{ "id": 5461276, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DENNIS TOWNSELL, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Townsell", "decision_date": "2004-04-15", "docket_number": "No. 95725", "first_page": "543", "last_page": "550", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 543" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442053 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "158-59" }, { "page": "158-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810080 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58901 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599302 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "345-46" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801357 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "challenge to a trial court's statutory authority to impose a particular sentence not waived when a defendant fails to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256710 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29934 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72-73" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442053 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "Kilbride, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58901 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302-08", "parenthetical": "Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J" }, { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J." }, { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J." }, { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599302 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 599, "char_count": 12217, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4666684528972417e-07, "percentile": 0.65839089460428 }, "sha256": "87d00f0548aae8d884522018ed2dcbf8ffc17cb7511d861277823bfb08729b16", "simhash": "1:e3af671a742558d0", "word_count": 1996 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:28:21.003204+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DENNIS TOWNSELL, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue presented is whether an Apprendi claim that is waived pursuant to a guilty plea may nevertheless be considered on appeal under the plain error exception to the waiver rule. We hold that it may not.\nBACKGROUND\nIn exchange for the State seeking neither the death penalty nor a mandatory life sentence, defendant, Dennis Townsell, pleaded guilty to first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1)). A sentencing hearing was held, and the circuit court of Rock Island County imposed an extended-term sentence of 100 years in prison. The extended-term sentence was based on the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s offense was \u201caccompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2)).\nOn appeal, the appellate court reduced defendant\u2019s sentence to 60 years, finding that the imposition of an extended term violated the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). 336 Ill. App. 3d 340. In so ruling, the appellate court initially acknowledged that, under this court\u2019s decision in People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 302 (2002), defendant\u2019s guilty plea waived any Apprendi-based claims. 336 Ill. App. 3d at 343. The court then held, however, that an Apprendi violation is so significant as to constitute plain error, which is an exception to the waiver rule under Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Consequently, the appellate court reached the merits of defendant\u2019s Apprendi claim, vacated his extended-term sentence, and imposed a nonextended term of 60 years in prison. 336 Ill. App. 3d at 346.\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 177 IU. 2d R. 315(a).\nANALYSIS\nIt is well established that a voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 491 (1993). In People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286 (2002), this court was asked to decide whether the \u201cerrors or irregularities\u201d waived by a guilty plea include Apprendi-based sentencing claims. In answering this question, Jackson began by acknowledging that, under Apprendi, \u201c[e]very fact necessary to establish the range within which a defendant may be sentenced is an element of the crime and thus falls within the constitutional rights of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296. Nevertheless, by pleading guilty, \u201ca defendant waives exactly those rights.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296. Indeed, \u201c[a] knowing relinquishment of the right to a trial by jury is the sine qua non of a guilty plea.\u201d Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296. Jackson therefore concluded that \u201cApprendi-based sentencing claims cannot be heard on appeal from a guilty plea.\u201d Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296.\nIn rejecting Jackson\u2019s seemingly unequivocal holding, the appellate court expressed its discomfort with the fact that, under Jackson, a defendant can be deemed to have waived an Apprendi-based claim even though he entered his guilty plea long before Apprendi was decided. According to the appellate court:\n\u201cTownsell would prevail on his Apprendi claim if he had proceeded to trial rather than pleading guilty. He would prevail because extension of his sentence offended substantial constitutional rights. We cannot in good conscience reach a different result merely because he pled guilty. We realize that he relinquished the rights upon which Apprendi is based when he entered his plea. However, the dispositive nature of that relinquishment is questionable because the plea occurred long before Apprendi was decided. How can we say that Townsell really waived his right to a procedure that remained unprescribed for another decade?\u201d 336 Ill. App. 3d at 345-46.\nFor these reasons, the appellate court \u201copt[ed] to forgo the administrative convenience of a waiver\u201d and addressed defendant\u2019s Apprendi argument on the merits. 336 Ill. App. 3d at 346.\nThe fatal flaw in the appellate court\u2019s analysis rests in the assumption that the procedures outlined in Apprendi \u201cremained unprescribed\u201d until Apprendi was decided in 2000. Nothing could be further from the truth. In Jackson, this court clearly explained that:\n\u201cApprendi did not deal with novel constitutional rights. Rather, the Court was concerned with the applicability and reach of the well-established constitutional rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rights which a guilty plea is specifically designed to waive.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 302.\nSimilarly, in Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151 (2002), this court specifically rejected \u201cthe complaint that a defendant did not \u2018know\u2019 that he was waiving the right to have the State prove enhancing factors beyond a reasonable doubt, because by pleading guilty the defendant releases the State from proving anything beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Hill, 202 Ill. 2d at 154. Again, \u201c[a] knowing relinquishment of the right to a trial by jury is the sine qua non of a guilty plea.\u201d Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296. Accordingly, \u201cApprendibased sentencing objections cannot be heard on appeal from a guilty plea.\u201d Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296.\nIt is worth noting that, whatever the merits of its Apprendi analysis, the appellate court\u2019s invocation of Supreme Court Rule 615(a) is entirely out of place in this context. Rule 615(a) is concerned with waivers that result from failing to bring an error to the trial court\u2019s attention. Under that Rule, \u201c[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed [on appeal] although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In relation to a guilty plea, by contrast, \u201cwaiver\u201d refers to the \u201c \u2018voluntary relinquishment of a known right.\u2019 \u201d Hill, 202 Ill. 2d at 158-59. Thus, in Jackson and Hill, the defendants\u2019 Apprendi claims were deemed waived not because the defendants failed to bring those claims to the trial court\u2019s attention but because the defendants voluntarily relinquished all of the constitutional rights upon which those claims are based. Hill, 202 Ill. 2d at 158-59. Significantly, Rule 615(a) in no way speaks to waivers of the Jackson and Hill variety \u2014 i.e., voluntary relinquishments of known rights. As a result, the appellate court had no authority to \u201cforgo the administrative convenience of waiver\u201d and reach the merits of defendant\u2019s Apprendi claims, as \u201cadministrative convenience\u201d has absolutely nothing to do with the waiver at issue in this case.\nIn sum, we meant precisely what we said in Jackson-. \u201cApprendi-based sentencing objections cannot be heard on appeal from a guilty plea.\u201d Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296. Moreover,. Rule 615(a) does not speak to waivers that result from the voluntary relinquishment of known rights, as in the case of a guilty plea. For both of these reasons, the appellate court erred in using Rule 615(a)\u2019s plain error rule as a means of reaching defendant\u2019s Apprendi-based sentencing claims.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\ndissenting:\nI cannot join the majority opinion for two reasons. First, as stated by the appellate court, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder, charged solely under section 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1), now codified as 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 2000)). Neither \u201cbrutal or heinous\u201d behavior under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2)) nor any other aggravating factor was alleged in the charging instrument or submitted to and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, defendant was only eligible for a 60-year term of imprisonment. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a). I agree with the appellate court that section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) \u201cessentially create[d] a new offense (brutal or heinous first degree murder) that [was] separate from, and more severe than, ordinary first degree murder.\u201d 336 Ill. App. 3d at 346. But, defendant was not charged with \u201cbrutal and heinous\u201d first degree murder. He was charged with simple first degree murder and he pleaded guilty only to that specific offense. In affirming defendant\u2019s extended-term sentence, the majority inexplicably sanctions the imposition of a penalty for an uncharged offense that was more severe than the offense that was actually charged. See Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 163 (2002) (Kilbride, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing).\nSecond, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000), \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi applies retroactively to all cases that were still pending on direct review, as this one was, when the decision was issued. People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 72-73 (2001). Therefore, for the reasons expressed in Chief Justice Harrison\u2019s dissent in People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 302-08 (2002) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J), the majority\u2019s assertion that defendant waived his right to challenge the extended-term portion of his sentence by pleading guilty is also flawed. In Illinois, a statute held unconstitutional is considered void ab initio. People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399 (1990). It is as if the law never existed. Accordingly, there was no statutory authority for the extended-term portion of defendant\u2019s sentence. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 304 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J.). That portion of his sentence is therefore void (Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 304 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J.)) and may be corrected at any time. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).\nMore specifically, to hold that a sentence is void because it is not authorized by statute under the facts of a case is no different, analytically, from holding that a sentence is void because it is unconstitutional as applied. In the former situation, we allow a defendant to challenge his sentence. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331, 333 (1997) (challenge to a trial court\u2019s statutory authority to impose a particular sentence not waived when a defendant fails to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment). Justice, not to mention a consistent body of precedent, dictates the same outcome in the situation at hand, where the sentence is invalid because it is unconstitutional as applied. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 306 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J.). Accordingly, despite the majority\u2019s conclusion in Jackson, defendant\u2019s plea of guilty should not have resulted in a waiver of his right to have his sentence vacated based on Apprendi.\nUnder these circumstances and for the foregoing reasons, I would hold that defendant\u2019s challenge to his extended-term sentence was not barred by his decision to plead guilty. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court, vacating the extended-term portion of defendant\u2019s sentence and modifying his sentence to 60 years. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Mary Beth Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 95725.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DENNIS TOWNSELL, Appellee.\nOpinion filed April 15, 2004.\nKILBRIDE, J., dissenting.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Mary Beth Burns, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert J. Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0543-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 562 }