{ "id": 5462011, "name": "THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ex rel. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 151 INTERSTATE ROAD CORPORATION et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp.", "decision_date": "2004-02-05", "docket_number": "No. 95042", "first_page": "471", "last_page": "491", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 471" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799398 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "attempts by the legislature to make nonfinal judgments appealable violate article VI, section 6, of our constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798065 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "949" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534577 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182722 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229713 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5264234 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 1039", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3232005 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1040" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/1039-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5799360 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906689 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5784777 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36-37" }, { "page": "37-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783188 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473220 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487221 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" }, { "page": "834, 841" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "838, 845" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58916 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564584 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0542-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1192, "char_count": 36512, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4213765768723285e-07, "percentile": 0.6490754866403408 }, "sha256": "830ffb6edbccb8d88070e531eff07216f8aeee6f31bb632631483a23bb21957d", "simhash": "1:cd358d05ce87ec70", "word_count": 5964 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:28:21.003204+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ex rel. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 151 INTERSTATE ROAD CORPORATION et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RARICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court: This condemnation action presents a question of law on which our appellate court is divided: May a condemning authority\u2019s good faith in negotiating with a property owner be challenged in an interlocutory appeal brought pursuant to section 7 \u2014 104(b) of the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 104(b) (West 2000))?\nThe Fifth District of the appellate court was the first to consider the question. It answered in the negative, holding that whether a condemning authority has negotiated in good faith is not among the issues that can be raised in an interlocutory appeal under the statute. See Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill. App. 3d 542 (1999), aff\u2019d, 199 Ill. 2d 225 (2002). Although our court affirmed the Fifth District\u2019s judgment, we did so without addressing the question now at issue. The question was subsequently considered by the Second District of the appellate court in the case before us today. It rejected the Fifth District\u2019s view and concluded that the issue of good faith can be considered on interlocutory review pursuant to section 7 \u2014 104(b). 333 Ill. App. 3d 821. The Third District of the appellate court is in agreement with the Second District\u2019s view. See Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. Hunziker, 342 Ill. App. 3d 588 (2003).\nWe granted the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) leave to appeal from the Second District\u2019s judgment to resolve the conflict. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We also allowed the Forest Preserve District of Du Page County to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of IDOT. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the circuit court.\nThe pertinent facts are these. In May of 2001, IDOT filed a petition in the circuit court of Du Page County to acquire, through eminent domain, certain property owned by 151 Interstate Road Corporation (Interstate Road). The action was brought pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)). The subject property was located in the City of Addison and was needed by IDOT for a project to improve and repair a public highway known as U.S. Route 20. Five parcels were involved. In two of the parcels, IDOT sought to obtain a fee simple interest. In the remaining three, IDOT requested only a temporary easement.\nIDOT filed a similar eminent domain action against Jane A. Green in her capacity as trustee of two revocable trusts which owned additional parcels of land near Interstate Road\u2019s property. IDOT sought to acquire the trusts\u2019 property for the same highway project involved in the Interstate Road matter. Jane Green\u2019s family controls Interstate Road, and the two proceedings were consolidated by the circuit court on IDOT\u2019s motion. For purposes of this opinion, Interstate Road and Green will be referred to collectively as \u201cthe Owners.\u201d\nThe Owners filed a traverse and motion to dismiss in each proceeding asking the circuit court to dismiss IDOT\u2019s petitions and to award them their costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees. As grounds for their motions, the Owners alleged that IDOT\u2019s petitions were fatally defective because they failed to plead compliance with section 7 \u2014 102.1 of the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 102.1 (West 2000)), which requires the state and its agencies to take certain action before initiating eminent domain proceedings in the circuit court. The Owners further alleged that IDOT\u2019s petitions should be dismissed because IDOT had not complied with the substantive provisions of section 7 \u2014 102.1 and had not made a bona fide attempt to reach a negotiated agreement with them with respect to the compensation and damages to be paid for the subject property.\nA two-day hearing on the foregoing motions was held in July of 2001. At the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court denied the Owners\u2019 motions to dismiss and scheduled a hearing on a motion by IDOT for immediate vesting of title. See 735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 103 (West 2000). After hearing evidence and the arguments of counsel regarding that motion, the court made a determination pursuant to section 7 \u2014 104(b) of the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 104(b) (West 2000)) that IDOT had authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, that the property sought to be taken is subject to the exercise of such right and that such right was not being improperly exercised in this proceeding. The court\u2019s order, filed in August of 2001, then granted IDOT\u2019s motion for immediate vesting of title and made a preliminary finding regarding the amount constituting just compensation.\nThe Owners were dissatisfied with the circuit court\u2019s ruling and filed an immediate appeal under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(7), which authorizes interlocutory appeals as of right from orders \u201cdetermining issues raised in proceedings to exercise the right of eminent domain under section 7 \u2014 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 104].\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(7). As grounds for their appeal, the Owners argued that the circuit court erred in determining that IDOT\u2019s right of eminent domain was not being improperly exercised in this case. According to the Owners, IDOT exercised its right of eminent domain improperly because it failed to make a good-faith attempt to negotiate with them before filing suit and did not comply with the prelitigation notice requirements set forth in section 7 \u2014 102.1(d) of the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 102.1(d) (West 2000)). As an alternative basis for challenging the circuit court\u2019s order, the Owners argued that IDOT\u2019s petitions were defective because they should have alleged that IDOT had complied with section 7 \u2014 102.1(d)\u2019s notice requirements, but did not.\nThe appellate court rejected the Owners\u2019 challenge to the adequacy of IDOT\u2019s petitions. It held that neither the terms of the Eminent Domain Act nor the applicable case law requires a condemnor to plead compliance with section 7 \u2014 102.1(d)\u2019s notice requirements. It further held that the Owners had suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged defects in the pleadings and that to allow them to challenge the sufficiency of the petitions would violate \u201cthe spirit of the waiver rule.\u201d 333 Ill. App. 3d at 839.\nAlthough the appellate court did not believe IDOT\u2019s petitions should have been dismissed on the pleadings, it found the Owners\u2019 substantive claims to be meritorious. Specifically, it held that the circuit court\u2019s determination that IDOT had negotiated in good faith before filing suit was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. It also held that IDOT had failed to properly comply with section 7 \u2014 102.1(d)\u2019s prelitigation notice requirements. Accordingly, it reversed the circuit court\u2019s order denying the Owners\u2019 traverse and motion to dismiss. It also remanded with directions to vacate the subsequent orders fixing preliminary just compensation and vesting title in IDOT and to address the Owners\u2019 claim for an award of their attorney fees and costs.\nIDOT petitioned for rehearing. The appellate court denied that petition in a lengthy supplemental opinion, which reaffirmed the court\u2019s construction and application of the relevant statutory provisions. This appeal by IDOT followed.\nAs grounds for its appeal, IDOT contends that the issue of whether it had negotiated with the Owners in good faith was a matter that the Owners should not have been permitted to raise in an interlocutory appeal. Whether a condemning authority\u2019s good faith in negotiating with a property owner may be challenged in an interlocutory appeal is a question over which our appellate court is divided. The appellate court in the case before us held that a condemning authority\u2019s good faith may be challenged in an interlocutory appeal. Its view is shared by the Third District. See Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. Hunziker, 342 Ill. App. 3d 588 (2003). The Fifth District has taken a contrary view. See Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill. App. 3d 542 (1999), aff\u2019d, 199 Ill. 2d 225 (2002). Because this question is jurisdictional in nature, we shall consider it first.\nArticle VI, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 6) provides that final judgments may be appealed as a matter of right from the circuit court to the appellate court. There is no corresponding constitutional right to appeal from interlocutory orders of the circuit court. Rather, article VI, section 6, vests this court with the authority to provide for such appeals, by rule, as it sees fit. Except as specifically provided by our rules, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to review judgments, orders or decrees that are not final. Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Center, 162 Ill. 2d 205, 210 (1994).\nThere is no dispute that the appeal in this case does not involve a final judgment. It is being taken from an interlocutory order. The supreme court rule on which it is predicated is Rule 307(a)(7), which authorizes interlocutory appeals as of right from orders \u201cdetermining issues raised in proceedings to exercise the right of eminent domain under section 7 \u2014 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 104].\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(7).\nSection 7 \u2014 104 of the Eminent Domain Act sets forth certain of the procedures to be followed in \u201cquick take\u201d condemnation proceedings. \u201cQuick take\u201d proceedings provide a means to prevent delays to public projects that could result pending the final determination of just compensation, while at the same time protecting the rights of the landowner. Under the \u201cquick take\u201d provisions of the Eminent Domain Act, a condemnor files a motion for title and/or possession and the court enters a preliminary finding concerning the amount of just compensation. Title or the right to possession then vests with condemnor by order of the court upon payment of this preliminary amount. Upon a final determination of just compensation by a jury, any excess payment is returned by the landowner. Any shortfall is satisfied by the condemnor. Forest Preserve District v. West Suburban Bank, 161 Ill. 2d 448, 454 (1994).\nBefore the court may enter a preliminary finding concerning the amount of just compensation in a \u201cquick take\u201d proceeding, section 7 \u2014 104(b) of the Eminent Domain Act requires the court to first hear and determine: (1) that the plaintiff has authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, (2) that the property sought to be taken is subject to the exercise of such right, and (3) that such right is not being improperly exercised in the particular proceeding. 735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 104(b) (West 2000). Section 7 \u2014 104(b) provides that the court\u2019s order on these matters is appealable. Because section 7 \u2014 104(b)\u2019s provisions are expressly incorporated into our Rule 307(a)(7), the court\u2019s order is immediately appealable to the appellate court even though it is interlocutory in nature.\nInterlocutory appeals under Rule 307(a)(7) are limited to the three issues delineated in section 7 \u2014 104(b). See Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. Vollman, 235 Ill. App. 3d 32, 36-37 (1992). All other issues must await appeal until the conclusion of the eminent domain proceedings. See Vollman, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 37-38. Whether a particular aspect of an eminent domain proceeding can be challenged on interlocutory review therefore depends on whether it falls within one of the three categories of issues set forth in section 7 \u2014 104(b).\nThe particular matter challenged by the Owners in this appeal is whether IDOT engaged in good-faith negotiations prior to commencing condemnation proceedings. The Owners contend that the circuit court\u2019s ruling on that question is subject to interlocutory review under section 7 \u2014 104(b) because IDOT\u2019s good faith, or lack thereof, bears on the third of the three issues addressed by that statute, namely, whether the right of eminent domain is \u201cbeing improperly exercised in the particular proceeding.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 104(b) (West 2000).\nThe Eminent Domain Act does not specifically require a condemnor to undertake good-faith negotiations with a landowner before filing a condemnation action. Our appellate court has inferred from provisions of the Act, however, that a good-faith attempt by the condemnor to reach an agreement regarding the amount of compensation to be paid is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of condemnation. See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. DiBenedetto, 275 Ill. App. 3d 400, 409 (1995); Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. Brownfield, 221 Ill. App. 3d 565, 567 (1991); Department of Transportation v. Walker, 80 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1040 (1980). The appellate court in this case viewed that condition precedent as encompassing an obligation by the condemning authority to undertake good-faith negotiations with the landowner before proceeding to court. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 834, 841. That aspect of the appellate court\u2019s analysis has not been challenged, and we believe that it is sound. We therefore agree that the Eminent Domain Act requires the condemnor to negotiate with the landowner in good faith over the amount of compensation to be paid before it initiates proceedings to take the landowner\u2019s property through eminent domain.\nBecause good-faith negotiations with the landowner are a condition precedent to condemnation proceedings under the Eminent Domain Act, the question of whether a condemnor has negotiated in good faith bears directly on whether the condemnor was exercising its right of eminent domain improperly. Absent good-faith negotiations regarding the amount of compensation a landowner should receive, any attempt to exercise the right to eminent domain would not comply with the Eminent Domain Act and would be fatally defective. We therefore agree within the appellate court in this case that the question of IDOT\u2019s good faith fell within the provisions of section 7 \u2014 104(b) of the Act and could be challenged by the Owners on interlocutory review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(7).\nAs we noted at the outset of this opinion, the Fifth District adopted a contrary interpretation of the law in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 304 Ill. App. 3d 542 (1999), aff\u2019d, 199 Ill. 2d 225 (2002). A review of that decision discloses that it did not address the foregoing matters. In fact, it offered no analysis in support of its position. It merely made a general reference to Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. Vollman, 235 Ill. App. 3d 32 (1992). Vollman, however, is distinguishable. The good faith of the condemnor was not at issue. The only challenge in Vollman was to the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Eminent Domain Act, a matter plainly outside the ambit of section 7 \u2014 104(b). We therefore find the Fifth District\u2019s approach unpersuasive.\nAlthough our court affirmed the appellate court\u2019s judgment in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., we had no occasion to consider whether a condemnor\u2019s good faith could be raised in an interlocutory appeal. Disposition of the appeal turned on the separate and unrelated question of \u201cwhether eminent domain powers authorized by the State of Illinois were improperly exercised in the taking of private property from one private entity for the benefit and use of another private entity.\u201d Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, 199 Ill. 2d at 235. As a result, there is no inconsistency between our holding today and our resolution of that case.\nOur conclusion that a condemnor\u2019s good faith in negotiating compensation is a matter that can be raised in an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(7) fully resolves the conflict which gave rise to our decision to allow an appeal from the appellate court\u2019s judgment in this case. It does not fully resolve IDOT\u2019s complaints about the appellate court\u2019s decision to reverse the circuit court\u2019s order denying the Owners\u2019 traverse and motion to dismiss and remanding with directions to vacate the orders which fixed prehminary just compensation and vested title in IDOT.\nIn addition to raising its jurisdictional challenge, IDOT also contends that the appellate court erred in holding that its prelitigation notice was deficient. It further argues that the appellate court was wrong to set aside the circuit court\u2019s determination that IDOT had acted in good faith throughout the negotiations leading up to the initiation of condemnation proceedings. Finally, it asserts that the appellate court misapplied waiver rules when considering and denying its petition for rehearing.\nWe turn first to the question of notice. Section 7 \u2014 102.1(d) of the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7\u2014 102.1(d) (West 2000)) requires state agencies such as IDOT to send a letter to the property owner by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least 60 days before filing a petition in court to initiate condemnation proceedings stating the amount of compensation for the taking of the property and the basis on which the amount of compensation was computed. The letter must also state the agency\u2019s intention to continue to seek a negotiated agreement with the property owner and advise the owner that in the absence of a negotiated agreement, the agency intends to initiate a court proceeding under the Act. Under the terms of the statute, these notice provisions are mandatory.\nIn the case before us, IDOT sent certified letters to the respective owners of the two sets of parcels it wished to acquire. The first, dated December 29, 2000, went to the trustee of the revocable trusts that owned one of the sets of parcels. The second, dated January 9, 2001, went to Interstate Road, which owned the second set of parcels. There is no dispute that the letters conformed to the substantive provisions of the statute. There is likewise no dispute that each letter was sent more than 60 days before IDOT initiated condemnation proceedings in court on May 21, 2001.\nThe problem regarding notice, according to the Owners, is that after sending its original letters, IDOT revised its offer regarding the property held by Interstate Road. By letter dated March 26, 2001, IDOT advised the owners that it was amending its offer by reducing the amount of land in which it sought to acquire a fee simple interest and lowering the amount of compensation for the property by $7,000. The $7,000 reduction was not based solely on the smaller amount of acreage involved. It also reflected a decrease of approximately 4.45% in the rate IDOT was willing to pay per acre.\nThe Owners contend that the reduction in the amount of land to be taken and the price to be paid transformed this into an entirely new offer. In their view, section 7 \u2014 102.1(d) therefore obligated IDOT to wait an additional 60 days before initiating condemnation proceedings. That was not done. As noted earlier in this disposition, eminent domain proceedings were initiated on May 21. The additional 60-day period did not expire until four days later.\nThe appellate court correctly observed that the Owners\u2019 objections to IDOT\u2019s notice were relevant only to the eminent domain proceedings involving the property owned by Interstate Road. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 838. The March 26 offer did not affect the property held by the revocable trusts, and IDOT fully complied with the time requirements imposed by section 7 \u2014 102.1(d) before it instituted court proceedings with respect to the trusts\u2019 property.\nWith respect to Interstate Road\u2019s property, the appellate court was persuaded by the Owners\u2019 argument. Especially significant in the appellate court\u2019s view was that IDOT had decided to reduce the compensation it was willing to pay per acre after submitting its initial offer. The court stated that it might have reached a different conclusion had IDOT merely reduced the amount of land it sought to acquire. Such a development could have worked to the Owners\u2019 benefit. Lowering the compensation rate did not. The appellate court believed that decreases in compensation or increases in the area to be acquired work to the disadvantage of property owners, and that when subsequent offers are prejudicial to property owners, a new 60-day period is warranted under the statute. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 845.\nIn ruling as it did on the notice issue, the appellate court was required to break new ground. There was no precedent directly on point to guide it. The court looked to the language of the statutory notice provision, adhering to the maxim that eminent domain statutes are strictly construed to protect the rights of property owners. See Forest Preserve District v. Estes, 222 Ill. App. 3d 167, 175 (1991). In its supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing, the court also considered the effects its construction of the law would have on the conduct of condemnation proceedings.\nThe appellate court\u2019s analysis is not binding on our court. The construction of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000). Having said that, we believe that the conclusion reached by the appellate court here was a sound one. The provisions of section 7 \u2014 102.1 of the Eminent Domain Act make clear that the statute was designed to facilitate a negotiated resolution of eminent domain proceedings whenever possible. Meaningful negotiation will only occur if property owners believe they will be no worse off at the end of the process than they were at the beginning. If the state is permitted to do what IDOT did here, namely, to make an offer at a certain price, but then reduce the rate it is willing to pay and proceed to court before an additional 60-day period has expired, property owners will have no such assurance. The prospect of diminishing payments will intimidate some property owners, making them feel pressured to accept the state\u2019s initial proposal and forgo further discussion for fear that they might end up receiving less and less the closer the state comes to the time when it can initiate court proceedings against them. It will alienate others, causing them to reject the state\u2019s offer at the outset and elect to take their chances in court. In either case, the likelihood of meaningful bargaining will be substantially impaired. That outcome is directly contrary to the result the General Assembly hoped to achieve when it enacted section 7 \u2014 102.1(d).\nThe construction placed on the statute by the appellate court helps to implement rather than frustrate the statute\u2019s purposes. Under the appellate court\u2019s approach, the state remains free to alter the terms of its offers if circumstances disclosed during the negotiation process so warrant. Should the state decide to make its offer less advantageous to the property owner, however, the statute\u2019s 60-day clock will be reset. Because judicial proceedings cannot be initiated until the new period expires, the state cannot use reductions or the threat of reductions to pressure landowners into accepting its terms. Freed from that possibility, landowners are far more likely to engage in meaningful discussions with the state.\nThe state resists application of these principles in the present case on the grounds that its revised offer may not actually have been less advantageous to Interstate Road. This contention is untenable. As we have noted, IDOT\u2019s revised offer dropped the price per acre it was willing to pay Interstate Road for its property by $19,277.77. The state has not cited to anything in the record that would justify such a reduction. It merely posits that the lower rate \u201cmay be explicable due to appraisal reasons.\u201d There are two problems with that rationale. First, it involves nothing more than speculation by the state\u2019s appellate counsel. If such \u201cappraisal reasons\u201d actually existed, they are not evident in any of the materials before us. Second, even if the price reduction was based on accepted appraisal principles, that is of no consequence. For purposes of determining whether a revised offer works to a property-owner\u2019s disadvantage, what matters is the effect the offer would have on the owner, not the explanation given by the state. Reasons do not change results. No matter how compelling the state\u2019s justification for changing its position may be, the fact remains that taking more property than originally sought or offering a lower price per acre than originally offered will still leave the property owner relatively worse off.\nIn light of this conclusion, we believe that the appellate court was correct in holding that IDOT\u2019s March 26 offer triggered an obligation by the department to provide Interstate Road with a new notice under section 7 \u2014 102.1(d) and that Interstate Road should have been given an additional 60 days to consider the new offer. Because that was not done, the circuit court erred in concluding that the right of eminent domain was not being improperly exercised in this particular case. The Owners\u2019 motion to dismiss the condemnation proceedings initiated by IDOT on May 21 with respect to Interstate Road\u2019s property should have been granted.\nWe next consider the question of IDOT\u2019s good faith during the negotiations leading up to its initiation of condemnation proceedings. IDOT argues that it acted properly throughout the negotiation process and that the appellate court was wrong to reject, as against the manifest weight of the evidence, the circuit court\u2019s determination that IDOT had acted in good faith. The appellate court\u2019s original and supplemental opinions devote substantial attention to this question. We note, however, that with respect to the proceedings involving Interstate Road\u2019s property, that discussion was unnecessary. Because the proceedings involving the property owned by Interstate Road were fatally flawed by the lack of proper notice under section 7 \u2014 102.1(d), IDOT\u2019s complaint was subject to dismissal in any case. The appellate court\u2019s conclusion that IDOT had not acted in good faith added nothing to the disposition. The result was unchanged. Whether or not IDOT had negotiated in good faith, the complaint could not stand.\nThe only aspect of this litigation where good faith remained relevant and should have been considered by the appellate court was with respect to the proceedings involving the trusts\u2019 property. Our discussion of the question shall therefore be limited to those proceedings.\nWhether a party has acted in good faith is generally a question of fact. As a result, a trial court\u2019s finding of good faith, or lack thereof, should not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Marriage of Barnard, 283 Ill. App. 3d 366, 370 (1996). A trial court\u2019s finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence unless an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. See Dynamic Recycling Services, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 210 Ill. App. 3d 602, 613 (1991). It will not suffice to show that the record will support a contrary decision; rather, if the record contains any evidence to support the trial court\u2019s judgment, the judgment should be affirmed. See McMahon v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 221 Ill. App. 3d 935, 949 (1991).\nWhen the foregoing standards are applied to IDOT\u2019s actions regarding the trusts\u2019 property, it is difficult to conclude that the circuit court\u2019s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The amount of real estate involved was extremely limited. IDOT sought to acquire a fee simple interest in only 0.007 of an acre, which is equivalent to approximately 305 square feet. The only other interest it wanted in the trusts\u2019 property was a temporary easement in 0.006 of an acre for grading. Based on an appraisal it commissioned on this property and the property owned by Interstate Road, IDOT offered the Owners of this property the sum of $8,000.\nIDOT sent a certified letter to the Owners of the trusts\u2019 property conveying its offer. As we observed earlier in this opinion, the letter complied with the requirements of section 7 \u2014 102.1(d) of the Eminent Domain Act. The letter was dated December 29, 2000, and included a statement of IDOT\u2019s intent to seek a negotiated agreement to avoid litigation. There was communication between the Owners of the trusts\u2019 property and IDOT during the ensuing months, and IDOT deferred proceeding to court even after the 60-day notice period expired at the end of February. When IDOT eventually received a counteroffer from the Owners, the amount it requested for the interests held by the trusts was $11,305, a difference of $3,305 over IDOT\u2019s original offer.\nIn arguing that IDOT did not exercise good faith, the Owners focus on the valuation it placed on the property. We note, however, that the valuation was based on a written appraisal from a certified appraiser with 15 years of experience. Although the value placed on the property by the appraiser was substantially lower that the value given by a different appraiser subsequently retained by the Owners, it was based on accepted methodology. Nothing in the record suggests that the appraiser deviated from professional standards. When the testimony from the appraisers is compared, it is evident that the difference in their appraisals resulted from differences in professional judgment regarding how relevant factors should be applied.\nThe Owners tout the superior expertise of their appraiser and disparage the credentials of the appraiser retained by IDOT. They point to certain weaknesses in the IDOT appraiser\u2019s analysis. They also emphasize that the appraiser hired by IDOT did substantial business with the department and arguably had an incentive to be conservative in his valuations. Such factors, however, were for the trial court to weigh when determining an appropriate amount to award the Owners when it entered its order fixing preliminary compensation. They did not render IDOT\u2019s appraisal inherently unreliable as a matter of law.\nThe trial court heard testimony from the appraisers and considered the relevant documentary evidence. It concluded that the valuation by the IDOT appraiser was, in fact, too low. Significantly, however, it also concluded that the amount demanded by the Owners for the trust property was too high. The amount it fixed as preliminary just compensation for that property was $9,940, slightly higher than the midpoint between the parties\u2019 respective positions.\nConsidering all of the foregoing circumstances, we find no basis for the appellate court\u2019s characterization of IDOT\u2019s appraisal as \u201cpatently inadequate\u201d and \u201ccompletely deficient.\u201d Nor do we believe that IDOT\u2019s reliance on the appraisal demonstrated a lack of good faith. Accordingly, the appellate court should not have reversed that portion of the circuit court\u2019s order denying the Owners\u2019 motion to dismiss the eminent domain proceedings against the property held by the trust.\nIn reaching this result, we note that the Owners are not without recourse. We are still at an early stage of the condemnation process. If the Owners believe strongly in the validity of their own appraisal and consider the court\u2019s preliminary award to be inadequate, the Eminent Domain Act affords them the opportunity to seek higher compensation. The amount of the prehminary award cannot be used as evidence in further proceedings to ascertain finally the just compensation to be paid (735 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 104(d) (West 2000)), and the Owners will be free to challenge the qualifications, procedures and conclusions of whatever valuation experts IDOT elects to use to support its position.\nAs a final matter, IDOT argues that the appellate court misapplied waiver rules when considering and denying its petition for rehearing. After reviewing the proceedings in the appellate court and in view of our resolution of this appeal, we do not believe that the manner in which waiver principles were applied by the appellate court resulted in any prejudice to IDOT. Further discussion of the matter would therefore serve no purpose.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the appellate court\u2019s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirm that portion of the appellate court\u2019s judgment which reversed the circuit court\u2019s order denying the Owners\u2019 motion to dismiss IDOT\u2019s complaint involving the property owned by Interstate Road. We reverse that portion of the appellate court\u2019s judgment which reversed the order of the circuit court denying the Owners\u2019 motion to dismiss IDOT\u2019s complaint involving the property held by the trusts. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nDuring the pendency of these proceedings, Edward H. Green, Jr., succeeded Jane Green as trustee of one of the trusts.\nWere section 7 \u2014 104(b)\u2019s provisions not incorporated into Rule 307(a)(7), they would run afoul of separation of powers principles. See In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 60 (2002) (attempts by the legislature to make nonfinal judgments appealable violate article VI, section 6, of our constitution), quoting Almgren, 162 Ill. 2d at 213.\nThe circuit court mistakenly believed that IDOT had merely made a pro rata reduction in its offer based on the reduced acreage it sought. The court claimed there was nothing in the record to show that IDOT had altered the price it was willing to pay per acre. Our examination of the evidence shows this to he incorrect. As we have discussed, IDOT sought to acquire interests in five parcels owned by Interstate Road. It wanted a fee simple interest in two of the parcels, identified as 4A and 4B, and temporary easements in the other three, identified as TE1, TE2, and TE3. The reduction concerned only parcels 4A and 4B.\nParcel 4A contained .026 acres. Parcel 4B contained .101 acres. The total area of 4A and 4B was .127 acres. The amount IDOT originally offered for that acreage was $55,000. That is equivalent to $433,070.87 per acre.\nThe revised offer also sought .026 acres in parcel 4A, but requested only .090 acres of parcel B. The total area sought in these two parcels was thus reduced to .116 acres. If IDOT were merely diminishing the area it was requesting and still adhering to the same rate of payment it originally offered ($433,070.87 per acre) as the circuit court believed, it would have offered $50,236.22 for the reduced area ($433,070.87/acre x .116 acres). The record shows, however, that the amount it offered was only $48,000. An offer of $48,000 for .116 acres is equivalent to only $413,793.10 per acre. The per acre price offered by IDOT thus declined by $19,277.77 ($433,070.87 minus $413,793.10), or 4.45% ($19,277.77 divided by $433,070.87), from IDOT\u2019s original offer.\nBecause the change in the state\u2019s offer pertained to the two properties in which it sought to acquire a fee simple and did not affect the amount it was willing to pay to acquire temporary easements in the other three parcels, the state argues, in the alternative, that we should leave undisturbed that portion of the condemnation proceedings related to the easements. This we decline to do. All five parcels are integrally related. Their valuations are interrelated. Their utility is intertwined. Unless the state succeeds in securing all of the parcels, its ability to utilize any of the parcels is in doubt. That is why the state bundled them together in this action. Accordingly, we see no justification for severing the proceedings against Interstate Road\u2019s property. All severance would accomplish at this point is to burden taxpayers with the cost of easements that IDOT cannot yet use.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RARICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Redmond, Steffanie N. Garrett and Michele E. Sibley Gonzales, of Holland & Knight, L.L.E, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Robert J. Pugliese, Hugh C. Griffin and Hugh S. Balsam, of Lord, Bissell & Brook, L.L.E, of Chicago, for appellees.", "Scott M. Day and Rachel K. Robert, of Day & Robert, EC., and Robert G. Black, all of Naperville, for amicus curiae Forest Preserve District of Du Page County." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 95042.\nTHE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ex rel. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 151 INTERSTATE ROAD CORPORATION et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed February 5, 2004.\nModified on denial of rehearing April 15, 2004.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Redmond, Steffanie N. Garrett and Michele E. Sibley Gonzales, of Holland & Knight, L.L.E, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRobert J. Pugliese, Hugh C. Griffin and Hugh S. Balsam, of Lord, Bissell & Brook, L.L.E, of Chicago, for appellees.\nScott M. Day and Rachel K. Robert, of Day & Robert, EC., and Robert G. Black, all of Naperville, for amicus curiae Forest Preserve District of Du Page County." }, "file_name": "0471-01", "first_page_order": 483, "last_page_order": 503 }