closed-circuit television. Under the facts presented by this case, we hold that it was.\nBACKGROUND\nOn March 23, 1998, defendant, Bennie Stroud, entered a negotiated plea of guilty in the circuit court of Kankakee County to the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 103(a)(1) (West 1998)), case No. 97 \u2014 CF\u2014621. When defendant entered his plea, he was not physically present in the courtroom; rather, he appeared via closed-circuit television. Defendant was represented by counsel at the time the plea was taken, and defendant made no objection to his absence from the court or to the fact that the plea was taken through closed-circuit television. Pursuant to agreement, defendant was sentenced to two years\u2019 probation. Before accepting the plea, the court advised defendant that any wilful violation of his probation could result in revocation, with a prison sentence of between three and seven years imposed. Following acceptance of the plea, the court advised defendant of his appeal rights, including the necessity of compliance with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)).\nOn July 1, 1998, the State filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging that subsequent to the above-mentioned case, defendant committed the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, as reflected in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u2014374. On November 3, 1998, defendant was found guilty of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 1998)), case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u2014374. On December 1, 1998, defendant\u2019s probation for his initial conviction in No. 97 \u2014 CF\u2014621 was revoked because of the subsequent offense, and defendant was sentenced to seven years in prison for each offense, the sentences to run concurrently. Thereafter, defendant appealed the conviction in No. 98 \u2014 CF\u2014374 and the probation revocation in No. 97 \u2014 CF\u2014621. The appeals were consolidated.\nThe appellate court dismissed defendant\u2019s direct appeal in No. 97 \u2014 CF\u2014621 for lack of jurisdiction, finding that because defendant had not filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 604(d), he could not attack the guilty plea in the appeal of his probation revocation. People v. Stroud, Nos. 3 \u2014 98\u20140981, 3 \u2014 98\u20140982 cons. (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn November 22, 2000, defendant filed a postconviction petition, again arguing that the original guilty plea should be vacated because he entered it via closed-circuit television, rather than in person. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because defendant had not filed a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea in No. 97 \u2014 CF\u2014621, he was barred from moving to vacate the plea through his postconviction petition. The trial court granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss, and defendant appealed.\nOn review, the appellate court vacated both convictions and remanded for further proceedings in No. 97\u2014 CF \u2014 621 and for resentencing in No. 98 \u2014 CF\u2014374. 333 Ill. App. 3d 416. The appellate court found that, although defendant was barred from challenging his guilty plea on direct appeal, nothing prevented him from collaterally attacking his plea in a postconviction proceeding on constitutional grounds. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 419. The court then found that defendant\u2019s plea of guilty over closed-circuit television violated his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the proceeding. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 419.\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R 315) and now affirm the appellate court.\nANALYSIS\nThe State initially argues before this court that defendant waived his right to challenge his guilty plea. It notes that defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment as is normally required by Rule 604(d) to bring an appeal. Relying on the rule that \u201c 1 \u201ca constitutional right, like any other right of an accused, may be waived, and a voluntary plea of guilty waives all errors or irregularities that are not jurisdictional\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 491 (1993), quoting People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill. 2d 414, 433 (1985), quoting People v. Brown, 41 Ill. 2d 503, 505 (1969)), the State maintains that defendant cannot attack his guilty plea for the first time in a postconviction proceeding.\nIn response, defendant argues that he can attack his guilty plea in a postconviction petition even though he did not first move to withdraw the plea or attempt to file a direct appeal because the plea itself was not voluntary. Specifically, defendant contends that the plea was involuntary because he was not advised of his right to be physically present in the courtroom at the plea proceeding.\nWe agree with defendant that the State\u2019s waiver arguments must be rejected. \u201c \u2018Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.\u2019 \u201d People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187 (1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970). Thus, a guilty plea does not waive a contention that the plea itself was involuntary because of faulty admonishments. People v. Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127, 141-42 (1991); People v. Beronich, 334 Ill. App. 3d 536, 540 (2002). Moreover, such claims may be raised for the first time in a postconviction petition. Beronich, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 540. As we will explain more fully below, this case involves whether and to what extent a trial judge must admonish a defendant of his right to be physically present prior to accepting a guilty plea by closed-circuit television. Accordingly, we conclude that the State\u2019s waiver arguments do not apply.\nWe now turn to the merits of the question of whether defendant had a constitutional right to be physically present at the guilty plea hearing and whether his physical absence requires that his guilty plea be vacated. To support his position, defendant relies upon People v. Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1044 (2000), where the appellate court vacated a defendant\u2019s guilty plea because he was not physically present in court for the plea proceeding, but instead appeared by closed-circuit television. Defendant attempts to distinguish this court\u2019s recent decision in People v. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45 (2002), on the basis that it involved an appearance by closed-circuit television at an arraignment and jury waiver hearing, not a guilty plea proceeding. The State in response argues that Lindsey is controlling and the appellate court\u2019s decision should therefore be reversed.\nIn Lindsey, this court found that arraignment and jury waiver were \u201ccritical stages\u201d at which a defendant generally has a right to be present, but the right is not absolute. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 56. This court recognized that both the federal and state constitutions afford criminal defendants the general right to be present, not only at trial, but at all critical stages of the proceedings from arraignment to sentencing. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 55, 57, citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 356, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058 (1970); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998). Arraignment amounts to the initiation of formal criminal proceedings and, as such, is \u201c \u2018far from a mere formalism.\u2019 \u201d Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 55, quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 418, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1972). Because of the importance of arraignment, a defendant\u2019s right to counsel attaches at that time. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1997); Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 55.\nA defendant can plead guilty at arraignment: \u201c \u2018Arraignment\u2019 means the formal act of calling the defendant into open court, informing him of the offense with which he is charged, and asking him whether he is guilty or not guilty.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/102 \u2014 4 (West 2000). Moreover, section 113 \u2014 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) provides that \u201c[w]hen called upon to plead at arraignment the defendant *** shall plead guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty\u201d and if defendant pleads guilty such plea shall not be accepted until defendant is fully admonished. But if defendant understandably persists in his plea, it shall be accepted by the court and recorded. 725 ILCS 5/113 \u2014 4 (West 2000).\nLindsey reviewed the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Stincer and of this court in People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65 (1990), and concluded the following:\n\u201c[E]ven where a defendant has the general right to be present because the proceeding is a \u2018critical\u2019 stage, a defendant\u2019s absence is not a per se constitutional violation. Rather, a defendant\u2019s absence from such a proceeding will violate his constitutional rights only if the record demonstrates that defendant\u2019s absence caused the proceeding to be unfair or if his absence resulted in a denial of an underlying substantial right.\u201d Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57. Applying the above-quoted standard, Lindsey then\nfound that the record did not demonstrate that the defendant\u2019s physical absence from the courtroom contributed to the unfairness of the proceedings or caused him to be denied any underlying constitutional right. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 58. Lindsey observed that, while the defendant was not physically present in the courtroom for his arraignment and jury waiver, he was not entirely absent from the proceedings either. The defendant participated in the proceedings by the closed-circuit system, allowing him to interact with the court with relative ease. The overall solemnity of the proceedings was preserved, and the defendant\u2019s ability to defend against the charges was unaffected by his physical absence from the courtroom. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 58-59. This court concluded by stating its holding as follows:\n\u201cIn sum, we hold that defendant\u2019s appearances via closed circuit television at arraignment and jury waiver did not render those proceedings unconstitutional. To show a constitutional violation of the right to be present, there must be evidence that defendant\u2019s due process rights were violated by his absence from the courtroom, i.e., that defendant\u2019s physical absence from the proceedings caused the proceedings to be unfair or that his physical absence from the proceedings resulted in the denial of an underlying constitutional right. There has been no showing on this record. Consequently, we find no constitutional violation.\u201d Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 60.\nWe find Lindsey instructive, but not determinative of the outcome, because, unlike the present case involving the constitutionality of a closed-circuit television procedure for taking a plea of guilty at a plea proceeding, Lindsey only considered the propriety of a jury waiver and entry of a not-guilty plea at arraignment by closed-circuit television. The number and gravity of the rights at stake at a guilty plea hearing are greater than when a defendant intends to plead not guilty at arraignment. In Guttendorf, the appellate court addressed the precise issue here, concluding that a televised guilty plea is not constitutionally permitted. Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1047. The court stated the following in explaining the importance of a guilty plea hearing:\n\u201cA guilty plea is a critical stage because its direct result is defendant\u2019s conviction. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12 (1969). It is an admission of guilt of the criminal acts charged as well as of all material facts alleged in the charging instrument. See People v. Johnson, 28 Ill. 2d 531, 533-34 (1963). This admission rebuts the presumption of innocence. See People v. Page, 38 Ill. 2d 611, 612-13, 232 N.E.2d 689, 690-91 (1967). The entry of a guilty plea results in a waiver of a defendant\u2019s \u2018right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u2019 177 Ill. 2d R. 402. A guilty plea also waives other constitutional rights, such as the fundamental right to present evidence and to raise the privilege against self-incrimination. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 279, 89 S. Ct. at 1712.\nA guilty plea is a decisive moment for the defendant in the criminal process. The plea obviates the prosecution\u2019s burden of proof. \u2018 \u201cIt supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.\u201d \u2019 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 n.4, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279 n.4, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 n.4 (1969), quoting Woodward v. State, 42 Ala. App. 552, 558, 171 So. 2d 462, 469 (1965). It carries the same finality as a jury verdict. The atmosphere of the courtroom can play a critical, albeit intangible, role in the proceedings, including a hearing on a plea. A courtroom \u2018is more than a location with seats for a judge, jury, witnesses, defendant, prosecutor, defense counsel and public observers; the setting that the courtroom provides is itself an important element in the constitutional conception of trial, contributing a dignity essential to \u201cthe integrity of the trial\u201d process.\u2019 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 561, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1642 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ.), quoting Craig v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367, 377, 91 L. Ed. 2d 1546, 1553, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1256 (1947).\nIn a televised appearance, crucial aspects of a defendant\u2019s physical presence may be lost or misinterpreted, such as the participant\u2019s demeanor, facial expressions and vocal inflections, the ability for immediate and unmediated contact with counsel, and the solemnity of a court proceeding. In a guilty plea hearing, as in a trial, these components may be lost if a defendant\u2019s appearance is through closed circuit television.\u201d Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1046-47. The only other reported case to directly address the\nconstitutionality of a plea other than not guilty by closed-circuit television is State v. Peters, 237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655 (2000). There, the court found that the defendant\u2019s voluntary plea of no contest by closed-circuit television to the offense of driving with a revoked license did not violate his due process rights under the United States Constitution, even though he did not specifically waive his right to be physically present. It noted that \u201ccourts have recognized that \u2018the presence of the defendant is required as a *** condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.\u2019 \u201d Peters, 237 Wis. 2d at 747, 615 N.W.2d at 659, quoting May v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 175, 186, 293 N.W.2d 478, 483 (1980), citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 78 L. Ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1934). The court concluded that the defendant\u2019s right to a fair and just hearing was not thwarted by his physical absence. Peters, 237 Wis. 2d at 749, 615 N.W.2d at 660.\nBecause of its rather scant analysis and because it involved a plea on a misdemeanor charge, we do not find Peters to be persuasive. Peters did not discuss Snyder in any detail, nor did it address the decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486, 490, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1484 (1985), and Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987), the three cases that have adumbrated a defendant\u2019s due process right to be present for a trial proceeding. In Gagnon, the United States Supreme Court observed:\n\u201cWe think it clear that respondent\u2019s rights *** were not violated by the in camera discussion with a juror. \u2018[T]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror, nor is there a constitutional right to have a court reporter transcribe every such communication. \u2019 [Citation.]\nThe constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), the Court explained that a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding \u2018whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.\u2019 \u201d Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 490, 105 S. Ct. at 1484.\nIn Stincer, the Court added that \u201ca defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.\u201d Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 647, 107 S. Ct. at 2667.\nUnlike the present case, Snyder, Gagnon and Stincer involved short absences from minor portions of trial. In each of the three cases, the Court held that the defendant\u2019s due process rights were not thwarted. In Snyder, the defendant was absent from a jury view of the scene of the crime; in Gagnon, the defendant was absent from a brief in camera discussion between the trial judge and a juror; and in Stincer, defendant was not present at the competency hearing of a witness where no substantive evidence was addressed. Here, in contrast, defendant was physically absent from the most decisive moment of the criminal proceedings against him. We recognize that he was not entirely absent from the proceedings either, however, because of his closed-circuit television appearance. Nevertheless, the importance of the courtroom itself in \u201c \u2018contributing a dignity essential to \u201cthe integrity of the trial\u201d process\u2019 \u201d (Guttendorf, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 1046-47, quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 561, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1642 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Goldberg, JJ.)) leads us to conclude that a defendant\u2019s appearance at a guilty plea proceeding via closed-circuit television is constitutionally permissible only if the defendant waives the right to physical presence on the record after being advised of his right to be present. Defendant did not specifically waive his right to be bodily in the courtroom. We believe that defendant\u2019s physical presence would have contributed to the fairness of the proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant\u2019s due process right to be present at the proceeding was violated.\nWhile not dispositive of the constitutional issue, we find support for our conclusion in the legislative stances of the various states on guilty pleas via closed-circuit television. The approaches of the states fall into three distinct camps: (1) those that allow defendants to plead guilty by closed-circuit television (see, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 767.37a(5) (2000) (the act \u201cdoes not prohibit the use of 2-way closed circuit television for *** criminal pleas\u201d); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 15A \u2014 941(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (plea in a noncapital case may be taken by audio and video transmission); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 178.388(4) (Lexis 2001) (presence of defendant for plea at arraignment is not required if the court has provided for the use of closed-circuit television)); (2) those that categorically do not allow a guilty plea by closed-circuit television (see, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. \u00a7 46 \u2014 12\u2014201(5) (2001) (a judge may not accept a plea to a felony if defendant is not physically present in the courtroom)); and (3) those that allow such pleas upon a specific waiver by the defendant of the right to be present (see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 977 (West 2003) (guilty plea by closed-circuit television allowed upon execution of written waiver of right to be present and stipulation by the parties); Miss. Code Ann. \u00a7 99 \u2014 1\u201423(l)(d) (Supp. 2003) (upon waiver of any right to be present, a personal appearance by means of closed-circuit television may be made at \u201c[ajrraignment *** where a plea of guilty is entered\u201d); Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7 561.031 (West Supp. 2003) (plea of guilty may be entered at arraignment via closed-circuit television upon waiver of any right such person might have to be physically present); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.18(a) (West 2003) (court may accept a guilty plea or a waiver by closed-circuit video teleconferencing upon written consent to the procedure by the defendant and prosecutor)).\nThe State of Missouri appears to have enacted the most comprehensive legislation on the use of closed-circuit television. The Missouri statute provides in relevant part as follows:\n\u201c1. In the following proceedings, *** when the physical appearance in person in court is required of any person held in a place of custody or confinement, such personal appearance may be made by means of two-way audio visual communication, including but not limited to, closed circuit television or computerized video conferencing; provided that such audio-visual communication facilities provide two-way audio-visual communication between the court and the place of custody or confinement and that a full record of such proceedings be made by split-screen imaging and recording of the proceedings in the courtroom and the place of confinement or custody in addition to such other record as may be required:\n(1) First appearance before an associate circuit judge on a criminal complaint;\n(2) Waiver of preliminary hearing;\n(3) Arraignment on an information or indictment where a plea of not guilty is entered;\n(4) Arraignment on an information or indictment where a plea of guilty is entered upon waiver of any right such person might have to be physically present-,\n(5) Any pretrial or posttrial criminal proceeding not allowing cross-examination of witnesses;\n(6) Sentencing after conviction at trial upon waiver of any right such person might have to be physically present;\n(7) Sentencing after entry of a plea of guilty; and\n(8) Any civil proceeding other than trial by jury.\n2. This section shall not prohibit other appearances via closed circuit television upon waiver of any right such person held in custody or confinement might have to be physically present.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 561.031 (2002).\nIn Guinan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 427, 430-31 (Mo. 1989), the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the above-quoted statute in a case where defendant\u2019s postconviction hearing was conducted by closed-circuit television.\nMore recently, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been amended to allow the taking of a defendant\u2019s plea at arraignment by closed-circuit television. See Fed. R. Grim. E 10(c). Specifically, Rule 10(c) now provides that \u201c[vjideo teleconferencing may be used to arraign a defendant if the defendant consents.\u201d Fed. R. Grim. E 10(c). The advisory committee notes explain that \u201c[although the rule requires the defendant to waive a personal appearance for an arraignment, the rule does not require that the waiver for video teleconferencing be in writing. Nor does it require that the defendant waive that appearance in open court. It would normally be sufficient for the defendant to waive an appearance while participating through video teleconference.\u201d Fed. R. Grim. E 10(c), Advisory Committee Notes.\nBecause the federal rules prior to their amendment required the defendant\u2019s physical presence at arraignment, there is a paucity of federal case law addressing the constitutionality of pleas by closed-circuit television. In Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States, 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990), the court found that the defendant\u2019s not-guilty plea at arraignment by closed-circuit television was improper because the preamended rules required the defendant\u2019s physical presence. The court then commented, however, that the protections established by the rules were \u201cbroader than the constitution provides.\u201d Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at 1280; cf. United States v. Melgoza, 248 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (interpreted the amended federal rules as prohibiting a defendant\u2019s request to plead guilty by video teleconferencing, but did not address the constitutionality of such a procedure).\nThe majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue allow a guilty plea by closed-circuit television with the precaution that it be allowed only upon waiver by the defendant. We believe that this is the best approach, as well as the only constitutionally permissible one that would allow a guilty plea by television. In contrast to the statutes of many other states and the federal rules, the Illinois statute is not as clear about the kinds of proceedings that may be conducted by closed-circuit television or whether the defendant\u2019s consent to the procedure would be required. Specifically, section 106D \u2014 1(a) of the Code states that \u201c[w]hen a defendant\u2019s personal appearance is not required by the Constitution of the United States or Illinois Constitution, the court may allow the defendant to personally appear at any pretrial or post-trial proceeding by way of closed circuit television when: (a) the court has authorized the use of closed circuit television and has by rule or order set out the type of proceedings that may be conducted by closed circuit television.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/106D \u2014 1(a) (West 2000); see Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 62-63. We hold today that a defendant\u2019s physical presence at a guilty plea proceeding is constitutionally required unless he consents to having the plea taken by closed-circuit television. Like the advisory committee to the federal rules, we believe that it would normally satisfy constitutional considerations for the defendant to waive his physical appearance in court by stating so on the record while participating through closed-circuit television. We further add that an admonishment about the right to be physically present should be given by the trial judge at the beginning of the guilty plea proceeding as part of the admonitions required by Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402), unless the defendant has previously given his written consent to the closed-circuit procedure. Because defendant\u2019s plea was taken without him specifically waiving his right to be present, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which vacated defendant\u2019s convictions and remanded the cause for further proceedings.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant\u2019s closed-circuit television appearance at his guilty plea proceeding, without his consent on the record, violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAffirmed.\nThe June 9, 1998, indictment in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u2014374 actually charged defendant with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of school property, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(d), 407(b)(2) (West 1998)). However, on November 3, 1998, defendant was convicted in No. 98 \u2014 CF\u2014374 of the lesser-included offense of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 1998)).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "James Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Edward D. Smith, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Lisa Anne Hoffman, Russell K. Benton and Linda Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Carrie B. Marche, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 94823.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. BENNIE STROUD, Appellee.\nOpinion filed January 23, 2004.\nJames Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Edward D. Smith, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Lisa Anne Hoffman, Russell K. Benton and Linda Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Carrie B. Marche, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0398-01", "first_page_order": 408, "last_page_order": 424 }